

THE ĀGAMAŚĀSTRĀ OF GAUDAPĀDA

EDITED, TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED

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TO
THE REVERED MEMORY
OF
GURUDEVA
RABINDRANATH TAGORE

bhedo yasya na vastuto'stī bhuvane prāci pratīcīti vā
mitratvaṃ prakāṣikṣitaṃ ca satataṃ yenātmanah karmanā |
viśvaṃ yasya padam prasiddham anīṣaṃ sātṃ e ca yasya sthītur
bhūyāt tasya jayo raver anudinam tenāstu tīptam jagat ||

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PREFACE

Introductory

It was in July, 1919, that, in order to prepare some lectures for my pupils in the Visvabharati, Santiniketan, I had to read the Upaniṣads anew; and in doing so when I, now with a little acquaintance with Buddhism, began to study the *Āgamaśāstra* of Gaṇḍa-pāda, popularly known as the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, I was struck with its contents which were known to me before this quite in a different light. I found there something new. In 1922, in the Second All-India Oriental Conference held in this University, which was presided over by my esteemed friend, Prof. Sylvain Lévi, then the first Visiting Professor of the Visvabharati, I read a paper on the subject, in which I said that a book under the title of *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, embodying the result of my studies in it, would shortly be ready for the press. But, unfortunately, it could not be done earlier than now. However, I wrote some stray articles in English and Bengali on the subject. While they arrested the attention of certain scholars trained on modern lines, they gave rise to adverse criticism mainly from the orthodox section of my friends strictly following the indigenous interpretation of the Upaniṣad, given by Śaṅkara, the commentator of the present work.

Not being satisfied with the interpretation offered by Ś a ṇ k a r a and his followers, or some other teachers I have attempted in the following pages to present to the readers my own interpretation of the work as I have understood. But in no way do I claim that my interpretation is *the* interpretation, i.e., the interpretation intended by G a u d a p ā d a himself. G a u d a p ā d a has not appeared to me and said that mine is the true interpretation, nor has God told me anything to the effect, nor am I an omniscient being. It is quite natural and well-known to all that the same thing sometimes appears differently to different persons owing to a variety of circumstances. It would be sheer foolishness on my part, I am perfectly conscious, if I pretend to claim by writing the following pages any superiority to the 'commentator, whether he is or is not identical with the great author of the commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, who is known by the same name, Ś a ṇ k a r a. I have simply put down my views here and I request my readers only to see if the text can be explained also in the way I have followed here.

I may say here in the following words of Yaśomitra (AKV', p. 2).

yuktā ced grāhyeyam na ced ato 'nyathā vidhātavyā |
na hi viśame'rthe śkhalitum na sambhaven madrām buddhiḥ |

On points related to Buddhism, which are frequently raised in the course of my explanation, I have in many cases quoted in support of my views more passages than one, though a single passage could serve the

purpose, having meant them specially for those of my readers who are not adequately acquainted with Buddhist thoughts or have no easy access to Buddhist works.

In the present volume I have given a new edition of the text of the *Āgamaśāstra* based on a number of MSS and different editions as described below, followed by an English translation. After this comes my annotation.

At the end there are Appendixes including the text and English translation of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, Variants of the MSS used for the edition of the text of the *Āgamaśāstra*, and different Indexes as the Contents will show.

Manuscripts

Let us give here a description of the MSS. referred to above :

1. A¹. Adyar Library. No. IX. G. 52. It is in folios 20-28 of the codex. Written in Devanāgarī on paper in black ink, punctuated with red marks, and bounded on either side by double lines. Size 12.3" × 4.8". Eleven lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe. In this MS we have the MāU and the GK.

2. A². Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 99. Fols. 30-39 of this codex contain the MāU and GK. Size 10" × 6". Number of lines on each page 12 or 13. Written neatly in Devanāgarī on paper, punctuated and bounded on each side by a double line. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

3. A⁸. Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 130. Fols. 38-53 of this codex, too, contain MāU together with the GK. Written in modern Devanāgarī on paper, bounded on each side by a triple line. Size 10 1" × 5". There are 8 or 9 lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

4. A⁴. Adyar Library. No. IX. B. 181. It is written on hand-made paper in Śāradā script. There are 30 folios. Size 9" × 6". Each page has 18-25 lines. The borders of the MS are completely worn out, and last 12 folios are torn and destroyed in the middle. It is written in black ink, but the numbers of the folios are given in English figures in red ink. No date is to be found, but from the worn out condition of the codex it seems to be not less than two hundred years old. The name of the scribe is also not given.

This codex contains different Upanisads, 19 in all, the *Vedāntasāra* (*Saivadarśana*), and the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, III. 10. 9-11. Here we have also the MāU and only the first *prakaraṇa* of GK.

5. B¹. Bhandarkār Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 272 of 1879-80. It is written on paper in Devanāgarī. Size 10.5" × 4.7". Originally it had 67 fols., but the first 15 fols are missing, and so we have now only 52 fols. Each page contains 10 to 14 lines. It is dated as 1765 (*bhāṇa-āṅga-aśva-avani*), but it is not known whether it is Samvat or Śaka era.

This MS contains only the last three Books of the GK beginning with the first *kārikā* of Book II.

6. B². Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 778 of 1891-96. It is written on paper in Devanāgarī. Fols. 45. Size 9" × 5". Like the preceding one it, too, has only the last three Books of GK together with Śaṅkara's commentary.

The kārikās, specially those in the last Book are numbered very carelessly; thus the last kārikā of the last Book is numbered as 93 instead of 100. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

7. D¹. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly in Devanāgarī on paper. Size 11.4" × 6". There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. It contains MāU and the GK together with the commentary of Śaṅkara on both of them. Originally there were 42 fols., but fols. 18, 19, 30-35 containing kārikās 10-53 of the fourth *prākaraṇa* are missing. In three or four cases some letters are lost, the paper being torn or damaged. In this MS *b* is written for both *b* and *v*.

8. D². Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly on paper measuring 11.2" × 5.6" and bounded on both sides by thick lines. There are 69 fols. It contains the MāU and the GK with Śaṅkara's commentary on both of them. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

9. D³. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Fols. 2-35. Size 12.2" × 5.5". Written neatly on paper in Devanāgarī. It contains the first 7 passages of the MāU, first 14 kārikās of the first *prākaraṇa* of the GK and parts of Śaṅkara's commentary with Ānandagiri's *ṭīkā*.

10. 10. India office. No. 2783. In this codex there are three MSS, viz., (1) *Prapañcasāravivaraṇa*, (2) *Laghukāumudī*, and (3) *MāU* together with the GK only up to the Book I. The ślokas of *maṅgalācaraṇa* of Śaṅkara's commentary are given with GK. The script is Devanāgarī. No date, but it seems to be old. Almost correct.

11. K¹. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 290 (Cover No. 9). Written in Bengali character on paper. Size 9.2" × 4.2". Fols. 24. Lines in each page 7. There is no date, yet it appears to be very modern. Writer's name is not given. There are mistakes and omissions. The MS contains both *MāU* and GK.

12. K². Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 163. This is a part of a bigger MS of which we have only 24 fols. (29-52). Size 12" × 5". Each page has 9 lines. There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. This MS contains only the third Book of the GK with Śaṅkara's commentary. It is not quite correct. Some of the kārīkās are here misplaced.

13. K³. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 13 (Cover No. 4). Size 14.3" × 6.2". Script Devanāgarī. Fols. 10. Average number of lines in each page 13. Saṃvat 1907. Written at Vṛndāvana. The scribe is not mentioned.

It contains the original text of the *MāU* together with the commentary called *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadārthaprakāśa*. Though the name of its author is not mentioned here he is no other than Kūranārāyana, a follower of

the Rāmaṇuja school. This commentary is published in the Anandashram Series, No. 62.

14. K^a. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 304 (Cover No. 9). It is the first 12 fols. of a bigger codex. Size 10.3" × 5.4". Number of lines in each page 8. Written on paper in Bengali script. It extends up to the kārīkā 12 of Book I together with Śaṅkara's commentary. No date. Appearance modern. No name of the scribe.

15. PU¹. The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 948. Script Devanāgarī. Fols 9. Size 12" × 6". Lines on each page 13-18. Date about 1850 V.S., as says one Bhojla, a manuscript dealer and book-seller from whom it seems to have been secured.

It contains MāU up to prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām. atraite ślokā bhavanti, and the GK of Book I.

16. PU². The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 746. Script Devanāgarī. Fols. 142. Size 14" × 7". Number of lines on each page varies from 13 to 18. No date, but said to be of about 1850 V.S. Obtained at Amritsar, and said to be of Kashmir recension. It contains the MāU and the GK together with the commentary of Śaṅkara followed by Ānandagiri's ṭīkā.

17. V². Visvabharati. No. 1317. It is written in Grantha character on palm-leaf. Fols. 58. Size 15.7" × 1.3". Lines 7-8 on each page. It contains the following works: (1) Śrīmad Bhagavadgītā (fols 1-29), (2) Īśopaniṣad (fols. 30^a), (3) Kenopaniṣad (fols. 30^b-32^a), (4) Kathopaniṣad (fols. 32^b-37^a), (5) Praśnopaniṣad

(fols. 37^r-41^r), (6) *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (fols. 41^r-44^r), (7) *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 'with GK (fols. 44^r-52^r), and (8) *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (fols. 52^r-58). This MS seems to be about 150 years old, but there is no date nor the name of the scribe.

18. V^a. Visvabharati. No. 1632. Written on palm-leaf in Devanāgarī. Fols. 13. Size 11.5"×4". Lines on each page 7-8. The scribe was one Vāsudeva Bhide, the son of one Nārāyaṇa. It was written at Śrīpañcavaṭī in the presence of (god) Śrīrāmā on the 7th day of the black fortnight of the month of Caitra in the Śaka era 1733 (*Prajāpati samvatsara*)=1811 A.D. It contains the MāU with the GK beginning with the benedictory Vedic śloka, bhadram karṇebhiḥ^o (RV, I. 89. 8), and svasti na indra^o (RV, I. 89. 6) to which are added the first two śloka, viz., prajñānāmśu^o and yo viśvātmā^o of Śaṅkara with which he is said to have begun his commentary on the MāU.

As regards the relationship of the MSS described above it may briefly be observed that A¹ and A² are from the same family and have close connexion with A³, IO, PU¹ and PU². B¹ and B² are closely related and so are D¹ and D². V² and V³ agree in many cases with A¹, A², D¹ and D².

Among the MSS mentioned above A¹ and A² are the worst giving very wrong readings. Yet, at least in one case (IV 56^a) A¹ with IO gives the right reading. See Introduction, § 5. The Readings of the Text

In addition to the MSS described above the readings collected from the thirteen MSS, utilized for the preparation of the second edition of the *MāU* and *GK* together with Śaṅkara's commentary and Ānanda-giri's sub-commentary in the Anandashram Series, No. 10, have also been consulted. The MSS collected for that edition are mentioned here, where necessary, according to the abbreviations used there, viz., K, Kh, G, Gh, etc. Besides, such editions as of *Mahēśa-candra Pāla*, Calcutta, 1806 Śaka era; of *MM. Durgācaraṇa Sāṅkhyā-Vedānta-tīrtha*, Calcutta, 1331 Bengali era; and of *Gita Press*, Gorakhpur, 1993 V.S., have been consulted.

The most important readings are discussed in their respective places in the main work, while variants will be found in the Appendix II, pp. 229 ff. See Introduction, § 4.

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I am deeply indebted to the authorities of the following Institutions, who have kindly given me on loan the MSS described above : Adyar Library, Madras; Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona; Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore; Government Sanskrit College, Benares; India Office, London; Panjab University Library, Lahore; and Visvabharati Library, Santiniketan.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- Ā Ānandagiri.
 AAA Abhisamayālaṅkāraloka (Prajñāpāramitā,
 Vol. I), Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No.
 LXVII.
 AAS Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha with Vibhāvanī
 tīkā, ed. Fernando and Silva,
 Colombo, 1893.
 AK L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu
 traduit et annoté par Louis de la
 Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1923-31.
 AKB Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Tibetan Text), BB.
 AKV¹ Abhidharmakośavyākhyā of Yaśomitra,
 Fasc. I-II, BB.
 AKV² Abhidharmakośavyākhyā of Yaśomitra,
 ed U. Wogihara, Tokio, 1932-1936.
 AmK Amarakośa.
 AN Aṅguttara Nikāya, PTS.
 AO Acta Orientalia.
 AP Abhidhānappadīpikā, Colombo, 1900.
 ĀŚ Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda.
 AS Atthasālinī, PTS.
 ĀS Ācārāṅga Sūtra, PTS.
 ASP Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, Bl.
 ASU Aṣṭottaraśatopaniṣad, ed. W. Laxman
 Shastri Pansikar, Nirṇaya-
 sagar, 1917.

- AU *Ātmopaniṣad.*
 AV *Atharvaveda.*
 BA *Bodhicaryāvatāra, Bl.*
 BAP *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, Bl.*
 BB *Bibliotheca Buddhica.*
 Bbh *Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1930. See BSB.*
 BBU *Brahmabindu Upaniṣad.*
 BBV *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārttikā, Anandashram, 1892-94.*
 BCK *Buddhacarita Kāvya, ed. Johnston, 1936.*
 BG *Bhagavadgītā.*
 BI *Bibliotheca Indica.*
 BJS *Brahmajāla Sutta in DN, PTO.*
 BP *Bhagavata Purāṇa.*
 BS *Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyana.*
 BSB *Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1930. See Bbh.*
 BU *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.*
 ChU *Chāndogya Upaniṣad.*
 CN *Chullaniddesa, PTS.*
 CŚ *Catuhśataka, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts, ed. Vidhusheklara Bhattacharya, Visvabharati, Part II, 1931.*
 CŚ' *Catuhśatikā, ed. Haraprasad Shastri in the Memories of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. III, No. 8, pp. 449-514.*
 CVP *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa, ed. Prabhubhai Patel, Visvabharati (not yet published). See JASB, 1898.*

- DA Divyāvadāna, ed. Cowell and Neil, Cambridge, 1886. ✓
- DaV Der alter Vedānta von Max Walleser, Heidelberg, 1911.
- DB Daśabhūmikasūtra, ed. Rahder, Paris, 1926.
- D^a The edition of the MāU by Durgācaraṇa. Sāṅkhya-Vedānta-tīrtha, Calcutta, 1331, Bengali Era.
- DN Dīgha Nikāya, PTS.
- DP Dhammapada.
- DPA Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā, PTS.
- DPP Doctrine of Prajñāpāramita, by E. Obermiller, Acta Orientalia, Vol. IX.
- DS Dharmasaṃgraha, ed. Kaswara, Max Muller, and Wenzel, 'Anecdota Oxoniensia, Aryan Series, Oxford, 1885.
- DSn Dhammasaṃgani, PTS.
- DV Daśavaikālika Sūtra, Devchand Lalbhai Pustakoddhārasamiti, No. 47.
- ERE Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, ed Hastings.
- Ex Expositor, PTS (Translation Series).
- G^a The edition of the MāU from the Gītā Press, Gorakhpur, 1893.
- GK Gaṇḍapāḍakārikā.
- GM Gaṇaratnamahodadhī, ed. Bhīmasena Śarmān, Prayāga (Allahabad), 1894.
- HU Hitopadeśa, ed. P. Peterson, Bombay, 1887.
- HV Harivaṃśa.
- IU Isā Upaniṣad.

- JM Jagadgururatnamālāstava of Sadāśiva-
brahmendra with the com. of
Ātmabodhendra Sarasvatī
included in *Vedāntapañcaprakaraṇi*, Śrīvidyā
Press, Kumbhakonam.
- JS Jñānasārasamuccaya (Yes.śes.sññ.po.kun.las-
btus.pa), now only in Tibetan. Cordier, III.
p. 298.
- JU Jābāla Upaniṣad.
- KIU Kaivalya Upaniṣad.
- KN Kūranārāyaṇa.
- KnU Kena Upaniṣad.
- KP Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. Baron A. Von
Staël-Holstein, Sanghai, 1926.
- KtU Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad.
- KU Katha Upaniṣad.
- KV Kathāvatthu, PTS.
- LA Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ed. Bunyiu Nanjio,
Kyto, 1923.
- LC Laghucandrikā, Śrīvidyā Press, Kumbha-
konam, 1893.
- LV Lalitavistara, ed. Lefmann, Halle, 1902
and 1908.
- MA Madhyamakāvatāra (Tibetan Text), BB, IX.
French translation by Poussin, *Le
Muséon*, 1907.
- MAc Madhvācārya.
- MAK Madhyamakālaṅkāraśālikā of Śānti-
rakṣita, Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Sa,
53a¹-56b³.

MāU	Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.
MB	Mahābhārata, The South Indian Text, ed T. R. Krishnamacharya and T. R. Vyasacharya, Kumbha- konam, 1906-1914.
MBU	Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇopaniṣad.
MD	Mimāṃsādarśana.
M'	The edition of the MāU by Maheśa- candra Pāla, Calcutta, 1806 Śaka Era.
MHK	Madhyamakahrdayakārikā of Bhāvya, Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Dza, 1b ² -40b ⁷ .
MHKV	Madhyamakahrdayakārikāvṛtti Tarkajvālā of Bhāvya, Tibetan, Sde.dge, Dza, 40b ² -329b ⁴ .
MK	Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna, BB, IV.
MKU	Muktikā Upaniṣad.
MM	Mahārthamañjarī with commentary, Pari- mala, TSS.
MN	Majjhima Nikāya, PTS.
MNs	Mahāniddeśa, PTS.
MnU	Mahānārāḍīya Upaniṣad (Minor Upaniṣads, Adyar).
MnU	Mānasollāsa of Sureśvara, Nirṇaya- sagar Press, Bombay, 1959, V.E., 1825 Ś. E.
MP	Manorathapūraṇi, Mahāmukutarājavidyālaya, Siam, 2463 Buddha Era.
MPñ	Milindapañha, ed. V. Trenckner, London, 1928.

- MS or } Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, ed. Sylvain-Lévi,
MSA } Paris, 1907; French Tr; 1911.
- MSBT, MVBT, or MVST, q.v.
- MSt Mahāsaddantī, ed. A. Seelanda
Thera, Colombo, 1909.
- MSV Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika, Chaukhamba Sanskrit
Series, 1896.
- MT Madhyāntavibhāgatikā, ed. S. Yamguchi,
Nagao, 1934.
- MÚ Maitrī Upaniṣad.
- MuU Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
- MV Madhyamakavṛtti, ed. Louis de La
Vallée Poussin, BB, IV.
- MVBT Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā, ed. V.
Bhattacharya and G. Tucci,
Part I, Calcutta Oriental Series, 1932.
- MVD Madhyāntavibhanga Discourse, translated from
Sanskrit by Th. Stcherbatsky,
BB, XXX, 1936.
- MVT Madhyāntavibhāga tikā of Sthiramati,
édition per Susumu Yamaguchi
Nagoya, 1934
- MVg Mahāvagga of Vinaya, ed. H. Oldenberg,
London, 1879.
- MVt' Mahāvvyutpatti, ed. Sakaki, Japan.
- MVt* Mahāvvyutpatti, ed. Minaeff, BB.
- MVu Mahāvastu, ed. E. Senart, Paris,
1882-97
- N Nāgārjuna

- NAT Nyāyāmṛtataraṅgiṇi of Rāmacārya,
ed. T. R. Kṛīṣṇacharya,
Nirnayasāgar.
- NK Nyāyakandalī on Praśastapādabhāṣya, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6, 1895.
- NPTU Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanī Upaniṣad.
- NPU Nārada-parivṛājaka Upaniṣad.
- NS Nyāyasūtra.
- NSi Naiṣkarmyasiddhi with Candrikā, ed.
G. A. Jacob, Bombay, 1891.
- NSt Nirupamastotra in *Two Hymns of Catuḥstava
of Nāgārjuna*, ed. G. Tucci, JRAS,
1932, pp. 309 ff
- Nt Nirukta of Yāska.
- NUTU Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanī Upaniṣad.
- P Puruṣottama.
- Pāṇ Pāṇini
- PAS Prajñāpāramitārthasamgraha of Dinnāga
as quoted by Obermiller in his
paper *The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā*,
Reprint from *Acta Orientalia*, Vol. XI.
- PB Praśastapādabhāṣya, ed V Dvivedin,
Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6,
Benares, 1895.
- PD Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya.
- PO Poona Orientalist.
- PP Padma Purāṇa.
- PS¹ Paramārthasāra, of Ādiśeṣa, Trivandrum
Sanskrit Series, No. XII, 1911.

- PS² , —of Abhinavagupta, ed. L. D. Barnett, JRAS, 1910, pp. 707 ff.
- PS³ —of Ādiśeṣa, Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes, ed. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Karnatak Publishing House, 1941.
- PSP Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 28, 1934.
- PU Praśna Upaniṣad.
- PV Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrtti, Tibetan Text. Cordier, III, p. 298.
- PVk¹ Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrtti, ed. Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna, 1938.
- PVk² Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrtti with Manoratha Nandin's Commentary, ed. Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna.
- RPR Review of Philosophy and Religion.
- RUTU Rāmottaratāpani Upaniṣad.
- RV Ṛgveda
- Ś Śāṅk'arācārya.
- SāS Sāṅkhyasūtra.
- ŚB Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.
- SDS Sarvadarśanasamgraha, BI, 1858.
- SK Sāṅkhyakārikā of Iśvara-kṛṣṇa.
- SKr Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra, Āgamodaya Samiti, 1917.
- SMV Śāstrakamimāmsābhāṣyavārttika, ed. Ananta-kṛishna Sastri and Ashokanath Bhattacharya, Asutosh Sanskrit Series, No. 1, Calcutta, 1941.

SN	Samyutta Nikāya, PTS.
SNS	Sandhinirmocanasūtra, Texte Tibétain, édité et traduit per Etienne Lamotte, Louvain et Paris, 1935.
SNt	Suttanipāta, PTS.
SP ¹	Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, BB, 1912.
SP ²	Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, ed. U. Wogihara, 1934.
SR or SRS	Samādhirañjasūtra, ed. Rai Sarat Chandra Das Bahadur and Pandit Sarat Chandra Śāstri, Fasc. I, Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, 1898.
SS	Subhāṣitasamgraha, ed. C. Bendall, <i>Le Muséon</i> , N S. IV. 1903, V. 1904.
ŚS	Śikṣāsamuccaya, ed. C. Bendall, BB, 1902.
§S	Saddarśanasamuccaya with Gunaratna's Com., ed. L. Sualī, BI, 1905 ff.
SSP	SaptaśatikāPrajñāpāramitā, ed. G. Tucci, Roma, 1923.
SSS	Sarvasiddhāntasangraha, ed. Prem Sundar Bose, Calcutta, 1919.
St. LA	Studies in Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra by D. T. Suzuki, London, 1930.
ŚU	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, Anandashram, 1905.
ŚV	Śivasūtravimarśinī of Kṣemarāja, ed. J. C. Chatterjee, <i>The Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies</i> , Vol. I, 1911.
TA	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, Anandashram, 1898.

- TAI , Tattvaratnāvalī of Advaya vajra in *Advayavajrasaṃgraha* ed. Haraprasad Śhastrī, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. LX, 1927.
- TAK Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No. XXX.
- TG Theragāthā, PTS.
- TJ Tarkajvālā, See MHKV.
- Tk , Triṃśikā of Vasubandhu, ed. Sylvain Lévi in the *Viññaptimātrasiddhi*, Paris, 1925.
- TM Tattvamuktākālāpa and Sarvārthasiddhi of Venkatanātha Deśika with the *Ānandadāyini* and the *Bhāvaprakāśa*, Bibliotheca Sanskritica, Mysore, 1933, 1940.
- TP Tattvaparakāśa, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 1926.
- TS Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntiraksita, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Nos. XXX and XXXI, 1926.
- TSN Trisvabhāvanirdeśa of Vasubandhu, ed. Sujitkumar Mukhopadhyaya, Visvabharati, 1939.
- TSP Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā of Kamalaśīla, See TS
- TTU Tripuratāpani Upaniṣad.
- TU Taittirīya Upaniṣad

- TV . Tantravārttika of Kumārila as printed with the Śābarabhāṣya on the MD, Ananda-shram Series.
- U or UP Upaniṣad.
- UC Uttaracarita of Bhavabhūti.
- US Upadeśasāhasrī.
- VāP Vāyu Purāṇa.
- Vbh Vibhaṅga, PTS.
- Vc or Vch Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. Max Müller, Anecdota Oxoniensia, 1881.
- VeS Vedāntasāra, ed. G. A. Jacob, Nirnaya-ssgar Press, Bombay, 1894.
- ViP Viṣṇu Purāṇa.
- ViS Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang traduite et annotée par Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1928-29
- ViV Vighrahavyāvartanī, ed. K. P. Jayswal and Rāhula Śāṅkṛtyayana, JBORS, XXIII.
- Vk Viṃśatikā of Vasubandhu. See Tk
- VM Visuddhimagga, PTS.
- VP Vinayapitaka, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879-1883.
- VS Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā.
- VSN Viṣṇusahasranāma, Bibliotheca Sanskritica, Mysore, No. 19.
- VSt Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.

- VV , *Śrīvātulasūtravṛtti*, *Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies*, No. 39.
- YB *Yogācārabhūmi* of *Aśaṅga*, MS with the present author.
- YŚ *Yogaśāstra* of *Hemacandra*, *Bibliotheca Indica*, 1907.
- YS *Yogasūtra*.
- YV *Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa*, *Nirnayasāgar Press*, 1918.

INTRODUCTION

§ 1. *The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and its Extent*

What work or works are we to understand by the name of MāU? And what is its real extent?

It is generally believed that the MāU comprises only the twelve prose passages beginning with "om ity etad akṣaram^o" and ending with "ātmānam ya evaṃ veda" (see pp. 223-25).¹ It is also assumed that the kārīkās of Gauḍapāda are mere explanation of these passages. These two works are thus separate, though related to each other very closely as text and commentary.

But this is not admitted on all hands. Some hold that the Upaniṣad is composed not only of the twelve prose passages referred to above, but also of the kārīkās, twenty-nine in all, attributed to Gauḍapāda, as contained in Book I. — Thus according to them those prose passages and the kārīkās in Book I are regarded as *Upaniṣad* or *śruti*.² This view seems to have partly



¹ Of these passages the first seven are found with slight variations in some cases also in NPTU, IV 12, NUTU, II, and RUTU, 5.

² In 1925 I had an occasion to write (IHQ, Vol 3, pp. 119ff) with regard to the present subject that this view was at least as old as Maṇḍhvaśārya (1199-1274 A.D.), the great champion of the Dvāita school of the Vedānta philosophy. For, according to him and his followers, such as Vyāsa-tīrtha and Śrinivāsa, both the prose passages and the kārīkās referred to are handed down by Vārṇana in the form of a *maṇḍūkya 'śloka'* (see the commentary on the MāU by Maṇḍhvaśārya with Śri-

been subscribed to by Śāṅkara, the commentator of MāU, who says in the introduction to his commentary

nivāsiya, Kumbhakonam, pp 2-3) In support of it *Madhvācārya* quotes the following two passages from the PP and HV respectively

(i) *dhyāyan nāiṣyaṇam devam prapavēna samāhutaḥ* |

mandūkārūpi varuṇas tustīva harīm avyāyam ||

(ii) *iti mandūkārūpiṣaṇ dadarśa varuṇaḥ śrutim* |

These lines are not found, so far as I know, in printed editions of the works

Here *Madhvācārya* writes (*ibid.*, p. 2) *mandūkārūpinā varuṇena catūrūpo nāiṣyaṇo 'tra stūyate* He regards the *kārikās* as *mantras* which are said to have been visioned by Brahman, the creator. On this he quotes the following couplet not yet traced in the same work (p. 8) :

brahmadṛṣṭēn ato mantṛēn pramāṇam saṁlīlavarah |

atra śloka bhavanīkī cakṛāraivam pṛithak pṛithak ||

Vyāsātīrtha's *tīkā*, too, introduces the *kārikās* under *mantras*

The commentator of NPTU, who is known by the name of Śāṅkara-
cārya and identical with the author of the *Prapāñcasūtra*, a Tāntic work (see my paper, *Śāṅkara's Commentaries on the Upaniṣads*, in *Sir Asutosh Mukherjee Silver Jubilee Volumes, Orientalia*, 2, pp 101 ff. and against it *Raghuvāra Mitthulā* *Shastri* *Proceedings and Transactions, Fifth Indian Oriental Conference, 1928, Vol I, pp 691 ff.*, as well as *T. R. Chintamani*, *Proceedings and Transactions, Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924, pp 419 ff*) is also of the same opinion, though he does not give particulars as to whether the *ru 'seer*' of the Upaniṣad is Varuṇa or whether the *kārikās* are seen by Brahman, the creator. *Kṛāṇārāyaṇa*, another commentator of MāU helenging to the Rāmānuja school of the Vedānta maintains the same view taking the *kārikās* in Book I as *mantras*, which, in his opinion, too, together with the prose passages form the original Upaniṣad. Appayya Dīkṣita (a person different from the celebrated author of the *Siddhāntaleśa*) who is a commentator of the one hundred and eight Upaniṣads, seems to subscribe to the same view, for his commentary on the Upaniṣad extends only up to the prose passages and the *kārikās* of Book I. See the Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library Vol. I. Upaniṣads, pp 116, 287 &

After what I wrote as above in 1925 so far as my information goes, it was B. N. Kṛishṇamurti Sāma who in 1931 took up the case in right earnest and advocated it very strongly. His first paper (*New Light on the Gauḍapādakārikā*) appeared in *RPR*, Vol II, No 1, pp 35 ff. He wanted

on it that the first of the four sections (*prakāraṇa, catuṣṭaya*) of the *Āgamaśāstra* begins with "om ity etad akṣaram"¹ (MāU, 1), though the question as to whether that particular section or all the sections are regarded as *śruti* or not is not raised by him— Leaving aside what is said by this *Śāṅkara* whose identity with the great author of the commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* is doubtful,² it appears plausible that the view under discussion dates back at least from the time of *Rāmaṇuja* (1055-1137 A.D.), as he seems to quote in his commentary on BS, I. 1. 1, a *kārikā* of *Gauḍapāda* (I. 16) as *śruti*.

mainly to show that *Madhvācārya* cannot rightly be accused of holding the view that the *kārikās* in Book I are regarded as *śruti*, and form a part of the original MāU. In doing so he tried to demonstrate that teachers "of the three schools of Vedānta, such as *Śāṅkara*, *Ānandagiri*, *Madhusūdana*, *Brahmananda*, *Rāmaṇuja*, *Kṛṣṇānārāyaṇa*, *Madhvācārya*, *Madhva*, *Jayatīrtha*, *Vyāsa-cārya svāmin*, *Rāṇacārya*, etc." are of the same opinion. In the same journal (RFR, 1932, Vol. III, No. 1, 1933, Vol. IV No. 2) he wrote two papers more on the same subject. His writings gave rise to an interesting and long controversy in which took part some scholars, such as Y. Subrahmanya Sharma (RPR, 1933, Vol. IV, No. 3), and A. Venkata Subbiah (PO, 1936, Vol. I Nos. 1-2), B. N. Krishnamurti's rejoinder being given in PO, 1936, Vol. I, No. 2, and 1937, Vol. II, No. 1. Besides, A. Venkata Subbiah wrote in IA, 1933, pp. 181 ff. an independent paper entitled *The Māndūkya-paniṣad and Gauḍapāda* which deserves to be mentioned in this connection.

¹ Those who think that the two *Śāṅkaras*, the author of the *Śārirakabhāṣya* on BS and the author of the commentary on *ĀS*, are one and the same should consider in the latter not only the question of *mangalācāraṇa*, the inferior quality of composition of the *śloka*s, the defect of metre (*Ānandagiri*'s explanation can hardly be accepted), and the grammatical mistakes, but also the explanation offered of such *kārikās* as I. 10 II. 37, III. 25, and IV. 83 as to whether it is possible for the former. Cf. here his explanation of the words *bhūta* and *abhūta* in III. 23 with that in IV. 3, of *sambhūti* in III. 25 with that of IU, 12. See note 2.

He writes ; *jīvasyaiva hi nirodhaḥ śrūyate*^o *anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyata* (I. 16) *iti ca*. By the word *śrūyate* evidently he regards the line as *śruti*.

B. N. K r i ś h n a m u r t i S a r m a thinks that the above date is to be pushed back to the time of S u r e ś v a r a , the author of the BBV or even that of Ś a n k a r a , the author of the *Śārīrakabhāṣya* on BS. But in spite of what he has said in support of the view one can hardly accept it when the statements made by the above two teachers themselves are taken into consideration. S u r e ś v a r a quotes ĀŚ, I. 11 (*kāryakāraṇa*^o) in his NSi, IV. 41, and tells us (*Op. cit.*, IV. 44) that it is said by the revered G a u d a s .⁴ The word *Gauda* here refers to G a u ḍ a p ā d a . As regards Ś a n k a r a , he, too, quotes in his commentary on BS, II. 1. 9, a *kārikā* of G a u ḍ a p ā d a (*anādimāyayā*^o, I. 16), and says it is a saying of those teachers who know the tradition of the Vedānta,⁵ just as said by him in another case (BS, I. 4. 14) with regard to another *kārikā* of G a u ḍ a p ā d a (*mṛlloha*^o, III. 15).⁶ Here S u r e ś v a r a and Ś a n k a r a say in the clearest possible language that the *kārikās* referred to above are by revered teachers.⁷ Hence, according to them, they are not *śruti*.

⁴ *evam gaudair dvāvidair naḥ pūjyaḥ ayam arthah prabhāṣitah* This line, as in the printed text is metrically defective. The word *ayam* seems to be omitted here.

⁵ *atraktam vedāntasampradāyavibhīḥ śrūyate*

⁶ *tathā ca sampradāyavido vādanāḥ*

⁷ For detailed discussion of this question readers are referred to the scholars and their papers mentioned in note 2 of this section.

In the face of this clear statement, the passages from some works attributed to Śaṅkara, and as such of doubtful authority, which are quoted by B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma in order to support his view that the *kārikās* of the Book I are *śruti*, do not, as it appears to me, carry any particular weight. ✓

Sureśvara's words, viz., *vedāntokṛti* with regard to GK, I. 14, and *āgamaśāśana* with regard to GK, I. 3, which are quoted by him for the same purpose from BBV, I. 4. 615 and 744 respectively, do not necessarily imply that the *kārikās* are *śruti* in the primary sense of the word, for the same author, Sureśvara, takes elsewhere, as we have already seen, one (I. 11) of the GK *kārikās* of Book I in which the above two *kārikās* are included, as a statement of *Gaudapāda*. We should remember here that the above phrases are applicable also to works of human origin dealing with the Vedānta or Āgama.

That this controversy is not new, but an old one is known from the words of Rāmācārya, the author of the NAT, p. 223, where with regard to the two *kārikās* of *Gaudapāda*, I. 17 and 18, he raises the question as to whether they are *śruti*, and arrives at the conclusion that they are really so.*

Thus we reach the conclusion that at least from the time of Rāmānuja, the author of the *Śrībhāṣya* of

* See RPR, 1933, Vol. IV, No. 2. It is interesting to note here that sometimes the *kārikās* of Book I of GK is referred to as *Gaudapādiyokṛtśruti* (LC, p. 580), and *Māndūkyopaniṣadvyāsaḥ Gaudapādiyokṛtśruti* (NAT, p. 123b). The reader may think over here as to how these two words are used here loosely.

BS, there were some authoritative teachers according to whom the *kārikas* of Book I of the GK were regarded as *śruti* and as such they formed a part of the MāU.

Speaking generally our old teachers were *śraddhādeva*, 'trustful,' to use the word of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (I. 1. 4. 15), with regard to the authenticity of our sacred or Sanskrit texts. Any work dealing with Upanisadic matter would readily be accepted by them as Upaniṣad.⁹ Remember the number of Upanisads and their language, subject matter and the way of treatment therein. Are they all Upaniṣads, though they are called so? The *Bhagavadgītā* is not an Upaniṣad in fact, yet, it bears the name. We all know its colophon in which occurs the following *iti śrīmadbhagavadgītāsu upaniṣatsu*. And it is so only owing to the fact that it is like an Upaniṣad. The practice of taking what is actually not an Upaniṣad as an Upaniṣad appears to have been in existence from the time of Pāṇini, as says Satyavrata Sāmaśramin in his *Trayīparicaya*, Calcutta, 1893, p. 69. From his work (I. 4. 79)¹⁰ we may gather a word, *upaniṣatkṛtya*, which means 'having made like an Upaniṣad.' Does it not lead us to conclude as above? But grammarians differ here on the meaning of the word *Upaniṣad*, according to some it being *tattvajñāna*, the 'knowledge of reality,' while to others, *rahasya*, a 'secret' or 'secret doctrine'. Let us take here the case of Purāṇas. A Purāṇa is said to have 'five characteristics' (*purāṇaṃ pañcalakṣaṇam*). But there are Purāṇas which are, in

⁹ See Śaṅkara on BG, II 19 and 20 where he uses the words *rc* and *mantra* referring to the above two stanzas

¹⁰ *jivikopaniṣadāṃ aupamye*

fact, not so, though they are known to us under the same name. Similar is the case with regard to Upaniṣads and other works. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is not only the Book I of GK but also the remaining three Books of it which are sometimes held to be Upaniṣads, as *Advaitapraṅgana Up.*, *Alaṭaśāntipraṅgana Up.*, etc.¹¹

We have seen above that according to some authorities including specially *Madhvācārya* only Book I of GK is śruti, and the last three books are not so, and as such they do not form any part of MāU, as does Book I. In other words, they form a separate work or works with which the former has no connexion. If it is not so, it will be very difficult to explain as to why the last three Books are not commented upon by those teachers. Why have they explained only the Book I? It cannot be said that these last three Books were not known to them or in their time, as their existence before them can very satisfactorily be proved by the very simple fact that the great Śaṅkara who flourished long before them has quoted in his commentary on BS, l. 4. 14, a *kārikā* (III. 15) from one of those three Books.

The fact that they did not comment upon the last three Books can be explained in two ways. First, it might have been their honest belief that those three Books had no connexion whatsoever with the MāU which, according to them, comprised only the twelve prose passages

¹¹ See MSS labelled ZZE of BBRAŚ. Similarly each of the five chapters of the NPTU is regarded as a separate Upaniṣad. The case is the same with the TU, the three chapters (Śikṣāvallī, Brahme*, and Bhṛgu*) of which are held to be three Upaniṣads.

and the twenty-nine kārīkās of Book I of GK. Secondly, it might be said that they could not explain them, for the dominant thoughts therein, viz., *Advaitavāda* 'absolute monism' and *Vijñānavāda* 'idealism' would go against their own views, viz., *Dvaitavāda* 'dualism' or *Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda* 'qualified monism.' The first answer seems to be more reasonable than the second, for had they known that the last three Books, too, were really included in or connected with the original Upaniṣad they would have undoubtedly explained them, as is done¹² by *Puruṣottama*, the grandson of *Vallabhācārya*, the great teacher of the *Suddhādvaita* 'pure monism' school of the Vedānta.¹

§ 2. *The Relationship between the Prose Passages and the Kārīkās in Book I*

As *Madhvācārya* says,¹ the twelve prose passages of the Upaniṣad are divided into four parts.²

¹² I have seen the Commentary only on the first two Books as edited by *Bhattacha Ramānātha Śāstrin* and published from *Pustimārga-Kāryālaya*, Bombay, Vikrama 1960. That *Puruṣottama* wrote or intended to write his commentary also on Book III (*Adiasta Prakaraṇa*) is known from his own words (*adastakhye śicarayisyel*), p. 55. It seems that he commented or intended to do so also on the last Book.

¹³ It is known from the Tibetan sources that in about the first half of the eighth century A.D. the GK was regarded as an Upaniṣat (*gstan ba hi bstan bcos*). For *Kamalaśīla*, a disciple of *Śāntiraksita* (705-763 A.D.) and the author of the *Pañjikā* of his MAK quotes some kārīkās from Books II and III of our work which he calls *Upaniṣat śāstra*. It is to be noted that *Kamalaśīla's* remark cannot be considered with reference only to the above two Books.

¹ *MāU* with *Srinivasagacit*, p. 8.

² Part I, passages 1-6, Part II, passages 7, Part III, passages 8-11, and Part IV, passage 12.

Just after each of them there is a line *atraite ślokā bhavanti* 'here are these ślokas.' These introductory lines when compared with similar sentences in different Upaniṣads² will show that the ślokas are quoted there *only to support what has been stated before*. And we have already seen that *Madhvācārya* and others, specially the former, say the very thing quite clearly. Thus it follows from it that the ślokas or *kārikās* were already in existence and the prose passages came into being afterwards.

This will be confirmed if we compare the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding *kārikās*. The comparison will further show that it is the *kārikās* on which the prose passages are based and not *vice versa*.

Supposing that the *kārikās* are explanations of the Upaniṣad, i.e., of the twelve prose passages which are generally held to be so, one may naturally expect to see the difficult points in the latter explained in the former. And it also goes without saying that an exposition may add something new to what is said in the original, but it does not or should not omit the most important and difficult words or points in it. If these facts are borne in mind, it will be evident that it is the *kārikās* that should be regarded as the earlier work, and not the prose passages.

² See BU, IV 3 11; 4, 6 tad'ete śloka-bhavanatī; Śr. crī, II 2 2 (V 4 6, 7, tad'esa śloka bhavati; ChU, II 21 3, III 11 1, etc. tad'esa ślokaḥ, TU, II 1 1, 2 1, etc. tad'apy'esa śloka bhavati, ChU, III 12 5 tad'etad' rābhyaṅgam.

According to the general view, *kārikās* 1-5 are to be taken as the exposition of the prose passages 3-5.⁴ Now the words *saptāṅga* 'with seven limbs,' and *eṅgonavimśatimukha* 'with nineteen mouths' in the passages 3 and 4 are the most difficult and they are explained differently by different commentators⁵; but not even the slightest mention of them is made in the *kārikās*. Why should the *kārikās* which are supposed to have been written in order to explain the text, i.e., the prose passages, omit these two important words?

Again, in the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word *vaiśvānara* and not *viśva*, while in the *kārikās* (l. 1-4, 19, 23) there is only *viśva* and never *vaiśvānara*. Why is this discrepancy? A commentator is to explain what is actually found in the text, he is not allowed to take the liberty of changing it. Nor are the two words *vaiśvānara* and *viśva* identical or synonymous. It is difficult to account for this alteration. That it is owing to the exigency of metre is an absurd hypothesis.⁶

In this connexion, there are three words more, viz., *jāgaritasthāna*, *svapna*^o, and *susupta*^o in the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively. But they are entirely omitted in the *kārikās*. But why? It cannot be explained away by simply saying that they are not so important or difficult as to require any explanation; for, in order to

⁴ It is to be noted that the first two passages have nothing in the *kārikās* as we have them before us.

⁵ See § here and on NPTU, IV, Madhyam, KN, and P on the passages, Vidyāsāraṇa on NPTU I and Nāṭyaśāstra on RUTU, 3.

⁶ Note there is *prajñāghana* in the prose passage 5 for which we have *ghonaprajña* in *kārikā* 1.

understand the main thought of the passages the importance of these three stages, *viz.*, wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, can in no way be ignored.

The fact is that the *kārikās* are older, and from them, as well as from some older Upaniṣads, the MāU, i.e. the prose passages to which that name is usually given, are of the same age. The *kārikās* and some Upaniṣads are here in the prose passages simplified, modified or explained adding something new. Thus, it appears, in the present case, the author of the prose passages having found the word *viśva* in its special sense nowhere in the Upaniṣads⁷ seems to have substituted for it *vaiśvānara* which is used in such old Upaniṣads as ChU (V. 11. 12) and BU (V 9. 1).⁸ Now the author of NUTU, I where the entire MāU is quoted with some slight variants,¹⁰ seeing both the words *viśva* in the *kārikās* and *vaiśvānara*¹¹ in the older Upaniṣads, has adopted both of them¹² and simplified the text to some extent.¹³ As to why these two terms are taken together in NUTU and what is

⁷ See pp 223 ff., and Deussen *Upaniṣads des Veda*, p 574.

⁸ Excepting perhaps MU, VI 7 which is not so old.

⁹ On the greatness of Vaiśvānara see RV, I 59 6, 98 1, Nt, VII 21-23, BS, I 2 32.

¹⁰ The MāU is almost entirely found also in NPTU, I.

¹¹ For a different view of *Vaiśvānara*, *Tajasa* and *Prājña* cf *Ivara* and *Prājña*, *Hiranyagarbha* and *Tajasa*, and *Vaiśvānara* and *Tajasa* in PD, I 16 29.

¹² *Śhālabhuk caturātmā vidva vaiśvānarah prathamah pādah*.

¹³ This is also with NPTU, I. For example, *sūkṣma* is substituted here for *pravivikṭa* in the *kārikās*. Here *sūkṣma* is undoubtedly simpler than *pravivikṭa*. For details the reader is referred to that Up.

their special significance is clearly shown by *V i d y ā - r a n y a* in his *ṭikā* on it and in PD I. 28-29. See also VeS, § 17.

Similarly the three states, *jāgarita*, *svapna*, and *suṣupta* in the prose passages (3-4) are later additions from BU, or ChU, or both for a clear exposition of the terms *bahisprajña*, *antahprajña*, and *ghanaprajña* in *kārikā* 1.

That the MāU (i.e., the prose passages) has drawn upon the *kārikās* and some other Upanisads can be gathered from the comparison of both the texts. In the *kārikās* we have simply *ghanaprajña* (1) and *ānandabhuj* (3) or *ānanda* (4), while the prose passage (5) reads as follows (see p 224):

yatra supito na kañcana kāmam kāmayaṭe na kañcana svapnam paśyati (BU, IV. 3. 9) *tat suṣuptam, susupta-sthāna ekibhūta¹⁴ prajñānaghana* (BU, IV. 5. 13) *evānandamayo* (TU, II. 5. 1) *hy ānandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prajñas tṛtiyaḥ pādah.*

Which of these two, the *kārikā* and the prose passage, is the original, and which is the exposition, may now easily be ascertained.

The word *ghanaprajña* in the *kārikā* is no doubt, identical with *prajñānaghana* in a somewhat different form, and to explain it the prose passage has introduced the word *ekibhūta* found, in fact, in the form of *ekibhavati* in different Upanisads.¹⁵

¹⁴ Cf. *ekibhūtaḥ*, BU, 6 IV 4 2 (seven times). See PU IV 2 (twice), NPTU IV 1, NUTU, 1

¹⁵ See note 14

The *kārikā* I. 19 runs thus :

viśvasyātvavivakṣāyām ādisāmānyam utkatam |
mātrāsampratipattau syād āptisāmānyam eva ca ||

And the corresponding prose passage (9) is this :

jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro 'kāraḥ prathamā mātrāpter
ādimattvād vā. āpnoti ha vai sarvān kāmān ādis ca bhavati
ya evaṃ veda.

It means that *Vaiśvānara* whose sphere is the waking state is the first *mātrā* 'measure,' the letter *a*, on account of obtaining (or pervasiveness) or on account of its being the first (*āpter ādimattvād vā*). One who knows thus obtains one's all desires and becomes first of all.

Now, if these two texts are compared it will at once be clear that the second is merely the exposition of the first with a tinge of the language used in the *Brāhmaṇas*.

Here is one point more. In the first text the reason is advanced as to why *Viśva* (= *Vaiśvānara* of the second text) is to be regarded as the letter *a*. And the reason is *sāmānya* 'similarity'—similarity between *Viśva* and the letter *a*. And this similarity is 'beginning' (*ādi*) or 'obtaining' or 'pervasiveness' (*āpti*). Now, according to the order of *Viśva*, *Tajasa* and *Prāṇa*, *Viśva* is at the beginning or first (*ādi*); just so is at the beginning or first the letter *a* of *a*, *u* and *m* of which *Om* is composed. Owing to this similarity *Viśva* is said to be identical with the letter *a*. The second similarity is *āpti* which by *Śaṅkara* is thus explained: As *Viśva* pervades all the visible world, so does the letter *a* all the speech. On account

of this similarity, too, Viśva is to be regarded as the letter *a*. The second text, however, gives a somewhat different explanation of this identity of Viśva and *a*. For, while the first text says that owing to both the similarities of *ādi* and *āpti* they are identical, the second text clearly says that it is owing to either of them (*āpter ādimattvād vā*).¹⁶ All these seem to be later developments

The case is exactly the same with *kārikās* 1. 20, 21 and the corresponding prose passages 10 and 11 of the Upaniṣad, to which the reader is referred.

There is one thing more to be noted with regard to the *kārikā* 1. 21 and the corresponding prose passage 11 of the Upaniṣad. In the former one of the two similarities is *māna* 'measure' from $\sqrt{mā}$ 'to measure' while in the latter the word is not *māna*, but *mīti* 'measure' from $\sqrt{mī}$. Similarly, while in the former we have *apiti* 'disappearance' from *api*- \sqrt{i} , in the latter there is *laya* 'disappearance'. There is, however, no difference of meaning, as shown, in the two cases. Yet, how far such divergency between an original text and its explanation in Sanskrit can be accounted for is to be considered seriously

The conception of *ātman* as having four fourths or quarters (*catuspād*) is not so explicit in the words of *kārikās*¹⁷ as in those of the Upaniṣad, 2. This idea

* 16 One may, however, say that the word *lā* in the text may be taken in the sense of *ca* or *api*. But Śaṅkara or Śaṅkarānanda does not say so

17 See 1. 10-13 (where the fourth state is described), 24, and 29 (where *Onkāra* is described with or without *māt-ā*)

is, however, fully developed in the Upaniṣad 2 from the very beginning. This fact also goes to show the priority of the kārīkās.

The distinction between Turya or Turiya 'fourth' and the other three, viz., Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, as made in the kārīkās (I. 10-15), has nothing corresponding in the Upaniṣad, but the nature of Turya, which is expressed in a kārīkā (I. 29) simply by two words, *śīva* 'blissful' and *dvaita-upaśama* 'cessation of duality' is thus elaborated in two passages, 7 and 12, of the Upaniṣad :

(i) nāntahprajñam na bahisprajñam nobhayatahprajñam na prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam adīṣtam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyayasāram prapañcopaśamaṁ śāntaṁ śīvaṁ advaitaṁ caturtham manyante. sa ātmā sa vijñeyah.

(ii) amātraś caturtho 'vyavahāryah prapañcopaśamaḥ śīvo 'dvaita evam onkāra ātmaiva.' samviśaty ātmanātmānam¹⁸ ya evam veda.

These two passages are mere amplification or exposition of what is briefly said in the kārīkā, I 29, and consequently appear to be later developments, as shows also the language used here.

Again, it is to be noted that though in the Upaniṣad (1) Brahman or Ātman is said to have four quarters (*catuspād*) which are explained there later on (3-6), there is no express mention of them in the kārīkās which are supposed to be an explanatory work.

¹⁸ See VS, XXXII 11 ātmanātmānam abhisamviveda

Compare the kārīkā I. 24 with the prose passage B of the Upaniṣad and it will be found that the former is explained in the latter in some detail and not *vice versa*.

The kārīkā (I. 6) opening the discussion about the origin (*prabhava*) of all things may be connected with the last part of the passage 6 of the Upaniṣad: *prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām*.¹⁹ Here *prabhava* is described in the kārīkā I. 6-9 at some length, but *apyaya* 'disappearance' is not even touched in the kārīkā. This would hardly be possible if the kārīkā were meant to explain the Upaniṣad.

All these considerations lead me to conclude as follows :

(i) The kārīkā in Book I are not the exposition (*vyākhyāna*) of the MāU.

✓ (ii) The MāU is mainly based on the kārīkā,²⁰ and not *vice versa*.

(iii) And as such the MāU is later than the kārīkā.²¹

Here we must remember what M a d h v ā c ā r y a has said on the point. Serious charges may be and have been brought against him, saying "that he is addicted to the fabrication of evidence and that he very frequently cites passages from books which do not and

¹⁹ It is taken from KU., II 2

²⁰ It has drawn much also upon some older Upaniṣads as will be seen from the text printed herewith, pp 223 ff

²¹ See Max Walliser *Der alter Vedanta*, p 5 He says that the kārīkā do not show that the Upaniṣad was before them

did not at any time exist."²² Or Appayya Dīkṣita in his *Madhvamatavidhvamsana* may give a list of such books, or may say of him :

tathāpy ānandatīrthīyaṃ matam agrāhyam eva naḥ |
yatra vaidikamaryādā bhūyasy ākulatām gatā ||²³

Or, again, most of the authorities cited by him in his commentary on the MāU may not be traced; or one may or may not attach any value to the myth he has given us that Varuṇa having assumed the form of a frog received the *mantras*, i.e., the *kārikās* originally visioned by Brahman, the creator; yet, in the present case, we have to accept, as we have shown above, his view that the *mantras* or *kārikās* are older and on them is based our MāU.²⁴

§ 3. *The Inter-relationship of the Four Books of the Āgamaśāstra*

It is generally held that the *Āgamaśāstra* has four *prakāraṇas* or Books, viz., *Āgamapraṇāna*, *Vaitathya*^o, *Advaita*^o, and *Alāṭāśānti*.^o Here arise the following questions. Are these Books, in fact, four parts of the same work, or are they four independent treatises compiled in one volume? Again, is it that

²² A Venkatasubbiah IA. 1933, p. 189

²³ See RPR, Vol II, p. 51

²⁴ This view was originally expressed by me long ago in IHQ, 1925, Vol I, pp. 119-125, 295-302. Against this see S. K. Belvalkar's observation in his *Vedānta Philosophy* (Sreegopal Basu Mallik Lectures), Part I, pp. 192-193. But I do not think that the modification of my opinion is necessary.

while one or more of the Books form a work, the remaining one or ones constitute another work?

Śankara, the commentator, with his followers, holds that the four Books are the different parts of the same work entitled *Āgamaśāstra*. And so, in order to show their mutual connexion first with reference to Books I and II, he writes just at the beginning of his commentary on Book II: " 'When (the Reality) is known there is no duality'—This is already said (I. 18d),¹ and it is supported by such *śruti*s as 'There is only one without a second (ChāU, VI. 2. 1).' This is, however, only a statement of scripture (*āgamamātra*). With a view to showing that the unreality of duality can be established also by reasoning (*upapatti*) Book II is begun with the words '*vaitathya*,' etc."

Now, as regards the relationship between Books II and III Ś observes (III. 1): "The determination of

¹ Ś could easily refer here also to I 16, 17 and 29. Moreover, in the manner which he has adopted in showing the relationship between the first two Books the following might also be added in his favour, as in his opinion the *Āgamaśāstra* begins with "Om ity etad aksaram ity ādi," in other words, it includes the MāU. We read in the concluding kāvya (29) of Book I, *dvaitasyopasāmah śivah*, which is in fact the same as *prapañcopasāmah śāntam śivam* and *prapañcopasāmo 'dvaitah* of the MāU, 7 and 12 respectively. This very thing is re-assured in Book II 33 by a phrase which is exactly the same in sense as the above, i.e., *prapañcopasāmo 'dvaitah*. Again, in I 10 we have *advaitah sarvabhāvānām*, and the same thing in one or other form is seen in many places in Book II (*tasmād advayaḥ śivah* II 33), *advaito jayati amṛtīm* (II 35), *advaitam samanuprāpya* (II 36). Cf. here also *advaitam paramārtho hi* (III 18). And this truth is established there (II 1 ff.) by strong reasons showing the unreality (*vaitathya*) of all things as in dream. Thus does it not show that these two Books are closely connected with each other?

Om is made only by a proposition (*pratijñāmātra*): 'The Ātman is the cessation of expression, blissful and without a second, (MāU, 12).' It is also said that 'When (the Reality) is known there is no duality' (I. 29). There in the Book called Non-reality (*vaitathya*), i.e., II, the absence of duality is set forth by the illustrations of dream, magic, castle-in-air, etc. (II. 31), by reasons such as the 'capability of being seen' (*drīyatva*)² and 'the state of having the beginning and the end' (*ādyantavattva*),³ and also by reasoning (*varṇa*). Now, it is asked: Is it that non-duality can be understood only by scripture or also by reasoning? The reply is: It can be done also by reasoning. How is it? For this Book III is begun."

Finally with reference to Book IV, Ś says in introducing it: "Through the determination of Om non-duality is proposed (*pratijñāta*). It is then established (*siddha*) by showing the non-reality of the different external objects (in Book II). Again, in Book III it is directly ascertained by scripture (*āgama*) and reasoning concluding that it is the highest truth (III. 48). At the end⁴ it is hinted that the Dvaitins 'Dualists' and Vaināśikas 'Nihilists' are opposed to this view of non-duality which is the meaning of the scripture (*āgama*), and their views are wrong views as they cause such evil passions as attachment and aversion, on

² Where is it in Book II?

³ II. 7.

⁴ *advaitam kim āgamamātreṇa pratipattavyam śhoṣat tatkṛtṛṇa*

⁵ In fact, it is not 'at the end' (ante), nor is it in any of the original *kāṇḍas*. It is the commentator's own observation. See the commentary on II. 7.

opinion of the wise that all things in dream are unreal. He could also write here that the determination of Om is through the realization of non-duality which depends on the unreality of external things, which is dealt with in Book II. But he has not done so.

Let us consider here another point. We have already seen that in accordance with some teachers such as M a d h v ā c ā r y a , the MāU is composed of the twelve prose passages and the twenty-nine kārikās in Book I. It is quite clear from it that, in their opinion, the work is a complete one having no connexion with any of the remaining three Books of the ĀŚ. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that its subject matter, i.e., the determination of Om, is here dealt with completely, as one can easily understand from the last two kārikās of Book I, after reading which one does not feel that anything more remains to be further discussed and elucidated; and, in fact, we see nothing directly of Om in the following Book or Books. Thus it follows that the treatise consisting of the kārikās of Book I has no relationship to any of the Books that follow. It is also to be noted here that the views of the teachers referred to above cannot be ignored altogether.

Further, if Book II is a continuation of Book I, it could be expected that the former should somehow or other presuppose the latter. But does it do so? If so, where? Moreover, what does one lose if one takes Book II as an independent work on the *advaita* Vedānta? Does one find in reading this Book in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming

its connexion with Book I? Or does one really feel that without Book I it appears to be incomplete? That it is complete in itself will be clear if we attentively read at least the concluding portion of it, i.e., *kārikās* 35-38.

Now with regard to the connexion between Books II and III let us remember what Ś says. His words, put briefly, would amount to this that non-duality can be understood not only by *āgama*, but by reasoning (*tarka*) as well. Consequently to exhibit the reasoning Book III is required. If that is so, we shall have to accept that according to Ś the object of both the Books II and III is one and the same, i.e., giving the arguments for non-duality. In that case, why should there be two separate Books instead of one in which all could be included? This leads one to think of a different object for which Book III must have been written. And what this object was will be clear if one examines the contents with some amount of care. Here at the beginning (III. 1-2) the author tells us about 'non-origination' (*ajati*) and having established it concludes in the end (III. 48) that it is the highest truth (*uttama satya*). In doing so he discusses the Vedānta, and in that connexion the absence of difference between Jiva and Brahman. He treats also of a *samādhi* 'intense abstract concentration' called *asparśavega* meant for the realization of the Truth.

It is not that there is no mention of non-duality in this

Book. It is there (III. 18),⁸ but only incidentally, and as such is not discussed. But can one say rightly that because of the mention of non-duality in this Book, Books II and III must have some direct connexion between them? If so, is it not that there will be no difficulty whatsoever in finding out a relationship between any two works on the same subject? But that relationship will certainly not be as that between the different chapters of the same work. It is to be noted that Ś himself has not suggested such relationship. Thus it appears to me that there is nothing against one's thinking that Book III, too, is an independent work on *advaita* Vedānta.

We now come to Book IV. It has already been seen how Ś wants to connect it with the preceding Books. He assumes that the views of Dvaitins and Vaināsīkas⁹ are to be shown in details¹⁰ in this Book as wrong, and by doing so the conclusion is to be established that the theory of non-duality is right. First, we are to examine here as to how far this assertion can be accepted. Let us take for granted that, as he says, owing to their mutual contradiction the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināsīkas are wrong and this is to be shown in detail in this Book. But where and how much is it done? Dvaitins are referred to by the word *vādins* 'disputants' only in two places (IV 3 and 6); but even there in

⁸ Book III. 18 *advaitam paramārtho hi* See Book I 17 *advaitam paramārthatah*

⁹ See III 17

¹⁰ Com on IV 1 *tad iha vistareṇa anyonyavāituddhatayā asamyagdarśanātveṇa pradarśitā, tatpratiseḍhena dvaitadarśanasauddhīr upasamhartatayā*

the first place, though only their mutual contradiction is simply referred to, no detail of it is to be found. There is no allusion to Vaināśikas in this Book. But if by that word the Buddhists are meant, no mutual contradiction with the Dvaitins, (or among themselves,) is to be found of their views. On the contrary, the author of the ĀŚ has accepted or approved of them throughout the Book as the present writer has attempted to show. How is it then that in accordance with Ś, one can expect to understand from this Book that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas are wrong and the view of non-duality is right? Thus one can hardly connect in this way the present Book with the preceding one or ones. We should also remember here the questions that have already been put in discussing the relationship between Books I and II. See p. lii.

Is there then no relationship of any kind between Books IV and others? How can it be so? Certainly there is a relationship and it is rather a close one, as the following lines will show. A careful reader will see that a large number of expressions in various forms in the first three Books are literally quoted or alluded to in Book IV. And it will be noticed that some matters dealt with in the former are done so again in the latter. For instance, I. 16 = III. 36^a = IV. 81^a; II. 6-7 = IV. 31-32¹¹; (cf. II. 1, 4 with IV. 33, and II. 2 with IV. 34¹²), III. 20-22 = IV. 6-8¹³; III. 29-30

¹¹ See III 2, 48, IV 4, 5

¹² The second half is, however, identical

¹³ Here is a slight variation, and it is that for the word *bhāva* in the former there is *dharma* in the latter with regard to the first and the last *kārikās*

=IV. 61-62¹¹; III. 48=IV. 71. Besides, such expressions or topics as the following are to be found in more than one Book: *jñeyābhinna jñāna* 'the knowledge is not different from the knowable' is in III. 33 and IV. 1; *ajātivāda* 'the theory of non-origination' in III. 2 ff and IV. 3 ff. Such being the case it must be accepted that Book IV is rather closely related to other Books.

But this relationship is not such as between a work and its different chapters on the following grounds:

With reference to later Sanskrit works it is a well-known practice that their commencement is with a *maṅgalācaraṇa* 'prayer for success' which includes a *namaskāra* 'paying homage' to one for whom the authors have regard. Now, as we have at the very beginning of Book IV a *kārikā* embodying *maṅgalācaraṇa*, it naturally induces one to think that it is not a chapter of any work, but itself an independent work.

It is, however, true that *maṅgalācaraṇa* is found not only at the commencement of a work, but also in other places of it, as in the case of the *Nyāyakaṇḍali* of Śrīdhara on the *Prastapadabhāṣya*, or of the *Saṅjivani* of Mallinātha on the *Raghuvamśa*. But it is to be noted here that in such cases it is done in each of the chapters, and not in any particular one, whereas in the present case, here in Āś we have it

¹¹ With the following variations. For *spandate māyayā manah* in III there is *cittam calati māyayā* in IV, and for *manah* in III there is *cittam* in IV.

only in Book IV, so far as the extant editions and the MSS that are examined can show.¹⁵ Here we may remember a Buddhist work, viz., the *Pañjikā* of *Praññākararmati* on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. It consists of nine chapters. Here the *maṅgalācarana* is only in the first¹⁶ and the last chapters, and not in others. Evidently the *maṅgalācarana* at the beginning of its chapter IX does not mean to say that it is an independent work. Considering the contents of this chapter of both the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and its *Pañjikā*, which deal with *prajñāpāramitā*, it appears to me that the only thing that can be said is this that the *maṅgalācarana* of the *Pañjikā* simply suggests a special importance of both the works, the *Pañjikā* and the BA. Thus the *maṅgalācarana* of Book IV cannot conclusively show that it is an independent work and not the continuation of the preceding ones. But here is a thing which should not be left unnoticed. Both at the beginning and at the end of Book IV there is a *maṅgalācarana* in the form of *namaskāra* 'paying homage.' Does it not imply that the Book is an independent work and complete in itself?

Let us discuss here another point. We have already seen that a number of *kārikās* in Books II and III

¹⁵ We have some ground to think that at the beginning of Book I a few *kārikās* are now missing. It is not improbable that there was a *maṅgalācarana* in those *kārikās*.

¹⁶ As the first folio of the MS, the basis of the present edition (*Bibliotheca Indica*) of BAP is lost, and the second one, in some parts illegible, is broken down, the beginning lines of BAP could not be printed. Hence it could not be ascertained from the edition as to whether there is any *maṅgalācarana* at the beginning. Yet, from its Tibetan version we know that it actually exists.

are repeated in Book IV. Why is this repetition? Moreover, certain things treated of before are discussed again in Book IV; e.g., *ajātivāda* 'theory of non-origination' discussed in III is discussed again in IV. But why? A point discussed and settled once in a chapter may, if necessary, be alluded to in a subsequent chapter, but why should it be discussed and settled again? Is it not useless? Why should the author of Book IV indulge in such a useless action? This leads one to think that Book IV is an independent work in which the author has incorporated certain things that are already dealt with by him elsewhere, while others are discussed again more elaborately or in a different way. The discussion of the *ajātivāda* is an instance on the point.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that these four Books are four independent treatises and are put together in a volume under the title of the *Āgamaśāstra*.

§ 4. The Text of the *Āgamaśāstra*

We are now to discuss a few points regarding the text of the *ĀŚ*, as we have now in the extant editions and the MSS examined for them. Here arises a question: Is it that the text is a complete one? It seems to me that the answer cannot be given in the affirmative. It will at once occur to the mind of a reader that the first *kārikā* of Book I has found its place there quite abruptly. Without any reference to the three states, waking, dreaming and deep sleep as described in the

prose passages of the MāU this *kārikā* is not intelligible.¹ It appears therefore that one or more *kārikās* here are missing.²

It may be said that as in Book IV,³ so here, too, at the beginning of Book I, a *mangalācaraṇa* is expected, but it is not found. Hence it appears that originally at least one *kārikā* was composed here for it, but subsequently somehow or other it was lost. This point of *mangalācaraṇa* cannot, however, be much insisted upon. For, in the time of the author of the ĀŚ this practice of *mangalācaraṇa* was not so much persisted in as in later days. The great Śaṅkara, the author of the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, does not follow it, so far as his undisputed works are concerned.⁴ So it may be that the author did not like it at the beginning of Book I, though he actually followed it in Book IV. Thus this point is not of much importance.

Let one read *kārikās* 5 and 6 and say if there is any connexion between them. *Kārikā* 6 seems to have come here all of a sudden. The commentator Ś is silent here on their mutual connexion. Does this not lead one

¹ This fact should not, however, be taken as a reason for supposing the priority of the MāU to the *kārikās* refuted elsewhere on strong grounds.

² According to also those who hold that the *kārikās* of *Gaudapāda* are written as an explanation (*vyaṅgyāna*) of the MāU, one might naturally expect at the beginning some words to that effect, but they are not found. In accordance with this theory also at least one *kārikā* is lost here.

³ The commentary on the *Saṅkhyakārikā* may also be added here, but it is not quite certain that its author and the author of ĀŚ, though both of them are known by the same name, *Gaudapāda*, are identical.

⁴ It is disputed that the beginning *śloka*s of the commentary on the TU, which go by his name are actually written by him.

to think that a *kārikā* or *kārikās* are missing here? They might have been in existence in the time of the commentator, and possibly they were commented upon by him, but all this was lost afterwards.

Undoubtedly *Om* is one of the subject matters of Book I which consists of 29 *kārikās*, but until *kārikā* 19 there is no mention whatsoever of the word. This does not seem to be quite proper. And here is one thing more to be borne in mind; it is this that without a knowledge of the fact that *Om* can be analysed into *a*, *u*, and *m* this *kārikā* (19) can hardly be understood, so one expects here something like the prose passage 8 of the *MāU*.

With reference to some of the *kārikās* it appears to me that their original order has been somehow or other changed, so that their proper elucidation has been difficult. Let us take *kārikā* II 33. I am afraid, it does not fit well here after *kārikā* II. 32. Its right place seems to be after II. 30. Similarly in Book IV *kārikās* 38, 39, 40 and 41 appear to be 40, 38, 41 and 39 respectively, as is discussed in a foot-note on p 146.

As regards IV. 77, it seems to me that between its two lines at least two more lines are lost, as will be seen from the discussion on p 184, to which the reader is referred.

This consideration coupled with that of the variants that are supported by Ś in his commentary, as I have discussed in their places, shows that the original text of the *ĀŚ* of *G a u d a p ā d a* underwent some serious changes at least by the time of Ś, if not earlier.

§ 5. Readings of the Text

We may now speak here a few words with regard to the readings of the ĀŚ. The collation¹ of the MSS referred to above as well as of the different editions of the work has resulted in showing or suggesting true or better readings in many cases, which have mainly been discussed under the *kārikās* concerned, giving the grounds for the readings adopted. There are, however, other cases where I have not offered my reasons for selecting a particular reading, as they can easily be understood by the reader himself. Below will be found, for example, some notable readings that are chosen or suggested :

1. *dve tu* (I. 11^d) for *dvau tu*.
2. *saṃvṛtalvaṃ na* (II. 4^b) for *saṃvṛtalvena*.
3. *'pi pratipadyate* (II. 7^b) for *vipratipadyate* See IV. 32^b.
4. *'vyavasthītān* (II. 13^b) for *vyavasthītān*.
5. *nānyabhāvena* (II. 34^a) for *nātmabhāvena*
6. *sa-yathā* (III. 11^d) for *khaṃ yathā*.
7. *yad a°* (IV. 12^a) for *yady a°*. As we have *yadi* in ^b, it cannot again be expected in ^a; nor can it, in that case, be construed properly. Besides, the reading *yad a°* is actually found in V².
8. *'nādih* (IV. 23^a) for *'nādech*, and *jātir*⁴⁾ supported by PU¹ for *hy ādir*.
9. *samsāro nopalabhyatē* (IV. 56^d) supported by A¹ and IO for *samsāram na prapadyate*.

¹ For a detailed account see Appendix II, Variants, pp. 229-244

10. *svabhāvena* (IV. 57^a) for *sadbhāvena*.
11. *saṃvṛtyā* (IV. 58^b) supported by V^v and Ś for *jāyanle*.
12. *paratantrō 'bhi*^o (IV. 73^c) for *paratantrābhi*^o.
13. *paratantrō 'bhi*^o (IV. 74^d) for *paratantrābhi*^o.
14. *dharmadhātūḥ svabhāvataḥ* (IV. 81^d) for *dharmo dhātusva*^o.

§ 6. The Name of the Work

The present work popularly known as *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* (or ^o*kārikās*) or *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* (or ^o*kārikās*) is traditionally called *Āgamaśāstra*. It is owing to this fact that the commentary on it by Ś is called *Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa*¹. Sometimes it is named also *Āgamagrantha* or *Upadeśagrantha* as some of the colophons show (p. 244), occasionally both of these names are used together (*loc. cit.*). It is also called or described as *Māṇḍūkyavārttika*,² or *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-gauḍapādayākyāna*, or *Gauḍapādiyakārikā*, or simply *Gauḍapādiya* after its author, as is shown by some MSS. Again, sometimes it is referred to as *Māṇḍūkyasākhā*³

¹ See the Colophons, pp. 231, 234, 236, 244

² The word *vārttika* is not properly used here, as the present work has not the characteristics of a *vārttika*, for a *vārttika* is said to be a work which criticises what is said, what is not said, and what is said wrongly in the original work, as says Rājasekhara in his *Kācāyaminimāṃsā*, GOS, No. 1, 1916, II p. 5: *uktānuktaduruktacintā vārttikam*

³ Śaṅkara on TA, VII 1 (p. 483), VII 2 (p. 570)

māyāmātram idam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ |

nī māṇḍūkyasākhāyām śrutivākyam udāhṛtam |

Here 17 of our text is referred to. For other two names see § 1, note B, p. xxxv

It may be noticed here that two MSS, D' and D², describe the work as *Vedāntamūla* 'origin of the Vedānta' which is very significant.

Now let us discuss as to why this book is called *Āgamaśāstra*. The word *āgama* among other things means 'a traditional doctrine' or 'anything handed down and fixed by tradition'; and *śāstra* gives the sense in such cases as the present one, of 'a religious or authoritative treatise.'¹ Thus the compound word, *Āgamaśāstra*, means a *śāstra* pertaining to *āgama*, i.e., authoritative treatise which deals with or is based on a traditional doctrine or doctrines. That the *Āgamaśāstra* is in fact of such character is fully borne out throughout the book itself, as the following few lines will show.

Besides the general meaning 'to remember' the root √*smṛ* figuratively means also 'to hand down memoriter, declare,' and so its past participial form *smṛta* is used in the sense of 'handed down memoriter, or declared, mentioned,' etc. Thus the sentence *śāstre smṛtam* means 'it is handed down memoriter or declared in a scripture.' And though the subject of the sentence is not expressed in this or similar cases, it is easily understood, it being a teacher or teachers or a similar person or

¹ For *āgama* see MV, pp. 268-9. For the Buddhist interpretation of the word *śāstra* one may be referred to MVST, p. 4 from which the following is quoted here:

yaś cā chāsti ca kleśarūpūn asaññān santrāyate durgatito bhayā ca |
tāś cāśāsnāññān trānagunāś ca śāstram*

It is quoted also in MV, p. 3. For a description of *śāstras* see Rāja-
tēkhara, *Op cit.*, II. For the significance and importance of the word
śāstra (Tibetan *baśon* *bcos*, Chinese *lun*), mark its use in Nāgārjuna's
fundamental work, *Mādhyamakāśāstra*.

persons who may or may not have been mentioned before. Now with regard to our case the word *smṛta* is employed by our author not less than eleven times.⁵ This fact clearly shows that our author refers to or deals with some doctrine or doctrines handed down traditionally. This is clear also from his employment of the following phrases in the work :

1. *satām iti viniścayah* (I. 6); 2. *svapna āhur maṇi-
ṣinah* (II. 2); 3. *svapna āhuh prakāṣitam* (II. 3); 4. *evam
āhur maṇiṣiṇah* (II. 5); 5. *dṛṣṭam vedānteṣu vicakṣānaih*
(II. 31); 6. *iti tattvavido viduḥ* (II. 34); 7. *°munibhir
vedapāragaih | nirvikalpo hy ayaṃ dṛṣṭah prapañcopaśamo
'dvayaḥ ||* (II. 35); 8. *vādinah kecid* (II. 3), 9. *vivadanto
'dvayā hy evam ajātiṃ khyāpayanti te* (IV. 4); 10.
khyāpyamānām ajātiṃ taiḥ (IV. 5); 11. *jātum icchanti
vādinah* (IV. 6).⁶

§ 7. The Author

We have already seen,⁷ as the great Śaṅkara says in his commentary on the BS, I. 4. (4 and II 1. 9, that the work was by an Ācārya 'teacher' to whom the tradition of the Vedānta was known. But the question

⁵ I 1, 20, 26, II 4 7, III 1, IV 32, 46, 88, 90, 94

⁶ Besides, the following words may be referred to here : 1 *arya* (I 7), 2 *apara* (II 25), 3 *āstomaśid* (II 27), 4 *kālocintaka* (I 8), 5 *kālarid* (II 24), 6 *ganacid* (II 20), 7 *ettacid* (II 25), 8 (*dig-*) *id* (II 24), 9 *pāderid* (II 21), 10 *prānacid* (II 20), 11 *buddhicid* (II 25), 12 (*bhāṣana-*) *id* (II 24), 13 *vādinah-jana*² (II 23), 14 *śiṣyāṅga*³ (II 22), 15 *śiṣyā-kṛt* (II 22), 15 *manocid* (II 25), 16 *mārlarid* (II 23), 17 *laya-* *id* (II 23), 18 *lokeid* (II 21), 19 *sūktmacid* (II 23), 20 *argurid* (II 28), 20 *sthiticid* (II 28)

⁷ See *supra*, § 1, notes 5 and 6, p. xxxiv

is: who is that Ācārya? That he is Gauḍa-pāda² is well-known traditionally and found in the colophons of each of the four Books in MSS of the original and its commentary. He is sometimes called Gauḍapādācārya,³ Gauḍācārya,⁴ or simply Gauḍa.⁵ From this we may think that his real name is Gauḍa, the words -pāda, -pada, -caraṇa, or -ācārya being added to it simply as honorific.⁶ That his actual name is Gauḍa is stated very clearly by Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (middle of the 17th century A.D.) in his SMV, p. 6, ll. 9-12.

Now the question arises: Is the word Gauḍa his personal name or does it simply signify that he belongs to a country called Gauḍa?⁷ In Sureśvara's NS₁, IV. 44, there are two words, *Gaudas* and *Drāvidas*, which refer to Gauḍapādācārya, the author of the present work and the great Śankarācārya, the author of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, respectively, according

² Sometimes we have Gauḍapada (JM, 10), and Gauḍacarana (SMV, p. 5, l. 23), most probably for metrical exigency

³ See ŚU, I 8 (p. 30)

⁴ PD, II 23, Śāyana on TA, VII 2 (p. 565)

⁵ NS₁, IV 44

⁶ A Venkatasubbiah (IA, 1933, p. 193) is of the same opinion

⁷ There is evidence to show that the country called *Gaudadesa* was once regarded as the land between 82° and 88° longitude and 25° and 28° latitude along with the adjacent districts of North Bengal (*Matsya P.*, XII 30, *Kūrma P.*, Part I, 20-9 *Linga P.*, Part I, l. 65, 34 JASB, 1908, pp. 273 ff). Recent researches show that the country is identical with North Bengal. See Harachandra Chakradar *Annals of the Bhanderkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. III, Part I pp. 43 ff

to the commentator, *Jñānottama*.⁸ It may be said that as *Śaṅkara* is referred to by a name related to his native country, *Draviḍa* (i.e., Kerala, the modern Malabar), and not by a personal name, so the case must have been the same with *Gaudapāda*; in other words, he, too, 'must have been alluded to by a name connected with his country which is *Gauḍa*. Otherwise, why should *Sureśvara* mention him in a different way?

Wallerer (*op. cit.*, p. 3) is of opinion that by the two words of *Sureśvara*, *Gauḍaś* and *Drāviḍas*, we are to understand two Vedantic schools. If we are to know by the word *Drāviḍas* a school founded by *Śaṅkara* in Malabar (the representative work of which is here said to be the *Upadeśasāhasri*), we must take also the *Gauḍas* as a native school established in North India in the land of *Gauḍas*,⁹ which might have already been much advanced in culture. It is, however, immaterial, to my mind, to discuss as to whether the words actually refer to the two

⁸ It may be noticed here that in the second edition (*Bombay Sanskrit Series*, No XXXVIII, 1906) of the NS: occurs the following line in *Jñānottama*'s commentary on IV 44 *kevalānām api drāvidatva-prāddheḥ*. Seeing this the editor Colonel G. A. Jacob writes in his notes (p. 247) "Who are the *kevalas* referred to in the commentary?" The fact is that the word *kecala* is wrongly written, or read, or printed for *Kerala*, the ancient name of the country. The same mistake occurs also in the revised edition (1926) of the book, p. 193.

⁹ Wallerer thinks that the country might have been so named owing to much cultivation of sugar cane (*ḡuḍa*). Cf. the word *pundra* for North Bengal, which also means 'sugar-cane' (of red variety).

representative teachers or to the two schools represented by them, both the interpretations being equally possible.

It may be pointed out here that merely the word *Gauda* cannot invariably refer to one who is an inhabitant of the Gaudadeśa. One may not actually be an inhabitant of it, yet, may be regarded as a Gauda. *A b h i n a n d a*, the author of the *Yogavāsisthasāra* or *Laghuyogavāsistha*, though a Kashmirian, is called Gauda. Similarly *B r a h m ā n a n d a*, the well-known author of the *Laghucandrikā*, though not born in Gaudadeśa, has the epithet *Gauda*, probably as he was educated in Gaudadeśa, Bengal, being, as is said, a fellow student of *Gadādhara Bhattācārya*. One who has any connexion, past, present, or future, in respect of oneself or one's ancestors, with the Gaudadeśa may be a Gauda. On this one may be referred to MD, I. 3. 23 with *Ś a b a r a s v ā m i n*'s commentary in which it is said that a man who has set out for the city of Mathurā is regarded as a Māthura; similarly one who lives in the city of Mathurā, or one who has come out from the city of Mathurā is also called a Māthura.¹⁰

With regard to our author we should remember here the views of *B ā l a k ṛ ṣ ṇ ā n a n d a S a r a s v a t ī* already once referred to. He writes (SMB, p 6, ll. 9-12). There was in the country of Kuruksetra a river

¹⁰ mathurāyām abhiprasthito māthura ut mathurāyām vasan mathurāyā nṛgatai ca

called *Hirarāvati*.¹¹ On its banks there were some Gauda people, the pre-eminent of whom was our author, and as he was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the *Dvāpara* age, his special name is not known to modern people and so he is—celebrated by the general one.¹²

Let us notice here the observations made by Walliser (*op. cit.*, pp. 6 ff.). He thinks there was none named Gaudapāda who is believed to have been the author of the present work. By the word *Gaudapādas* we are to understand the four Books (*prakaraṇas*) of the work and *Gaudapādiyakārikā* is the name for the whole work, as found in MSS. This last title seems to be somewhat artificial and it can be guessed that the work was commonly known as *Gaudapādi* in the same way as the provincial expression *Bhadracarī* for *Bhadracaryā*. In fact both the titles *Gaudapādi* and *Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa* have been shown by C. F. Hall in one of his contributions.¹³ Walliser says further that the quotations from later works correspond to his opinion that no teacher known as Gaudapāda was the author of the book, but it

¹¹ It remains to be identified. It is doubtful if the name is correctly written by the scribe of the MS or read or edited accurately by the editors.

¹² *gaudacaranaṁ kurukṣetradefagata-hirarāvati-naditirabhava-gaudapādīśreṣṭhā defavīcābhavajātināmnaiva prasiddhāḥ, dvāparayugam śrabhyaiṣa samādhimisthatvenādhunikajarair aparjātavīcābhiddhāṇāḥ sāmānyanāmnaiva lokavikhyātāḥ*

¹³ Such practice is not very common in the country of *Vidyāsāgara*, as seen by Ānandapūrṇa Vidyāsāgara on the *Khandanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, *Rāmabhadri*, as also on the *Nyāpakusumāra* by Rāmabhadra, so are *Dinakarī*, *Rāmaradri*, etc. etc.

existed among the contemporary people as a fundamental work of a school and not as a production of a definite author. He shows from the Tibetan sources¹¹ that though the work was known to the Buddhist authors as a *Vedāntaśāstra* in which the doctrines of the school are explained, nothing is known there of Gauḍapāda who is supposed to have composed it. Śaṅkara in his *Śārīrakaḥṭhāya* quotes twice, as shown above, from the work referring to our author (or authors) as those to whom was known the tradition of the Vedānta (*vedāntārthasampradāyavid* or simply *sampradāyavid*). The commentator, Govindānanda in his *Ratnaprabhā* and Ānandagiri in his *Nyāyanirnaya* introduce the above opinion of Śaṅkara as the 'approval of the old' (*viddhasammata*, BS, I. 4. 14 and II. 1. 9). Sureśvara¹² has quoted two *lārikās* (NSi, IV. 41, 42; our text I 11 and 15 respectively) mentioning their author as Gaudas (*gaudatā*),¹³ while he takes Śaṅkara as the representative of the Drāvida tradition. In the commentary on the NSi Jñānottara describes the quoted passages as *gaudapādīya-vākya*. We have already seen in the PD (II 28) the Gauda teaching, but the commentator, Rāmākṛṣṇa, does not know

11 That is the Tibetan translations of *Sāntirakṣita's Madhyamakālanṅkaratāṅkā* together with its commentary by Kamalaśīla, as well as of *Bhāvavivēka's Madhyamakāhodayaṭarika* and its commentary *Tarkayāla* by himself. Vide *infra*.

12 It is however not true that Sureśvara never mentions the name *Gaudapada* for he uses it at least once in his BVV, IV 4 2% (p. 196). In the same work he has also used the words *gaudapādīya* (loc. cit. IV 4 39%, p. 510) and *gaudacarya* (II 1 3%, p. 95).

the author, he describes the passage quoted as *ācārya-sammati*. Śaḍānanda quotes in his *VeS*, § 33, two *kārikās*, III. 44, 45, referring as *tad uktam*, and *Nṛsiṃha Sarasvatī*, the commentator, does not name their author simply alluding to them as *vrddhasammati* 'the opinion of the old.' Rāmā-tīrtha, another commentator, says that it is a contemporary opinion. Again, if we examine *Kāśmiraka Yati*, the author of the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* (p. 277) we find no evidence that the *Gauḍapādakārikā* was known to him as a work of a single author. *Vijñānabhikṣu* has quoted *kārikās* (II. 32, III. 5, 26) from the work in his *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, (I. 45, 47; 153; VI. 50). But there is nothing to show that *Gauḍapāda* was taken to be their author. Walliser thus says that not a single passage¹⁶ can be quoted from all these texts which can make us believe that *Gauḍapādi* had *Gauḍapāda* as its author. We are told that Śaṅkara received instruction from Govinda who was a disciple of *Gauḍapāda* with whom the former had a conversation and he had another conversation with Vyāsa himself. The same sort of contradiction is found also with regard to the residence of Govinda, one source gives it as the banks of the Narmadā and the other the Himālayas. This sort of things does not give us a historical clue.

¹⁶ Not *vrddha* as writes Walliser

¹⁷ Excepting, as he himself has pointed out, one passage from Śa commentary on the *ŚU*, I 8, where the following line occurs *tathā ca tukaṭayo gauḍapādācāryah*. But that the commentary is not by the great Ś is the view not only of Walliser but also of others including the present author

W a l l e s e r thus finally observes that the whole tradition is fabulous, and with this the last of the arguments in favour of the authorship of *Gaudapādi* by a certain *G a u d a p ā d a* vanishes. And as one could not explain the word *Gaudapādi* one imagined a fictitious *G a u d a p ā d a*. Now he adds that for the history of Vedānta we can gather from the preceding discussion that in a time considerably before the activities of *Ś a n k a r a* there existed a philosophical school in the country of Gauḍa and in the same district in which Buddhism flourished till the eighth century. This school for the first time put the traditions of the Vedas and Upaniṣads in the form of a *śāstra*, i.e., a school doctrine and embodied it in a collection of sayings (*Spruchsummlung*) consisting of the four *pādas* of the *Gaudapāda-kārikā*. Already in the time of *Ś a n k a r a* this text, the only older Vedānta text which has been preserved and perhaps the only one which was ever produced, enjoys high consideration quite independently of legendary traditions which connect *Ś a n k a r a* with *G o v i n d a* and *Ś u k a* with *G a u ḍ a p ā d a*. The existence of the North Indian school at the beginning of the century preceding *Ś a n k a r a* seems well-established.

We are, however, to consider here the following without entering into a hair-splitting discussion. There is a text before us known as the *Āgamaśāstra* or *Gaudapāda-kārikā*, or passing under any other similar name; and of this text there must be an author. There may, however, be more than one author. The

work may represent the view of the predominant school of a particular people. But can we only for this reason think that it is the production of the whole people of the land? When a very prominent man of a country pronounces something in public, it may be regarded as the opinion of the country itself, and not as his personal view, though he may not consult the people of the country before doing so. In the same way, it appears to me, that the present work is by one person and yet, it represents the views of the entire country to which he belonged. But who is that person? He is one *G a u d a*. When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition, as far as possible? Thus, as we have already seen, the actual name of the author is *G a u d a*, or with the honorific word *-pāda* or *ācārya* added to it *G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a*, or *G a u ḍ ā c ā r y a*.

Much could be known of any author from the old records on which naturally one inclines to depend for ascertaining the truth. But they are so fantastic and self contradictory in the present case that it is almost impossible to find out the truth from them.¹⁹ These

¹⁹ On their unreliability observes S. K. Pölvalkar in his *Vedānta Philosophy*, Poona, 1929, pp. 231-232. "while all the other so-called Prācīna, Brhat, or Keraliya Śāṅkaravijayas are prejudiced in favour of one or the other Pontifical See, and so contain almost shameless tampering of traditions and documents which is provable to the hilt even by the accusations on the score of falsification of records which each party finds it possible to bring against the other. When such is the case of the avowed followers of the School, it need hardly be wondered at if the pronounced opponents belonging to the Mādhva and the Rāmānujīya Schools have gone one better, and indulged in a merciless throwing of mud in the hope that some of it might stick."

records are the accounts of the life of the great Śaṅkara and those who were connected with him in some way or other.¹⁹ Readers desirous of knowing these legendary accounts of Gauḍapāda are referred to those works themselves which are to be used very cautiously.

§ 8. The Date of Gauḍapāda

Now let us discuss the date of our author, and in doing so we shall begin from one of the old accounts of the school already referred to, viz., JM, in which Gauḍapāda is mentioned as having some connexion with a few Greeks. It is said there (10)¹ that the feet of Gauḍapāda were adored by Āyārcya, and he was the preceptor of such Niṣāka mystics as Apalūnya. Here Ātmabodhendra, the commentator, adds something on the authority of such works as *Gauḍapādollāsa* of Harimīśra, and *Patañjalīvijaya* (= °carita? of Rāmabhādra Dīkṣita). He writes that when Gauḍapāda on a peak of the Himālayas was seeking after the truth of the self under the guidance

¹⁹ Gopinath Kavirāṇi singles out the following books in his learned Introduction (in Hindi) to the *Brahmasūtras* published from the Acvuta Press, Benares, 1936, pp 26 ff. (1) *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Mādhavācārya (not of Vidyāraṇya), (2) *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Ānandagiri, (3) *Śaṅkarabhṭya* of Rājacūḍamaṇi, (4) *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Cidvilāsa, (5) *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Sadānanda, (6) *Puṇyasthokamañjarī* of Sarvajña Sadāśivabodha, (7) *Puṇyasthokamañjarī-parīkṣā* of Ātmabodha, (8) *Gururātnamālā* of Sadāśivabrahmendraprītiśa, Suvarṇa, by Ātmabodhendra is a good one.

¹ ॥ १॥ गौडपाद-आचार्य-पुण्यारंभ-अपलुन्यादित्वात् । अद्वैतानुसारेण ।

atha gauḍapādān pharaṇaṁ al lēya-pāṇiṁ mātān l. p. rāṇiṁ pāpādye

of Ś u k a,² it was through his influence that the wrong Buddhistic views (*śauddhodani-kaḍadhvanām*) of the persons headed by Ayārcya who was being attended by such Yogins, belonging to the Western border of the country as Apalūnyā and Damīśa (*apalūnya-damīśādyaparāntyayogibhiś ca*), as well as by Prāvṛti, the Śākya chief of Taxila (*taṭśaśilādhiśa-śākyaprāvṛti-pramukhaiḥ*), were made to disappear.

If here one turns over the pages of *The Indian Travels of Apollonius of Tyana* by Osmund de Beauvoir Priaulx, JRAS, 1860, pp. 70 ff., one will easily see that Apalūnyā in the Sanskrit text is no other than the Pythagorean philosopher Apollonius of Tyana, who flourished in the first century A.D. He travelled to India and came to the court of Phrōtes who was the same as Prāvṛti in the Sanskrit text, the king of Taxila. And Damīśa of our text is identical with Damis,

² In connection with Gaudapāda's *topasya* in the Himālayas the following story may be related here from Nārāyaṇa's *līkā* on MāU. The four parts of the MāU of the *recension* of the RV (yet, note that the Upaniṣad is said to belong to the AV) were explained by Gaudapāda by his four Books (*prākaraṇas*). He was a disciple of Ś u k a and the grand preceptor of Ś. He flourished at the end of the age called *Dvāpara*. At the hermitage of Badarikā by his devotion he propitiated Nārāyaṇa and having obtained a boon from him he entered into a cave of a mountain, so that he would not look at the face of any one born in the age of *Kālī*. In this state he was approached by Ś and requested to come out from the cave, but he did not comply with the request. Yet having written the four Books of his work on the leaves of a Banyan tree with red chalk he gave them to Ś. *Report of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Southern India* by E. Hultzsch, No. III, p. 133. But there is no end of such legends on which one can hardly rely.

the fellow traveller and friend of Apollonius. The last person in our text, Ayārcya, is the same and one with Iarchas (probably a corruption from Rac'h yas, *op. cit.*, p. 83, note), a Greek king.³

All this looks well, but do you gain anything from it about the date in question? The Greek account simply relates the travel of Apollonius,⁴ being completely silent about Gaḍapāda. There is no doubt that some names of both the accounts are identical, but it does not follow from it that the persons having the same names are also identical. Supposing that the account is true it will be for a further creation of confusion in settling the date even of the great Ś, into which we do not enter here as useless.

Hence without having recourse to such legendary records for the determination of the date of our teacher

³ Perhaps it is M. Hirsyanna (*IHQ*, 1926, pp 415-416) who has first made the identification. See also Gopinath Kaviraj, *op cit.*, pp 22-23.

⁴ How far this account is true it is not easy to say, *Prieux*, the author of the paper observes (*Op cit.*, p 104). "of Damis's geography, I can only say that it reminds me of a fairy tale. Who shall explain these discrepancies, account for these mistakes and fix localities thus vaguely described?" "Reviewing the whole work of Philostratus (*ie*, the original author of the life of Apollonius) it seems to me that Apollonius certainly pretended to have travelled through and made some stay in India, but that very possibly he did not visit it, our Damis never accompanied him, but if we may judge from cinnamon and pepper-trees, fabricated this journal perhaps from books written upon India, and tales current about India, which he easily collected at the great mart for Indian commodities, and resort for Indian merchants—Alexandria."

we should take a safer course by which at least the upper and lower limits of his time can be ascertained.

I think we have no reason for discarding what Walliser has said in this respect. So far three Buddhist writers are known to us, who have actually quoted Gauḍapāda, viz., Bhāvaviveka (cir. 500-550 A.D.),⁵ Śāntirakṣita (705-762 A.D.), and his disciple Kamalaśīla. Bhāvaviveka is the author of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* as well as of its commentary *Tarkajvālā*, the full title being *Madhyamakahrdayavṛtti Tarkajvālā*. In chapter VIII of his work Bhāvaviveka reviews the system of the Vedāntins as he does in other chapters the systems of Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā. In doing so Bhāvaviveka in his TJ, VIII has quoted passages from such texts as ChU, ŚU and MuU. Besides, there are some other passages quoted, four of them (10-13) being very important in the present connexion. While the first three have the closest relationship with three kārikās of our text the last (i.e., TJ, VIII. 13) is entirely identical with III. 5 of our

⁵ Or Bhavya, as he is sometimes called, or Bhāvaviveka as suggested from the Tibetan sources 'legs ldon lbyed'. Bhāvaviveka was the founder of the Prāsāngika school of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamika system. He is much criticised by Candrakīrti in his MV. I. Bhāvaviveka's *Pratyāpradīpīśīra* (Nanjio, No 1183) was translated into Chinese by Prahasikara Miira in 630-632 AD. He was a junior contemporary of Dharmapāla (Th. Watters: *On Yuan Chuang's Travels in India*, II p 222) who lived in the 5th century AD (Winternitz: *History of Indian Literature*, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol II, p. 362). Thus it can be said that the date of Bhāvaviveka is 500 AD, or a few years after it.

text. There is, therefore, not an iota of doubt here that the GK was known to *Bhāvavivēka*. With reference to the other three *kārikās* cited by *Bhāvavivēka*, which are not identified in the GK, but have the closest relationship, we have to seek after another source.

As regards *Śāntirakṣita* he is the author among others of the *Madhyamaḥālankarāḥikā* as well as of its commentary called *Madhyamaḥālankāraṭṭhi*. Besides, his disciple *Kamalaśīla* has written a *Pañjikā* on the former work just as on the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. *Śāntirakṣita* in his MAK, 93, discusses the views of the Aupanisadas (lit. Aupānisadānusārin, Tib. gsan.ba.pahi. rjes.su.ḥbrañ.ba.dag),⁶ and in doing so he cites there not less than ten *kārikās* from our text which is referred to by *Kamalaśīla* in his *Pañjikā* as an *Upāniṣat śāstra*.⁷

Now as we have seen above we cannot reasonably deny the existence of the GK before *Bhāvavivēka* who has actually quoted it. Thus one may ascertain that the time of *Gauḍapāda* is cir. 500 A.D.

The following consideration, too, leads us to the same decision. *Gauḍapāda* has quoted almost fully, partially or substantially from works of some

⁶ Generally in Buddhist texts we come across similar words, as *Aupāniṣadika* (TSP, śl 328), and *Upāniṣad-tāḍin* (BAP, pp 455, 465), and not *Vedāntacādin* or *Vedāntika*.

⁷ It may be noted that though *Śāntirakṣita* has quoted here so many *kārikās* from GK he has not done so at all in TS (śls 328-335) either from this or any other work. For the *kārikās* quoted in Tibetan works see our text II 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 19, 20, III 4, 5, 6, 8.

celebrated Buddhist teachers who flourished between 200 A.D. and 400 A.D. For instance, see our text, IV. 22^{a-b} :

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate |

And read here N ā g ā r j u n a ' s (200 A.D.) MK, XXI. 13^{a-b} :

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate |

See our text, pp. 105 ff. and 127 ff. Again, we read in our ĀŚ, 7^{c-d} and 29^{c-d} :

prakṛter anyathābhavo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati ||

And in MK, XV. 8^{c-d} we have :

prakṛter anyathābhāvo nahi jātūpapadyate ||

The following line occurs in ĀŚ, IV. 4^b :

abhūtaṃ naiva jāyate |

And let us cite here the following from the CŚ, 373^a of N ā g ā r j u n a ' s' disciple Ā r y a d e v a who probably lived, in the words of W i n t e r n i t z (*A History of Indian Literature*, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol. II, p. 350), "at about the turning point of the second and third century A.D." :

nābhūto nāma jāyate ||

See our text III. 44 (pp. 77-78) :

laye sambodhayec cittaṃ vikṣiptaṃ śamayet punaḥ |

sakaṣāyam vijāñjyāc chamaprāptaṃ na cālayet ||

With this read the following from MAS, XIV. 9^{a-d}—10^{a-b} of M a i t r e y a n ā t h a or Asanga (400 A.D.) :

liṇaṃ cittasya grhṇjyād uddhatam śamayet punaḥ |

śamaprāptaṃ upekṣeta tasminn ālāmbane punaḥ ||

Thus Gaudapāda quoting the above teachers can in no way be placed before them, in other words he cannot be assigned a date before 400 A.D.

Here we are to consider another kārīkā of our author, i.e., IV. 13 which runs thus (see pp. 114-115):

jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyavasthā prasajyate |

Compare this with the following line quoted in MV, p. 13 from the AKV:

utpannasya punar utpattau kalpyamānāyām anavasthāprasangaḥ.

Now this work, AKV, is by Yaśomitra. Before he wrote his own commentary on the AK of Vasubandhu (400 A.D.) there were at least three commentaries, two of them being written by Gunamati (425 A.D.) and Vasumitra, as he himself says in the introductory śloka of his work. This shows that Yaśomitra lived in the 5th century A.D. And so, if Gaudapāda's kārīkā (i.e., IV. 13) is in fact based on the above line of the AKV his date naturally falls in the 5th century A.D.

Certainly this will militate against the traditional time of Śankara or the succession of teachers and disciples of his school. But how far the accounts of this succession can be relied upon is a question which has not yet been settled finally or satisfactorily. Are not the traditional succession lists kept in different Mathas unscrupulously manipulated? Under these circumstances we have no course left to us other than the evidences of

quotations and cross-references in early and reliable texts.⁸ [§ 9. *Alleged Borrowing by Gaudapāda*]

Let us discuss the question from a different point of view. There is a work *Paramārthasāra*⁹ attributed to Śeṣa who is apparently the mythical Śeṣa, as he is referred to in the work itself as *ādhāra* (8), i.e., *jagad-ādhāra* (87). From this some take him as *Paṭaṅjali*, the less mythical Śeṣa, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* on *Pāṇini*.

It is also called *Āryāpañcāṣīti* owing to the fact that it is composed in eighty-five stanzas in the *Āryā* metre, though in fact there are eighty-seven stanzas.¹⁰

⁸ Our old traditions are so divergent that according to them as well as the modern researches we shall have to place Śaṅkara some time between the 6th century B.C. and the 9th century A.D., viz., 6th century B.C., 4th century B.C., 1st century B.C., 4th century A.D., 6th century A.D. and the 9th century (788-820) A.D. The last date is now accepted by many a scholar. See Gopinath Kaviraj, *op cit.* pp. 23 ff., Belvalkar, *op cit.* pp. 209 ff.

⁹ There are so far at least five editions of this book, the latest and critical one being by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastrī (Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes), Karnataka Publishing House, Bombay, 1941.

¹⁰ It may be that the first two stanzas which are not in *Āryā*, but *Upajāti*, were added later on. But, if it is so, as regards the first of them, it was added long before Abhinavagupta who has adopted it just at the beginning of his PS¹, I. The last stanza (87 -vedānta*) does not also appear to constitute the original, being added by a second hand, as is suggested by Suryanarayana Sastrī, *op cit.* p. 40, note. Mark here the employment of the perfect tense, in the word *babandha*. The original number, 85, can however, be obtained by reckoning an additional stanza between 18 and 19 given from a MS in a foot-note in the Trivandrum edition (PS) being fully supported by PS¹, 9 (and not 6 as in PS¹).

in the hope that this may decide the case. He writes :
 "Both are concerned with the three forms—Viśva,
 Taijasa and Prājña—as veiling the fourth which is the
 real."¹⁷ This refers, as he says, to PS¹, 31 and GK, I.
 1 and 11.

The most important thing to be pointed out here first
 is that between the two texts, ĀŚ and PS¹, the latter is
 certainly a later development, as a perusal of the texts will
 show. Let us, however, make an attempt to understand
 PS¹, 31 as it is before us without taking any help either
 from the commentator or from *Abhinavagupta*.¹⁸
 The word *jāgrat-svapna-susupta* is an adjective of *viśva-
 taijasaprajña*. But what is to be understood from the
 abrupt statement that Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are
jāgrat, *svapna* and *susupta* respectively? What are these
 three, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña? How can one know
 them? How is one to understand that there is only
 one and the same who is regarded as three (i.e., Viśva,
 etc.) owing to three different stages (i.e., *jāgrat*, etc.)?
 How is it that *turya* undoubtedly referring to *Vāsudeva*
 in the preceeding *kārikā* (30) is put in the neuter gender,

¹⁷ Is the last part of this statement exactly so? Do *chādita* in PS¹, 31
 (= *ācīta* in P¹, 34) and -*baddha* in *kāryakāraṇabaddha* and *kaṇabaddha* in
 GK, I 11 convey the same idea? We are to consider here GK, I 15 and
 NS₁ (IV 41, 42) where these two *kārikās* of *Gaudapāda* are quoted

¹⁸ He has here the following two *kārikās* (PS¹, 34 and 35)

śrīstutitīṣṭisamhāṣā jāgrat-svapnau susuptam iti tasmin |

bhānti turye dhāmanī tathāpi taiḥ svitam bhāti

(In the first half of this *kārikā* in PS¹ quoted in foot-note 2- *svapnam* is to
 be read as -*svapnau* :

jāgrat viśvam bhedaḥ svapnau tejah prakāśamāhātmyāt |

prājñāh sup-śvasthā jñānaghaṇatāt itaḥ param turyam

while the latter word is in the masculine?'' Moreover, what is the significance of *tañ* in the first half? If it is not superfluous, what is it that it refers to? How far are we justified with the commentator in taking the word with *chādita* in the second half? Again, why is it that *eva* should be used in the first half after *tribhir*? All this taken together shows, as far as I can judge, that Śeṣa's work presupposes that of *Ga u ḍ a p ā d a*, and not *vice versa*. Śeṣa had before him *ĀŚ*, I. 1-5 (as well as *MāU*, 3-7) upon which he has drawn adding something (*ādimadhyaniidhana*) more quite independently as he has done throughout his book. While in *ĀŚ* there are five *kārikās*, Śeṣa has only one, and even in it he has made some addition. This on one hand and the metrical exigency on the other did not allow him, as seems to me, to express his ideas adequately with the result that there occurred some anomalies. Comparing *PS*¹ and *PS*² with the *GK* here it appears to me that as Śeṣa could not express himself adequately and consequently his *kārikā* became obscure *Abhinava* added here one *kārikā* more, as has already been pointed out, explaining all that was absolutely necessary for its proper elucidiation.

Now, what is the source or sources of *Abhinava*'s interpretation here (*kārikās* 34, 35), without which we cannot understand the *kārikā* of Śeṣa? Certainly it was not only *Ga u ḍ a p ā d a*, for such things as

¹ *Abhinava* is quite justified in putting *turya* in the neuter gender as he has before it (*kārikā* 34) *dhāman*, neuter, which is referred to by the former word and we can think that he got it from *GK*, I 5, 22

while the latter word is in the masculine?" Moreover, what is the significance of *taiḥ* in the first half? If it is not superfluous, what is it that it refers to? How far are we justified with the commentator in taking the word with *chādita* in the second half? Again, why is it that *eva* should be used in the first half after *tribhir*? All this taken together shows, as far as I can judge, that Śeṣa's work presupposes that of *Gaṇḍapāḍa*, and not *vice versa*. Śeṣa had before him *ĀŚ*, I 1-5 (as well as *MaU*, 3-7) upon which he has drawn adding something (*ādimadhyanidhana*) more quite independently as he has done throughout his book. While in *ĀŚ* there are five *kārikās*, Śeṣa has only one, and even in it he has made some addition. This on one hand and the metrical exigency on the other did not allow him, as seems to me, to express his ideas adequately with the result that there occurred some anomalies. Comparing *PS*¹ and *PS*² with the *GK*, here it appears to me that as Śeṣa could not express himself adequately and consequently his *kārikā* became obscure *Abhinavagupta* added here one *kārikā* more, as has already been pointed out, explaining all that was absolutely necessary for its proper elucidation.

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śṛṣṭisthitisamhāra cannot be known from his work. One is therefore inclined to say with some amount of certainty that it was partly the work of Ś e ṣ a , and partly the tradition connected with him, though under the present state of our knowledge we do not know if this tradition is recorded anywhere. Nevertheless, we have to accept its existence, as we cannot explain the difficulties without it. The question arises here as to how A b h i n a v a came to know that tradition. Does it not persuade one to think that the distance of time between Ś e ṣ a and A b h i n a v a is not as wide as it is supposed to have been? What is there against thinking 'that PS' and PS' belonged to the same period, though the former must have evidently been a little earlier? In this case the question of the interpretation of the present *kārikā* of Ś e ṣ a given by A b h i n a v a can very satisfactorily be explained. What is there that can be offered for pushing back the date of PS' to a period before GK?

Again, with reference to the creation of the world Ś e ṣ a in his work which deals with the Vedānta has effected a synthesis of the Sankhya and the Vedānta systems by the introduction of the creation from Upendra (= Viṣṇu = Vāsudeva = Hari = Naraṇana-Paramātman = Brahman) through *prakṛti* with the gradual evolution from it of *buddhi* (= *maṇat*), etc. In the process of the creation he has accommodated also the theory of *anda* 'cosmic germ,' found, as for instance, in the *Manusamhitā*, I 8 ff. and the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, I. 2. 58 ff. Here we are to note what Ku l l ū k a observes on *Manusamhitā*, I 8

abhidhyānapūrvikāṃ sṛṣṭiṃ vadato manoh prakṛtir
acetanā 'svatantrā pariṇamata ity ayam pakṣo na
sammataḥ. kintu tridaṇḍivedāntasiddhānta evābhimataḥ
pratibhāti.

It is further elucidated by him in another place
(I. 15) :

nanv abhidhyānapūrvakasṛṣṭyabhidhānād vedanta-
siddhānta eva manor abhimata iti prag uktaṃ, tan na
sangacchate. idāniṃ mahadādīkrameṇa sṛṣṭyabhidhānād
vedantadarśanena ca .paramatmana evākāśādīkramena
sṛṣṭir uktā,^o ucyate, prakṛito mahadādīkrameṇa sṛṣṭir iti
bhagavadbhāskariyadarśane 'py upapadyata itī^o tadvido
vadanti.²¹

Now B h ā s k a r a is one of the post-Ś a n k a r a
commentators of the BS. Undoubtedly he was in the
ninth century A.D. being criticised by V ā c a s p a t i
M i ś r a (841 A.D.) in his *Bhāmātī* (BS, III.
3, 29). Ś e ṣ a seems therefore to have been well
acquainted with the Vedantic system maintained by
B h ā s k a r a and has then combined his theory with
that of M a n u and others according to whom* in the
process of ceation there intervenes the theory of *aṇḍa*.

I do not therefore think that I can concur with
S u r y a n a r a y a n a S a s t r i in suggesting that
"the *Paramārthasāra* is the original drawn upon."
(p. ix).

²¹ See B h ā s k a r a s commentary on the BS (Chaukhamba Sanskrit
Series, 1914), II*1 26. tatas ca brahmanah paramāmānupapattēh pradhānam
astayam iti tātparārthah. U d a y a n a observes in his *Nyāyakaśamāñjali*,
p 332 brahmaparimāter iti bhaskaragotire yujyate

In passing we are to take up another question in this connexion. B. L. Atreya having noticed "much common between *Kārikās* (i.e., GK) and *Yogavāsiṣṭha* not only in thought, but also in language"²¹ concludes that the latter is prior on the following three grounds: (1) The *kārikās* do not form "an independent treatise on the *Advaita Philosophy*," being "a sort of commentary on the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*." (2) "On the other hand, the philosopher Vasiṣṭha claims to have received his doctrines directly from the cosmic mind (*Brahmā*) and to have realised their truth in his own experience. The philosophy of Vasiṣṭha includes almost all the views held by *Gaudapāda*." And (3) "*Gaudapāda-kārikās* represent a later phase of the *Advaita* philosophy, when it tended to become critical, hostile and polemical towards other contemporary schools of thought, whereas *Yogavāsiṣṭha* represents the earlier phase."

As the space at my disposal does not allow me here to enter into a detailed discussion I desire simply to make a few observations as briefly as I can. I do not see that I can follow the above arguments. For, supposing that the GK is a sort of commentary and Vasiṣṭha received his doctrines directly from *Brahmā*, are we in any way justified in thinking that the YV is prior to the GK? Does it follow from that? As regards the third argument of Atreya he thinks that the *Advaita* philosophy as represented in the GK is of a later phase, because it is "critical,

²¹ *Yogavāsiṣṭha and its Philosophy* 1932, p. 14-15

hostile and polemical towards other" systems. But may one ask here: Is there anything in the GK that may be regarded as "critical, hostile and polemical?" If so, what and where is it so? On the contrary, one may find there (GK, III. 17 ; IV. 3-6) clear non-hostility (*avirodha*), and there is no instance of anything that is critical and polemical. If, however, the mention of different views in the GK is meant thereby, the case is the same also with the YV.²²

It is not always safe to conclude the priority or posteriority of one of two works simply seeing the same or similar passage, or thought, occurring in both of them. For instance, we read the following in the GK, II. 6²³ and IV. 31 :

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamane'pi tat tathā |

The same line occurs also in the YV, IV. 45. 45 and a similar one in III. 11. 13, as quoted in our text, p. 142, note 3. Now, apart from the question of the date of the GK, can we determine with any amount of certainty the priority or posteriority of one of the two works unless we take into consideration the other factors that are connected herewith? One may be referred here to the present Annotation on GK, IV. 31, and it will be found that the same thought only in slightly different words is expressed in such works as MK and ĀS, which are undisputably far earlier than YV. Now, if we see that *G a u d a p ā d a* has abundantly drawn upon

²² For instance, see III. 62. 10-11, 84. 22-27, *vivadante hy asambuddhāḥ 'vavikālpavijmbhitāḥ* |

²³ *A t r e y a* has noticed it

such earlier works can we ever think in this or similar cases that he has borrowed from YV, unless there is any strong ground for doing so? When there are two texts containing the same thing, one earlier and the other later, one may quote from either of them; but to decide definitely as to from which one it is actually done one should discuss carefully.

Another instance of what is common to both GK and YV, as noted by *A t r e y a*, is the non-difference between the states of wakefulness and dream (*jāgrat* and *'susupta*), as found in GK, II. 5 and YV, IV. 9, 11 ff. Here, too, when we see that the first half of the GK clearly refers to the BU, IV. 3-14 (see p 19), upon which, just as upon other Upanisads, *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* draws so much, as is evident from the work itself,²¹ how can we think that YV is here the source of GK? On the contrary; a careful perusal of YV will at once show that in his answer to the question put to him by Rāma about the difference between wakefulness and dream *V a s i ṣ ṭ h a* has written a number of ślokaś (YV, IV. 19. 9 ff), and attempted thereby only to explain what is very briefly stated in GK. Does this fact point to the priority or posteriority of YV to GK?

²¹ See next section

²² According to *A t r e y a* the date of YV is the sixth century A D. But his arguments do not appear to me to be strong or convincing. It may be noted here in this connection that there are two things that may specially be mentioned in *Ś v ā m i B h ū m ā n a n d a*'s paper entitled *Priority of the Yogatāsisṭha to Saṅkarācārya* (1) *S a ṅ k a r a* quotes (BS, III 4 50) the *V a s i ṣ ṭ h a d h a r m a ś ā s t r a* (ed. A. A. F u h r e r, Bombay, 1993), V 18,

§ 10. *The Works of Gauḍapāda*

With regard to the works ascribed to G a u ḍ a - p ā ḍ a the only one that can be accepted with certainty as written by him is the ĀŚ. The authorship of a few other books is ascribed to him. The most important of them is a *bhāṣya* on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. There is a *bhāṣya* under his name also on the *Uttaragītā*. But there is no strong ground for holding that they are actually by G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a , the author of the ĀŚ, nor is there anything of the nature that can decide the case otherwise, though I incline to subscribe to the view that they are not by G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a . A commentary, too, on the NUTU is attributed to him. There are three other works which pass under the name of G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a as their author. A commentary on the *Durgāsaptāśatī* is one of them. This is referred to by the great Tantric teacher B h ā s k a r a r ā y a in his commentary on the same

and (2) mentions the name of V a s i s t h a in his commentary on the BG, XIII 4. But the question whether these two V a s i s t h a s, the V a s i s t h a of YV as well as the V a s i s t h a in the list of the teachers of the Śāṅkara school are identical, remains to be settled, though according to some of the authors of the *ṭīkā*s on BG, the V a s i s t h a referred to by Śāṅkara is the author of YV.

¹ There is a manuscript, No 1405, of this work in the Grantha character in the Visvabharatī Library, Santiniketan. The following occurs there on folio 24a

kavacam bijam ādītam argalā śaktir isyate |

kīlakaṁ kīlakaṁ prāhuḥ saptaśatyām mahāmanoh¹

iti gauḍapādadhrtavacanāt

And again yady api vedāntamūrdhanyaīr gauḍepādācāryaīḥ sarvaṁ idam nirvīṣasatpratīpīdakaśāstraparatiṣṭhā vyākhyātam.*

work.¹ The other two are Tantric treatises, viz., *Subhagodaya*² and *Śrīvidyārātnasūtra*.

Here arises a question: Can we think that there are two *Gaudapādas*, one Vedāntic and the other Tantric, being the authors of works on the Vedānta and Tantricism respectively? In the *Śrīvidyārṇava* which is a Tantric work by *Pragalbhācārya*, *Śaṅkarācārya* is said to have been the founder of a Tantric school. There is in this work also a list of the succession of his teachers and disciples. But it seems impossible to reconcile this list with the traditional one of the Advaita Vedānta school. So the list in the *Śrīvidyārṇava* hardly helps us in this matter. Nevertheless, we may simply note in the list given here that there are two *Gaudapādas*, one of them being mentioned as *Gauda* (No. 55) and the other *Gaudapādaka* (No. 65),³ who is, in fact, the same as *Gaudapāda*, the suffix *-ka* being evidently on account of the metrical exigency. On this the reader may form his own judgment.

§ 11. The Sources

The sources of the *Āgamaśāstra*, which one naturally desires to know, roughly fall into three classes, viz.,

¹ 2 It is said that there is a *bhāṣya* on it by *Śaṅkara*.

³ In the verse containing the word as quoted by *Rājendranātha Ghosa* in his *Advaitavāda* (in Bengali), p. 227, the actual reading is *Gaudapādakaḥ*. But *Gopinātha Kaviraj* (op. cit. p. 53), who has not quoted the verse, reads only *Gaudapāda* leaving out the suffix *-ka*, which seems to be right.

(1) Vedic texts: Vedas and Upaniṣads, (2) Schools or Teachers, and (3) Buddhist works.

With regard to class (1), these are mostly Upaniṣads, Vedas being quoted in not more than two cases (III. 24b and c). It is, however, to be noted in this connexion that when there is a passage which occurs both in a Veda and in an Upaniṣad it is very difficult to ascertain as to whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter. For instance, here in III. 24b we have *indro māyābhīr iti*. This is found in RV, VI. 47. 18 as well as in BU, II. 5 19. How can we, in this case, ascertain that the reference is in fact to the one and not to the other? The case is exactly the same with the second instance (III. 24 c) of a quotation from a Veda. Similarly with regard to II. 24 we know much of *kāla* 'time' from the AV, XIX 53, 54 and the ŚU, I 2, IV. 1. But here it is very difficult to conclude whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter, or to the both of them. Again, the *Kālavīds* 'knowers of time' are, as says Ānanda-giri, astronomers, and it is not impossible that our author might have alluded to some work of them, or simply to the view held by them or to their school.

In the course of the present Annotation many references to different Upaniṣads have been inserted in support of a point or points in our text, but which of them, if any, is in fact meant by the author in any particular case we cannot say definitely. It may be that in some cases the Upaniṣadic authority, really meant by the author, is different from what the present

annotator has quoted. For instance, with regard to *pāda* (II. 21) which is capable of being interpreted differently, various references are given in the Annotation, or still other references may be shown. But it is not easy to ascertain the particular reference or references the author himself intended. Nevertheless, it is certain that the author had in his mind any one or more of these or similar passages when he was writing his book.

Among the references in the Annotation the names of the *Bhagavadgītā* (XIII. 22 in II. 22 of our text) and the *Brahmasūtra* (II. 3 19-32 in II. 23 of our text) will be found. But we cannot be sure that these two works are actually drawn upon by our author, though they may elucidate the texts to some extent.

Similarly for the explanation of our text there will be found some references in the Annotation to such minor Upaniṣads (for instance, in II 32) as *Avadhūta Up.*, 8; *Āśrama*°, 4; *Ātma*°, 31; *Jābāla*°, 6; *Tripurā-tāpani*°, V. 10; *Brahmabindu*°, 10. But whether these minor Upaniṣads are prior to the *Āgamaśāstra* is to be left as an open question, though some of them such as *Brahmabindu*° and *Jābāla*°, are before Ś a ṅ k a r a as is quite clear from his commentary on BS, III 2 18 and 4. 20 respectively

In five places (III. 12, 24, 25, 26 and 36) passages from Upaniṣads are expressly quoted, while in III. 11 and 23 the words *Taittirīya* and *śruti* are actually mentioned and in II. 3 a passage of the BU, IV. 3. 10 is clearly alluded to with the word *śrūyate*. Similarly in II. 5 another passage from the same Upaniṣad (BU, IV. 3. 14)

is clearly referred to though with the word *manisins*¹ and not *śruti* as before and usual. In III. 12, 13 and 15 references to Upanisads are also very clear. In two or three more places (I. 2, 8, 9) references seem to have been made to Upanisads.²

It will be seen that no Upanisad is quoted or referred to by our author in his last Book, *Ālātāsānti*. There is absolutely nothing of the kind³

As regards class (2) of the sources readers are referred to § 6: *The Name of the Work* of the present Introduction, p. lxiii, where the names of different schools or teachers alluded to in our text, are mentioned.

It appears from these names that some of the schools or teachers mentioned by our author here were undoubtedly prominent at his time, but gradually they have lost their prominence and have fallen almost into a state of oblivion.

With regard to class (3) of our sources, i.e., the Buddhist texts, the reader is referred to the Annotation on II. 31, 32, 35 (cf. 38), 44, 46, and most of the *kārikās* in Book IV.

§ 12. *The Bṛhadāranyaka Upanisad as the Main Upanisadic Source of the Āgamaśāstra*

In the preceding section we have seen that the BU is one of the sources of the ĀŚ in which there are

¹ As in the Upanisad itself (BU, IV 3 14) there is *atha khalv āh* in our author seems to have chosen to take the nominative as *manisins* and not *śruti*. See II 1, 5, IV 54, and Appendix X Additional Notes, II 1

² See the Annotation

³ With regard to the word *dardarīa* in IV 10) we cannot say definitely that it refers to KU, II 12, as it is often found also in Buddhist works

some quotations from or references to the former. In the present section it is proposed to examine to some extent the inter-relationship of these two works by which we shall see that the main Upanisadic source of the ĀŚ is the BU.

From the text of the ĀŚ as it is before us it is quite clear that *G a u d ā p ā d a* has drawn much upon it. In fact, Book I of our text is mainly based on it. Nay, it may be declared that Book I of the ĀŚ is nothing but an epitome or essence of the BU, IV. 2-3 with some clear exposition and an addition of the *upāsana* 'meditation' of *Pranava* or *Om*. By writing the first Book of the ĀŚ *G a u d ā p ā d a* has in reality made a key to that portion of the BU, without which it would have been extremely difficult to understand its true significance.

The opening part of the ĀŚ, i.e., the part dealing with the three divisions of the One (i.e., *Purusa*) such as *Viśva*, etc. (l. 1-4, 10), is to be found only in different words in the BU, IV. 2-3, as says Śaṅkara very clearly on BU, IV. 3. 1 (p. 519).

We see in our text (I. 1-4, 10) that the One, i.e., Puruṣa¹ (=Brahman=Ātman of the MāU, 2) owing to different states is called Viśva, Taijasa, Prajña and Turya (or Turiya, I. 15). None of these names excepting Prājña (BU, IV. 3. 21 and 35) is, however, to be found in the BU. For Viśva it reads (IV. 2. 2) *Indha* 'shining' which is the same as *Indra*, the former, as the Upaniṣad would say, being used by people cryptically.² As to why the Puruṣa is called *Indha* Sureśvara says (BBV, IV. 2. 37) that 'because he shines day and night' (idhyate harniṣam yasmād indhanāmā tatah pumān). This 'shining' implies, according to Ānandagiri, his enjoyment of gross things in the waking state (śthūlārthabhoktṛtvena sadā jāgare sphūrteḥ). Śaṅkara is found to have employed both the terms in his commentary on the BU, *Indha* (BU, IV. 3. 1, p. 519) and *Vaiśvānara* (BU, IV. 2. 2-4, pp 513-519), but not *Viśva*, so far as goes my information, with regard to the commentary referred to. From the text of the BU (IV. 2. 3, 3. 11, 35) itself it appears that

¹ As in the original of the text, i.e., BU, IV. 3 we have this word

² It is a well-known saying in Brāhmanas that gods are fond of the cryptic, as it were, and dislike the evident ('parokṣapriyā iva hi devāḥ pratyakṣadviṣaḥ —BU, IV. 2. 2). Sureśvara says in BBV, IV. 2. 37 (p. 1365) that even now people do not like to call a superior person directly by his personal name.

pratyakṣanāmagrahanam pradṛṣanti jagaty api |

śreyāṁso mukamīṣā te ity uktim kāmayaṁti ca

In referring to a superior person the use of *amuka* 'so and so' or *uni* in Bengali, is still found. It is to be noted that in the country, at least in Bengal, a woman does not call her husband by his name, but, for it uses such words as *uni*.

if any other term for *Viśva* is to be chosen from that work it is only *śārira* 'existing in the body,' 'embodied.' But *Gaudapāda* has not accepted it, but has adopted a new name, *Viśva*, probably thinking the latter to be more expressive of the idea behind it. Finally in the hand of the author of *MāU* it has undergone a further change in the form of *Vaiśvārara* 'common-to-all' perhaps for the same purpose.

Of these names *Turya* (or *Turiya*) 'fourth' is evidently not a name in fact, but as it is described after the first three *Viśva*, etc., it is so called, being their fourth. In the BU *Indha-Indra* is a name, no doubt, but *Taijasa* and *Prājña* were originally mere adjectives,⁵ becoming names afterwards. Sometimes the appellation *Lingātman* is found for *Taijasa*, as writes Śaṅkara in his commentary on the BU, IV. 2. 3 (p. 515), IV. 3. 1 (p. 518). Similarly *saṁsṛta* is used for *Prājña* as says Sureśvara (BBV, IV. 3. 5, p. 1377). Undoubtedly this word clearly expresses the state of the Person.

As regards the wording of our text in the first Book of *ĀŚ* with which we are now concerned the following comparison may be made:

(i) With regard to *Viśva* our author writes (I. 2): *daṁṣṇāḥśimukhe viśvah*.⁶ See here BU, IV. 2. 2: *indho ha nāmaṣa yo 'yam daṁṣṇe 'kṣan puruṣah* (= BU, II. 3. 5; IV. 2. 2, V. 5. 2, 4).⁷

⁵ See BU, II. 5. 8

⁶ Mark that the *MāU* is here silent

⁷ The idea that a person is seen in the eye and specially in the right one is often found in Upaniṣadic texts. Besides the BU quoted above see ChU, IV. 15. 1, VII. 7. 4, KūU, IV. 2. 17, Mū, VII. 11. It simply signifies that

(ii) In l. 2 we have *ākāśe ca hṛdī prājñāh*, and we read *ya eṣo 'ntar hṛdaya ākāśaḥ* in BU, II. 1. 17, IV. 2. 3, 4. 22. Cf. TU, I. 6. 1.

(iii) In l. 3 there is *pravivikṭabhuj*,⁸ and in this connexion we read *tasmād eṣa pravivikṭāhārātara ivaiva bhavati* in the BU, IV. 2. 3.

(iv) With regard to the third or *susupta* state of the Person in l. 3, 4 there is *ānandabhuj* or *ānanda*, and in BU, IV. 3. 32 we read *eṣo'sya parama ānandaḥ*. See also, *Op. cit.*, IV. 3. 33.⁹

It is to be noted here that the above conception of *Puruṣa* is found also in ChU, VIII. 7-12 in the course of *Prajāpati's* instruction to *Indra* and *Virocana*. Here, too, the first three names, *Viśva*, etc. are not given, *Saṅkara* has used different appellations for them; viz., for *Viśva* he writes *Akṣipuruṣa* 'eye-person' (VIII. 7, 4, 79), or *Chāyāpuruṣa* 'shadow-person' (VIII. 10.4), or *Chāyātman* 'shadow-self' (VIII. 7. 4, 8. 1, 2);¹⁰

He is visible to our eyes, and this means that he is the ordinary incorporated soul (*śārīra-ātman*). This is quite evident from *Gaudapada's* employment of the word *mukha* after *dakṣinākṣi*—l. 1, *dakṣinākṣimukhe* 'in the front of the right eye'. As to why the right eye is specially mentioned *Sureśvara* says (BBV V 2 37-38, p. 1365) that it may be due to some excellence of the right eye, which might have been known to the *smṛti*, or to the fact that the right limbs of a man is more vigorous than the left ones. Sometimes the left eye is also referred to (BU, IV. 2. 3). See below.

⁸ See also l. 4

⁹ That the sentence *yatra supto na kiñcana** in the MāU, 5, p. 224, is quoted from the BU, IV. 3. 19 is already shown Introduction: §2, p. xli

¹⁰ He uses this term also in his commentary on BS, I. 2. 13; on I. 3. 43 he has also *śārīra*.

quite appropriately *Uttamapuruṣa* 'the Highest Self.'¹²

That this conception of *Puruṣa* in *ChU* is a later development of that in the *BU* goes without saying. Now, though the *ChU* like the *BU* is far earlier than our text, there is nothing which can show that it is the former and not the latter which has been drawn upon by our author; yet, we have already seen what can be said in favour of *BU*.¹³

In support of the view that the main source of the *ĀŚ* is *BU* we may discuss here one point more. The idea of *Brahman* (= *Puruṣa* = *Ātman*) as having four fourths or quarters (*catuspād*) at the beginning of the *MāU* is not a new one as it is found long before it even in the *RV*, X. 90. 3¹³ as well as in *ChU*, III. 18. 2.¹⁴ The difference of these texts lies, however, in the fact that the quarters (*pādas*) are different in them. For instance, in the *RV* referred to above all the beings (*viśvā bhūtāni*) are regarded as one quarter, and the remaining three quarters (*tripād*) are said to be in the heaven, while in the *ChU*, IV. 5-8

¹² See *BC*, XV. 17-18

uttamah puruṣas tv anyah paramātmety udāhṛtaḥ |

yo lokatrayam āvīṣya bibharty advaya īśvaraḥ ||

yasmāt ksaram aṣṭito'ham aksarād api cottamah |

ato'smi loke vede ca prathitaḥ puruṣottamah ||

Ś has here quoted no *śruti* Ś r i d h a r a refers to *BU*, V. 6. 1 (sa vā syam ātmā), but not appropriately

¹³ See *ĀŚ*, II. 21

¹⁴ For minor *Upaniṣads* see *Brahmopaniṣad*, 2. tatra catuspādam brahma vibhāti; *NP1U*, V. 1, *NUTU*, 1, *RUTU*, 3. so 'yam ātmā catuspād

the four quarters each consisting of four parts (*catuṣkālā*) are named as *Prakāśavat* 'shining,' *Anantavat* 'endless,' *Jyotismat* 'luminous,' and *Āyatanavat* 'having an abode.'¹⁵ In another place of the same Upanisad (III. 18. 1-6) the quarters of Brahman are described differently with reference to person (*adhyātma*) and with reference to divinities (*adhidaivata*). With reference to person they are speech (*vāc*), breath (*prāṇa*), the eye (*caḥsus*) and the ear (*śrotra*) representing respectively with reference to the divinities fire (*agni*), wind (*vāyu*), the sun (*āditya*) and quarter (*diś*). But in the MāU the quarters are described quite in a new way and it is remarkable. It is said that these four quarters are nothing but the same Self with its four states. The first three of them are waking (*jāgrat*), dreaming (*svapna*), and deep sleep (*susupta*). And the Self with them is called *Vaiśvānara*. 'common-to-all,' *Taijasa* 'brilliant,' and *Prājña* 'intelligent' respectively. The fourth state is the true or absolute essence of the Self having no connexion whatsoever with anything else. In this state the Self is regarded as *śānta* 'quiescent,' *śiva* 'blissful' and *advaita* 'without a second.'

It is to be noted here that while in RV and ChU the Purusa or Brahman is represented as the Universal or World Self, in the MāU it is represented as the individual Self though ultimately in fact it is identical with the Universal Self.

Now, it is remarkable that though in the MāU, as

¹⁵ For details see the Upanisad

we have seen above, there is a clear mention and description of the four quarters of the Self (*catuspād*), in the *ĀŚ* it is not so. Even the particular word *catuspād* or any of its possible equivalents is not to be found here. Up to *kārikā* 5 we come across the three-fold division of the Self, viz., *Viśva* (instead of *Vaiśvānara* as in the *MāU*, 3), *Taijasa* and *Prāṇa* (I. 1-4). It is clearly said in our text (I. 1-2) that the One exists in three ways in the body, and this idea is further expressed in I. 3-5. Yet, it cannot be said from this that the idea of four quarters is altogether unknown to the author of the *ĀŚ*, as it is implied in I. 10-15 in which the word *turya* or *turiya*, which is the same in meaning 'fourth,' as *caturtha* in the *MāU*, 7, is used. It is further implied by the author's employment of the word *pāda* in I. 25.¹⁶ This difference between the *ĀŚ* and the *MāU* with regard to the idea of four *pādas*, implied in the former and expressed in the latter, is significant. It shows that the origin of the *ĀŚ* is not the *MāU*, but the *BU* in which the idea of *pādas* in this connexion did not then so develop.¹⁷

En passant we should like to discuss one thing more. There is a very striking difference at the very

¹⁶ See *BU*, IV. 1. 2-7 where each of the following six things, viz. 'speech,' *prāṇa* 'breath,' *cakṣus* 'eye,' *śrotra* 'ear,' *manas* 'mind,' and *hrdya* 'heart' is regarded as a *pāda*. Consult Śaṅkara and Sureśvara (*ESV*), IV. 1. 16 ff., according to whom each of the above six is explained as *catuspād* 'having four quarters.'

¹⁷ This fact will also show that the *ĀŚ* is prior to the *MāU* in which the obscure points of the former are made clear.

beginning between the two texts, MāU and ĀŚ. It is this that while the MāU begins (1-2) highly extolling Om symbolically identifying it with Brahman-Ātman, the ĀŚ has here nothing of the kind. It simply proceeds gradually to describe the One with it's first three states, *Iśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* (I, 1-5) the fourth having come afterwards (I, 10). Here in the ĀŚ till *kārikā* 19 there is no mention of, or reference to Om. So it is to be found that here in our text mention is made first of the One and then of Om. This order is quite right and logical. For, here there are two things, the object which is to be approached or realized (*upeya*) and its means (*upāya*). And it is reasonable that the object is stated first and then the means. Here the object is the realization of the Puruṣa or Self in its absolute state and the means is the meditation of Om. This is done in the ĀŚ, but it is quite reverse in the MāU, for here the means Om is stated first and then gradually the object (3-7) which is repeated later on (12). The author of the MāU seems to have been much influenced by earlier Upaniṣads, (such as ChU, I 1. 1. TU, I 8. 1) and too much bent on the glorification of Om, and this is why he has changed the reasonable order found in the ĀŚ. There is no *upasana* of *Pranava* in the BU and this is why our author of the ĀŚ did not include it in the main thesis of his work. Then independently of the BU in which no means for the realization of the object is shown *Caṇḍapada* has added the remaining portion of the first Book of his ĀŚ setting forth *Pranava* and its *upasana*.

So far with regard to Book I. Let us now take up Book II and see the connexion it has with the BU. This Book is rightly called *Vaitathya* 'unreality' as it shows the unreality of the world in the waking state just like that of the experience in dream. This is the subject discussed herein by *Gauḍapāda* with various arguments. And here, too, he has taken his stand on the BU, IV. 3, where it is clearly declared that the two states, waking and dream, are in fact one. Not only are passages quoted from the BU, or referred to by him (II. 3, 5), but they are supported by his own arguments. This will be quite clear if one takes pains to read BU, IV. 3 and the second Book of the *ĀŚ*. And it should be noted that here in the latter we find the oldest interpretation of that portion of the BU, though in a concise, yet, very substantial form.

In Book III we are referred to BU not less than six times (12, 13, 15, 24, 25 and 26).

Thus we may safely conclude that the main Upanisadic source of the *ĀŚ* is the BU.

§ 13. *Pre-Saṅkara Teachers of the Vedānta and their Works*

Setting apart what we know of the Vedānta from the *Śruti-prasthāna* 'the Course of Revelation' or the Vedic literature, i. e., the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas including the Āranyakas and Upaniṣads, as well as from the *Smṛti-prasthāna* 'the Course of Tradition or Remembered Texts', such as the *Mahābhārata* with the

Bhagavadgītā, it may conveniently be divided into two, pre-Ś a ṅ k a r a and post-Ś a ṅ k a r a.

Among the teachers of the pre-Ś a ṅ k a r a Vedānta the most distinguished is B ā d a r ā y a ṇ a, the celebrated author of the *Brahmasūtras*, the source of which is the Upaniṣads. It is the *Brahmasūtras* that constitute the *Sūtra-prasthāna* 'the Course of *Sūtras*.'

We all know that the difference of opinions is but natural. Owing to various factors the same thing is viewed differently by different persons. So it is found in the *Brāhmaṇas* that there are both the offering of oblation before sun-rise (*anudita-homa*) and the offering of oblation after sun-rise (*udita-homa*), there being a regular discussion thereof establishing that the latter is preferable and not the former (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, XXV. 5-6; *Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa*, II. 1. 2-8; cf. however, II. 1. 2. 12). There are also functions in these *Brahmanas*, which are discarded saying that these are not to be preferred (*ādṛtya*) or performed (*kūrya*), though they are actually enjoined by others. There are many such contradicting, obscure or dubious cases, and an attempt has also been made in later works to find out a solution of these problems.¹

Now as with regard to *ḥarman* the teachers had their different views, so they differed also on points of *jñāna*. In some cases they entertained even quite opposite views. For instance, with regard to creation while a sage of a certain Upaniṣad (i.e., TU, II. 7. 1;

¹ For instance, see MD X B. 6 with reference to *śoḍaśgrahana*

see ChU, III. 19. 1) tells us: 'In the beginning, verily, this was non-existent (asad vā idam agra āsīd),' but from another text (i.e., *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, II. 4. 1) we know: 'Verily, in the beginning this was only Self (ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsīd).' And the following is found in the ChU, VI. 2. 1-2, evidently refuting TU, II. 7. 1 quoted above: "Verily, in the beginning this was, my dear, existent only one without a second. On this some say that verily in the beginning this was non-existent only one without a second; from that non-existent the existent was produced. But, my dear, whence could it be? How from non-existent could the existent be produced? On the contrary, my dear, verily, in the beginning this was existent, only one without a second."

From the above it is quite clear that all the *śruti*s do not always tell us the same thing, clearly there is difference among them.² Such being the case the question arises as to which of them is to be accepted as valid and which is to be rejected as not valid. How can one say that this is valid, and that is not valid? For, as *śruti* there is no difference whatsoever.³ Therefore if you accept one, you will have to accept all of them. And in that case you cannot arrive at any definite

² See with the *Prakāśa* of P u n y a r ā j a the *Vākyapadīya* of B h a r t ṛ h a r i, 1 8

tasyāṅgrhasādarūpāni nīcitāni svavikalpajāḥ |

ekatvīṇām dvaitīṇām ca pravācā bahudīśa smṛtāḥ :

³ Ś a ṅ k a r a has rightly observed (BS, III 2. 15). *nāhi vedavākyānām kasyacid arthavattvam kasyacid anarthavattvam ity yuktam prapñcane pramānatvavīkṣat*

It is well-known that Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa are the authors of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the *Brahmasūtras* respectively. But there are reasons to think that there were also other authors of the *Mīmāṃsa*- and the *Brahma-sūtras* which are different from the extant ones.⁴ For instance, Bādarī, a teacher, is quoted not less than four times both in the present *Mīmāṃsā*- (III. 1. 3; VI. 1. 27; VIII. 3. 6; IX. 2. 33) and *Brahma-sūtras* (I 2. 30; III. 1. 11; IV. 3. 7; IV. 4. 10). From this it may appear that Bādarī was an author of both the *sūtras*. But we cannot ascertain only from this that he was actually so. It may be that he had some views on some particular points of *karman* and Brahman and these are alluded to in those two works by their authors Jaimini, as the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* is known to us all. He is referred to eleven times in the *Brahmasūtras* on different topics (I 2. 28, 31, 3. 31, 4. 18; III. 2. 40, 4. 2, 18, 40; IV. 3. 12, 4. 5, 11). Here, too, we may think that Jaimini wrote also *Brahmasūtras*. But though from only this it is not safe to decide that he really did so, Sureśvara's *Nsi* (2nd ed. by Hiriyanna), p. 52, shows that it is a fact. Kāśakṛtsna, a teacher, is quoted in BS, I. 4. 22, and his *Mīmāṃsā* is mentioned not less than three times by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*.⁷ This *Mīmāṃsā* may be both *Karmamīmāṃsā* and *Brahma-mīmāṃsā* (i.e., the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the *Brahmasūtras*),

⁴ See Belvalkar. *Op cit.*, p 140

⁵ See *Jaimini's Sāhityaśāstra* in the *Gerbe-Festschrift*, 1927.

⁷ Kielhorn. Vol II, pp 206, 249, 325.

or either of them, and in this case probably the latter. Bādarāyaṇa in his BS refers also to Ātreya (III. 4. 44), Āśmaratḥya (I. 2. 29, 4. 20), Kārṣṇājini (III. 1. 9)⁹, and Auḍulomi⁹ (I. 4. 21, III. 4. 45, IV. 4. 6).¹⁰

Then comes a number of teachers, some of whom flourished before and some after the great Śaṅkara. Some of them explained the BS of Bādarāyaṇa, some the *Bhagavadgītā*, and some an Upaniṣad or Upaniṣads. There were also some who interpreted more than one kind of the above works. This was done either by writing a gloss (*vṛtti*) or a commentary (*bhāṣya*). As we are concerned here with the pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta the following teachers who are connected with it may be mentioned in this connexion.

So far as we know the first of all these teachers is Bodhāyana (about the first or second century A.D.). He wrote a lengthy gloss or commentary (*vistṛita vṛtti*) on the BS of Bādarāyaṇa on which is based the Viśiṣṭādvaita system of Rāmānuja, the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* of Jaimini, and the *Devatākāṇḍa*, in other words, on the whole of the *Mīmāṃsāśāstra*. This

⁹ He is mentioned also in MD, IV 3 17, VI, 7 35

⁹ The *Bhedeḥheda* doctrine of the Nimbarka school owes its existence to him

¹⁰ To them may be added the names of Kātyāyana alluded to by Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Bhagavadgītā*, 29, and of such sages as Asita, Devala, Bhṛgu, and Parāśara referred to in different works. But we do not know if they were the authors of different *Brahma-sūtras* or if any one of them wrote also *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, though we know something of their views from the fragmentary accounts available from certain books, some of which are referred to above

ṛtti is called *Kṛtaḥ* (*Prapañcaḥ*, TSS, p. 39; *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 1911, p. 17).

Next comes *Upavarṣa*. He is credited with the authorship of a *ṛtti* on both the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and *Brahmasūtras*. This *ṛtti* was, however, in fact a *bhāṣya* or *Mahābhāṣya* and consequently he was regarded as a *Mahābhāṣyakāra* as well as a *Ṛttikāra*, being the author of the *ṛtti*.

According to *Rāmānuja* (*Vedārthasaṃgraha*, p. 154) and *Śrīnivāsa* (*Yatindramata-dīpikā*, Poona ed., p. 2) *Guhadeva*, *Kapardika* (or *Kapardin*) and *Bhāruci* are three ancient Vedānta teachers and authors. The former two, being referred to by *Rāmānuja* among the *śiṣtas* 'wise men', seem to have been in favour of the Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda. One *Bhāruci* as an author of a *Dharmaśāstra* is mentioned in such works as *Vijñāneśvara*'s *Mitākṣarā* on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* (I. 18, II. 124), and *Mādhavācārya*'s *ṭikā* on the *Parāśarasamhitā* (II. 2. 3, Bombay Sanskrit series ed., p. 510). It is not known if the Vedāntic *Bhāruci* is identical with *Bhāruci*, the writer on the *Dharmaśāstra*. If it is so, he may be held to have belonged to the first half of the ninth century A. D.

Bhartṛhari's name is found among a host of writers on the Vedānta (*Siddhitraya*, p. 5). He may be identified with the celebrated author of the *Vākyapadīya* (600-650 A.D.), the very first *kārikā* of which points to the Vedāntic doctrine.

(With him is mentioned in the same work *Bhartṛmītra*. According to the *Nyāyaratnākara* on the *Śloṭavārttika* (l. 10) he wrote a commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and made the *Mīmāṃsāsāstra* atheistic. Whether this Mimāṃsist *Bhartṛmītra* and the Vedāntic *Bhartṛmītra* are one and the same is not known, nor do we know anything of any Vedāntic work that might have been written by the latter.)

✓ *Brahmanandin* (or *Brahmānandin*) is another teacher. He is known as the *Vākyākāra* or *Chāndogyavākyākāra* quoted or referred to by *Rāmānuja* in his commentary on BS and *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* in his *tikā* on the *Samkṣepaśārīraṇa* (III.218-220). According to *Bhāskara* on BS, l. 4. 25, *Brahmanandin* approved the *Parināma-vāda*, but *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (*Op. cit.*) is of opinion that it was in fact gradually to lead one to *Suddhādvaita-vāda* 'Pure monism' through the *Vivarta-vāda* or the doctrine maintaining that the appearance of the universe is imposed on Brahman which is the only reality, the phenomenal world being held to be a mere illusion.

After him is *Dravidācārya* or *Drāmidācārya* (cir. 750 A.D.). He was in favour of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda* 'Qualified monism' and as such is mentioned and quoted by *Rāmānuja* in his commentary on BS. As *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* says (*Samkṣepaśārīraṇa*, III. 218-220), he wrote a *bhāṣya* on *Brahmanandin's vākyas* owing to which the latter was called *Vākyākāra* (*Brahmanandi-viracitā-*

nām vākyaṇām sūtrarūpāṇām bhāṣyakartā draviḍa-cāryo'pi). It is known from Ānandagiri's ṭikā on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the ChU that Draviḍa-cārya wrote a vast commentary on the ChU compared with which Śaṅkara's commentary was a smaller one (*alpagantha*). He is said to have written a *bhāṣya* also on the BS.

✓ Brahmadatta was a renowned teacher of the Vedānta. In the *Prapañcahṛdaya* he is said to have composed a commentary on the BS. Some of his views are alluded to in such works as the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (II.16), a ṭikā by Veṅkaṭanātha deśika on his *Tattvamukṭākālāpa*; Nsi, I. 67-68; and Śaṅkara's commentary on the BU, I. 4. 7. One of them may be mentioned here and it is this that it is the long *bhāvanā* 'meditation' of the knowledge arising from the *Vedānta-vākya* and not the knowledge itself, as holds Śaṅkara, that removes one's illusion. Some informations of him as collected by Hiriyanna will be found in Nsi (2nd ed.), p. xxiii, and the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, Vol. II, Part I, p. 1 ff. See also Gopinath Kaviraj, *Op. cit.*, p. 13 ff.

✓ Bhartṛprapañca was also a great Vedāntic teacher before Śaṅkara. It is known from the words of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (*Samkṣepasāriraka*, I. 7) that Bhartṛprapañca explained the Sūtras of Vyāsa, i.e., Bādarāyaṇa (*kāścit tatsūtram vyākṣāṇair bhartṛprapañcādibhiḥ*). Yāmuna-cārya (*Op. cit.*, p. 5) says that he was one of the writers on

the Vedānta, and we know from the introductory lines of Ānandagiri's śukā on Śaṅkara's bhāṣya of BU (p. 2) that while Śaṅkara commented on the Upanisad belonging to the Kāṇva recension Bhartṛprapañca wrote his commentary on the text of the Mādhyandina recension, and the former's commentary was bigger than that of the latter. In many cases Ānandagiri in explaining Sureśvara's vārttika on the BU, refers to or quotes from Bhartṛprapañca. Of all the commentators before Śaṅkara, the works of whom could not yet been discovered it is Bhartṛprapañca whose quotations are now mostly available. For the fragments gleaned together from his writings by Hiriyanna see *The Indian Antiquary*, 1924, pp. 76-86; and *Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference*, Madras, 1925, pp. 439.

I should like to mention here one teacher more of the pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta. He is Sundarapāṇḍya. He was a great Mīmāṃsist and Vedāntin of South India (8th century A.D.). His three kārīkās (gaunamithyātva^o) are quoted by Śaṅkara in the last portion of his commentary on BS, I. 1. 4. Amalānanda in his Kalpataru (BS, III. 25) quotes his other three kārīkās (nirāśāyārohanapṛāpya^o). These last three kārīkās together with two more are cited by Kumārila in his Tantravārttika (Benares ed.), pp. 852-853. It seems that these kārīkās are from a vārttika of Sundarapāṇḍya that he

wrote on some *vṛtti* or *bhāṣya* of some unknown author.¹¹

There were also some teachers who wrote independent works on the Vedānta and of these authors the most distinguished is Ga u ḍ a p ā d a, the author of our *Āgamaśāstra* which is the most important work, still extant, representing one of the most remarkable phases of the Vedānta. Here we find the first interpretation of some of the most important *śrutis* as we shall see later on.

§ 14. *The Conspectus of the Contents of the Āgamaśāstra*

✓ Now we may give here a conspectus of the contents of our text, and in doing so Book I may conveniently be divided into two parts; part (i) containing *kārikās* I. 1-18, and part (ii) the remaining *kārikās*, i.e., I. 19-29. While part (i) discusses what is to be realized, part (ii) is devoted to show its means.

It is well-known that in the Upaniṣads all thoughts centre round the Puruṣa (Ātman = Brāhman), 'Self' who is 'all that has been and that will be' (RV, X.90.2: *puruṣa evedaṃ sarvaṃ yad bhūtaṃ yac ca bhavyam*). He must be known, according to the sages of Upaniṣads, for the fulfilment of the mission of one's life.

¹¹ S. Kuppaswami Śāstri *Journal of Oriental Research*, 1922, p 1 ff.

On the main topic of this section see Gopinath Kaviraj, *Op cit.*, and P. V. Kane: *Proceedings and Transactions of the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference*, pp 937 ff.

But how can he be known properly? As he is extremely subtle, *Gauḍapāda* leads us gradually from the gross to the subtle, following our common and every-day experience. And in doing so he takes his stand on such Upaniṣads as the BU and ChU, and shows (l. 1-5) that the self, though in reality, only one (*eka eva*) remains in the body in three forms (*tridhā dehe vyavasthitāḥ*), in accordance with his three states, *jāgrat* 'waking', *svapna* 'dream' and *suṣupta* 'deep sleep.' When the self is in the waking state he is called *Viśva* 'all' (because as an embodied one (*śārīra*) he is known to every man). In the state of dream he is named *Taijasa* 'brilliant' (because he himself is his light (*svayāṃjyotīś*) in that condition; i.e., he does not depend for his light on others for seeing things there, as he does in the waking state in which he is to take light from such things as the sun, the moon, and fire).¹ In the state of deep sleep he is called *Prājña* 'intelligent' (because he is never dissociated from his intelligence).²

Viśva is the embodied self (*śārīra ātman*), hence it is metaphorically said that he remains in the front of one's right eye,³ meaning thereby that he may be seen reflected in one's right eye (or in such things as

¹ See BU, IV 3 1-9 *svena bhāsā svena jyotiśā pradvapoty atītyeṣu puruṣaḥ svayāṃjyotir bhavati*

² BU, IV 3 23 ff. *yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai 'an na paśyati nahi dīpantur dīpate viparilopo vidyā'e vināśitvāt na tu tad dvitīyam asti tato 'nyad viśvāḥ kām yaś paśyati.*

³ See p. lxxxviii

⁴ As the right portion of the body of a male person is said to be more powerful than the left the reflection therein is brighter. See p. lxxxviii, note 7.

water or a looking-glass). Taijasa is in the mind, as it is here that a man dreams. Prājñā's seat is in the space of one's heart. Again, Viśva has the consciousness of outside, Taijasa of inside, while Prājñā has his consciousness compact. These three enjoy or experience the gross, the subtle and bliss^b respectively. In passing the author refers (I. 6-9) to the opinion of the sages that all things have their origin and mentions different theories or purposes of creation. The first theory is this that one creates all as the rays of one's mind (*ceto'msu*). This simply means that it is the mind that appears in the form of the external world which has, in fact, no reality. This is the author's own view.*

Then he reverts to his main subject, the Self, and says (I-10) that besides his three forms or quarters (*pādas*) in accordance with the three states, waking, etc., referred to above, there is one form more; it is his real, natural or innate form. It has no particular appellation as he is beyond all expressions and is designated by the simple word *Turya* (or *Turiya*) 'fourth' as occupying the fourth place in order with the above three. This *Turya* is above all changes and duality, all-pervading, and when realized removes all miseries.

G a u d a p ā d a then shows (II-18) some points of mutual agreement and disagreement of these four forms or quarters (*pādas*) of the Self, and says that one, if awakened from one's sleep due to illusion

(*māyā*), can realize the state of Turya in which there is no duality at all. Duality, i.e., the expansion of the visible world, or the expressions, is mere illusion, and as such it has absolutely no reality. (Here it may be said that as there is no duality, in fact, it does not cease to exist. It is just a knot made and loosened by dint of illusion (*māyayaiva kṛto granthir māyayaiva vimocitah*).⁶ Nevertheless, we have our common practice with duality, but it is only for our instruction, i.e., it is only by that practice that we can understand and attain to the state of non-duality which is the highest (*advaitam paramārthataḥ*). Here ends the first part of Book I.

The second part (19-29) demonstrates the means for the realization of that non-duality or Turya. It is nothing but the *upāsanā* 'meditation' (*dhyāna*) of the Puruṣa (= Ātman = Brahman), 'Self' through the symbol of *Pranava* or Om.

In Book II *Gaudapāda* discusses and establishes the unreality (*vaitathya*) of the external world. For this purpose he begins this Book as Book I basing it on the BU, specially on its IV. 3. 8 ff. He says referring to the sages⁷ of that Upaniṣad that all things in dream are unreal on the following three grounds:

⁶ See the following saying of the Bhagavat (i.e., Buddha), as quoted in MV, p. 540 *ākāśena kṛto granthir ākāśenaiṣa mocitah*

⁷ *Gaudapāda* does not employ here or elsewhere (i.e., II 5, cf IV 54) such words as *ṛṣi* or *muni* (II 35) as is generally done in similar cases, but he has here the word *manisṛin*. This word, which is a Vedic one forming a phrase with *śāhā*, is used twice in our work (II 1. 5) as in KU, I 3. 4 and BG, XVIII 3 (with a variation that *pra* is prefixed to *śāhā*).

(i) because the things (such as a mountain, or an elephant) seen therein are inside the body ; (ii) because the time being short one does not see the things having gone to those far places where one dreams them ; and (iii) because one on waking is not found in the place where one dreams oneself to be. Having supported this proposition (II. 3) by a reference to the BU, IV. 3. 10, he asserts (II. 4) that the things in the waking state, too, are as unreal as those in dream, because in this state also the things are similarly inside the body, for the mind which appears in the form of different things around us is inside the body. Proceeding the teacher says (II. 5) on the authority of a scripture (BU, IV. 3. 14), supported by reasons, that the two states, dream and waking, are the same on account of the fact that the things experienced in them are of the same kind, there being no difference at all. Here, having offered one reason more in his favour and met an objection of his opponent, he says (II. 9-10) that the experiences in waking and dream are equally unreal, both of them being the creation of the mind. Here arises a question (II. 11) : If in both the states the things are unreal, then who is it that cognizes them? Who is it that imagines them? The answer is given (II. 12-15) according to the decision of the Vedānta that it is the Self that imagines himself as the Self through his own illusion, and it is he who cognizes the things. He creates some things in the mind which are not fixed and as such they vanish at once ; and he creates also some other things in the mind

which are outside and fixed. There is, however, no difference between these two sorts of creation—the creation of those inside which exists as long as exists the thought (*citta*), and the creation of those outside, which exists as long as exists the (notion of) the two, i.e., the perceptible (*grāhya*) and the percipient (*grāhaka*); both of these two creations are only imagined and there is nothing for their difference. ¹ Again, the things which are within and not-manifest, and the things which are without and manifest are all imagined, indeed, the only difference there being that the latter are cognized by different organs of sense. As to the creation of the internal and external things he tells us (II. 16) that first one imagines oneself as a personal Self and then various things, internal and external, following the recollection of one's experience. Of this he says further (II. 17-18) that as in the dark a piece of rope, or a continuous line of water, etc., not determinately known, is imagined to be a snake, so is imagined the Self. Now when the piece of rope is known determinately the things that are imagined there disappear at once,² so is to be known about the ascertainment of the Self (Ātman). It is an illusion of the Self owing to which he is imagined differently by different persons, such as the Breath (*prāṇa*) by those who know it, or Elements (*bhūtas*) by those who know them (II 19-30). But the reality is, concludes (II. 31-34) the teacher, that according to those

¹ The illustration of *rope snake* which is so widely known in Vedāntic works is found perhaps for the first time here in the ĀS. It is not in any of the Upaniṣads used for his Concordance by Jacob.

who are well-versed in the Vedānta, the universe is just like a dream (*svapna*), or an illusion (*māyā*), or an imaginary town in the sky (*gandharvanagara*). The highest truth is that there is neither disappearance nor origination; neither bondage, nor one desirous of emancipation. The universe is not manifold, either through its own nature or through that of others; it is neither different nor non-different. The sages (II. 35-38) who have fully mastered the Vedas have seen the truth that it is the cessation of the universe (*prapañcopaśama*), which is free from duality. Having known this, therefore, one should meditate on non-duality, and having realized it, one should behave as a fool among the people becoming an ascetic, and realizing the truth inward and outward, should remain unmoved from it.

Book III is devoted to show the non-origination of the universe. The author proposes (III. 2) that nothing originates, and concludes (III. 48) that this is the highest truth. In the course of the discussion he says (III. 5ff) that as the space (*ākāśa* or *mahākāśa*), owing to jars (*ghatas*), assumes the forms of the spaces occupied by the jars (*ghatākāśas*), and these forms, when the jars are destroyed, merge into the space, even so springs up the Ātman in the form of Jīvas 'individual persons' owing to the conglomerations of the different limbs, etc., and when these conglomerations are destroyed the Jīvas merge into the Ātman. If the space occupied by one jar is soiled with dust or smoke, not all the spaces occupied by other jars are soiled therewith, even so (i.e., not affected) are the Jīvas with reference to happiness, etc. The

forms, functions and names of the jars may be different, but the space is the same. This is the case also with Jivas. As the space of a jar is neither a transformation, nor a part of the space, so is a Jiva neither a transformation nor a part of the Ātman. As the space is never soiled with a dirty thing such as dust and smoke, yet it appears to be so to the ignorant, so appears the Ātman with impurities to those who are not enlightened. In death or birth, in moving forward or backward, he exists in all bodies just like the space. All the conglomerations of limbs, etc., as in dream, are created by the illusion of the Ātman.

Now having shown what the Jiva is according to the Upaniṣads (TA, II. 1-6 and BU, II 5) Gauḍapāda says (III 13) that the praise of the identity of the Jiva and the Ātman as well as the censure of their difference in the Upaniṣads is reasonable. And so, though their difference is found in some Upanisadic texts it is merely attributable with reference to the future state, and certainly it is not in the primary sense (III. 14-16) Indeed in the scriptures the creation is described with various illustrations showing a distinction between the Jiva and the Ātman. But in fact there is no distinction. It is only to lead one to the truth. For, there are three kinds of people, viz, of the lower, the middle, and the higher visions and in order to help them an *upāsanā* is meant here (by the description of the creation involving some distinction which is mere attributive). Here (III. 17-18) with regard to the view of non-duality which he holds, our author says that it

does not conflict with that of the dualists and shows how it does not do so.

G a u ḍ a p ā d a reverts now (III 19-32) to his main proposition, i.e., non-origination and offers some arguments in favour of it, refuting the views of his opponents. He says that though it is said that it is the unborn that is born, it cannot be maintained. It is true that in the scriptures creation or origination is found both from the existent (*bhūta*) and the non-existent (*abhūta*), yet, that which is reasonable is to be accepted. In scriptures origination is said to be through illusion, it is denied there and its cause is negated. Now, origination may be either of the existent (*sat*) or of the non-existent (*asat*), but neither of them is possible. That which exists may originate only through illusion and not in reality; because, if it originates in fact, it is to be accepted that the thing which had already been originated originates again. The origination of the non-existent is not reasonable either in reality or through illusion, as in the case of the son of a barren woman

As in dream so in waking there is only the mind, yet it appears in the form of the duality of the percipient and the perceptible. The duality is perceived by the mind, but when it becomes non-mind, i.e., when its function of thinking (*manana*) ceases, there is no duality. The author says here (III. 33-36) that the mind which becomes non-mind, and as such is free from the states of dream and deep sleep and has no determination (*nirvikalpa*), is identical with Brahman.

This state of the suppressed (*nigṛhita* = *niruddha*) mind is different from that in the deep sleep, because while in the latter it falls into a condition of stupidity (*mūḍha avasthā*), it is not so in the former. This is attainable (III. 37-47) through an intense abstract concentration, called *Asparśayoga* 'contactless concentration,' which, though very difficult, can be realized gradually by the means suggested by the author. When by that process the mind is completely suppressed being free from the states of stupefaction and distraction, not moving at all and having no sense-image whatsoever, it becomes Brahman. And it is said that in this state it rests on itself (*svastha*), it does not originate and is identical with the knowable which also does not originate. Here the author concludes (III. 48) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth.

G a u d a p ā d a begins Book IV, unlike the first three ones, with his homage to the 'Greatest of men' and the teacher of the yoga known as *Asparśayoga*, whom the present writer thinks to be no other than the Buddha (IV. 1-2). Introducing his thesis (IV. 3) he says that there are two classes of disputants, one of them holding that it is the existent (*bhūta*) that originates while the other says that which originates is the non-existent (*abhūta*). But the Advayas (= Advaya-vādins), i. e., Buddhists declaring that there is no origination at all maintain that neither the existent nor the non-existent comes into being (IV. 3-4). G a u d a p ā d a who is a Vedantin subscribes to this last view

and says (IV. 5): 'We approve of non-origination declared by them; we do not dispute with them, listen as to how there cannot be any dispute.' He then advances (IV. 6-71) various arguments gathered from Buddhist sources in support of the view attacking and refuting the theory of origination in different ways and arrives at the conclusion that non-origination is the highest truth. In the course of it he shows among others that though it is generally believed that a thing which is not born is born, it cannot be so in reality, for in that case it is to be admitted that nature changes; what is unborn must always remain unborn, it is its nature. Yet, if you say that it takes its birth, then evidently it changes. But what is nature does in no way change (IV. 6-10).

The theory that the cause itself is the effect that is born (as held by the Sāṅkhyas) cannot be maintained (IV. 11-13), nor can there be any reasonable relationship or order between the cause and its effect (IV. 14-21). Again, nothing is produced either from itself or from other than itself; nor is there anything produced that is existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent (IV. 22). It is not possible to prove the beginning of a cause or of an effect, and as such neither of them comes into being (IV. 24).

G a u ḍ a p a d a offers here some reasons in his support from the standpoint of the Viññānavādins (IV. 25-39) showing that the external things are unreal though they appear to be not unreal; they are, however, false as the experience in dream, being cog-

nizable only by mind (*cittadṛśya*). He tells us again (IV. 40-41) that origination cannot be established, for there is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent ; there is no existent arising from the existent, and where is the non-existent arising from the existent ?

It is true that the Buddhas have sometimes said of origination, but it is the instruction meant only for those who are afraid of the doctrine of non-origination (IV. 42). As an elephant called by illusion is said to exist only owing to the perception and the common practice, so it is said that a thing exists (IV. 44). He declares (IV. 45-46) that there is only *viñāna* without the two (*i e.*, the percipient and the perceptible), it is quiescent and has no origination (*aṇa*) ; it does not move, it is not an object (*vaṣṭu*), yet, it appears to admit movements, it appears to be an object. Thus the mind and the objects have no origination. As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight or crooked, even so the mind when it moves appears as the percipient and the perceptible (IV. 42). And as the fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance of its being straight or crooked, even so when the mind does not move, it does not appear in the form of the percipient and the perceptible (IV. 48).

We have already seen that causation (*hetuphala-bhāva*) is not reasonable. The author explains it further in the following few *kārikās* (IV. 53-56) for his main purpose of establishing non-origination. With the same object in view he refutes (IV. 57) like the Buddhists

theories of eternality (*śāśvata*) and annihilation (*uccheda*), and says (IV. 58) that it is in the empirical truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) that things are originated, but not in reality. From an illusive seed may come forth an illusive sprout. This sprout is neither eternal, nor has it annihilation. It is to be known with regard to all things. Therefore there is no room for the appellation of 'eternal' and 'non-eternal' of anything (IV. 60). As in dream so in waking it is owing to illusion that the mind which is only one moves having the appearance of the external things. Whatever is experienced in dream is nothing but the mind, similarly whatever we see in the waking state is only the mind. As a creature formed of dream or made of illusion or by some supernatural power takes birth and dies, even so all these creatures exist and do not exist. Therefore there is no Jīva that takes birth, there is no possibility of it. That nothing originates is the highest truth (IV. 61-71). The duality consisting of the subject and the object is only the vibration (*spandita*) of the mind which has, in fact, no object, and consequently has no relation whatsoever to it (IV. 72-74).

Owing to the persistent belief in what is non-existent (*abhūtābhiniवेश*) the mind relates itself to its objects, but when their absence is known it turns back from them having no relation at all (*nihsaṅga*). Now, when it so turns back and does not move onwards, that position of it is unwavering, it is then free from sorrow, desire and fear. This is the field of the activities of the Buddhas. It shines forth once for all having no

origination, nor sleep, nor dream, and is the essence of reality (*dharmadhātu*, IV. 74-81).

This truth is, however, made obscure by the childish with their different notions; yet, one who can realize it attains the state of omniscience free from duality. And if it is so, what is beyond it that one may desire (IV. 82-85)? The author then shows that it is through the 'supra-mundane' (*loṇottara*) knowledge by the realization of which one may become omniscient (IV. 86-89). Here he asks us to learn certain things from the *Aggrayaṇa* (=Mahāyāna) of the Buddhists giving some of its leading thoughts (IV. 90-95).

As the state of detachment (*asaṅgatā*) of our mind or knowledge is absolutely necessary, he tells us what it is and how it can be effected. Both the objects and their knowledge have no origination, and as there is no relation whatsoever between them the knowledge is said to be free from attachment (*asaṅga*). If this state is not achieved, there is no disappearance of the 'cover' or 'obscuration' (*āvaraṇa-cyuti*) from which we suffer. But in reality there is no cover or obscuration of anything, all the elements of existence being naturally unsullied (IV. 96-98). Concluding, the teacher declares that according to the Buddha the knowledge is not related to its objects, and these two things, i.e., the knowledge and its objects, are not mentioned by the Buddha (IV. 99), for, in fact, he has said absolutely nothing.

§ 15. *The Philosophy of Gauḍapāda*

Let us now make an attempt to discuss a little the philosophy of Gauḍapāda as it is in our text, though it has already been done to some extent in the preceding section, i.e., the *Conspectus of the Contents*. As some of the philosophical views of our teacher have already been shown incidentally they will not be repeated here. Indeed, much has been written on this by my predecessors, yet when a new annotation is added hereto the subject may be discussed anew according to the light derived from it. In doing so we should keep our minds free from the influence of later thoughts, for it is not always safe to explain an older text by the thoughts in a subsequent work or works.

Now, it goes without saying that our teacher, Gauḍapāda, is a Vedāntist and he mainly deals with the Vedānta in the present work declaring its conclusion (II. 12, 31, 35). Naturally, therefore, as a Vedāntist, he treats his subject in accordance with the scriptures (*śruti*), yet, not without pure reasons. Direct or indirect, his reasonings are in many cases based on scriptures (II. 1-10; III. 24-26). But when there are contradictory scriptures, he says (III. 23) that those which are with reasons (*yukti yukta*) are to be accepted. Besides, throughout the work he has advanced a number of independent grounds which are very cogent. With a view to removing an apparent contradiction in the scripture he would interpret (III. 14) a text in its secondary sense saying expressly

that the primary one is not reasonable. The well-known practice of explaining Upaniṣadic texts in their secondary senses among the later commentators of the *Brahmasūtras* may be seen first here in Gaudapāda's interpretation.

Among the Vedāntists Gaudapāda is an Advaitist, the highest truth to him being *advaita* 'non-duality' (*advaitam paramārthataḥ*, I. 17; *advaitam paramārtho hi*, III. 18; *advaita yojayet smṛtim*, II. 36). He says (II. 31) that according to the Vedānta the universe is like dream or illusion or an imaginary town in the sky (*gandharvanagara*). There is no duality at all, it is mere illusion (I. 17).

The statement of the duality in the scripture is 'intended for the instruction (of the ignorant), and so when the truth is understood the duality does not exist (I. 18) and its cessation is bliss (I. 29; see also II. 35). He says (I. 17) further that the duality is due to illusion (*māyā*). In order to support this view he quotes scriptures (III. 24) which say 'There is no plurality (*neha nānāsti kiñcana*, BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 11)'; and 'Indra appears multiform through *māyā*' (BU, II. 5. 19)'; and he concludes (III. 24) that 'He (Prajāpati) is born variously, though (in fact) he does not take birth (VS, XXX, 19)

Having thus offered the scriptural evidence for maintaining the view that the duality is mere illusion and as such it has no reality, Gaudapāda gives us some pure reasons. Here, too, first he refers us to a scriptural text (BU, IV. 3. 14) and says (II. 5) that the two

states, dream and waking, are the same and one, because of the identity of the nature of the things experienced in them.) That the things in dream are unreal is well-known to all and it is said also by the wise (BU, IV. 3. 8 ff), and can be maintained on the following grounds :

The things (such as mountains) in dream are within as they are enclosed or in an enclosed place (II. 1, IV. 33); but if they are real it is impossible. The time being very short, or there being no fixed rule of time, it cannot be said that the dreamer really goes to the distant land dreamt of by him and sees things there. Nor is he seen there when he awakes (II. 2, IV. 34). Again, when he awakes he does not find his friends and others whom he had then in dream grasped (IV. 35). Further, it is said in our scripture (BU, IV. 3. 10) that in dream there are no chariots, etc., yet, they are seen there. Similarly, in the waking state, too, the things we see around us are unreal on account of the fact that they are *within* (II. 4; IV. 33). That which is non-existent at the beginning and at the end is so also in the middle, *i.e.*, at the present. Therefore, being like the unreal (such as mirage) the external things appear as not unreal (II. 6; IV. 31). In both the cases, dream and waking, things are only imagined by the mind. That which is imagined by the mind within is regarded as non-existent (*asat*), while that which is imagined by the mind without is regarded as existent; but the unreality of both of them is reasonable and a matter of experience (II. 9, 10). Whether in

dream or waking, whatever is cognizable by the mind is unreal (*cittadṛśyam avastukam*, IV. 36). Moreover, in both the states the mind though in its own nature is undoubtedly without the two (i.e., the percipient and the perceptible), yet it moves owing to illusion with the appearance of the two (III. 30; IV. 62). This duality comprising the movable and the unmovable is therefore perceptible only by the mind. Hence when the mind becomes non-mind, i.e., when it ceases from its function of thinking, no duality is experienced (III. 31). The cessation of the function of thinking of the mind, or, in other words, the state of non-mind is reached when the mind through its knowledge of the truth of the Ātman does not think anything being non-cognizant owing to the absence of the things to be cognized (III. 32) ¹

We have seen above that the waking experience is as unreal as the dream experience both of them being due to *māyā* or mere imagination of the mind that moves on account of *māyā* (*spandate mayayā manah*, III. 29; *cittam calati māyayā* (IV. 61).

That all these external things are the creation of

¹ Caudapīḍa seems to have been fond of compromising conflicting views III 17, IV 5; and so considering the opinion of the Dualists, i.e., those who maintain duality, he says III 17 ff. that they are firmly fixed in their own destructive conclusions and contend one another. But his view does not conflict with them. In explaining it he says III 18 that the supreme reality is non duality, yet, it is not that we do not admit duality, we do it, so there is no conflict amongst us. The only difference amongst us is that while according to you duality is in reality as well as in appearance we hold that it is only in appearance on account of illusion, and not also in reality (III. 19).

the mind is further said (IV. 72) and described elaborately by *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* (IV. 47-52) with a very apt illustration of the fire-brand (*alāta*). A fire-brand, only when it is moved, and not when it is not moved, appears to be straight or crooked, or so. Now these appearances are not produced from anything other than the fire-brand. And when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor do they enter into it. Similarly when the *viññāna*² or mind moves and not when it does not move, it appears in the form of the duality consisting of the percipient and the perceptible. These appearances are produced not from anything other than the *viññāna*; and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor they enter into it. He says again (IV. 63-66) that as animals seen in dream are visible to the mind of the dreamer and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the dreamer, even so the animals seen in wakefulness are visible to the mind of the waking one and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the waking one.⁴

Clearly this is the *Vijñānavāda* 'Idealism' before us. Now taking here into consideration the passages quoted under IV. 72 from the LA, and comparing the *kārikās* IV. 47-52 with the corresponding Buddhist passages quoted in the Annotation under IV. 52, one will be struck with the agreement between a Vedāntist and a *Vijñānavādin*. One will also be in

² Mark here the use of the word *viññāna* in these *kārikās*, and not of *citta* or *manas*.

a position to understand how far G a u ḍ a p ā d a is here influenced by the Buddhist thoughts and arguments. It is, however, to be noted that G a u ḍ a p ā d a, though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedāntist. It is true that he advocates the *Vijñānavāda*, but certainly it is originally adopted by him from the Upanisadic source, i.e., BU, IV. 3. 14. on which is based his fundamental statement (II. 5) that the two states, dream and waking, are one. This Upanisadic seed of idealism being influenced by its elaborate system in Buddhism and the vast literature on it by the Buddhist teachers who flourished before G a u ḍ a p ā d a, has developed into what we now find in the *Āgamaśāstra*. But when there are the above and the similar germs of idealism in the Upanisads' it must be accepted that it did not first originate with the Buddhists, though it has much developed in their system later on.

There are thus two schools of Vijñānavādins, (1) Vedāntists headed by G a u ḍ a p ā d a and (2) Buddhists with M a t r e y a at the head. In both the schools the external world is the creation or transformation of the mind. But while in the first the cause for that transformation is *māyā* (III. 29, IV. 61) it is *vāsanā* (LA, X. 150)¹ in the second, both of them being without beginning (*anādi*). This *māyā* and *vāsanā*

¹ See *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, III 2-3, TU, III 5: *vijñānam brahmeti vyajñāṣī vijñānād dhy eva*°.

² *hāhīo na vidyate hy artho yathā bālan vikāpyate | vāsanair luditam cittaṁ atihābhāsam pravartate*

may, however, be regarded as the same thing. For *vāsanā*, though explained as *pūrva jñāna* 'previous knowledge' is conceived as a cosmical force, transcendental illusion (*The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad, 1927, p. 209). The real difference then between these two schools in the present case is with regard to the intervention of the Ātman with whom *māyā* is connected in the first, and his denial' in the second where the *vāsanā* is with the *citta*.

Now, the *māyā* of the Jīva referred to above like *vāsanā* has no beginning. He sleeps on account of it being himself deluded by it (I. 16; II. 19). He himself imagines himself and various other things through his own *māyā*, some of them being within while others without (II. 13). These things, i.e., those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (*citta*), as well as those which are without and exist as long as remains the notion of the two, are only imagined (II. 14, 15). In the process of the imagination first he imagines himself as a Jīva 'personal soul' then various things, external and internal (II. 16). Consequently as in the dark, a piece of rope not known determinately is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water, etc., even so is imagined the self; but when that piece of rope is known determinately the imagined snake, etc., vanish and there is no duality. So is to be known of the ascertainment of the self (II. 17, 18).

⁵ *cittamātram na drīyo 'sti dvīdhā cittam pravartate |
grāhyagrāhākabhāvena ātmātmīyam na vidyate* " LA, III, 21

But what is the characteristic of a Jiva ? As we have seen above, Gaudapada explains it (III 3-9) by an apt illustration of *aḥasa* 'space' or *mahākasa* 'great space' and *ghatakasas* 'spaces occupied by different jars'. As it is owing to the condition (*upadhi*) of jars that the *aḥasa* is regarded as *ghatakasas*, so it is on account of the conglomerations (of the different parts of the body) that the Ātman is regarded as Jivas. Consequently as when the jars are destroyed spaces occupied by them are completely merged into the great space (*mahākasa*), even so are merged the Jivas into Ātman when the conglomerations are destroyed (The spaces occupied by all jars are in reality only one,) yet if the space occupied by one jar is covered by smoke or dust, etc., not all the spaces occupied by all other jars are connected with it. The case is the same also with the Jivas in regard to their happiness, etc., i.e., if one Jiva feels happiness or suffers pain, not all the Jivas are subjected to it. There may be different conditions (*upadhis*), their forms, functions and names may differ from one another, but as regards the space occupied by them there is no difference. Similar is the case with reference to the Jivas. Again, the space occupied by a jar is neither a transformation (*vikāra*), nor a part (*avayava*) of the space (*aḥasa*), similarly a Jiva is neither a transformation nor a part of the Ātman. Gaudapada says further that the Ātman like the space remains in all the conglomerations or bodies which, too, have no reality as dream being the creation of the illusion of the Ātman (III 10). The Jiva is the supreme soul of the 'sheaths' (*kośas*) as

described in the TU, II. 1-6, and the supreme Brahman or Ātman is shown in the *Mādhvīdyā* section of the BU, II, 5. That the identity of the Jīva and the Ātman without distinction is praised and their distinction is censured in the scriptures is reasonable (III. 13), for though in some texts their distinction is to be found, those texts are to be taken in their secondary sense, the primary one being not reasonable (III. 14). Here the distinction is made purposely, it is made out of compassion to help one of inferior vision in one's *upāsana* which is for such a person impossible without some sort of distinction (III. 11-16). It is not that such a distinction must be a real one.

It is said that the mind becomes non-mind and Gauḍapāda is definitely of opinion that Brahman is nothing but the mind that has become non-mind. He says that the mind in the state of *suṣupta* 'deep sleep' falls into a sleeping state (*laya*), but it does not do so when it is suppressed (*nigṛhīta* = *niruddha*), and indeed that is Brahman above fear and radiant with the light of *jñāna* (III. 35). 'See IV. 77-81, and below. He expresses the same thing in other words saying that when the mind is completely suppressed (*niruddha*) and as such is free from all movements and does not perceive anything else it becomes Brahman (III. 46):

yadā na hyate cittam na ca vikṣipyate punaḥ t
 aninganam anābhāsaṃ niṣpannam brahma tat tadā ॥

'When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is

distracted again, and as such has no movement, nor any sense-image, then it becomes Brahman.'"

It is to be pointed out that here for the first time, so far as goes my information, it is found that Brahman is nothing but the *citta* which by *nirodha* is *anidrā* (I. 16; III. 36; IV. 81; = *alina* = *amūḍha*), *asvapna* (I. 16, III. 36; IV. 81; = *avikṣipta*),⁷ *aniṅgana* (III. 46; = *akṣipta*), and *anābhāsa* (III. 46; = *nirābhāsa* = *nirākāra* = *arūpa*, III. 36). Another appellation of this *citta* is *sanirvāṇa* 'with extinction' (III. 37), i.e. in this state it is extinct. It is *jñāna* 'knowledge' or 'thought' but *akalpa* (III. 33; = *nirvikalpa*) 'indeterminate' and consequently *asaṅga* 'having no attachment or relation to any object' (IV. 72, 96; = *niḥsaṅga* IV. 79, see IV. 99 = *nirvisaya*, IV. 72)⁸ Being as such this *jñāna* is not different from the knowable (*jñeyābhinna*), which is Brahman (III. 33)

6 The first half of the *kārikā* implies that in this state of the mind, which can be reached by *Asparśayoga* (III. 39, 45, IV. 2) it is free from the conditions known in the Yoga systems as *mūḍha* 'stupefied' and *vikṣipta* 'distracted' (Vyāsa on the YS, I. 1). These two are also expressed by our teacher as *anidrā* 'sleepless' and *asvapna* 'dreamless' respectively (III. 36 I. 16; IV. 81).

7 *Vācaspati* (YS, I. 1) *mūḍham tu tamaḥsamudrekān nidrāvyūṣmat. kṣiptāḍ viśiṣṭam viśeṣo* 'sthemabāhulārya kādācīkah sīthemā

8 Here *sanirvāṇa* mind = *amanibhāsa* (III. 31, MU, VI. 34, YV, III. 67, 81, = *amanastā* (III. 32, Mukti UP. II. 29) = *unmanibhāsa* *Brahmahindū* UP. 4) *manābhāsa* (MU, VI. 20) = *manurāsa* (Mukti UP, II. 10, 35, 36, 39) = *manolaya* (*Āśābhinna* UP, 47) = *acittatā* (Mukti UP, II. 20) = *cittanāśa* (*Op cit* II. 32, 34; *Sāṅkhya* UP. in *One Hundred and Eight Upaniṣads*, Nirmaya-vagat 1917, p. 358).

9 See the Annotation on IV. 72

It is further said that in this state the mind rests in itself (*svastha*, III. 47 ; = *ātmasaṁstha*, III. 34).¹⁰

This Brahman of G a u ḍ a p ā d a then points on one side to the state of *kaivalya* 'the state of being not connected with anything else,'¹¹ or the resting of the *Draṣṭṛ* or *Puruṣa* 'Self' in himself (*svarūpa*, i.e., *cin-mātra* 'pure thought'), as described in YS, I. 3,¹² and on the other to the resting of the *citta* in the *viññapti-mātratā* of the *Yogācāras* or *Vijñānavādins*. According to the latter *citta*, *manas*, *viññāna* and *viññapti* are synonyms.¹³ Therefore *viññaptimātratā* is the same as *viññānamātratā* which means the state of pure and simple *viññāna* 'intellect' or 'consciousness.' Here in this state there is the highest cessation of the perceiving faculty of the mind.¹⁴ And this is in their opinion *mukti* 'deliverance.'¹⁵ This is also the 'highest place of Viṣṇu' (KU, I. 3. 9 ; MU, VI 26 ; RV, I. 22. 20 ; 154. 5 with a slight variation), not only according

¹⁰ This will remind one of the following in the ChU, VII 24 1-2

Yatra nānyat paśyati nānyac chreṇoti nānyad vijñāti sa bhūmā * sa bhagavaḥ
kasmin pratīḥita itī sve mahimni yadī vā na mahimnī

¹¹ YS, IV. 34 puruṣārthasūnyānāṁ guṇānāṁ praprasavaḥ kaivalyam
svarūpapratiḥā vā citīśakteḥ

¹² tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe 'vasthnam

¹³ Vḥ, p 3 ; AK, II 34 ; MV, p 303, VM ed D' K o s a m b i., XIV 82.

¹⁴ MSA, XI 47. parama upalambhasya vigamaḥ. Tk, p 29 acitto
'nupalambho 'sau, see TSN, 36

¹⁵ viditvā nairātmyam dvividham iha dhīman bhāvegataḥ

samam tac ca jñātvā pravīṣati sa tattvam grahanataḥ |

tatas tatra sthānān manasa iha na khyāti tad api

tad akhyānam muktiḥ parama upalambhasya vigamaḥ ||

MSA, 47

to the Upanisadists,¹⁶ but also to the Vaiṣṇavas (BP, II. 1. 19).¹⁷

One point is to be discussed here. Brahman of the Vedāntists or G a u d a p ā d a (III. 30) is eternal (*nitya*), and if it is so, how can it be suggested, as done before, that Brahman and the *citta* in *Vijñapti-mātratā* are the same, for according to Yogācāras *jñāna* is not eternal, but momentary (*kṣaṇika*) ? The following is the solution :—

In the authoritative Buddhist works* the following words* are used for *nirvāṇa* : *dhruva* 'enduring', *amṛta* 'not dying', *acyuta* 'stable', *akṣara* 'imperishable', *ajarjara* 'not decaying' and *apaloṭīta* 'not broken down.' Certainly these words do not imply momentariness, but on the contrary some kind

The third and the first part of the fourth lines are explained there thus :
 tatas tatra tattavajñaptimūlāsthānīn monasas tad apī tattam na khyati vijñapti-
 mūlām tad akhyānam muktih.

16 MBU, p. 12.

yan manas trijagatsasthithivyaanakarmakit i
tan mano vilayam jñāta tad vishva paramam padam

17 *tatraikṣvavāṇaṁ dhyāyēd avyucchinne ce asti
mano nirvṛṣyam yuktā tathā kīrcara na smaret
radam tat paramam viṇor mano yatra prāṇidati*

18 VM, p. 224, SN, IV 369 ff., Proussin Arrière, CV XXV, pp. 153-4

19 Pousain has for it in French (Loc. cit.) with a query "le Soupçonné" ('suspected' or 'sumised'). But as clear from Buddhaghosa on SN, IV, 370 (apaluyy)atāya apalokitam, it is derived from pra-√'ray and not from pra-√'lok as may appear. And as it can be said in the words of Yācamini (AKV, p. 23) with regard to the derivation of the word lokethatīyūṇa gahīṇa lokik. See my note, *A passage of the Abhidharmaśālokaśāstra*, in JHQ, Vol II, pp. 418 ff., and Pousain's *Rejoinder*, p. 656.

of stability. Now the *citta* in the state of *viññaptimātratā* is described variously according to the variety of the aspects beginning from the 'Path of Illumination' (*darśanamārga*) in *Vasubandhu's* Tk, 29-30.²⁰ It is said there to be *lokottara jñāna* 'super-mundane knowledge,' *āśrayaparāvṛtti* (*āśrayasya parāvṛtṭiḥ*) 'the revolution or change of the recipient', i.e., the '*ālaya-viññāna*,' and *anāsrava dhātu* 'undefiled element' which is *dhruva* 'enduring.'²¹ Here by the word *āśrayaparāvṛtti* referred to above we understand, in brief, that owing to the elimination of the two sorts of evil condition (*dausthulya*), viz., the 'covers' or 'obscurations' (*āvaraṇas*), namely, the knowable (*jñeya*) and the passions (*kṛśas*), the recipient (*āśraya*), i.e., *ālayaviññāna*, turns back to its natural state in the form of *advaya jñāna* 'the knowledge free from the two,' i.e., the subject and the object. In other words, the *ālayaviññāna* which was before covered or obscured, the obscurations being now removed, gets its own innate state, i.e., the state of *advaya* (= *lokottara*) *jñāna*. This is called *anāsrava dhātu* 'undefiled element', which is *dhruva*.

²⁰ See our text, IV 18, foot note 1, where these two *kārikās* with the introductory line of *Sthiramati* are quoted.

²¹ On these words the commentary of *Sthiramati* may be quoted here.

aparicitatvāt 'Tib *hdraṣ par ma byas pa dan*, for *anucitatvāt* in the printed text) *loke samudācānābhāvāt* (for which Tib suggests *samudayābhāvāt* reading *kun tu hbyun ba med pa. dan*), *nirvikalpatvāt* *ca lokād uttīraṇam* *itu jñānam lokottaram* *ca tad iti* 'āśrayo tra sarvabījakaṃ ālayaviññānam, tasya parāvṛtṭir yā dausthulyavipākadvayavāsanābhāvena parāvṛtṭiḥ'. *nudausthulyatvāt* *ca tu āśrayavigata ity anāsravaḥ*. *dhruvo nityatvād aksayatayā*°.

But what is the true significance of the word *dhruva*, that is intended here? Among the 33 descriptive words for *nirvāṇa* found in SN, IV. 368-373 and 46 synonyms for it in AP. 6-9, we have *dhruva* and *never nitya*. It is true that sometimes the words *nitya*, *dhruva* and *śāśvata* are used as synonyms (Pali *vevecana* = *vivacana* = *paryāya*), as says Buddhaghosa himself on SN, I. 142.²² Yet, there is some difference in their meanings. For while *śāśvata*, according to him, means 'always existing' -(*sadā vijjamānaṃ*) *dhruva* implies 'enduring' (*dhuvam'ti thiram*; he writes also on SN, IV. 370: *thirattihena dhuvam*).

Jaina teachers, too, are of the same opinion. In connexion with the definition of *dravya* 'substance'²³ in their system they give the same explanation of the word *dhruva* or *dhrauvya* using the same or similar words.²⁴

In the older Upanisads *Ātman* or 'Brahman' is *nitya* and not *dhruva*. The word *nitya* implies that it does not admit of any change, while *dhruva* does not do so. Let us give here an illustration. If of a lump of gold a number of different ornaments is made one after another, their forms change, yet, through these changes

²² With regard to *pāpaka dīrghiga* idam niccam idam dhuvam idam anantam. See also *Sthiramatti*, Tk. 30, explaining *dhruva* as quoted in foot-note 21.

²³ *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra*, V 29 utpādavyavādhravyasyuktam sat

²⁴ *Tattvārtharajavārttika* (Śāntāna Jainagranthamālā, 1915), V 20 (*dhruva* = *sthira*); *Tattvadīpikā* on *Pravacanasūtra* (ed. A. N. Upadhye, 1935) II 3 (*dhrauvya* = *asthiti*); *Tattvadīpikā* on *Pañcāśasamayasūtra* (Rāyacandra Jainasāstramālā, 2nd ed.), 10 *purvottarablabocchedotpādayor api eva* *sthitir aparityāgo dhrauvyam*, *Sanmotīkākā* (Gujarātī Purātattva mandira, Ahmedabad, 1940 V S), Garhā 12, p. 410 (*dhrauvya* = *sthitir*)

the same gold continues to exist. Owing to this continuance it can be said that gold is here *dhruva* 'enduring', but not *nitya* 'eternal'.

The *Ālayavijñāna* is certainly momentary (*kṣaṇika*), as it changes every moment. It does not therefore move forward as one and the same (*ekam abhinnaṃ*), but continues in an uninterrupted stream (*santati*) as the flood with its currents (*srotasā oghavat*). This continuity has no beginning, nor has it an end (*anādī-nidhana*) till *nirvāṇa*. Now as through all the moments the *Ālayavijñāna* continues it is *dhruva* and not *nitya*.

It may be pointed out here that there is more than one kind of *nityatā* 'eternity' according to the primary and the secondary senses of the word; viz., (i) *kūṭasthanityatā* 'eternity as unchangeability' as of *Ātman* or *Brahman* of the Vedāntists; (ii) *pariṇāmanityatā* 'eternity as transformation' as held by the Sāṅkhyas and the Jainas. To these two may be added, according to the Buddhists, (iii) one more, viz., *santatinityatā* 'eternity as continuance.' It may, however, be the same as *pariṇāma-nityatā*. Where in such cases in Buddhist texts the word *nitya* is employed it is to be taken in this light.

Now in support of the main problem we are here concerned with, the following couplet may be taken into consideration :

prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ |
teṣāṃ apāye sarvārthaṃ taj jyōtir avinaśvaram ||²⁵

²⁵ Quoted by Jayatīrtha representing the views of the Vijñānavādins in his *tīkā* (sl. 30, on TAK. III, p. 35). It is already cited once more on p. 70 of our text.

Mark that *citta* is said here to be *avinaśvara jyotis* 'the light that is not liable to be destroyed'.²¹

It may therefore be safely concluded that *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* 's Brahman and the *citta* in *viññaptimātratā* of the *Yogācāras* are in fact the same thing with the only one difference that while the former is *nitya* the latter is *dhrūva*.

Let us remember here what *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* says about Brahman (III. 35-36, 46-47),²² as we have seen just now from the Vedāntic point of view, and compare it with what he says in IV. 76-81²³ of the 'field of the activities (*viśaya*) of the Buddhas' describing

²¹ See also the following

(i) *tatotpānnaprādhvamsi vijñānam anutpānnaprādhvamsi jñānam* LA, p. 157. See our text p. 85, foot note 2

(ii) *Jñānasiddhi* (*Two Vajrayāna Texts*, GOS, p. 85), XV, 50, referring to *cittadhāra* 'current of thought' (in the text read *cittadhāreṣu* for *cittadhāreṣu* in 48)

anādinidhanā śāntā sarvadharmēvarīca sū |

bibharti sarvarūpāni śatyadvayasamāśrītā ||

(iii) *Op cit*, p. 75 *anādinidhanam śāntam bodhicitram*

(iv) *Op cit*, p. 86 *jñānam amaranam* "anabhilāpyam

(v) *Suzuki* writes in his *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, 1907, p. 348 "Nirvāṇa is sometimes spoken of as possessing four attributes, (1) eternal (*nitya*), (2) blissful (*sukha*), (3) self-acting (*ātman*), and (4) pure (*śuci*). It is eternal, because it is immaterial, it is blissful, because it is above all sufferings, it is self-acting, because it knows no compulsion; it is pure, because it is not debled by passion and error "

²² Brahman is that *citta* which is unwavering and has no sense-image nor origination, nor sleep, nor dream *aniganam anābhāsam* (III, 46) and *ajam anidram asvapnam cittaṃ* (III 36).

²³ The field of activities or the aim of the Buddhas is the unwavering position of the mind having no origination, nor sleep, nor dream *cittasya anutpātik* (IV, 77) and *nīcalā sthūh* (IV, 80), and *ajam anidram asvapnam cittaṃ* (IV, 81).

and approving the views of the Buddhists ; it will then be clear that the same thing has been said by *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* in two places almost in the same words though from the two different standpoints

We have already discussed the *Vijñānavāda* as it is in our text. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is treated here by *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* only with a view to the establishment of the *Ajātivāda* 'the Theory of Non-origination' which is one of the most important topics of the philosophy of *G a u ḍ a p ā d a*. Having proposed to show what it is first in III. 2 and then in IV. 5 he declares (III 48) and affirms (IV. 71) that the highest truth is that nothing originates. For details the reader is referred to the *Conspectus of the Contents* (pp. cxiii-cxxvi) and the work itself, we should like to point out here only a few important aspects of it.

The subject is dealt with by our author as a Vedāntist separately in two places, Book II and Book IV. In the former he does so purely from the Vedāntic point of view supporting his thesis by scriptures and grounds based on them or in favour of them, some of these grounds being strikingly similar to those offered by the Buddhists for the same purpose ; while in the latter he expresses his approval on behalf of his school regarding *ajāti* as declared by the Advayas or Buddhists saying that he does not dispute with them on this point and asking his followers or the people at large to listen to him as to how there cannot be any dispute. He proceeds then to show throughout the Book IV the

arguments of the Buddhists taking even the actual words from their authoritative works in a number of cases. Readers are here referred to our text with Annotation.

One point may be pointed out here. In Book IV *G a u d a p ā d a* has discussed nothing directly of the Vedānta,²¹ as nothing Vedāntic will be found therein. In explaining the Vedānta in accordance with his own light he establishes the *Ajātivāda* in Book III, as we have seen above. Then in Book IV he supports that theory referring to the Buddhists who also hold the same view independently of the Vedāntists. *Gauḍapāda* says here that his school approves of what they say on this point and shows their arguments one by one.

From this it may appear that whatever is said by *G a u d a p ā d a* as the opinion of the Buddhists in that Book is approved or accepted by him. But can it be said strictly? The Buddhists being the follower of the Middle Path (*madhyama pratipad*) reject both the extreme views of 'eternity' and 'annihilation' (*śāśvata-* and *uccheda-vādas*). This is alluded to in our text in IV. 57-60. But how can *G a u d a p ā d a* as a Vedāntist accept it when his Brahman in his own word (III. 33) is eternal (*nitya*)? Nevertheless, in the present case, *G a u d a p ā d a* seems to have accepted the middle theory, for, as the case is put here, there may not be raised any objection. Or it may be that *G a u d a p ā d a* has here simply mentioned the views

²¹ Even such words as Brahman and Ātman are not to be found there

of the Buddhists as he has done it in some other cases in this Book. For instance, see IV. 90.

It is a very striking fact that some of the most remarkable doctrines as discussed and established by Gaudapāda have not been appreciated in subsequent works on the Vedānta even of the Advaita school; for instance, the peculiar conception of Brahman, the *Ajātivāda*, the *Sarvajñatvavāda* (IV. 85, 89) and the *Vijñānavāda*, besides what Gaudapāda approves of the views of the Advayavādins or Buddhists in Book IV. Even the great Śaṅkara himself does not appear to subscribe to the above doctrines of our teacher. It need not, however, be said that his *Māyāvāda* has undoubtedly got strong impetus from the first three Books of the ĀŚ. His *Adhyāsavāda* as explained by him in his *Śārīrakaḥbhāṣya* and other works has no mention in the ĀŚ, though a distant relationship may be found out. Here he is undoubtedly influenced by the Buddhist Vijñānavādins specially in explaining their doctrine of *Trisvabhāva* or *Trilakṣaṇa* 'three characteristics' (IV. 74, pp. 175 ff).

Of the philosophy of Gaudapāda there is much more that deserves to be discussed separately, but in order to avoid prolixity readers are referred to the text itself, specially to its Book IV together with the new Annotation of the present writer, in which he has tried to explain many an important and hitherto obscure point of the work. From this, it is hoped, readers will be in a position to form their own judge-

ments as to how much *G a u ḍ a p ā d a* is influenced by Buddhist thoughts and how much of them he has adopted into his own system of the *Vedānta*.³⁰



³⁰ One may consider here the following words in the *Bhāṣapraṭīkāśa* (T.M. Vol II, p 415) referring to *ĀS*, IV 11 23

*nanu māndūkyakārikāsu, Gaudapādācāryaḥ mādhyaṃikoktayuktibhīḥ
kāryakāraṇa-* (for wrongly printed *kāryākāraṇa*) *bhāṣasya sāmvitatvam
atīpṛiṭam*

BOOK I *

1

bahisprajñō vibhūr viśvo hy antahprajñas tu tajasah |
ghanaprajñas tatha prajña eka eva tridhā sthitah ||

The all pervading one is *Viśva* all when he has the consciousness of outside he is *Tajasa* brilliant when he has the consciousness of inside and when his consciousness is concentrated he is *Prajña* 'intelligent' The one exists in three forms ²

¹ Literally condensed (*ghana*) in other words when consciousness does not admit of any distinction with itself as in the case in wakefulness and in dream ² See 1.2

2

dakṣinaksimukhe viśvo manasy antā tu tajasah |
akase ca hṛdi prajñas tridhā dehe vyavasthitah |

Viśva is in the front of the right eye ¹ within the mind is *Tajasa* while *Prajña* is in the sky in the heart ² Thus he remains in the body in three ways ³

¹ Kū IV 17 MU VII 11 CHU IV 13 1 VII 7 4 BU II 3 5
IV 2 2 V 5 2 4

² BU II 1 17 IV 2 3

³ See pp lxxxiv lxxxv and 1 3

3

visva hi sthulabhun nityam ta jasaḥ praviviktabhuk ।
anandabhuk tatha prajñas tridha bhogam nibodhata ॥

V i s v a enjoys what is gross T a j a s a what is fine and
P r a j ñ a bliss (Thus) know enjoyment to be of three kinds

4

sthulam tarpayate visvam praviviktam tu tajasam ।
anandas ca tathā prajñam tridha triptim nibodhata ॥

The gross satisfies V i s v a the fine T a j a s a and bliss
P r a j ñ a (Thus) know satisfaction to be of three kinds

5

trisu dhāmasu yad bhojyam bhokta vaś ca prakṛtistatah ।
vedaitad ubhayam yas tu sa bhunjano na lipyate ॥

One who knows both what is said to be enjoyable and
what is said to be the enjoyer in three stages is not tainted
through enjoying

6

prabhavaḥ sarva bhūtaṅmānāṁ itām ita vinnā ajah ।
sarvam janayati pranaś ceto mśun puruṣaḥ pṛthak ।

The settled opinion of sages is that all things have the
origin (Some hold that) the Breath ' the Puruṣa (self) creates
all the rays of the mind differently

The 'objective' world is the vibrations of one's mind (*citta* - *spandita* see IV 72) which shines inside. These vibrations are called here rays (*amśu*) and assume different forms just like the rays of the sun on the clouds appearing in the form of the rainbow.

vibhūtim prasavam tv anye manyante sṛṣṭicintakah ।
svapñamayavarupeti sṛṣṭir anyair vikalpita ।

Other theorists about creation assert dogmatically that the creation (of the world) is (his) expansion¹ while others imagine that creation is of the nature of dream and magic.²

¹ As in the Upan seds 'TU II 6 1 so kāmayaṭa bahu syam prajāyeyā

¹ This view is held by some of the Vedantists including our teacher (see II 31) and the Buddhists Mādhyamikas and Yogicāras

8

icchamâtram prabhoh srstir iti srsrau viniscitah |
kâlât prasutim bhutanam manyante kalacintakah |

Those who are assured about creation say that creation is the mere volition of the Lord¹ and those who theorise about Time consider the creation of beings to be from Time²

1 See note on 17 Kuranārīyana a follower of Rāmānuja says that they are *Upaṇyāda*s or the followers of the *Upaṇyāda*s who say the *satyasaṅkalpa* one whose purpose is true or fulfilled (ChU, 3 14 2).
Astronomers See SU 1 1 MU 7 MB 7 224 227
Astronomers See SU 1 1 MU 7 MB 7 224 227

1 They are Astronomers See SU 1 1 MU 7 MB XII 224 227
SS pp 10-11 and specially the hymns on Kāla in the AV XIX 53 54

Now as regards the object of the creation the author says-

9.

bhogārthaṃ sṛṣṭir ity anye kṛdārthaṃ iti cāpare ।
devasyaisa svabhāvo 'yam āptakāmasya kā spṛhā ॥

'Some (say) that the creation is for the sake of (his) enjoyment,¹ while others (are of opinion) that it is for the sake of his sport.² It is, however, the nature of the Shining One, for how can desire be in one for whom every object of desire is (already) secured.³

K ū r a n ā r ā y a ṇ a says here in his ṭīkā: harer atṛptasyaiva bhogārthaṃ sṛṣṭir ity anye Ś r ī n ī v ā s a t ī r t h a, an annotator of M ā d h v ā c ā r y a 's commentary on MāU, clearly says that this view is held by R ā m ā n u j a or his followers (kecid rāmānujāḥ) '

¹ See BU, I 4.17, ātmaivedam 'agta āsīd eka eva so 'kāmayata jātā me syād atha prajāyeya vittaṃ me syād atha karma kurvīyati

² See BS, II 1 33 lokavat tu līlākāvalyam; MU, VI 1 viśvakrīḍarati prabhuh

³ The second half of the kārikā is quoted as śruti in the Mādhvabhāṣya on BS, II 1, 33

10

nivṛtteḥ sarvaduḥkhānām iśānaḥ prabhur avyayah ।
advaitaḥ sarvabhāvānām dēvas turyo vibhuḥ smṛtaḥ ॥

'The Turya 'fourth one' is said to be all-pervading, efficient in removing all miseries, the shining one, changeless, and of all things without a second.'

¹ The other three are already mentioned Viśva, Taijasa and Prāṇa

11

karyakaranabaddhau tav isyete visvataijasau |
prajñah karanabaddhas tu dve tu turye na sidhyatah | ✓

It is held that those two *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are bound with cause and effect *Prajña* is bound with cause but in *Turya* neither of them can be asserted

Here according to the commentator cause (*karana*) is non grasping of the truth (*tattvagrahana*) while effect (*karya*) is grasping the truth otherwise (*anyathagrahana*) See*1 15 These two are common to both *Viśva* and *Taijasa* In *Prajña* there is only *tattvagrahana* while in *Turya* there is neither of them Cf PS' 31 PS' 34 35

* Th a kar ka + quoted in the NS IV 41

~ 12

natmanam na paramś caiva na satyaṁ napi c intitaṁ |
prajñah kincana samvetti¹ turiyah sarvadrś sadā | *

Prajña knows *nothing—neither himself nor others neither truth nor falsehood but *Turiya* is always all seeing ¹

As to why *Prajña* is bound with cause (*tattvagrahana*) and *Turiya* is not bound with either of cause and effect (*anyathāgrahana*) is stated in the following *karika*

¹ See BU IV 3 21

² See IV 84 Cf aa aa a III 30 4*

As *Prājña* does not know anything he is regarded as bound with the cause (*tattvāgrahana*) which is just like darkness (*tamas*)¹ As regards *Turya* there being nothing except himself he is all seeing and thus in the absence of all ignorance he is not bound in any way

¹ See UṢ XVIII 26

13

dvaitasyagrahanam tulyam ubhayoh prajnaturyayoh |
bījanidrayutah prajnah sa ca turye na vidyate ||

Non recognition of duality is common to both *Prājña* and *Turya* but *Prājña* is with sleep which is a seed (i.e. cause of specific cognition) while it does not exist in *Turya*

In this *kaṇḍikā* the difference between *Prājña* and *Turya* is shown In the text *nidra* sleep implies *tattvapratibodha* non realization of truth (I 13) and as it is the cause of specific cognition in dream and waking it is called *bīja* seed

14

svapnanidrayutāḥ adyau prajnas tv asvapnanidrayaḥ |
na nidram naiva ca svapnam turye pasyanti niscitah ||

The first two (*Viśva* and *Taijasa*) are with sleep and dream¹ *Prājña* is with dreamless sleep while those who are certain (about the truth) see neither sleep nor dream in *Turya*

It follows therefore from the above that *Turya* is not bound either with cause or with effect

¹ Dream (*svapna*) = knowing otherwise (*anyathagrahana*) and sleep (*nidra*) as said before = non cognition of truth (*tattvapratibodha*) See I 15

anyathā gñhatah swapno nidrā¹ tattvam ajanatah |
viparyāse tayoh kśīne turyam padam aśnute² |

'Dream is for him who takes the truth otherwise, and sleep is for him who does not know the Reality. The error in these two (swapna and nidrā) being destroyed one attains the stage of Turya.'

¹ See YS, I 10

² See NSi, IV 42 US xviii 26,

anādimāyayā supto yadā jivah prabudhyate |
ajam anidram asvapnam advaitam budhyate tadā |

'When the Jiva sleeping on account of illusion¹ which has no beginning is awakened, he realizes (the state of Turya which is unborn and in which there is neither sleep nor dream nor duality.'

¹ The commentator says that this māyā is in the form of tattvāpavāda bodha and anyathāgrahaṇa

² See I 14, III 36, IV 81

prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na samśayah |
māyāmātram idam dvaitam advaitam paramārthatāh |

If the expansion of the (visible) universe (prapañca) were (really) existing it would have to cease to exist, no doubt but this duality is mere illusion. In absolute truth there is non duality.

For the meaning of *prapañca* see *Candra-kīrti* on MV p 350

te ca vikalpa anadimatsarṣarabhyastaj jñānājñeya vacya
vācaka kartṛkarmakriyā ghaṭa paṭa mukuṭa ratha rūpa vedāna strī
puruṣa labhalabha sukha duḥkha ya'ō ya'ō ninda prarāṃsādī lakṣa
nāḍ vicitrat prapañcad upajayante

Op cit p 373

prapañco hi vak prapañcayaty arthan itī kṛtva

18

vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadī kenacit ।

upadesad ayam vado jñate dvaitam na vidyate ॥

False creation (*vikalpa*)¹ would cease if it were created² by some one. This statement (of *vikalpa*) is for the sake of instruction. When (the Reality) is known there is no duality.

It means that if it is held as we hold that the *vikalpa* (= *prapañca* in the preceding *karikā*) false creation i.e. duality is made by some one it must disappear. We say that it is said so in order to instruct the ignorant or stupid people so that they may gradually arrive at the truth (a) *anām avabodhartham* — YV III 84 24). This will be clear from YV (III 84 19 27) from which a few lines are quoted below.

The second half³ of the *karika* is identical with YV III 84 22a and 27b with the single variation that in 26a there is *avibodhad* for our *upadesad*. The reading *avibodhād* however seems to have actually been *avabodhad*. See the following from YV III 84

upadesaya sastreṣu jataḥ śabdō thavarthajāḥ ।

pratīyog vyavacchedaśamkhyālakṣanapakṣavan ॥ 19

bhedo dīśyata evaṃ vyavahāran na vastavaḥ ।

vetalo balakasyeva karyartham parikalpitah । 20

¹ That is duality which is only imaginary

² Let imagined

e ...mādimayī mithyāsaṅkalpakalpanā matā ।
 ajñānām avabodhārtham na tu bhedo 'sti vastuni ॥ 24
 avibōdhād ayam vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate ।
 jñāte saṁsāntakalanam maunam evāvaśiṣyate ॥ 25
 vivadante hy asaṁbudhāḥ svavikalpavijjmbhitāḥ ।
 upadeśād ayam vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate ॥ 27

In a of the kārīkā KN reads *na nivarteta* for *vinivarteta*.
 Accordingly it would give the following meaning *vikalpa*
 would not cease if it is created by some one, but the fact is
 not so, for it is mentioned only for one's instruction KN,
 however, explains it differently

19

viśvasyātvavivaksāyām ādi sāmānyam utkatam ।
 mātṛasampratipattau syād āptisāmānyam eva ca ॥

'In the desire of saying that *V i ś v a* is *A* and in knowing
 the measure' the common quality 'first' (*ādi*) as well as
 'pervading' (*āpti*) is quite apparent.'

Ātman is to be meditated through the symbol *Om*, and for
 doing so these two must be regarded as identical. This identi-
 fication of Ātman and *Om* is described in this and the follow-
 ing two kārīkāś. In the present kārīkā the first part (*pāda*) of
 Ātman, viz., *V i ś v a*, is identified with the first part or
 measure (*mātṛā*) of *Om*, viz., the letter *A*. It is to be noted that
Om results from the euphonic combination of the three letters
 (*mātṛās*), *A*, *U* and *M*. In such identification there must be
 some common quality (*sāmānya dharma*) of the things to be

1 That is, in knowing the identity of the first *mātṛā* of *Om*, i.e., *A*,
 with the first *pāda* of Ātman, i.e., *V i ś v a*. See I, 20, 21, note 1

meditated as identical² In the present case there are two common qualities, 'first' (*ādi*) and 'pervading' (*āpti*). As *Viśva* is the first of the four *pādas* of *Ātman*, so *A* is the first of all the letters of which *Om* is composed. And, again, as the reward of one who understands this identity of *Viśva* and *A* is far-reaching (for one attains thereby everything that one may desire), so is far-reaching *A*, for, as said in the *śruti*, *A* is all speech, as it manifests itself in different letters³

² See *bhaktiśūda* in Vedic texts; *Nirukta*, VII 24 *bahubhaktivādini brāhmināni bhavanti*, and the present writer's *Vedic Interpretation and Tradition* in the *Proceedings of the Sixth Oriental Conference* held at Patna, p. 498

³ *Sāyana* says in his commentary on the *TA*, VII, *etad apy antareyaṁ samāmnītam akāro vai sarvā vāk saṁ sparśasambhir vyajyamānā bahvi nānā-rupā bhavati* This passage is quoted by commentators on the *BG*, X 33 See *AA* III, 23 with *Sāyana* *tasyaṁtasyākāro rājah*

20

taijasasyotvavijñāna utkarso drīyate sphuṭam |
mātrāsampratīpattau syād ubhayatvam tathāvidham ||

'In understanding that *Taijasa* is (the letter) *U* and in knowing the measure,¹ the common quality 'subsequence' (*utkarṣa*) as well as the state of being in (the middle of) both (*ubhayatva*) is clearly seen'

The common qualities required for identification of *Taijasa* with *U* are *utkarṣa* 'subsequence' and *ubhayatva* which is the same as *madhyasthatva* 'intermediate position.'

¹ That is, in understanding that the second *mātrā* of *Om*, i.e., *U*, and the second *pāda* of *Ātman*, i.e., *Taijasa* are identical! See I 19, note 1 and 21, note 1

Taijasa is subsequent to Viśva and U is subsequent to A; therefore there is *utkarsa* Taijasa and U both are in the middle being between Viśva and Prājña and A and M respectively

21

makārabhāve prāñasya mānasāmānyam utkatam ।
mātrāsampratipattau tu layasāmānyam eva ca ॥

'In the identity of Prājña with (the letter) M and in understanding the measure the clear common quality is 'measure' (*māna*) as well as 'disappearance' (*laya*)'

The commentator's explanation of the *kāṅkā*, as I understand it, is as follows. In involution Viśva and Taijasa enter into Prājña, while in evolution they come out of it, and as such they, as it were, are measured with Prājña, just as grains of barley are measured with *prastha* 'a special standard of measure,' generally a basket made of bamboo or cane of particular capacity. In measuring the grains they are first put into the basket and then they are taken out. Now as Viśva and Taijasa enter into and come out of Prājña, so in pronouncing Om continually A and U, as it were, merge into and emerge from M. This is the first common quality, called 'measure' (*māna*) for the identification of Prājña and M. The second common quality, called 'disappearance' (*laya*) is this. In *susupti* 'profound, deep and undisturbed sleep' Viśva and Taijasa disappear in Prājña. Similarly in pronouncing Om, A and U seem to disappear in M.

22

triṣu dhāmasu yas tulyam sāmānyam vetti niścitaḥ ।
sa pūjyaḥ sarvabhūtānām vandyas caiva mahāmuniḥ ॥

'One who knows what is equal and common in the three stages and is certain (about it) is a great sage worthy of veneration and praise of all beings '

23

ākāro nayate viśvam ukāraś cāpi taijasam ।
makāraś ca punaḥ prājñam nāmātre vidyate gatiḥ ॥

'A leads to Viśva, U to Taijasa, and M to Prājña; there is no going to that which has no measure (*mātrā*) '¹

This is the consequence of one's meditating upon the symbol Om consisting of three *mātrās*, A, U and M. The last *pāda* of the *kārikā* speaks of the consequence of the meditation on 'the fourth' (Turya). In this state none is led to anywhere, it itself being the cessation of all duality (*dvaitasya upaśamah*).²

¹ That is, Turya

² See I 29

24

onkāram pādaśo vidyāt pādā mātrā na saṁśayaḥ ।
onkāram pādaśo jñātvā na kiñcid api cintayet ॥

'One should understand Om with each of the *pādas* 'quarters'; no doubt, the *pādas* are the *mātrās* 'measures' '¹

¹ It is said in the original Up, 6 pādā mātrā mātrās ca pādah, which means that the quarters (*pādas*) of ātman are to be regarded as identical with the measures (*mātrās*) of Om

And having understood Om with each of the *pādas* one should not think of anything else.²

¹ For *d* cf BG, VI 25 *ātmasamastham manah kṛtoṣ na kṛtsid apī cintayet* See BP, II 1 19

25

yujjīta praṇave cetah praṇavo brahma nirbhayam ।
praṇave nityayuktasya na bhayam vidyate kvacit ॥

'One should apply' the mind to Om, for Om is Brahman in whom there is no fear. And nowhere is fear for him who is always fixed² upon Om.'

¹ That is, concentrate

² That is, whose mind is always fixed

26

praṇavo hy aparam brahma praṇavaś ca param smṛtaḥ ।
apūrvo 'nantaro 'bāhyo 'naparah praṇavo 'vyayah ॥

'Om is said to be the lower, as well as the higher Brahman Om is without any antecedent and unchanging, and it has nothing other than itself, nor has it inside or outside'¹

¹ BU, IV 5 83 *anantaro'bāhyah*

27

sarvasya praṇavo hy ādir madhyam antas tathaiiva ca ।
evam hi praṇavam jñātvā vyaśnute tad anantaram ॥

'Om is the beginning, middle, and end of all Having known Om in this way one attains it' immediately.'

¹ Original *and* It seems to refer to Brahman in the preceding *kārikā* The commentator takes it to refer to *ātmabhāva*

28

pranavaṃ hīśvaram vidyāt sarvasya¹ hr̥di samsthitam¹ |
sarvavyāpinam onkāram matvā dhīro na śocati² ||

'One should know Om to be the Lord present in the heart of all. Having understood the all-pervading Om a wise man does not grieve.'

¹ BG, XIII 17 hr̥di sarvasya dhūsthitam, KU, II 3 17. eadā janānām hr̥daye sannivīṣṭaḥ

² KU, I 2 22 ; II 1. 4, 3 6

29

amātro 'nantamātraś ca dvaitasyopaśamah śivah |
onkāro vidito yena sa munir netaro janah ||

iti gaudapādiya āgamaśāstra āgamākhyāṃ
prathamam prakaranam samāptam

'He and no other person is a sage (*munī*) who knows Om which has no measure, and yet has an unlimited measure, and which is the cessation of duality, and which is bliss'

'Here ends, in the *Āgamaśāstra* of G a u d a p ā d i a, Book
One, called Traditional Doctrine'

BOOK II

1

vaitathyaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ svapna āhur manīṣiṇaḥ ।
antaḥsthānāt tu bhāvānāṃ samvṛtatvena hetunā ॥

'The wise say that all things in a dream are unreal, for they are within owing to the fact that they are enclosed.'

See II 4, IV 33

Things such as mountains, elephants, etc., which are seen in a dream are not outside but inside the body. But as in reality they cannot exist within the body they must be regarded as unreal. Literally the *kārikā* means that owing to the fact that the things in a dream are enclosed (*samvṛta*) they are inside (*antaḥsthāna*), and hence they are unreal (*utathā*). But it will be evident from *kārikā* IV 33 in which this very thought is expressed in almost identical words, that the state of being enclosed (*samvṛtatva*) is not with reference to things (*bhūtas*), but to the place (*pradeśa*). This explanation of the author himself may rightly be accepted here and also in *kārikā* II 4.

See II. 2

... inside the body is ex-

2

adīrghatvāc ca kālasya gatvā deśān na paśyati ।
pratibuddhas ca vai sarvas tasmīn deśe na vidyate ॥

'The time being not long one does not see the things

dreamt) by going to (different) places ; and no person, on waking, is in the place (where he dreamt himself to be) '.

It cannot be held that in a dream one goes to different places and sees things in those places, for one may see things in a dream in a very distant land, but the time being short it is impossible to think that the dreamer travels to that distant land and sees the things there. Moreover, it is found that a dreamer, on waking, does not see himself in the country where he dreamt himself to be.

Thus it follows that the things seen in a dream do not exist in the external world.

In support of this view the author refers in the next *kārikā* to tle BU. IV 3. 10 :

3

abhāvaś ca rathādīnām śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam ।

vaitathyam tena vai prāptam svapna āhuh prakāśitam ॥

'The non-existence of chariots, etc. (seen in a dream), with the reason therefor, is learnt from the *śruti* ' Therefore, it is

1 See BU, IV 3 10 which runs as follows - na tatra rathā na rathayogā na panthāno bhavanti atha rathān rathayogān pathah srjate In this passage *tatra* refers to *svapna*. See also IV 3 13

svapnānta uccāvacam iyamāno
rūpāni devah kurute bahūni ।
uteva strībhiḥ saha modamāno
jīksad utevāpi bhayān paśyan ॥

As regards the *nyāya* 'reason' referred to here, Purasottama writes. svapnānta uccāvacamiyamāna—iti mantrenānekarūpakaranam ukta tasmān nāyatam bodhayed durbhaisajyam hāsmāi bhavaty anena suptasya nibandhena jāgarane kṣtam āha yady anyatra gato bhavet tatkaranam na vaded (?) durbhaisajyam ca yatra suptas tatraiva strīyā svapne ramamānāḥ skhalite jāgrat tām bahiḥ paśyēt yato na paśyati tataḥ karoti yataḥ karoti tato rathādyabhāvāḥ evam ca svapne pūrvam rathādyabhāvah paścāt karanād ityādīnyāyapūrvakam

said that the unreality (of things seen) in a dream, as follows (from the foregoing arguments), is evident.

In the next *kārikā* the author proceeds to show the unreality of things in the waking state also applying the same reasons :

✓ 4

antahsthānāt tu bhedānām tathā jāgarite smṛtam |
yathā tatra tathā svapne saṃvṛtatvam na bhidyate¹ ||

'The same² is declared of the things³ in waking on account

¹ The actual reading of *d* in all printed texts and MSS examined is *saṃvṛtatvena bhidyate* which hardly gives any proper sense. The commentary does not help us on this point. It explains *antahsthānāt saṃvṛtatvena ca svapnadṛṣṭyānām bhāvānām jāgraddṛṣṭyebhyo bhedaḥ*—'on account of being inside as well as of being covered the phenomena in a dream are different from those in waking.' But this explanation is hardly possible, for one naturally expects here to know the non-difference (*abheda*) and not the difference between the things in waking and in dream. Accordingly one might disjoin the *sandhi* *vi jāgraddṛṣṭyebhyo bhedaḥ* in the commentary taking the last word as *abhedaḥ* and not *bhedaḥ*, though Ānandagiri evidently accepts the latter. Apart from the propriety of that explanation the question is: How should one construe the second half of the *kārikā*? What is the nominative of the verb *bhidyate*? According to the commentator it must be *svapnadṛṣṭya bhāva*, but it is not in the text, nor can it be understood or supplied from any of the preceding *kārikās*.

One may, however, take the line as *saṃvṛtatva na bhidyate*. In this case the nominative is *vaistathya* 'unreality' which is to be supplied from the preceding *kārikā*. The author wants here to show the unreality of the phenomena in the waking state just like that of those in a dream on the same ground, i.e., *antahsthāna* which is due to *saṃvṛtatva* of the place. Thus it is said that the *vaistathya* of the things in waking does not differ from that of the things in a dream, for in both the cases *saṃvṛtatva* is the same, there being no difference whatsoever.

² That is, *vaistathyam* already described in the preceding *kārikā*.

³ The words *bhūta* (IV 33), *bhāva* (II 13, 16, 17, 19, 33 . III 20, 22), and *bheda* (II 4, 5, 11, 12) are the same as regards the meaning.

of the fact that they are inside ; for, as there (i.e. in waking) so in a dream the state of being enclosed does not differ ⁴

See II 1, IV. 33.

I should, however, like to suggest the reading as *saṃvṛtatoam* na bhidyate which makes the sense very clear.

As to how the state of being enclosed (*saṃvṛtato*) does not differ in waking and dream, is discussed and shown in some of the following *kārikās* (II 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, III 29, 30 ; IV. 61, 62, 64-66), where it is fully explained, as the *Vijñāna-vādin*s would say, that there being no external thing in reality, whatever we see around us either in waking or in dream is only, imagined (*kalpita*) by mind which is inside our body and inside of a body is covered (*saṃvṛta*). Says *Diṇnāga* in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, 6. yad antar jñeyarūpam tad bahirvad avabhāṣate

Puruso t t a m a writes here: jāgarita itī, bahir anubhavāt katham antahsthatvam ity ākāṅkṣāyām svapnatulyatvād itī vaktum svapnasyaitattatulyam āha yathā tatretī yathā jāgante manodhyāto 'rthah śarīrasamvitatvena bāhyebhyo bhidyata itī śarīrantahsthatvam tathā svapne 'pi pūrvam uktam. atas tattatulyatvāt tathety arthah

⁴ The commentary reads in explaining the *kārikā* .

jāgraddrīyānām bhāvānām vartathyam itī pratijñā drīyatvād itī hetuḥ. svapnadrīyabhāvavad itī drīyāntah yathā tatra svapne drīyānām bhāvānām vartathyam tathā jāgarite 'pi drīyatvam avūṣtam itī hetūpanayah ta-māy jāgarite 'pi vartathyam smṛtam itī sugamanam

Now the author goes to show further in the next *kārikā* that there is no difference between the two states, waking and dream, in fact they are one :

5

svapnajāgarite sthāne hy ekam āhur manśinat
bhedānām hi samatvena prasiddhenaiva hetunā

⁵The wise say that the two states, dream and waking, are

one, on account of the identity of things (in those two states), for the reason that has been well established.'

The first half of the kārīkā refers to BU, IV 3 14 :

atho khalv'āhur jāgaritadeśa evāsyāisa iti yāni hy eva jāgrat paśyati tāni supta iti

Here *esaḥ* refers to *svapna*, as says Śāṅkara. *esaḥ svapnaḥ*,

For *svapnajāgarite sthāne* cf. BU, IV. 3. 9 : *dve eva sthāne bhavataḥ*

'The reason that has been well established' (*prasiddhenauva hetunā*) refers to *antahsthāna* already explained (II 1, 4).

Though in fact the objects of waking experience appear as real, still they are unreal. How it may be so the author proceeds to say in the following kārīkā.

6

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā |
vitathaiḥ sadṛśāḥ santo'vitathā iva laksitāḥ |

See IV. 31.

'That which is non-existent at the beginning, and at the end, is so also at the present (i.e., in the middle); being like the unreal¹ things still appear as not unreal'.

For a full discussion see IV 31, which is identical with the present kārīkā.

¹ That is, being like mirage, etc., which are acknowledged to be unreal by all

7

saprayojanātā tesām svapne 'pi pratipadyate' |
tasmād ādyantavattvena mithyaiva khalu te smṛtāḥ ||

¹ The reading of *b* generally found in editions and MSS examined is *svapne pratipadyate*; but as the sense requires it should be *svapne 'pi prati-*

'that the things have some purpose also in dream is known Hence owing to their having a beginning and an end, indeed, they are regarded as unreal '

For particulars see IV. 32 which is a repetition of the present kārīkā

padgate which is actually found in a MS, D² in IV 32 which is identical with the present kārīkā Here too, MS Vn reads *svapne ca prati* It is supported also by MS Ch (३) of the Comm in Ānandāsrama ed which has *svapne prati* for *svapne viprati*

8

apūrvāḥ sthānidharmā hi yathā svarganivāsīnām ।
tān ayam preksate gatvā yathaiveha suśīkṣitah ॥

'(The phenomena of dream) are strange, like (the characteristics) of the inhabitants of the heaven; they are the characteristics of the person in the place (of dream, i.e., the dreamer himself) Just like one who is well trained here, he goes and sees them (in dream) '

/ I confess this kārīkā is not quite clear to me I simply write what I have been able to gather from it in the light of the commentator

It is to be noted that in a I suggest the reading *apūrvāḥ sthānidharmāḥ* for *apūrvam sthānidharmah*, so that the former can be connected with *tān* in c For other readings see the commentary and the Appendix

The kārīkā seems to say as follows The phenomena of dream, on the analogy of which the objects of the waking experience are held to be unreal, are sometimes strange, as the characteristics of some gods, such as the thousand eyes of Indra, and this is the nature of the dreamer (*sthānin* 'one in the place' of dream) himself And just as a man who is

well trained goes to a place and sees there strange things, so he sees strange things in a dream.

The next two kārīkās seek to establish the unreality of dream and waking experience alike .

9

svapnavṛttāv api tv antaś cetasā kalpitam tv asat ।
bahiś cetogṛhitam sad dṛṣṭam vaitathyam etayoh ॥ २

'Even in the state of dream that which is imagined by mind within is (regarded as) non-existing (*asat*), while that which is cognized by mind without is (regarded as) existing (*sat*) . (but) the unreality of (both of) them is a matter of experience .

10

jāgradvṛttāv api tv antaś cetasā kalpitam tv asat ।
bahiś cetogṛhitam sad yuktam vaitathyam etayoh ॥

'In the waking state also, that which is imagined by mind within is regarded as non-existing (*asat*), while that which is cognized by mind without is regarded as existing (*sat*) . the unreality of (both of) them is reasonable .

Cf these two kārīkās with IV 63-66

The opponent here says that it cannot be said that everything in the waking experience and dream is unreal, for there must be at least one thing real without which we cannot go on.

11

ubhayor apī vai tātṛṣyam bhedānām sthānāyor yadī
ka etān budhyate bhedān ko vai teṣāṃ vikalpakah ||

'If in both the states the different things are unreal, well, then who is it that cognizes these things? Who is it that imagines them?'

The answer is given in the following kārīkā :

12

kalpayaty ātmanātmānam ātmā devaḥ svamāyayā |
sa eva budhyate bhedān itī vedāntanīśchayah †

'It is the self, the shining one, that imagines the self by the self through its own illusion (*māyā*), and verily it is that (self) which cognizes the things This is the conclusion of the Vedānta '

For such use of the word *ātman* in the sense of self see BG, II. 55, V. 17; VI 5, 6

The word *deva* 'here and in similar cases (I 1; II. 19, 21) does not mean a 'god'. Its literal sense is 'a shining one' and it is used to denote anything that shines in any way, or that which has some sort of glory or power For instance, in Upanisadic texts see PU, II 1, 2 (where the following are called *devas* *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, *agni*, *prthivī*, *vāc*, *manas*, *cakṣus* and *śrotra*), 5 (*vāyu*); 8 (*prāna*), IV 1, 2, 5, 6 (*manas*), II (*agni*, etc.), BU, IV. 3 13 (Śaṅkara *devo dyotamānaḥ*) Puruṣottama would take the word in the sense of 'a playing one'. *atra deva itī kridāparatvam uktam teneyam kalpanā kridāpareti phalati.*

It may be noted incidentally that the words *prabhu* (I 8, 10, II. 13) and *virbhu* (I. 1, 10) in such cases are not to be

connected with the sense of 'god', they simply mean 'powerful'. See BG, V. 14, 15.

See also our text II. 19; ŚU, IV. 9

In what manner the Ātman imagines so, is shown in the next kārīkā :

13

vikaroty aparān bhāvān antaś citte 'vyavasthitān |
niyatāṃś ca bahiś citta evaṃ kल्पayate prabhuḥ |'

'It brings about some things in the mind within, which are not fixed, also some other things in the mind without which are fixed. Thus brings about the powerful one'

vikaroti 'brings about' (lit 'makes variously', Com nānā karoti)=kल्पayati (II 12) or kल्पayate (II, 13, 16, see 14, 30, 33 ; I. 18, II. 9).

There are two kinds of things, things in dream, and those in wakefulness, and both of them are imagined in mind. The only difference between them is that the former are imagined inside and are not fixed vanishing at once, while the latter are imagined outside and are fixed, for they serve our practical purposes.

The next kārīkā seeks to show that in fact there is no difference between them :

i In b the commentator with a number of editions and MS² reads *vyavasthitān* for *avyavasthitān* which is clearly supported by *Purusottama*. The sense of the kārīkā demands in the first half a term opposite to *niyata* in the second half, and it is *avyavasthitān* (= *an-gata*) and not *vyavasthitān*. In the phrase *bahikṛitā evaṃ* in c and d the commentator takes the first word as *bahikṛitān*. But it must be *bahikṛite*. *Purusottama* clearly reads the latter. Cf *antekṛite* in b

14

cittakālās ca ye 'ntas tu dvayakālās ca ye bahih ।
kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣo nānyahetukah ।

'Those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (*cittu*), and those which are without and exist as long as remains (the notion of) the two (i.e., *grāhya* 'perceptible' and *grāhaka* 'percipient'), are all merely imagined. And (in this respect) there is no difference on any other ground.'

For *dvaya* see III, 29, 30 ; IV 4, 24, 61, 62, 72, 75, 87.

That in such cases *dvaya* 'twofold' means *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, 'perceptible' and 'percipient' respectively, is quite clear from the words of the author himself (IV 72b) : *grāhya-grāhakavad dvayam*. It is also well known throughout the Buddhist literature, for instance, MS. XIV. 28 (p. 94)

*dvayagrāhavisamyuktam lokottaram anuttaram ।
nirvikalpam malāpetam jñānam sa labhate punah ॥*

°*dvayagrāhavisamyuktam grāhyagrāhagrāhakagrāhavisam-
yogāt* Op cit. XI 32 (p. 63)

*svadhātuto dvayābhāsāḥ sāvidyākleśavrttayah ।
vikalpāḥ sampravārtante dvayadravyavivarjitāḥ ॥*

°*dvayābhāsā itī grāhyagrāhakābhāsāḥ dvayadravyavivarjitā
itī grāhyadravyena grāhakadravyena ca*

See also the following quoted from the *Āryadṛdhā-
śayopaniṣchā* in MV, p. 463 :

*na hi kulaputra dvayaprabhāvitā tathāgatadharmatā tatra
ye dvaye caranti na te samyakprayuktā mithyāprayuktās te
vaktavyāḥ katamac ca kulaputra dvayam. aham rāgam
prahāsyāmiti dvayam etat aham dvesam prahāsyāmiti dvayam
etat. aham moham prahāsyāmiti dvayam etat*

TS, 3.538 :

prakṛtyā bhāsvare citte dvayākārākalankite ।
dvayākārāvimūdhātma kah kuryād anyathāmatih (tim) ॥
dvayākārāvimūdhātmeti prahīnagrāhyagrāhakābhīniveśaḥ

—*Pañjikā*.

Though both of the experiences, i.e., the experiences in dream and waking, are mere imaginations, and as such are not different, yet there is some difference between them with regard to the means of their cognition. This is shown in the next kārikā :

15

avyaktā eva ye 'antas tu sphuṭā eva ca ye bahiḥ ।
kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣaḥ tv indriyāntare ॥

'Those which are unmanifest within and those which are manifest without are all imagined indeed, but there is some difference owing to the difference of the organs of sense (with which they are cognized) '

The experiences of dream being related only to the mind (*manomātrasambandhāt*) are unmanifest (*avyakta* = *asphuṭa*), while those of waking being related to external senses, such as eyes, etc. (*caḥsurādibhir indriyasambandhāt*) are manifest (*sphuṭa*). Hence it is to be admitted that there is some difference between them. But this difference is not due to any reality (*astitva*) of external things, for the phenomena of dream, too, appear for the time being to be as real as those of waking. Therefore this difference lies in the fact that while the things within are cognized by mind those without are cognized by external senses. The following line of Ānandagiri is to be noted here specially. ye manasy antarbhāvanārūpatvād asphuṭā ye ca manaso bahir upalabhyamānāḥ sphuṭā bhavanti te sarve manahspandanamātratvena

kalpitāḥ. Mark here *manahspandana* and compare the views of the Vijāṇavādins which will be more and more evident as we proceed. See IV. 72

The creation of internal and external things are effected thus:

16

jīvaṃ kalpayate pūrvam tato bhāvān pṛthagvidhān |
bahyān ādhyātmikāś caiva yathāvidyas tathāsmṛtiḥ |

'First one' imagines a personal soul (*jīva*)², and then various things,³ external and internal.⁴ As one knows so one collects.⁵

Mark that it is a personal soul (*jīva*) that is first imagined, and then the other things. And it is so, because the imagination of the latter depends entirely on that of the former. Says the commentator (II 17) *jīva-kalpanā sarva-kalpanāṇāṃ mūlā* 'the imagination of *jīva* is the root of other imaginations'. This imagination of a personal soul is what is called *sakṛkāyadrsti*⁶ or *svakāyadrsti* (MK XXIII 5), Pāli *sakṛkāyaditthi*, 'theory of individuality' in Buddhism. It is generally known as *ātmadrsti*, Pāli *attaditthi*, or *ātmavāda*, Pāli *attavāda*. This *sakṛkāyadrsti* is fourfold: thinking that (i) *rūpa* (so also *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*,

¹ It refers to *ātman* 'self.' II 12, 13

² *ātman*, *sattva*, *jīva*, *jantu*, *puruṣa*, *puṭgala*, etc. are synonyms, ŚVI¹, §207, *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, 93, SS, pp 172, 236, NS, Commentary I 12

³ Such as *prāṇa* 'breath,' etc., See II 19 28

⁴ MS, XI 5 (p 55) *tatra gāhaka-bhūtam kīyācīlam ādhyātmikam grāhya-bhūtam bahyam*. See also Vacaspati Mīra on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, I

⁵ See ZDMG, Vol 64, pp 381 ff, AK, V 7. *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp 77 ff

saṃskāra and *vijñāna*) is *ātman*, (ii) *ātman* has *rūpa*, (iii) *rūpa* is in *ātman*, and (iv) *ātman* is in *rūpa* *

This *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is the source of all sorts of miseries in the world and consequently their cessation is effected only by giving it up (MK, XVIII. 2; MV. pp 346, 361; ŚS, p. 247)

As to how the imagination of all other things is dependent on the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* the following may be quoted from the BAP, pp 491-92 :

tathā hy ātmānam paśyataḥ saṃskṛteṣu skandhadhātva
āyataneṣv ahaṃ iti dṛḍhataram utpadyate snehaḥ tatas
taddukkhapratikāreccayā sukhābhilāṣi doṣān pracchādya
tadarthitayā guṇādhyāropāt tatsādhaneṣu pravartate svopākāriṇi
vayam iti buddhir upajāyate ahaṃ mameti ca dāśanāt
paripanthini vidvesaḥ tataḥ samastaduḥkhanidānaṃ sarva eva
kleśopaklesā labdhaprasārāḥ pravartante ity ātmamoha-
pravartito dukkhaḥetur ahaṅkāro bhavati tad uktam
ācāryapādaiḥ :

yah paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāśyāhaṃ iti śāśvatasnehaḥ ।
snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣyati tṛṣṇā doṣāns tṛṣkurute ॥
guṇadarśi paritṛṣyan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte
tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsārah ॥
ātmani sati paraśaṃjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadvesau ।
anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ praśāyante ॥

•

* To mention only a few see DŚn, pp 182-183, § 1003. MN, I, 300, SN, III 16 ff 42, 44, 46, 56, 102, etc MV¹, § 208 rūpaṃ ātmā svāmivati, rūpavān ātmā alankāravati, ātmīyam rūpaṃ bhṛtyavati, rūpe ātmā bhāṣanavati

The following may be quoted here which refutes the above view

rūpaṃ nātmā rūpavān naiva cātmā
rūpe nātmā rūpaṃ ātmany asac ca ।

This is quoted in ŚS, p 20, MV, p 355.

† These stanzas are from PV, II 217-19 BAP reads *tasyādrāha* for *tatrāśyāha*, *paritṛṣyan* for *tṛṣyan* and *tu* for *se* in *kārikā* 1st, 2nd and 2nd respectively The last verse is quoted in AAA, p. 67. NK, p. 279 Cf. the views

yāthāvidyā tathāsmṛtiḥ 'as one knows so one recollects' implies here that one's imagination of different things follows the recollection of one's experience

of the Kāpilas (Sāṃkhya) quoted here. See Aniruddha's *Vṛtti* on the SāS, V 79, JA, 1902, Sept.-Oct., p 291, AK, IX 230.

sāhankāre manasi na śamam yāti janmaprabandho
nāhankāroś calati hṛdayād ātmadīptau tu satyām |
anyah āstī jagati ca yato nāsti nairātmyavādi
nānyaa tasmād upasatnavidhes tvanmatād asti mārgah |

See also the *Basic Conception of Buddhism*, p 72

17

anīcitā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā |
sarpadhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitā ||

'As in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water,' etc., so is imagined the soul (ātman = jīva) ²

¹ See note 2

² In the commentary on śloka 93 of his *Mādhyamakalankāra* which is now available only in its Tibetan version, Tanjurī Mdo, sa = XXVIII, 52^a 1-81^a 7, Cordier III p 311), *Sāntirakṣita* quotes some *kārikās* from Books II and III of our work. The following is the Tibetan version of the present *kārikā*

ji ltar mun khun ma rtogs te |
thaq pa sbrul gyi rgyun la sog |
dnoa por nam par btags pa ltar |
de bzim bdag kyan nam par btags |

In a Tib has *andhakāre* (mun khun) for *andhakāre* and in it takes *sarpadhārā* as *sarpasya dhārā* (sbrul gyi rgyun), and not as *sarpa* 'snake' and *dhārā* 'continuous line'

18

niścītāyāṃ yathā rajjvām vikalpo vinivartate ।
 rajjur eveti cādvaitam tadvad ātmaviniścayaḥ ॥

'As the rope being determinately known the thing imagined vanishes and there is non-duality—it is nothing but the rope, so is the ascertainment of ātman'

According to Tib¹ the reading *rajjur eveti* in c is *rajjur ekaiva* (thag. pa gcig ſiḍ), and it appears to be better. In d Tib. literally reads *ātmāpi niścitaḥ* (bdag kyan nes pa yin) for *ātmaviniścayaḥ*

¹ It runs thus:

ji ltar thag pa nes rtogs na l
 rnam par rtog pa ldog hgyur te l
 thag pa gcig ſiḍ gūis man pa l
 de ltar bdag kyan nes pa yin l

19

prāṇādibhir anantais tu bhāvair etair vikalpitah ।
 māyaiśa tasya devasya yayāyaṃ mohitah svayam ॥¹

'It (Ātman) is imagined as Prāṇa 'breath' or 'life' and other innumerable things² This is an illusion of it, the shining one,³ by which it itself is deluded.'⁴

¹ See II. 12

² See II 20 ff

³ See BU, IV 4 15 yadaitam anupaśynty ātmānam devam ājyaśa

⁴ The following is the Tib version

srog la sogs pa mthaḥ yas paḥ l
 dnos po de dag rnam par brataḥ l
 gan gis de bdag ſiḍ rmoas l
 de ni lha dchi sgyu ma yin l

In c the actual reading is *dag* for *bdag* and in d there is *rgyu* for *sgyu* la c there are only six syllables instead of seven. One may, however, add here *pa* after *rmoas*

It is said that *Ātman* is imagined as *Prāna* and such other things. But what these things are is stated in the following *kārikās* (20 28) :

20

prāṇā iti prāṇavido bhūtāniti ca tadvidah 1

guṇā iti guṇavidas tattvāniti ca tadvidah 11'

'Those who know *prāna* 'breath' or 'life' (imagine) it as *prāna*, those who know *bhūtas* 'elements' as *bhūtas*, those who know *guṇas* 'ingredients' as *guṇas*, and those who know *tattvas* 'categories,' as *tattvas* '

The knowers of *prāna* are some followers of Upanisads, their view is found in the following : MnU, III 4 : *prāno hy esa yah sarvabhūtair vibhāti*; PU II. 4 : *prāne sarvam pratisthitam*; ChU, I 11 4-5; BU, IV 4 18; BS, I 1, 13 *Ānandagiri* says that they are the votaries of *Hiraṇyagarbha*, etc., *Vaiśeṣikas* and others

The *bhūtas* 'elements' are five, viz., earth, water, fire, air and sky (or ether). According to *Mādhyamikas* and the *Sautrāntikas* there are only four elements excluding the sky (CŚ, IX 3, 5). The *Vaiśeṣikas*, 'however, admit it as *bhūta* (AK, 1.8) *Ānandagiri* says that the view referred to here is held by the *Lokāyatikas* who maintain that the first four elements are the origin of the world

1 The following is the Tib. version

arog du rig pas stog ces byod 1
lhyun po yin ŷes de rig rnam 1
yon tan rig rnam yon tan sām 1
yas dag yin ŷes de rig rnam 1

Tib. *yon, dag* is generally used for Skt. *samyak* and sometimes for *bhāṣa*, and *paramārtha*, but it is only here in d, so far as I have noticed that it is employed for *tattva*

Visvabharati, 1933, p. 2 The following is quoted from the last mentioned work -

svādhūdaivatayogātmā jagadarthakṛtodyamah ।
bhunjāno viśayān bhogī mucyate na ca lipyate ॥ 17
yathāiva viśatattvajño viśam ālokyā bhakṣayan ।
kevalam mucyate nāsau rogamuktaś ca jāyate ॥

The *loka*vids are, according to Ā, the followers of the Purāṇas holding that there are three *loka*s 'worlds,' viz. *bhū* 'earth', *bhūvas* (*bhūvar*) 'atmosphere,' and *sva* 'heaven'

The *deva*vids are, as says Ā, the followers of the *Devatā-kāṇḍa*, i e., that part of the Veda (cf. *Nighaṇṭu* or *Nirukta*, VII) which deals with *devatās* 'deities' They hold that *karmaphala* 'consequence of action' is given by *Devatās*, Agni, Indra and others, and not by God

22

vedā iti vedavidō yajñā iti ca tadvidah ।

bhokteti ca bhoktrido bhojyam iti ca tadvidah ॥

'The knowers of the Vedas (imagine it) as the Vedas, the knowers of *yajñas* 'sacrifices' as *yajñas*, the knowers of the *bhoktr* 'enjoyer' as *bhoktr*, and those who know *bhojya* 'enjoyable' as *bhojya*.'

According to Ā *yajñavid*s are Bauddhāyana and others.

The *bhoktr*vids are the Sāṅkhyas who maintain that *ātman* is only enjoyer (*bhoktr*) and not also doer (*kartṛ*) Or see BG, V. 29. *bhoktāram yajñatapasām*, IX. 24. *bhoktā ca prabhur eva ca*, XIII 22. *bhartā bhoktā mahēśvarah* See also our text, I. 9

In accordance with the same authority *bhojyavid*s are the cooks (*sūpakāras*), for in their opinion food (*bhojyam vastu*) is the principle Cf TU, III 2-1 *annam brahmeti vyajñāt*, ChU, I 3 6: *anne hidam sarvam sthitam*.

23

sūkṣma iti sūkṣmavidāḥ sthūla iti ca tadvidāḥ ।

mūrta iti mūrtavido 'mūrta iti ca tadvidāḥ ॥

'Those who know what *sūkṣma* 'a subtle thing' is (imagine it) as *sūkṣma*, those who know what *sthūla* 'a gross thing' is as *sthūla*, those who know what *mūrta* 'an embodied thing' is as *mūrta*, and those who know what *amūrta* 'non-embodied' is as *amūrta* '

Sūkṣmavids are those who hold that the dimension of ātman is like that of an atom (*anu*). Accordingly they would refer to all the Vaiṣṇava teachers, such as Rāmaṇuja, Nimbarka, Maḍhva, and Vallabha. For the discussion see BS, II. 3 19-32. See also MuU. III 1. sūkṣmāc ca tat sūkṣma-taram vibhāti, 9. eṣo 'nur ātmā cetasā veditavyaḥ, MU, II 5 sa vā eṣa sūkṣmo 'grāhyaḥ.

Sthūlavids refer to a class of Lokāyatikas holding that the gross body is ātman —Ā.

Mūrtavids are Āgamikas, followers of Āgamas (*Saivas* and *Vaiṣṇavas*). *mūrtas* trisūlādīdhārī maheśvaraś cakrādīdhārī vā paramārtho bhavati —Ā. The following passage (BU, II 3 1) may here be cited. dve vā brahmano rūpe mūrtaṃ caivā-mūrtam ca.

Ā says *Amūrtavids* are Śūnyavādins. But see the passage quoted above from the BU

24

kāla iti kālavido diśa iti ca tadvidāḥ ।

vādā iti vādavido bhuvanāniti tadvidāḥ ॥

'Those who know *kāla* 'time' (imagine it) as *kāla*, those who know *diś-es* 'directions' or 'quarters' as *diś-es*, those who know

vādas 'discussions' as *vādas*, and those who know *bhuvanas* 'worlds' as *bhuvanas*.'

Kālavids are astronomers *Kāla* is the cause of all existence. See AV, XIX 53, 54, ŚU, I. 2, VI. 1; ŚS with Gunaratna, pp 10 ff.

The knowers of *diś-es*, as says Ā, are *starodayavids*, i.e., those who know good or bad omens by voices of birds, etc., holding that the *diś-es* are the highest reality

Vādavids are, according to the same authority, those who hold *dhātuvāda* 'alchemy', *mantravāda* 'formulas of sacred texts,' or 'the science of magic,' and so on. Here *vāda* may, however, refer to 'discussion' as in NS, I, I.1, 2 1.

The knowers of *bhuvanas* are those who know the system of the worlds (*bhuvanakośa*) and say that there are in all fourteen of them. See V1P, XXXIII-LX (*Bhuvanavinyāsa* and *gotispracāra*).

25

mana iti manovido buddhir iti ca tadvidah |

cittam iti cittavido dharmādharmau ca tadvidah ||

* Those who know *manas* 'mind' (imagine it) as *manas*, those who know *buddhi* 'intellect' as *buddhi*, those who know *citta* 'thought' or 'consciousness' as *citta*, and those who know *dharma* 'duty' and *adharma* 'non-duty' as *dharma* and *adharma* '

Ā says that a particular section of the Lokāyatikas who opine that *manas* is the self (*ātman*) is referred to by the word *manovid*, and the knowers of *buddhi* are Buddhists who maintain that the intellect is the self (*ātman*). The knowers of *citta* are evidently Yogācāras or Vjñānavādins. The knowers of *dharma* and *adharma* are the Mīmāṃsists

26

pañcaviṃśaka ity eke ṣaḍviṃśa iti cāpare ।
ekatriṃśaka ity āhur ananta iti cāpare ॥

'Some' say it to be consisting of twenty-five, some consisting of twenty six, some consisting of thirty-one, while others to be endless in number.'

Here *pañcaviṃśaka* refers to the opinion of the Sāṅkhyas, according to whom there are twenty-five *tattvas* 'principles,' viz , 1. *prakṛti*, 2. *mahat*, 3. *aḥankāra*, 4-8 five *tanmātras*, 9 *mūnas*, 10-14. five *jñānendriyas*, 15-19 five *karmendriyas*, 20-24. five *mahābhūtas*, and 25 *puruṣa*

By *ṣaḍviṃśa* we are to understand the view of Pātañjalas or the followers of the Yoga system. Their *tattvas* are the same as those of the Sāṅkhyas enumerated above plus *Īvara*, the twenty-sixth

The word *ekatriṃśaka* refers to the view held by the Pāsupatas. There are, in fact, thirty-six *tattvas*, viz , 1 *śiva*, 2 *śakti*, 3 *sadāśiva*, 4 *īvara*, 5. *vidyā*¹, 6 *puruṣa*, 7. *māyā*, 8 *kūla*, 9 *nyati*, 10. *kalā*, 11 *avidyā*², 12 *rāga*³, 13 *prakṛti* or *avyakta*, 14. *mahat*, 15 *aḥankāra*, 16. *manas*, 17-21 five *jñānendriyas*, 22-26 five *karmendriyas*, 27-31 five *tanmātras*, and 32-36 five *bhūtas*.⁴

As Nos. 8-12 are merely the manifestations (*vibhūti*s) of *māyā*, as said by the commentator of the MM, p. 50, one may

1 Nos. 1-5 constitute the *tattva* called *pai*

2 This is according to MM, p. 50; but TP, III, 8 clearly reads *vidyā* and the commentator explains it as *śuddha-vidyā*.

3 Nos. 6-12 constitute the *tattva* known as *pāśa*

4 Nos. 13-36 are included in the *tattva* named *pāśa*. See MM, verses 13-25, TP. II 5-11, III 4, 12.

excluded these five, thus making the number *thirty-one* as required in our text.

There is one point to be noted here. According to TP, IV, 2, between *avyakṣa* and *buddhi* or *mahat* there is an additional *tattva* called *guna*, but in MM it is not mentioned

27

lokāḥloka-vidah prāhur āśramā itī tad-vidah ।

s.rīpumnāpumsakam laingāḥ parāparam athāpare ॥

'Those who know *loka*s 'people' (imagine it) as *loka*s, those who know *āśrama*s 'stages of religious life' as *āśrama*s, those who know *linga*s 'sexes' as a male, a female, or a eunuch, while others as *para* 'higher' and *apara* 'lower' '

The *loka*vids or *laukika*s are those who hold that the pleasing of people (*loka-nuraṇjana*) is the real thing — Ā See II. 21

The *āśrama*vids are, assays Ā, D a k s a and others. Probably they are the writers on religious laws (*dharmaśāstra-kāras*)

*Laing*as are grammarians, as says Ā

Here *parāpara* refers to those who say that two *Brahmans* are to be known, the higher and the lower MU, VI 1 - dve brahmaṇi veditavye param caivāparam ca — Ā

28

srstur itī srstivido laya itī ca tad-vidah ।

sthitir itī sthiti-vidah sarvam ceha tu sarvadā ॥

'Those who know *śṛṣṭi* 'creation' (imagine it) as *śṛṣṭi*,¹ those who know *laya* 'destruction' as *laya*, and those who know *sthiti* 'continued existence' as *sthiti*.² All (these imaginations) are always here.'

1 See I. 7.

2 The knowers of *śṛṣṭi*, *laya* and *sthiti* are, according to Ā, the Paurāṇikas 'knowers of *Purāṇas*'

3 It (*īha*) refers to Ātman

29

yaṁ bhāvaṁ darśayed yasya taṁ bhāvaṁ sa tu paśyati ।
taṁ cāvati sa bhūtvāsau tadgrahaḥ samupaiti taṁ ।

'Whatever thing is presented to him, he sees it; that (*ātman*) becomes it (i.e., the thing presented), and satisfies him. And the strong attachment to it (i.e., to the idea that *herein* lies the truth) takes possession of him.'

30

etair eṣo 'pṛthagbhāvaiḥ pṛthag eveti laksitaḥ ।
evam yo veda tattvena kalpayet so 'viśankitaḥ ।

'Verily it (*ātman*) is considered different through these things that are not different from it. One who knows it in fact may imagine without any hesitation.'

When one sees a piece of rope as a snake, in fact, there is no difference between these two things, for the snake is nothing but the piece of rope which simply appears as a snake. Thus there is only the piece of rope and not the snake which is merely imposed thereon. In the same way there is only *ātman*, all things other than that being mere imagined.

The imagination referred to in *d* of the *kārikā* is with reference to the practical view of the things. There is no harm to the man in doing so when he knows the truth.

31

svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe gandharvanagaram yathā ।
tathā viśvam idaṃ dṛṣṭam vedāntesu vicakṣaṇaiḥ ॥

'As dream and illusion are seen, and as is the town of Gandharvas, so is seen all this universe by those who are well-versed in the Vedāntas.'

The word *gandharvanagara* 'an' imaginary town in the sky' is not pre-Buddhist and is frequently used in Buddhist works. The thought, too, of the *kārikā* has often found expression in them. For instance, SR, IX (p. 29)

yathaiṣa gandharvapūram maricikā,
yathaiṣa māyā supīnam yathaiṣa ।
svabhāvaśūnyā tu nimittabhāvanā
tathopamān jānatha sarvadharmān ॥

See MV, p. 178 ; MK, XVII. 33

gandharvanagarākārā maricīsvapnasannibhāḥ ।

LA, X. 144 (p. 282) .

gandharvanagarasvapnamāyānirmitāśādrśāḥ ।

Op cit 875 (p. 374)

māyāsvapnanibhā bhāvā gandharvanagaropamāḥ ।
maricyudakacandrābhāḥ svavikalpam vibhāvayet ॥

¹ Tiesendler writes in his *Popular Scientific Recreations* 'The mirage or Fata Morgana is a very curious but sufficiently common phenomenon and in the Asiatic and African plains it is frequently observed . . . The Fata Morgana and the inverted images of ships at sea are not uncommon on European coasts. Between Sicily and Italy, this effect is seen in the Sea of Reggio with fine effect. Palaces, towers, fertile plains with cattle grazing on them are seen with many other terrestrial objects upon the Sea.—The Palaces of Fairy Morgana, p. 649

See also 279 291 (pp 301 303)

In showing the Buddhist view Śaṅkara quotes the following in his commentary on BS II 2 28

svapnamayamaricyudakagandharvanagaradīpratyaya vīnaiva
bahyenarthena grahyagrahakaḥ bhavanti

The author says in the karika that this view is of the Vedantins Śaṅkara follows it but Ramanuja with others is of the opposite opinion saying (BS I 1 1) jagad
apī paramarthikam eva jñayate

The following two karikas show the conclusion

32

na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sadhakah
na mumuksur na vai mukta ity esa paramarthata ॥

There is no disappearance¹ nor origination no one in
bondage "no one who works for success no one who is
desirous of emancipation" no one who is emancipated — This is
the highest truth

This is what is the essence of Mahayana Buddhism For
the wording of na nirodho na cotpattir of the opening karika
of Nāgārjuna's MK p 3 anirodham anutpadam See
also BA IX 150

evam ca na nirodho stī na ca bhavo stī sarvada
ajātam aniruddham ca tasmāt sarvam idaṁ jagat ॥

LA p 191 aniruddha anutpannaś ca bhagavata sarva
dharma deśyante

* See also LA II 1 X 1

utpadabhāṅgarahito lokah khaṇuspasannibhah 1

For *bandha* and *mokṣa* compare the following: CŚ, 179.

kasyacit kenacit sārddham bandho nāma na vidyate |
parena saha bandhasya viprayogo na yujyate ||

LA. 796.

nātra kaścin mahāmate badhyate na ca mucyate.

Op. cit. X. 275.

na mokṣo na ca bandhanam |

See also the *Āryaratnakūṭa* quoted in MV, pp. 49, 339 and the Chapter called *Bandhanamokṣaparīkṣā* of MK with MV, XVI from which we quote the following (5)

atrāna. yady api tvayā samsāranirvāne pratisiddhe tathāpi
bandhamokṣau vidyete na cāvidyamānasya bhāvasvabhāvasya
bandhamokṣau sambhavataḥ tasmād bandhamokṣasadbhāvād
vidyata eva bhāvānām svabhāva iti ucyate syād bhāvānām
svabhāvo yadi bandhamokṣāv eva syātām na tu sta ity āha—

na badhyante na mucyanta udayavyayadharminah |

Āryaratnakūṭa in MV, p. 49

athāyusmān subhūtiś tāt bhiksūn etad avocat kutrāyusmanto
gatāḥ kuto vāgatāḥ te 'voca na kvacid gamanāya na kutaś-
cid āgamanāya bhānta subhūte bhagavatā dharmo deśataḥ.
āha ko nāmāyusmatām śāstā. āhuh yo notpanno na parinir-
vāsyati āha. katham yusmābbhir dharmah śrutah āhuh. na
bandhanāya na mokṣāya

Cf *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 62

tasmān na badhyate nāpi mucyate nāpi saṃsarati kaścit |
saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ ||

We read in the MSA, VI 2 (p. 22).

na saṃ na cāsaṃ na tathā na cānyathā
na jāyate vyeti na cāvahīyate |
na vardhate nāpi viśudhyate punar
viśudhyate tat paramārthalaksanam ||

The present *kāṅkā* is widely quoted in minor Upaniṣads and other religious and philosophical works of the country sometimes with slight variations. For instance, see *Avadhūtopaniṣad*, 8, *Ātmopaniṣad*, 31, *Tripurātāpnyupaniṣad*, V 10. *Brahmabīndūpaniṣad*, 10.

The reason for what is said above is advanced in the following *kārikā*—

— 33

bhāvair asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitah ।

bhāvā apy advayenaiva tasmād advayatā śivā ॥

'It is (ātman) imagined in the form of things which are really non-existent through that which is non-dual, and the things (themselves), too, are imagined through what is non-dual. Therefore non-duality is blissful.'

The word *advaya* 'non-dual' means 'one free from both the perceiver and perceptible (*grāhyagrāhakarahita*)'.

The imagination of ātman as different things, such as *prāṇa*, etc., which have no existence, is through the *advaya*. For the imagination mainly depends on it, just like the imagination of a snake on a piece of rope, no imagination of a snake is possible, if there is no rope. Similarly things are imagined through the *advaya*, ātman. It is the *advaya* through which there are both the imaginations, the imagination of ātman as different things, and the imagination of the things themselves. Thus *advayatā* 'the state of non-duality' being real is blissful.

34

nānyabhāvena nānedaṃ na svenāpi kathaṅcana ।
na pṛthaṅ nāpṛthak kiñcid iti tattvavido viduḥ ॥

'It (the world) is not manifold either through its own nature

or through that of another; there is not either the different or the non-different—the knowers of truth know this¹

Here in the beginning of a I should like to propose to read *nānyabhāvena*, as I have done, for *nātmabhāvena* accepted by all, though the former is not supported by any edition or MS known to me. My reason is this. The words *ātmabhāvena* (a) and *svena* (b) are in fact, one and the same in sense, they do not convey any difference in their meanings which is evidently required here. I am afraid, Ś's explanation² can hardly be accepted being unwarranted and far-fetched, as it seems to me. Here *ātmabhāvena* appears to be inexplicable.

Having modified the reading as above, I think the words *anyabhāva* and *sua* are actually the same as *parabhāva* 'nature of other' and *svabhāva* 'nature of one's own' respectively, as thoroughly attacked, discussed, and finally refuted in MK and MV, XV (*svabhāvaparīkṣā*), pp 259 ff. Cf Nāgārjuna's *pratītyasamutpāda* which is (MV, p 3) *anekārtham anānārtham*. *Candrakīrti* comments, *ekas cāsāv arthaś caikārtho 'bhinnārthah. na prthag ity arthah, nānārtho bhinnārthah, prthag ity arthah*. See MK, X 16

*ātmanaś ca satattvam ye bhāvānām ca prthak prthak |
nirḍiśanti na tām manye śāsanasy ārthakovidān ||*

See our text IV 91 with notes

¹ *ātmabhāvena paramārthavarūpa, svena prāhōjy ātmanā*

*vītarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaih |
nirvikalpo hy ayam dīstaḥ prapañcopaśamo 'dvayah |*

'This cessation of the expansion of the universe, devoid of duality and imagination, is seen by the sages who have reached

the other shore of the (ocean of the) Vedas and are free from attachment, fear and anger.'

The word *prapañcopaśama* is nowhere found in the pre-Buddhist Brahmanic works. It is met with only in later and minor Upaniṣads (NPU, 4 1; NUU, 1; RUU, 2; for *prapañca* see ŚU, 6 6; KIU, 17), including the MāU, 7, the existence of which before Ś is doubtful.

The word *prapañca* of *prapañcopaśama* is from *pra-√pac* or *√pañc* 'to spread out, make clear, or evident.' With this is connected *√pajpañj* from which *pañjikā* 'a commentary.' Rājasekhara writes in his *Kāvya-nīmāṃsā*, GOS, 1916, p. 5 *viśamapadabhañjikā pañjikā*; and we read in Hemacandra's *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*, II 168, 170 *nirukṭam padabhañjanam, pañjikā padabhañjikā*. From this it appears that *pañjikā* is from *bhañjikā* (from *√bhañj*; cf. *viḥhanga* from this root in the sense of 'thorough explanation' used in Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali works). But philologically it can hardly be supported.

Let it be as it may, the meaning of *prapañca* used frequently in subsequent Vedantic works is, according to that system, 'expansion of the universe' or the 'visible world' (*prapañcyata iti prapañcaḥ*). But in accordance with the Buddhists it means 'verbal designation,' 'expression,' 'word' (*prapañcyate 'nena* or *prapañcayati prapañcaḥ*). Thus anything that is expressed by a word or the word itself is *prapañca* according to the Buddhists. (See *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, pp. 48, 91 156, 209.) Candrakīrti writes in his MV, p. 373

prapañco hi vāk prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā prapañcair aprapañcitam (MK, XVIII. 9) *vāgbhir avyākṛtam iti arthaḥ*

These words (*vāc*) are naturally various as said in the same work, p. 350. See the passage quoted in our text, I. 17.

prapañcopaśama which is the same as *prapañcoparama* (MV, p. 11) and *prapañcaviḥaya* (discussed by Ś in his commentary on BS, III 2 21) is *mokṣa* of the Vedāntists belonging to the school of Gauḍapāda followed by Ś and *nirvāṇa* of the

Mādhyamikas, and the object in view of Nāgārjuna in writing his MK as said in MV, p. 4. sarvaprapañcopaśamaśivalakṣanam nirvāṇaṃ śāstrasya prayojanam nirḍiṣṭam He himself says (MV, p. 11):

anīrodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam ।
 anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anīrgamam ॥
 yaḥ pratityasamutpādam prapañcopaśamam śivam ।
 deśayāmāsa sambuddhas tam vande vadatām varam ॥

For a fuller explanation of *prapañcopaśama* (and *śiva*, MāU, 7) from the Buddhist point of view see MK, XXV. 24 with MV, p. 538.

sarvopalambhopaśamah prapañcopaśamah śivah ।

iha hi sarvesām prapañcānām nimittānām ya upaśamo 'pravṛttis tan nirvāṇam sa eva copaśamah prakṛtyaivopaśāntatvāc chivah vācām apravṛtter vā prapañcopaśamaś cīttasyāpravṛtyā śivah kleśāprahānena vā prapañcopaśamo nīravaśesavāsanāprahānena śivah jñeyānupalabdhyā vā prapañcopaśamo jñānānupalabdhyā śivah

LA, X 230 (p. 295)

sarvaprapañcopaśamād bhrānto nābhīpravartate
 prajñā yāvad vikalpante bhrāntis tāt at pravartate ॥

For *nirvikalpa* see MV, p. 374

nirvikalpam hi tat (referring to *tattva*, MK, XVIII 9) vikalpas cittapracārah tadrahitatvāt tattvam nirvikalpam yathoktam sūtre. paramārthasatyam katamat yatra jñānasyāpracārah kaḥ punarvādo 'kṣarānām iti evam nirvikalpam

It is to be noted that it is *vikalpa* from which spring up *rōga*, *doṣa*, *moha*, etc

The word *vedapāra*ga in the text may be taken here as *vedapāra*-ga and not *veda*-pāra-ga as above meaning 'one conversant with Vedānta (*Veda*-pāra) ' Cf. *vedāntesu vicaḥṣanaiḥ* (II. 31)

36

tasmād evaṃ viditvainam advaite yojayet smṛtim ।
advaitaṃ samanuprāpya jaḍaval lokam ācaret ॥

'Therefore having thus known it (i.e., *prapañcopaśama*) one should fix one's memory on non-duality, and having realized non-duality should behave as a fool among people.'

The word *smṛti*, Pali *saṃti*, means one of the five *balas* 'strengths or powers,' or one of the seven requisites for attaining supreme knowledge (*bodhyaṅgas*, Pali *bodhhaṅgas*) See DS, LXVIII, XLIX; MVT² §§ 38, 39, Cf. CU, VII 26. 7 : āhāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhiḥ sattvaśuddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ smṛti-lāmbhe sarvagranthinām vipramokṣaḥ Here Ś explains *dhruvā smṛti* as continuous absence of forgetting (*avicchinna avismarana*) This is nothing but *dhyaṇa* 'meditation' Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS, III (ed. Nara-simhācārya, Ananda Press, 1909, pp 9ff), supports it; and Vācaspati-miśra, YS, I 20, expressly says that *smṛti* is steady and undisturbed meditation (*smṛtir dhyānam anākulam avikṣiptam*) The word *smṛti* in the present kāṇḍā should be taken in this sense .

For d see Ś on BS, III 4 50, where he says . 'Let him be free from guile, pride and so on, not manifesting himself by a display of knowledge, learning and virtuousness, just as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not strive to make a display of himself before others (SBE)' He quotes here the following from a work (*smṛti*) .

gūḍhadharmāśrito vidvān ajñātacantaṃ caret ।
andhavaḥ jaḍavac cāpi mūkavac ca mahim caret ॥

See *Jābala Up.* 6 ; *Ātma Up.* 4 . *Minor Upanisads*, Adyar Library, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 154, 161, 184.

37

nistutir nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca ।
calācalaniketaś ca yatir yādṛcchiko bhavet ।

'Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing *svadhā*, with an unfixed home and acting at random one should become an ascetic '

The word *svadhā* (originally *svadha* 'self-position' 'self power,' 'inherent power') is a Vedic exclamation mostly used in offering food to *pitṛs* 'deceased ancestors' It also means the food for *pitṛs* In this case *svadhākāra* would mean 'offering food to *pitṛs* '

Calācalaniketa is, in fact, *aniketa* of BG XII 9, and *anilaya* of BA, VIII 29, 88, both meaning 'homeless' Cf *aparyaṇa* in BA, VIII 16, *anagara* 'homeless' or a homeless wanderer' in Buddhist literature, and in Jaina works (*dupaṭikāśāstra*, ed. Leumann, 1883, 1: 27, 57 etc.)

Here *calācala* in the compound *calācalaniketa* is taken by Ś as two words *cala* and *acala*, and consequently he has fallen into a great confusion in explaining it. The fact is that *calācala* is one word meaning *calācala* 'intensely moving' i.e., 'absolutely not fixed'. See the *Ṭīkā* to (*calācala*) in the *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini VI 1 12. For example the following may be quoted: *Śiṣupalatadha* XVII 53 *calācalanirupadān* *ahataḥ khurāt*, *Kṛtāraṇṇa* XI 30 *ṛṇṇa no 'ya sthitiṃ vidyāt* *lakṣmīṃ* *iva calācalam*, *C. akṣentidāpura* (Bombay 1867), V, 20 *calācale ca kṛpā* 're dīṇaṃ kōḥ hi mūḍaḥ'.

The word *yādṛcchika* does not imply absolutely unrestrained movements for that is impossible for such a man. See Ś on PS, III 4 28 31, 47 50. Mark the significance of the word *pati* lit. 'one who strives to restrain one's passions'. The

following occurs in the NPU in the *Minor Upanisads*, Adyar, Vol. I, pp 147, 153 :

nīrdvandvo nīrnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca.
kasyāpi vandanam akṛtvā na-namaskāro na svāhākāro na-
svadhākāro na-nindāstutir yādṛcchiko bhavet.

38

tattvam ādhyātmikam dṛṣṭvā tattvaṃ dṛṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ |
tattvibhūtas tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet |

iti gaudapādiya āgamaśāstre vaitathākhyam
dvitīyaṃ prakaraṇaṃ samāptam.

'Having realised the truth inward, having also realised the truth outward, one becomes the truth (itself), delighting therein and being such one should be unmoved from it

Here ends in the *Āgamaśāstra* of Gaudapāda
Book Two called Unreality'

The *tattva* referred to in the *kārikā* is nothing but *prapañcopasama* (II 35) and this is for Vedantists *moḥsa* and for Buddhists *nīrvāṇa* = *pralīyasamutpāda* = *śūnya*

The words *ādhyātmika* and *bāhya* are two opposite terms and can respectively be translated by, 'subjective' and 'objective', or in some cases by 'inward' and 'outward' respectively, *ātman* meaning 'body' and, according to those who believe in the existence of a separate soul, 'soul' as well. Here *bāhyataḥ* is an adverb, and so *ādhyātmika* too, may be taken as such. Or both of them are to be construed as adjectives.

For the thought and wording of the *kārikā* see the following couplet quoted as a speech of Bhagavat in MV, p. 348 (Poussin JRAS, 1910, p 137) .

śūnyam ādhyātmikam paśya paśya śūnyam bahirgatam |
na vidyate so 'pi kaścid yo bhāvayati śūnyatām ||

BOOK III

I

upāsanāśrīto dharmo jāte brahmaṇi vartate ।

prāg utpattē¹ ajam sarvam tenāsau kṛpanah smṛtaḥ ॥

'The *dharmā* 'duty' relating to *upāsana* 'worship' arises when Brahman is born, but before birth all is unborn; therefore, that (*dharmā*) is regarded as miserable '

Ś takes *dharmā* to signify a worshipper (*upāsaka*, *sādhaka*) A simply follows him explaining, *dehasya dhāranād dharmo jīvaḥ*

Upāsana depends upon the duality of an *upāsaka* 'worshipper' and an *upāsyā* 'one to be worshipped' This duality also in its turn is possible only when that one Brahman is *jāta* 'born', i e , manifests himself in the form of this universe His *jāti* or *prajāti* 'birth' or 'growing forth' or *bahubhāva* 'becoming many' is often found in the Upaniṣads · TU, II 6: so 'kāmayata bahu syām prajāyeya, ChU, VI 2 1-3 tad aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeya, 3.23 seyam devataikṣata hantāham imās tīro devatā anena jivenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaraṇāni See BS with Ś, I 1 2, 5 '

Upāsana literally 'means 'sitting near,' i e , 'sitting near one who is to be worshipped' In fact, *upāsana*, as Ś explains it, is a continuous course of thought (i e , meditation), not disturbed by any other dissimilar thought upon an object supported by the scripture So says Ś in his Introduction to ChU, I 1, 1. *upāsanam tu yathāśāstrasamarthitam kūrīd ālambanam upādāya tasmīn samānacittavṛttisantānakarāram tad-vilakṣanapratyayānantaritam* See his Com. PU, 5, and BS, I. 1 11.

¹ This phrase, *prāg utpattēḥ*, is used not less than eight times by Ś in his comm. on the ChU, VI 2. 1

2

ato vaksyāmy akārpaṇyam ajāti samatām gatam ।
yathā na jāyate kiñcij jāyamānaṃ samantataḥ ॥

'I shall, therefore, so speak of that state of non-miserableness in which there is no origination (*jāti*), and which (on that account) is the same throughout, as to show that the things which are (apparently) being born on all sides are none of them born at all.'

The highest truth (*paramārtha*), according to our author and the Mādhyamikas as well, is that there is nothing that comes into being (*jāyate*, III 48) This *ajāti* or *anutpāda* (so frequently used in Buddhist texts) 'non-origination' is the main subject which the author takes up and discusses throughout the remaining portion of his book See II 32, III 20, 38, 48; IV 5, 71. The word *ajāti* occurs nine times in the work: III 2, 38; IV. 4, 5, 19, 21, 29, 42, 43

The sameness (*samatām gata*, *samatā*, *sāmya*) of things is owing to their common quality of non-origination (*ajāti*). The following is from the *Āryasatyadvayavātūra* quoted in MV, p 374. *paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānutpādasamatayā paramārthataḥ sarvadharmātyantājāyatisamatayā paramārthataḥ samāḥ sarvadharmāḥ tat kasmād dhetoh paramārthato nirvāṇā- (nānā)karanā hi devaputra sarvadharmā atyantanutpādatām upādāya. tad yathāpi nāma devaputra yac ca mṛdabhājanasyābhyantaram ākāśam yac ca ratnabhājanasyābhyantaram ākāśam ākāśadhātur evaṣaḥ. tat paramārthato na kiñcin nānākaranam evam eva devaputra yaḥ [saṃ]kleśa[ḥ sa] paramārthato 'tyantānutpādatā yad api vyavadānam tad api paramārthato 'tyantānutpādatā. saṃsāro 'pi paramārthato 'tyantānutpādatā jāvan nirvānam api paramārthato 'tyantānutpādatā nātra paramārthato nānākaraṇam tat kasmād dhetoh. paramārthato 'tyantānutpādatvāt sarvadharmānām* See SP, IV 83 (p 143):

sarvadharmān sanīān śūnyān nirmānākaranātmakān ।
 na caitān prekṣate nāpi kiñcid dharmam vipaśyati ॥
 sarvadharmāḥ samāḥ sarve samāḥ samasamāḥ sadā ।
 evam jñātvā vijñānāti nirvāṇam amṛtaṁ śivam ॥

For *b* of the *kārikā* see III 38a, IV 93c-d, 95a, 100b.

In the first *kārikā* of this chapter mention of origination (*jāti*) of Brahman is made. Non-origination (*ajāti*) is, however, said in the second, and the author promises here to explain it. Now from the following *kārikā* he proceeds to do so showing the real sense of origination and non-origination:

3

ātmā hy ākāśavaṃ jīvair ghaṭākāśair ivoditaḥ ।
 ghaṭādivac ca sanghātair jātāv etan nidarśanam ॥

'Ātman has sprung up in the forms of Jivas 'individual selves,' just like the springing up of the *ākāśa*¹ 'space' in the form of *ghaṭākāśas* 'spaces occupied by jars,' the conglomerations (of different limbs, organs of sense, etc.) being like jars and others. This is the illustration of origination.'

It is with *ghatas* that *ghaṭākāśas* are formed from the *mahākāśa*. In the same way, it is with the conglomerations that Ātman is born in the form of Jivas.

On the origination of Ātman see BU, II 1 20, MuU, II 1.1; MnU, I 4, BS, II 3 17 with Ś's Com.

It is evident from the *kārikā* that the origination in both of the cases is not real, but imaginary.

See TJ, VIII 10, and cf

ghaṭasamvṛtam ākāśam niyamāne ghate yathā ।
 ghato niyeta nākāśam tathā jivo nabhopamah ॥

TTU, V. 3

1 This is generally called *mahākāśa* in Vedantic and other works.

This is further explained in the following kārīkā :

4

ghaṭādisu pralīneṣu ghaṭākāśādayo yathā ।

ākāśe sampraliyante tadvaj jivā ihātmani ॥

'As the jars, etc., being destroyed the spaces of jars, etc., are completely merged into space, so are (completely merged) the Jivas into Ātman '

This kārīkā is quoted by Śāntirakṣita in his commentary on MAK, 93, and it runs as follows in its Tibetan version:

bum.pa la sogs shig¹ pa ni ।

[bum. paḥi. nam mkhah la sogs. pa ।]

jī ltar nam mkhah hdu.ḥgyur. ba ।

de.bshin srog kyañ nes pa yin ॥

The second line of the verse is left out in Tib., and is reconstructed from Sanskrit by Walleser *Der alter Vedānta*, p. 20.

¹ Read bshig for shig

The following kārīkā meets the objection that the Ātman that springs up as different Jivas being one, if one jiva feels happiness or suffers pain all the Jivas should have the same state of mind But in fact it is not so .

5

yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute ।

na sarve samprayujyante tadvaj jivāḥ sukhādibhiḥ ॥

'As one ghaṭākāśa 'space occupied by a jar' being connected with dust, smoke, etc., not all (ghaṭākāśas) are connected with them. so are the jivas with reference to happiness, etc.

The kāṅkā is quoted by Bhavya in his MHK, VIII. 13, the Tibetan version being as follows

ji.ltar.bum.pahi.nam mkhah.gcig t
rdul dan du bas bsgribs pa.na t
thams cad de bshin.ma.yin ltar t
bde sogs.de bshin.bdag la.mn ||

Literally reconstructed it would read in Sanskrit :

yathākaśmīn ghatākāśe rajodhūmaḥ [sam]āvṛte t
na bhavanti tathā sarve na sukhōdī tathātmanī ||

The present kārikā is quoted with the reading *na ca sarve prajayante* for *c* and is attributed to the ViP by Vijāna-bhikṣu in his comm. on the SāS, I 152, but it is not to be found there. See Ś's comm on the VSN, p. 16

6

rūpakāryasamākhyāś ca bhidyante tatra tatra vai t
ākāśasya na bhedo 'sti tadvaj jivesu nirmayaḥ ||

'Indeed forms, functions and names differ here and there, but there is no difference of the space ; similar is the conclusion with regard to jīvas.'

There are different things, earthen pots, cloths, etc., their forms, functions, and names all differing from one another, yet the ākāśa intercepted by them is in itself not different in fact. In the same way though jīvas corresponding to ghatākāśas, etc., are different, Ātman corresponding to ākāśa or mahākāśa, etc., is not different.

Cf TJ. VIII. 12

ji.ltar.bum sogs tha dad kyan t
sa la tha dad hgah yañ med t
de bshin lus ni tha dad kyan t
bdag la tha dad hgah.yan med ||

It may thus be translated into Sanskrit:

bhinneṣv api ghaṭādyeṣu mīdī bhedo na kaścana ।
tathā deheṣu bhinneṣu na kaścīd bheda ātmani ॥

7

nākāśasya ghaṭākāśo vikārāvayavau yathā ।
naivātmanaḥ sadā jīvo vikārāvayavau tathā ॥

'As the *ghaṭākāśa* is neither a transformation, nor a part of the *ākāśa*, so is always a Jīva neither a transformation, nor a limb of Ātman.'

8

yathā bhavati bālānam gaganam malīnam malaiḥ ।
tathā bhavaty abuddhānām ātmāpi malīno malaiḥ ॥

'As the sky appears to be soiled with dirt¹ to the ignorant, so appears Ātman, too, with impurities, to those who are not enlightened.'

For *a* and *b* see Ś on BS, I 1. 1 : ākāśe² bālās talamalinatādy adhyasyanti

This kārīkā is quoted by Śāntirakṣita, loc cit. The Tib. version is as follows :

je ltar byis pa.rnams.la. ni ।
nam mkhaḥ.dri.mas dri.can. hgyur ।
de bshin mi mkhas.rnams la.yaṅ ।
bdag.ni dri.mas dri.can hgyur ॥

¹ Such as dust, smoke, etc.. See III. 5. rapadhūmārdibhūh

9

maraṇe sambhave caiva gatyāgamanayor api |
sthitah¹ sarvaśarīresu ākāśenāvilaksanah |

In death and in birth, in moving forward and backward, (Ātman) in all bodies exists just like the space.'

In the origination and destruction of the *gha'ākāśa* the *mahākāśa* is not affected. So is the case with Ātman in regard to death, birth, etc., which are connected only with the bodies. See ChU. VI. II. 3 : jivāpetam vāva kiledam mriyate na jīvo mriyate

¹ It is found in only one MS, the reading which is generally known is *sthitau* 'in standing'

10

sanghātāḥ svapnavat sarve ātmamāyāvisarjitāḥ |
ādhikeye sarvasāmye vā nopapattir hi vidyate ||

'All conglomerations (of limbs, etc.) are like dream being projected by the illusion of Ātman. As regards their superiority or the equality of all of them there is no ground.'

The *sanghātas*, i.e., the bodies, having which the Ātman is born in the form of Jivas, are like the *ghatas* of *ghātākāśas*. These *sanghātas* have, however, no real existence, nor is there, therefore, any ground for thinking of their superiority or equality among them.

In discussing what Jiva is the author says further:

11

rasādayo hi ye kośā vyākhyātās taittirīyake |
tesām ātmā paro jivah sa-yathā¹ samprakāśitah ||

'The sheaths such as consisting of the essence (of food)

are described in the *Taittirīyaka*, i.e., *Taittirīya Upanisad* (II 1-6), the supreme soul of them is Jiva, as it is made there clear.¹

'There are five *kośas* 'seaths,' viz., *annarasamaya* or simply *annamaya*, *prāṇa*°, *mano*°, *vijñāna*°, and *ānanda*°, i.e., consisting of the essence of food, breath, mind, understanding, and bliss respectively. These are explained in the TU, II, 2 ff. According to the five divisions of *kośas* Ātman is also divided into five and are called after them, the last of them i.e., *ānandamaya*, or in accordance with a different authority (see BS, I. 1. 12-19), the one on which rests the last of them is real Ātman. This is referred to in the present *kārikā* by *para ātman*. And the author says that this is Jiva.

¹ With some MSS. I read *sa yathā* for *kham yathā* accepted by S and found in other MSS. In favour of the second reading compare *d* of the next *kārikā*, which is in fact identical. The word *sayathā*, Pali *seyyathā*, in the sense of *tad yathā*, is often used in Brāhmanas and Upanisads. See PU, IV 7, VI 5; MuU, III 2. 8, SB, I 2. 5. 24, 7 3 2, BU, II 1 20. Cf. in this connexion *sa-yadī* (= *tad yadī*), PU, V 1, and Pali *sa-ce* for *sa-cek* (see p. 72, 12) in the same sense (Skt. *tac cet*).

12

dvayor dvayor madhujñāne param brāhma prakāśitam |
pṛthivyām udare caiva yathākāśaḥ prakāśitaḥ ||

'In the *madhuvidyā* (i.e., the *Madhubrāhmaṇa* section of the BU, II. 5) in each of the pairs, (such as) the earth and the inside (of the body), the supreme Brahman is made manifest, as is made manifest the sky (III. 3 ff.)'

BU, II 5, is called *Madhubrāhmaṇa* owing to the fact of its dealing with a particular *Brahmavidyā* which is named *madhuvidyā* or *madhujñāna* (as in our text) on account of the frequent use of the word *madhu* which is very important

in this connexion Here there are some pairs of things, such as the earth and all beings (*pṛthivī* and *sarvāṇi bhūtāni*), and in these pairs it is shown that the person outside the body in the earth, etc., and the person inside the body are identical with Ātman, Brahman. Let the following passage be quoted here (BU, II. 5. 1):

īyaṃ pṛthivī sarveṣāṃ madhu asyai pṛthivyai sarvāṇi bhūtāni
madhu. yaś cāyam asyām pṛthivyāṃ tejomayo 'mṛtamayah puruṣo
yaś cāyam adhyātmam śārīras tejomayo 'mṛtamayah puruṣo 'yam
eva sa yo 'yam ātmedam amṛtam idam brahmedam sarvaṃ.

'This earth is the honey (*madhu*, the effect) of all beings, and all beings are the honey of this earth. Likewise this bright immortal person in this earth, and the bright immortal person incorporated in the body (both are *madhu*). He indeed is the same as the self, that immortal, that Brahman, that All¹

¹ Tr Max Müller, SBE

13

jīvātmanor ananyatvam abhedena praśasyate |
nānātvam nindyate yac ca tad evam hi samāñjasam¹

'That the identity without any distinction of Jiva and Ātman is praised, and that their distinction is censured, this becomes reasonable only on this hypothesis'

As regards the identity of Jiva and Ātman see ChU. VI 8 7 (tat tvam asi), BU, I. 4 10 ('aham brahmāsmi), II. 5 19 (ayam ātmā brahma), MuU, III 2 9 (sa yo ha vai tat paramam brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati). As for the difference see BU, I 4 2 (dvitīyād vai bhayam bhavati), IV 4 19, KU, IV. 10, 11 (mṛtyoh sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati); IU II 7 (yadā hy evaisa etasmīn u darām antarāṃ kurute atha tasya bhayaṃ bhavati).

14

jivātmanoh pṛthaktvaṃ yat prāg utpatteḥ prakīrtitam |
bhaviṣyadvṛtṭyā gaṇaṃ taṃ mukhyatvaṃ na hi yujyate ||

'The difference of Jiva and Ātman before creation, which is declared (in texts¹), is attributive with reference to the future state; its primary sense is certainly not reasonable.'

It is only after creation that there is a distinction between Ātman and Jiva, but before it there is no distinction whatsoever. When there is no production of *ghaṭa* 'jar,' and consequently no *ghaṭākāśa*, there is no distinction between *mahākāśa* and *ghaṭākāśa*. Yet, one sometimes speaks of that distinction at that time, simply anticipating what is going to happen in the near future, that is, thinking of the imminent production of the *ghaṭa*.

In his explanation of the *kārikā* Ś gives an apt example. He says that it is like the use of the following sentence which is very common *odanaṃ pacati*. The word *odana* means 'cooked or boiled rice'. Therefore literally the sentence means 'one cooks cooked rice'. But the rice which was already cooked or boiled does not require to be cooked again. Yet, the people say, 'He cooks cooked rice'. Clearly here this use is attributive and has reference to the future state of the unboiled rice. The people assume the future state as present. So is here the statement of difference of Ātman and Jiva.

Ś says that in passages of the Upaniṣads about evolution and dissolution it is the unity of Ātman and Jiva, which is sought to be established. This unity will be demonstrated in the text. First there is shown difference and then unity which is the conclusion. It is, therefore, in view of this future

¹ Such as RV X 121,1

sa dādihāre pṛthivīm dyām utemām |
kasmal devāya havisa vidhema,

sense or state that the difference is stated. Thus it is only in its secondary, and not in its primary sense.

The author wanted (III. 2) to show that there is no origination (*jāti*), nor is there anything that comes into being (*jāyate*). Having done so to some extent he now meets, in the next *kāṅkā*, the objection that may be raised against this view, showing thereby also that there is, in fact, no distinction between Ātman and Jīva :

15

*mṛllohavispṛhūṅgādyaiḥ sṛstir yā coditānyathā ।
upāyah so 'vatārāya nāsti bhedaḥ kathaṅcana ॥*

'The creation which is urged in different manners with the illustrations of earth, metal, sparks, etc., is only a means for an introduction (to the truth). There is in no way any distinction (between Ātman and Jīva) '

For details see IV. 42

For the creation referred to see ChU, VI 1. 4-5, BU, II. 1.20, VI 2. 14, MuU, II 1-1, MU, VI 26

As to how that creation and consequently the distinction between Ātman and Jīva, though unreal, are a means for introducing one to truth is explained in the next *kāṅkā*

16

*āśramās trividhā hīnamadhyamotkṛṣṭadṛṣṭayaḥ ।
upāsanopadisteyam tadartham anukampayā ॥*

'There are three spiritual stages, viz., of lower vision, of middle vision, and of higher vision; and this *upāsana* 'worship' is laid down for them out of kindness.'

In fact there is no distinction between Ātman and Jīva, yet some distinction is attributed there, only to help people

in realizing the truth by prescribing different upāsanaś according to their respective powers of vision. See III, 1

'The word *āśrama* in the text is explained by Ś as *āśramin* 'one with *āśrama* or religious state of life,' i.e., *adhikṛta* 'an entitled one.' In all probability the original word was *āśraya* 'a recipient, a person or thing in which any quality or article is inherent or retained or received,' i.e., an *adhikārin* or *adhikṛta* 'an entitled one.' See the use of the word in the following line from MSA, XVI. 69 :

nikṣṭamadhyottamaviryam anyad

yānatraye yuktajanāśrayena ।

atra āśrayabhedena vīryabhedo nirdiṣṭaḥ

The author now mentions the opinions of the dualists, such as the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṅkhyas, etc., and shows that the decision arrived at by him, i.e., non-distinction (*abheda*), does not conflict with the views held by them

17

svasiddhāntavyavasthāsu dvaitino niscitā dṛḍham ।

parasparam virudhyante tair ayaṃ nā virudhyate ॥

'The dualists are firmly fixed in their own distinctive conclusions and contend with one another, but this (our view) does not conflict with them'

18

advaitaṃ paramārtho hi dvaitaṃ tadbheda ucyate ।

teṣāṃ ubhayathā dvaitaṃ tenāyam na virudhyate ॥

'The supreme reality is non-duality, and duality is said

to be of it a particular state or effect of it,¹ while according to them (i.e., dualists) there is duality in both ways.² Therefore it does not conflict'

So far as mere duality is concerned, it is not that we do not admit it at all, as you do; we do accept it. Hence there is no conflict. Between cause and effect there is, in fact, no difference (*kāryakāraṇayor abhedaḥ*), the effect being merely a particular state of its cause. So there is no independent existence of the effect apart from that of its cause. In the same way duality is a particular state or effect of non-duality, being an illusion (II 10). The only difference between us is that according to you duality is in both ways, in reality and also in appearance, while we say that though there is duality, no doubt, it is not in reality, it exists only in appearance.

See next *kārikā*.

¹ Cf. *bheda* with *bhidyate* in the following *kārikā*.

² Ś. *paramārthataḥ cāparamārthataḥ ca* 'in reality and not in reality.'

19

māyayā bhidyate hy etan nānyathājam kathaṁcana ।
tattvato bhidyamane hi martyatām amṛtam vrajet ॥

'It (*advaita*) becomes different only through illusion, as the unborn (*aja*) can in no other way become different, for if it becomes in reality different the immortal would become mortal.'

See IV. 6

20

ajātasyaiva bhāvasya jātim icchanti vādinah ।
ajato hy amṛto bhavo martyatām katham esyati ॥

'The disputants seek to establish the birth of an unborn

thing. Now a thing which is unborn is immortal, and that being the case, how can it become mortal ?

See IV, 6.

21

na bhavaty amṛtaṃ martyaṃ na martyaṃ amṛtaṃ tathā ।
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati ।

'The immortal does not become mortal, nor likewise the mortal immortal. In no way can nature change.'

See IV, 7, 29.

22

svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvo gacchati martyatām ।
kṛtakenāmṛtas tasya kathaṃ sthāsyati niścalaḥ ।

'How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal, maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial, will remain changeless ?

See IV, 8.

23

bhūtato 'bhūtato vāpi sṛjyamāne samā śrutih ।
niścitaṃ yuktivyuktam ca yat tad bhavati netarat ॥

'As regards creation there are equal sacred texts (stating

creation to be) from the existent¹ or from the non-existent.² But that which is ascertained and reasonable is (acceptable), and not the other.³

See IV 3.

It says that in reality there is no *jāti* 'origination' either from the existent or the non-existent, though there are *śrutis* supporting both the views equally. Therefore the author says that what is reasonable is to be accepted, as certain. And what is reasonable is pointed out in the next *kārikā*.

According to Śankara *bhūtatah* is *paramārthatah*, and *abhūtatah* *māyayā*. But in IV 3 he explains the same words saying *bhūtasya vidyamānasya*^o, *abhūtasya avidyamānasya*.

¹ *sad eva somyedam agra āsit** ChU, VI 2 1

² *aśad vā idam agra āsit tato vai sad ajāyata* TU, II 7 1

24

neha nāneti cāmṇāyād indro māyābhīr ity api ।
ajāyamāno bahudhā māyayā jāyate tu sah ।

'From the sacred text¹ "there is no plurality here"² and also from "Indra through *māyās*, etc."³ (it is to be known

¹ In the original *āmṇāya* means *śruti*

² *neha nāneti kiścane* BU, IV 4 19, KU, IV 11

³ *rūpamrūpam pratirūpe babbhūva*
sad asya rūpam prastācaksasya ।
indro māyābhīr pururūpa iyate
yuktā hy asya harayah itāś data ।

RV, VI. 47 18, BU, II 5 19

that) it is through illusion that he⁴ is variously born, though (in fact) he does not take birth.⁵

⁴ It refers to Puruṣa, Prajāpati.

⁵ The sentence *ajāyamāno bahudhā jayate* in the text is taken from the VS XXXI. 19 (= TA, III 13 I) which runs as follows

prajāpatiś carati garbhe antar
ajāyamāno bahudhā vijjate |
tasya yonim paripaśyanti dhīrāḥ
tasmān ha tathur bhuvanāni vidvāḥ |

The preceding stanza (18) is:

vedīham etam puruṣam mahāntam
ācītyavarṇam tamasah parastāt |
tam eva viditīśūmrītyum eti
nānyah panthā vidyate 'yanīya |

25 ✓

✓ sambhūter apavādāc ca sambhavaḥ pratiṣidhyate |
ko nv enam janayed iti kāraṇaṁ pratiṣidhyate ||

'By the denial of sambhūti 'birth' (in the śruti)¹ birth is negated, and (by the śruti) "who indeed would produce him"² the cause of birth is denied.'

Here for the first time we have the oldest interpretation of the words *sambhūti* or *sambhava* and *asambhūti* or *asambhava* in IU, 12, 13, 14. which are so differently explained

¹ tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u sambhūtyaṁ tatāḥ IU, 12 This is the second half of the verse the first half being "andham tamaḥ pravīṣanti ye 'sambhūtim upāste

² jāta eva na jāyate ko nv enam janayet punah. BU, III 9 28

26

sa eṣa neti netīti vyākhyātaṃ nihnute yataḥ ।
sarvam agrāhyabhāvena hetunājam prakāśate ।

‘(The *śruti*) “This is No, No” denies what is explained. Therefore by the reason of incomprehensibleness it is evident that all is unborn.’

The *śruti* “This is No, No” refers to sa eṣa neti nety ātmāgṛhyo na hi gṛhyate (BU, III 9, 26; IV. 2. 4, 4, 22, 5 15) — ‘That (Ātman) is (to be described by) No, No. He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended’ *But it appears, as thinks also the commentator himself, it alludes to the following *śruti*, too: athāta ādeśo neti neti (BU, II. 3. 6) ‘Now follows the teaching by No, No’ For it is that *śruti* which denies both the forms of Brahman, viz., that which has form (*mūrta*) and that which has not form (*amūrta*). These two forms have already been described or explained in the text (BU, II. 3. 1) ¹ Things are either with or without a form, so when both of them are denied they cannot be comprehended. Thus it becomes evident that there is nothing that may have origination, in other words, all is ‘unborn’ (*aja* ‘without generation’)

¹ dve vā brahmano rūpe mūrtaṃ caivāmūrtaṃ ca

. Now *jāti* or origination may be either of the existent (*sat*) or of the non-existent (*asat*) But both the cases are impossible. The author shows it in the next *kāṅkā* :

27

✓ sato hi māyayā janma juyate na tu tattvataḥ ।
tattvato jāyate yasya jātaṃ tasya hi jāyate ।

‘The birth of that which exists can be reasonable only

through illusion, but not in reality. He who holds that one is born in reality has to accept (the position) that what is born had, indeed, been born

See IV. 58 See also IV. 13 with its explanation. Cf. CŚ. XI 10 (260) with the note

sambhavaḥ kṛiyate yasya prāk so' stiti na yujyate¹
sato yadi bhaved janma jātasyāpi bhaved bhavaḥ ||

28

' asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate |
vandhyāputro na tattvena māyayā vāpi jāyate |

'The birth of that which does not exist is not reasonable at all through illusion or in reality The son of a barren woman is not born either through illusion or in reality.'

The author now proceeds to show that the birth of the existent is possible only through *māyā* as said before (III. 27) :

29

yathā svapne dvayābhāsam spandate māyayā manah |
tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsam spandate māyayā manah ||

'As owing to *māyā* the mind in dream moves with appearance (or image) of the two (viz., the percipient and the perceptible, or in other words the subject and the object), so owing to *mayā* the mind in the waking state¹ moves with the appearance of the two '

See IV 61

¹ See IV 40

30

advayaṃ ca dvayābhāsaṃ manah svapne na saṃśayaḥ ।
advayaṃ ca dvayābhāsaṃ tathā jāgran na saṃśayaḥ ।

'There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two; so there is no doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two '

See IV. 62.

31

manodṛśyam idam dvaitam yat kiñcit sacarācaram ।
manaso hy amanibhāve dvaitaṃ naivopalabhyate ॥

'This duality in whatever form, comprising the movable and the unmovable is perceived by the mind, but when the mind becomes non-mind (i.e., when it loses its own function of thinking, *manana*) duality is not experienced

See IV. 47, 48, 72. It means that the appearance of duality is nothing but the vibration of the mind (*citta-* or *viññāna-spandita*), and when this vibration is stopped there is no duality at all

When the state of non-mind is reached is said in the following *kārikā* :

32

ātmasatyānubodhena na sankalpayate yadā ।
amanastāṃ tadā yāti grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt ॥

'When by the knowledge of the truth of *ātman* i.e. 'the mind' ceases from imagining it goes to the state of non-mind being non-cognizant in the absence of the things to be cognized.'

See IV. 72, 79, 99.

Mark here that *d* (*grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt*) is identical with that of Tk, 28. See Vis, p. 584 ; LA, p 169 ; and the note on III of our text.

The next *kārikā* says that the mind which becomes non-mind 38 as described above, is, in fact, identical with Brahman .

33

akalpakam ajam jñānaṃ jñeyābhinnaṃ pracaksate ।

brahma jñeyam ajam nityam ajenājam vibudhyate ॥

/ 'The *jñāna* that does not imagine (i.e , indeterminate) and is (consequently) unborn is, they say, not different from the knowable . The knowable is Brahman, the unborn and eternal one . So the unborn (Brahman) becomes manifest through the unborn (*jñāna*) '

Here *jñāna* which the commentator explains as *jñaptimātra* is in reality *viñāna* or *citta* 'mind' as spoken of above . See Vk, p 3 *cittam mano viñānam viñaptiś ceti paryāyāḥ*, MV, XVII 1 (p 308) *cittam mano 'tha viñānam iti tasyaiva (=cittasyaiva) paryāyāḥ* , AK, II 34 *cittam mano 'tha viñānam ekārtham*, DN, I 121, SN, II 94 . See III 38, IV 96

For *ajam vibudhyate* cf I 16 *advaitam budhyate tadā*, III 26 *ajam prakāśate* . For the whole thought see III 35, 46 *ajenājam vibudhyate* = *ajena jñānena (=cittena) ajam jñeyam* (Brahman) *vibudhyate prakāśate* . The unborn knowable Brahman is manifest through the unborn knowledge (i.e , the mind when it ceases from its function), there being no difference between them. See III, 46, 47

aḥkalpa = *nirvikalpa* (III 34) = *asanga* (IV 72) . See LA, p 157 *asangalakṣanam jñanam*

For *jñeyābhinna* 'not different from the knowable' see IV 1

The author now goes to speak about the state of the mind described above

34

nigṛhīṭasya manaso nirvikalpasya dhīmataḥ ।
 pracāraḥ sa tu vijñeyaḥ suṣupte 'nyo na tatsamaḥ ।

'That state (*pracāra*) of the mind of a wise man which is suppressed and (thus) indeterminate is to be known ; (the state of the mind) in deep sleep is different from that, it is not like that.'

It is said here that the state of the suppressed and indeterminate mind is different from that in *suṣupti*. Why, it is so is stated in the following *kārikā* (III. 35).

The word *pracāra* which is the same as *vihāra* or *bhūmi*, as the yogins and the Buddhists would express, means in such cases *avasthā* 'state.' Our author uses (IV 80) for it also *viśaya*.

By *nirvikalpa manas* 'indeterminate mind' we are to understand that it recognises no such distinction as that of subject and object, etc.

In Buddhist works *dhīmat* is a synonym for *Bodhisattva* (MSA, XIX. 73).

The reason for what is said above is now offered as follows :

35

liyate hi suṣupte tan nigṛhītam na liyate ।
 tad eva nirbhayaṃ brahma jñānālokaṃ samantataḥ ।

'For in deep sleep it (*manas*) falls into a state of oblivion,' but it does not do so when suppressed. Indeed, that is

1 Or, into a sleeping state, *laya*, see III 41, 42

Brahman, free from fear and radiant as *jñāna*² on all sides *

It is clear here that the mind when suppressed, i.e., ceases from all of its activities, becomes Brahman. See III 46

Cf. the following quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary on śloka 30 of TA (Vol. III, p 23) presenting the views of the Vijñānavādins :

prabhāsvaram idam cittam prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ ।
tesām apāye sarvārtham taj jyotir avinaśvaram ॥

* On *jñānaloka Śaṅkara* writes *jñaptir jñānam ātmasvabhāvaśaitanyam tad eva jñānam ālokaḥ prakāśo yasya tad brahma jñānalokaḥ*. For *āloka* see *cibhāṣa* (III 36, IV 81), and *jyotiḥ* (III 37).

Brahman referred to above is now further described in the following *kārikā*

36

ajam anidram asvapnam¹ anāmakam arūpakam ।
sākṛdvibhatam² sarvajñam³ nopacārah kathañcana ॥

'It is unborn and has no sleep, nor dream, nor has it name and form, it is illumined once for all and is all-knowing. And in no way is there access-concentration (*upacāra*)'

The state i.e., the state of becoming Brahman as stated above is in fact the state of *samādhi* intense abstract meditation' as we shall see presently in the following two *kārikās*.

See I 16 IV 81

² See III 37* IV 81 with the note ChL VIII 4 12 *sākṛd vibhāto hy esa brahmalokaḥ*

³ III 47

Now, there are two kinds or stages of *samādhi*, *upacāra samādhi* and *arpanā** (Pali *appanā*). In the first the mind is concentrated on its object, but not uninterruptedly, for now it is so and the next moment it is not so, simply moving near (*upacarati*) the object just like a bee sitting gently inside a lotus in search of its honey. In the second, the mind is firmly and uninterruptedly fixed on the object. Because this state of *samādhi* 'gives (*arpayati*)' the one-pointed mind to the object it is called *arpanā*, as B u d d h a g h o ṣ a explains in his AS, p 142 : *ekaggaṃ cittaṃ ārammane appatiti appanā* Cf. p. 143 : *upagantvā vicaranavasena upavicāro* Cf also *vicāra* as explained in the *Vibhāvanī Tikā* on the AAS, I 17 .

santavutti vicāro cittassa nātipphandabhūto ākāse uppatitassa sakunassa pakkhapasāraṇaṃ viya, padumassa uparibhāge paribbhamanam viya ca padumābhīmukhapattitassa bhamarassa.

The difference between *upacāra* and *appanā* is thus shown in VM, p 126 :

duvidho hi samādhī upacārasamādhī ca appanāsamādhī ca. dvih'ākārehi cittaṃ samādhiyati upacārabhūmiyam (= upacāra-vatthāyaṃ—Tikā) vā parilābhabhūmiyam (= jhānassa adhigamāvatthāyaṃ—Tikā) ° dvinnam pana samādhinam idam nānā-karanam ° yathā nāma daharo kumārako ōkkhipitvā jhapiyamāno punappunam bhūmiyam patati evam ēva upacāre uppanne cittaṃ kālena nimittam ārammanam karoti kālena bhavangaṃ otarati ° yathā nāma balavā puriso āsanā vuṭṭhāya divasaṃ'pi tiṭṭheyya evam eva appanāsamādhimhi uppanne cittaṃ saki bhavangavāraṃ chinditvā kevalam'pi rattim kevalam'pi divasaṃ tiṭṭhati.

The *d* of the *kārikā* may be explained in another way Brahman is described here by such words as *aja*, *anidra*, etc., but being beyond speech and mind it cannot be done so. This is said : *nopacārah kathaṃcāna* '(But) in no way there is any figurative (or metaphorical) expression (*upacāra*) See BSB, p 44.

sa punah pāramāṛthikah svabhāvaḥ sarvadharmānām nirvikalpasyaiva jñānasya gocaro veditavyaḥ sacet punar yathaivābhilāpo yeṣu dharmaṣu yaṣmin vastuni pravartate tadātmakās te dharmās tad vastu syāt. evam sati bahuvīdhā bahavaḥ svabhāvā ekasyaikasya vastuno bhaveyuh. tat kasya hetoh tathāhy ekasmin dharma ekasmin vastuni bahuvīdhā bahavo bahubhir abhilāpaiḥ prajñaptaya upacārāḥ kriyante.^o

The following two kārikās say that this state of becoming Brahman is *samādhi*

37

sarvābhilāpavigataḥ sarvacintāsamutthitah |
supraśāntah sakrījyotih samādhīr acalo 'bhayaḥ |

'It is intense abstract concentration (*samādhi*) which is beyond all expression,¹ and above all thoughts,² very calm and full of light burning once for all,³ unwavering and without fear.'

In Buddhism there is a particular *samādhi* called *acala* (MVt.¹ 580)

¹ *anābhilāpya* = *akalpya*, AK, II 243 See IV 24

² III 38* *cintā yatra na vidyate*

³ III 36', IV 81 with note

38

graho na tatra notsargaś cintā yatra na vidyate |
ātmasamsthā tadā jñānam ajāti samatām gatam ||

'Where there is no thought¹ there is neither apprehension or abandonment (of any object) At that time the mind

¹ III 37*

(*jñāna* = *citta*)² rests in itself, is unborn and attains to the state of sameness.³

In this state the mind does not apprehend or abandon any of its objects and as such rests in itself (*ātmasamstha*).

The word *ātman* in *ātmasamstha* here means 'itself' (*svarūpa*) and not 'soul' (*paramātmā* or *Brahman*) as distinct from the mind (*jñāna*). Cf. BG, VI 25 - *ātmasamstham manah kṛtvā na kiñcid api cintayet* 'having made the mind resting in itself one should not think of anything' *Nilakantha* writes here in his *ṭīkā* on the word *ātmasamstha* *ātmanī svarūpe samsthā sthitir yasya*.

This *ātmasamstha jñāna* is, in fact, in other words, *vijñaptimātra* or *vijñānamātra* of the Buddhist *Vijñānavādins*. The word *vijñānamātra* means 'simply *vijñāna*,' and the state of being so is *vijñānamātratā*. When the *vijñāna* does not apprehend any object whatsoever and as such rests only in itself this state is called *vijñānamātratā*. Says *Vasubandhu* (Tk. 28, Viṣ, p. 584) :

yadā tv ālambanaṃ jñānam naivopalabhate tadā ।
sthitam vijñānamātratve grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt ॥

LA, p. 169

yadā tv ālambyam arthaṃ nopalabhate jñānam tadā
vijñaptimātravyavasthānaṃ bhavati vijñapter grāhyābhāvād
grāhakaśyābhāvaḥ tadagrahanān na pravartate jñānam

This is referred to in the following stanza of the KU, II. 3.10 :

yadā pañcāvatiṣṭhante jñānāni manasā saha ।
buddhiś ca na viceṣyate tām āhuh paramāṃ gatim ॥

² See III 32, IV 96, with notes

³ See III 2, IV 77, 80, 93, 95, 100 It is to be noted in these *kāṇkās* that *aśīti* or *anupatti* and *sama*, or *sīmya* or *samāś* are always used together Cf this with the quotation of MV in the note on III 2

In the Upanisads it is well-known that Brahman is *viñāna* (BU, III 9, 28; TU, II, 5 1, III, 5, 1., etc., *viñānamaya* = *viñāna*) or *jñāna* (TU, II, 11) This *viñāna* or *jñāna* is *ātmasamsthā jñāna* or *viñānamātra*.

For *ātmasamsthā jñāna* see ChU, VII 24, 1-2:

“Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite (*bhūman*)

‘Sir, in what does the Infinite rest?’

‘In its own greatness,—or not even greatness’”⁴

‘It is to be noted that in the beginning of the present chapter (III 3) the author proposed ‘*ato vaksyāmy akārpanyam ajāti samatām gatam.*’ here in the present *kārikā* he concludes the subject

⁴ See my paper *Evolution of Viñānauāda* in *IHQ*, X, 1934, pp 1 ff

That *samādhi* which is *nirvikalpa* is further described in the next *kārikā*

39

asparśayogo nāmaisā durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ ।

yogino bibhyati hy asmād abhaye bhayadarśinaḥ ॥

‘This is what is called ‘contactless concentration’ (*asparśa-yoga*), very difficult to be realized by all yogins, the yogins shrink from it seeing fear where (in fact) there is no fear’

For *asparśayoga* see IV 2

The Commentator explains the second half of the *kārikā* saying that though there is no fear in this yoga yogins (of lower order) are afraid of it thinking it to be one’s own destruction

(*ātmanāśarūpa*). These people have no discrimination (*avivekin*), and so they have fear though there is no fear.

V i d y ā r a ṇ y a quotes this *kārikā* in his PD, II. 29, introducing it (II. 28) thus :

gaṇḍācāryā nirvikalpe samādhāv anyayoginām ।
sākārabrahmaniṣṭhānām atyantam bhayam ūcire ॥

Now the author proceeds to say that for the yoga referred to the control of mind is absolutely necessary, on which depend the absence of fear, and such other things :

40

manaso nigrahāyattam abhayaṃ sarvayoginām ।
duḥkhaksayaḥ prabodhaś cāpy aksayā śāntir eva ca ॥

'The absence of fear, the destruction of misery, the awaking, as well as the eternal peace of all yogins depend on the control of mind '

The next *kārikā* shows how the mind can gradually be controlled without difficulty .

41

utseka udadher yadvat kuśāgrenaikabindunā ।
manaso nigrahas tadvad bhaved aparīkshedataḥ ॥

'The control of mind without great pains is like the draining out of a sea by drops with the point of a *kuśa* grass '

The first half of the *kārikā* refers, according to *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (BG, VI. 23) and *Rāmākṛṣṇa*, a commentator of PD (XI 109), where this

kārikā is quoted, to an old story, (cf. *Titibhopākhyāna*, HU, pp. 78-79) which runs, as given by *Madhūsūdana Sarasvatī*, as follows :

Once upon a time the sea carried off with its waves the eggs of a bird which were laid on the beach. The bird got angry and determined to dry it up. He began to take out the water drop by drop with the tip of his beak and he could not be dissuaded from it by the birds related to him. In the mean time the divine sage Nārada came there. He, too, asked him to turn back, but in vain. The bird said that anyhow he would dry up the sea either in this or in the future life. Fortunately Nārada became very kind to him, and sent there Garuda, the lord of birds, for his help. Owing to the wind produced by the flapping of the wings of Garuda the sea began to dry up and thus being frightened gave back the eggs to the bird.

The substance of the kārikā is that it is with determination and perseverance that mind is gradually controlled.

The author now suggests the means for controlling the mind.

42

upayena nigrhṇīyad vīkṣiptam kama-bhogayoh |
suprasannam laye caiva yatha kamo layas tatha |

'By the means' one should control it (mind) when it is distracted in desire and enjoyment and also when it remains at ease in the sleeping state (for the sleeping state is as (bad) as desire is).

Kārikās III 42-46 are quoted and explained by *Madhūsūdana Sarasvatī* in the commentary on the BG.

VI. 26, and III. 44-45 a-b by S a d ā n a n d a in his VeS. §§32-33 According to the former *kāma* 'desire' is the state of thinking of, or longing for enjoyment (*cintyamānāvasthā*), while *bhoga* 'enjoyment' is the state of enjoying the desired things (*bhujyamānāvasthā*). *Laya* 'sleeping state' is, in his opinion, deep sleep (*suṣupti*), as supported by G a u ḍ a p ā d a himself (III. 35), but S a d ā n a n d a explains it by 'sleep' (*nidrā*). *Laya* causes mental inactivity, and corresponds to the state called *mūḍha* 'infatuated' in the yoga philosophy See V y ā s a on YS, I 1

The means referred to above are as follows :

43

duḥkhaṃ sarvaṃ anusmṛtya kāmabhogān nivartayet ।
ajam sarvaṃ anusmṛtya jātaṃ naiva tu paśyati ॥

'Repeatedly remembering that all is misery one should turn back (one's mind) from desires and enjoyments' Indeed repeatedly remembering that all is unborn one does not see anything born'

✓ The second half of the *kārikā* implies that when everything is unborn and consequently has no existence in reality there is no object for one's desire and enjoyment ।

¹ Or we may write for 'one should, etc.', 'one should keep back (from the mind) desires and enjoyments' Thus, as says M a d h u s ū d a n a S a r a s v a t I (BG, VI 26), *kāma*¹*hogān* in the *kārikā* may be explained as accusative plural or ablative singular

44

laye sambodhayec cittam vikṣiptam śamayet punaḥ ।
sakaṣāyaṃ vijāniyāc chaṃapṛāptam na cālayet ॥

'One should awaken the mind when it is in the state of

sleep; when distracted one should pacify it again. One should also investigate if it is with the evil passions (*saḥasāya*). And (finally) when it reaches the state of equanimity one should not cause it to move.

As regards the control of mind there are four impediments enumerated in our *kārikās* (III 42-45) of which *vikṣepa* 'distrac-tion' and *laya* 'sleep' have already been mentioned also in *kārikā* 42, the other two being *kaśāya* and *stabdhā*, or according to some (VeŚ, §33) *rasa-āsvāda*. The last term will be explained in the next *kārikā* (45). We are concerned here with *kaśāya*. It means here *stabdhībhāva* 'becoming stiffened' of mind as *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* and *Sadānanda* would explain (*loc cit*). The primary meaning of *kaśāya* is 'decoction,' so to say, of evil passions (*rāga, dveṣa, moha*). *Śaṅkara* explaining *mṛditaḥkaśāya* in ChU, VII 26 2, writes: *vārksādīva kaśāyo rāga-dveṣā-didoṣaḥ*. It causes the stiffness of mind, owing to which it cannot be fixed on the object. Thus the *kaśāya*, i.e., the evil passions, being the cause of *stabdhībhāva*, is explained by those authors to mean *stabdhībhāva*. We may, however, take the word in its actual sense, i.e., the evil passions.

Cf MSA, XIV 9c d—10a b.

linam cittasya¹grhṇiyād uddhatam samayet punaḥ ||
śamaprāptam upekṣeta tasmīn nālabhane punaḥ ||

See also XIV 11

For *śamaprāpta* in *d* which gives better sense (cf *śamayet* in *d* of the *kārikā*) and is supported by VeŚ, with its *Tīkā* *Vidyānmanorājanī*, §33 and MSA quoted above the reading found in editions and a very large number of MSS is *samaprāpta*. It means one that has reached the state of equilibrium. *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* takes the word *sama* in the sense of Brahman.

45

nāsvādayet sukhaṃ tatra nihsaṅgaḥ prajñayā bhavet ।
niścalaṃ niścaraṃ cittam ekikuryāt prayatnataḥ ॥

'There (in practising yoga) he should not enjoy happiness'¹
By wisdom² he must be (then) free from all attachment. If the
mind which is (thus) fixed goes out, by endeavour he should so
do as to make it remain only in itself'

On *ekikuryāt* 'should make one' the Commentator says :
citsvarūpasattāmātram evāpādayet Cf *ekibhavati*, BU, IV 4.2 ;
ekibhūta, MāU, 5

¹ There is a feeling of happiness from that condition of mind in practising
yoga, and it should be avoided as it is an impediment

² Or, discrimination

The next *kārikā* says that when the mind is thus completely
controlled or suppressed (*niruddha*) and as such is free from
all movements and does not perceive anything it becomes
Brahman :

46

yadā na liyate cittam na ca vikṣipyate punaḥ ।
anāṅgam anābhasam niṣpannam brahma tat tadā ॥

'When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is distracted
again, and as such has no movement nor any senses-image,
then it becomes Brahman'

See III 35.

The first half refers to two states *laya* corresponding to
mūḍha and *vikṣepa* corresponding to *vikṣipta* in the *Vyāsa's*
commentary on YS, I 1. See III 42 See also *anidra* and

asvapna in III, 36. The Commentator explains *anābhāsa* saying that it does not appear in the form of any of its objects which are imaginary (*na kenacit kalpitena viṣayabhāvenānābhāsatē*). *Ābhāsa* is *pratīcchāyā* 'reflection'. See BAP, V 36. Or it may be taken in the sense of 'appearance,' namely, the appearance of any object

On d the Commentator says - *yadaivamlaksanam cittam tadā nispannam brahma brahmasvarūpena nispannam cittam bhavaty arthah* Cf. IV 77 where he writes : *cittasyeti yā moksākhjā-nutpattiḥ* and on IV 80 *cittasya nīcalā calanavarjitā brahmasvarūpaiva tadā sthītī yaiṣā brahmasvarūpā sthitiś cittasyādvaya-vijñānaikarasaghanalaksanā*

In this connexion the following may be quoted from the BA, IV *15 *cittasya brahmatādīkam* which BAP explains : *cittasya phalam brahmabhūyādīkam*

It is said here that the *anāngana* and *anābhāsa* citta becomes Brahman With this compare the following

MU VI 24 (p 143)

*mānase ca vilīne tu yat sukham cātmasāksīkam ।
tad brahma cāmṛtam śukram sā gatir loka eva ca ॥*

Mṛtyujidbhattāraka as quoted in ŚV, p 99

nirābhāsam padam tat tu tat prāpya vinivartate

LA IV 16

*cittamātram nirābhāsam vihāro baddhabhūmī ca ।
etad dhi bhāsitam buddhair bhāṣante bhāṣayanti ca ॥*

X 105 (p 278)

cittamātram atīkramya nirābhāse sthītam phalam ।

X 110 (p 279)

*cittamātram atīkramya nirābhāsam atīkramet ।
nirābhāsesthito yogi mahājñānam na paśyate ॥*

X, 257 (p 299).

tadā yogi hy anābhāsaṃ prajñayā paśyate jagat ।
 nimittaṃ vastu vijñaptiṃ manovispanditam ca yat ।
 atikramya tu putrā me nirvikalpāś caranti te ॥

X. 94 (p. 277)

etad vibhāvayan yogi nirābhāse pratiṣṭhate ।

X. 235 (p. 296).

ālambālabhayvigatam yadā paśyati samskṛtam ।
 niscitam cittamātram hi cittamātram vadāmy aham ॥
 mātṛāsvabhāvasaṃsthānaṃ pratyayair bhāvavarjitam ।
 niṣṭhābhāvah paraṃ brahma etām mātṛām vadāmy aham ॥
 III. 25, 26.

See also LA, p 126 . matpravacane punar mahāmate
 vikalpakasya manovijñānasya vyāvṛttir nirvānam. Ś a ŋ k a r a
 on BU, IV. 3.7 (p. 587) : vijñānasya nirvāṇaṃ puruṣārthah

• See III. 35, IV. 29 (comm ajātaṃ yac cittam brahmaiva
 jāyate), 48, 77, 80

The *citta* that becomes Brahman is described in the next
 kārikā .

47

svastham śāntam sanirvānam akathyam śūkham uttamam ।
 ajam ajena jñeyena sarvajñam paricakṣate ॥

'They say it rests in itself' and is calm having *nirvāṇa* ;
 it is unspeakable and the highest bliss, unborn, and (identical)
 with the knowable, which is also unborn, and is all-knowing '

See III. 33, IV 1.

The word *nirvāṇa* has different meanings, such as 'delight',
 'extinction', 'cessation', 'disappearance', 'calmed', 'quieted'.

² Here *avastha* is *ātmasthāna*, III 38

We may take it here in the sense of 'extinction'. The extinction of mind means the disappearance of its function of thinking (*manana* or *cintana*), in other words, the *amanibhāva* of *manas* referred to above (III, 31), and in MU, VI, 34, or *vilaya* of *manas* in MBU p. 12. This is also called *unmanibhāva* (BBU, 4), *urtlikṣaya* of *citta* (MU, VI, 34, p 178), and the *nirodha* of *viñāna* (= *nirvāna*) in DN, I, 223 (*viñāna-ssa nirodhena*).

Cf YV, III, 67 8

spandād bhavati citsargo nihspandād brahma śāśvatam ।

See also MU, VI 24 (p 143) .

mānase ca viline tu yat sukham cātmasāksikam ।

tad brahma cāmṛtam śukram sā gatir loka eva ca ॥

For *sarvajña* see III 36.

The author proposed in the beginning of this chapter (III, 2) to speak of non-origination (*ajāti*). Now having done so mainly with regard to Jiva and partly also to other things he concludes thus

48

na kaścij jāyate jīvaḥ sambhavo 'sya na vidyate ।

etat tad uttaram satyam yatra kiñcin na jāyate ॥¹

iti gaudapādīya āgamaśāstre 'dvaitākhyam trtiyam
prakaranam samāptam.

'No individual soul is born, nor is there any possibility of it This is that highest reality where nothing is born

Here ends, in the *Āgamaśāstra* of Gaudapāda,
Book Three called 'Non-duality'

BOOK IV

The proposition was enunciated (III, 2), discussed (III), and finally established in the last line of the last *kārikā* of the last Book, and it will further be affirmed later on (IV 71) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth. In order to further elucidate this view the author now begins the present Book of his *Āgamaśāstra*.

Its first two *kārikās* form what is known in later Sanskrit works as *mangalācaraṇa* 'salutation, benediction, or prayer for success'. The first *kārikā* is as follows.

1

jñānenākāśakalpena¹ dharmān yo gaganopamān² |
jñeyābhinnena³ sambuddhas taṃ vande dvīpadām varam ||

'Who has perfectly understood the elements of existence (*dharma*) that are like the sky, through the knowledge (*jñāna*) which is not different from its object (*jñeya*) and is also like the sky, to him, to the greatest of men, I pay my homage.'

The author here pays his homage to *dvīpadām varam* 'the greatest of men.' Who is this *dvīpadām varam*? The word *dvīpad* (RV, X. 165.1: *saṃ no astu dvīpade saṃ catuspade*) or *dvīpada* literally 'biped' means in such cases 'man.' Words such as *dvīpadām varam* or *dvīpadānām uttama* (or *agra*) or *dvīpadottama* (Pali *dvīpad'uttama*) in compound are all synonymous. They are used both as adjectives and nouns

¹ IV 96 with S

² IV, 91.

³ III 33, IV, 88

As an adjective *dvīpadām vara* is found in MB, Vanaparvan, 51.45 (.naisadho dvīpadām varah) and also in Ādiparvan, 220.36 (with reference to Dhṛtarāstra: abhiṣṭausi ca yat kṣatruḥ samīpe dvīpadām vara)⁴ In Buddhist literature, both Sanskrit and Pali, *dvīpadottama* or *dvīpad'uttama* in Pali or any one of the synonyms mentioned above is used to mean the Buddha (AP, 1; MSt, p 60, l 25; SNt, 83, 995, 998, MVt², § 267; SS, p 8, 57, here in the last place not less than thirteen times) *Narottama* (Pali *nar'uttama*) and *purusottama* (Pali *puris'uttama*) are also used specially for the Buddha [SNt, 544 (see DP, 78) 1021, MVt,² § 1.40, MVu, Vol II, pp 194, 199, 232, 266].

On the other hand Ś takes *dvīpadām vara* to mean *purusottama* in the sense of Nārāyaṇa⁵

Now, which of them, the Buddha or Nārāyaṇa, is really meant by the author himself can be decided if we consider the subject matter of the kāṅkā

There are mainly two points to be discussed here. First, *jñāna* 'knowledge' is said to be *ākāśakaḥ* 'like the sky,' and again it is not different from the *jñeya* 'the knowable,' i.e., the object of knowledge. And second, the *dharma*s, 'elements of existence' or 'things or objects' are also *gaganopama* 'like the sky.'

What are we to understand by the statement that *jñāna* is like the sky? One characteristic of *jñāna*, according to both our author and the Vijñānavādins, is that it is *asaṅga* (IV 72, 96) 'having no attachment, contact, or relation.'

⁴ Such instances are there many. See I 50.27

⁵ It may be noted that so far as I know no word compounded with *dvīpad* or *dvīpada* is found in Brahmanic literature to mean Nārāyaṇa. But thanks to a friend who points out that *dvīpadām varasīha* which, in fact, is the same as *dvīpadām vara* is applied at least once to Nārāyaṇa (MB, Śāntiparvan, 343.1). But it is to be noted that though here it refers to Nārāyaṇa, no doubt this Nārāyaṇa is not God (*īśvara*), but a sage (*ṛṣi*) and hence a man, though an incarnation of the former.

i.e., it does not relate itself to its object, it does not cognize any object (*agraha*, III. 32), there being no object whatsoever. See IV. 26, 27, 72, 96, 99, and the following from LA, p. 157: *asāṅgalakṣaṇam jñānam* ⁶ Now *jñāna* being *asaṅga* is compared here with the sky which is also *asaṅga*. See BAP, p. 359: *evam° niṣprapancatvād ākāśavad asaṅgam anāspadam* ⁷ *aśeṣam viśam utpaśyāmaḥ*. ⁸

As regards the absence of difference between *jñāna* and *śreya* it is a well-known fact that this view is maintained by *vijñānavādins*. According to them there is no reality in external things. Knowable is, in fact, inside being the transformation of *vijñāna*, and only appears to be outside. (Dinnāga says in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, 6 (quoted by Śaṅkara in his commentary on BS, II 2.28 and by Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* on TS, p. 582: *yad antarjñeyarūpam tad bahirvad ababhāṣate* ⁹ And Dharmakīrti formulates it in his PV, ¹⁰ fol. 274a, l. 7 in the following

⁶ Sometimes there is made a difference between *jñāna* and *vijñāna* as the following passages of the same work (LA) will show saying that *jñāna* is *asaṅga*: p. 157 *tatrotpannapradhvamsi, vijñānam anutpannapradhvamsi jñānam; asāṅgalakṣaṇam jñānam viśayavacitryasaṅgalakṣaṇam ca vijñānam, asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇam jñānam; aprāptilakṣaṇam jñānam*. ASP, p. 399 *asaṅgalakṣaṇaḥ subhūte prajñāpāramitā*. See also MY, p. 533, *nimittālambanam vijñānam, jñānena hi śūnyatālambanena bhavitavyam, taccānutpādarūpam eveti*. See IV 96, notes

⁷ As the editor, Poussin, has pointed out, this reading is supported by the Tibetan version where we have. *lhag pa.med.pa(asaṅga) gnas med (anāspada)*

⁸ See also BA with BAP, IX 155.

⁹ The other half runs as follows so 'rtho *vijñānarūpatvāt tatpratyaayatayāpi ca*. See also TS, p. 582

nilapīṭhāy yaj jñāne bahirvad ababhāṣate |

tatra satyam ato nāsti vijñeyam tattvato bahih ||

¹⁰ The book in its original Sanskrit is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan translation called *Tsad ma rnam par nes pa* (*Pramāṇavivēcayā*) in Tanjur, Mdo, G, fols 250b 6—329b 1. Cordier, III, p. 437.

etc. And from this it follows that in reality there is no external object as the foolish imagine,¹⁵ it being nothing but the transformation of the mind (*vijñānapariṇāma*) owing to *vāsanā*,¹⁶

In this *kārikā jñeya* 'object of knowledge' is to be taken in its ordinary sense and not in its particular significations, as in III.33, and IV.90.

'We are now to discuss the second point, i.e., the *dharma*s 'elements of existence' are *gaganopama*. From the absolute point of view (*paramārthataḥ*) the external things appear only in their imposed forms having no reality at all. They have not their intrinsic existence (*niḥsvabhāva*) and as such are void (*śūnya*) like the son of a barren woman. Hence they are *gaganopama*.¹⁷ Śāntideva says in his BA, IX.155: *

sarvam ākāśasankāśam pariṣṭhāntu madvidhāh |

'Let those who are like me accept the doctrine that all is like the sky.'

Why is it like the sky? *Prajñākaramati* explains, because it is imposed and devoid of reality (*śamāropitatattva-śūnyatvāt*). We read the following in ASP, p. 297.

evam eva subhūte sarvadharmā ākāśagatikā ānāgatikā agatikā ākāśasamāh yathākāśam anāgatam agatam akṛtam avikṛtam anabhisamskṛtam asthitam avyavasthitam anutpannam anirudham evam eva subhūte sarvadharmā anāgatā agatā akṛtā avikṛtā

¹⁵ LA, p. 285.

bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yathā bāhir vikalpyate |
vāsanair lūḍitam cittam arthābhāsam pravarṇate ||

¹⁶ Tk, 1

ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yah pravartate |
vijñānapariṇāmo 'sau" ||

Śhīramati writes here in his *bhāṣya dharmānām ātmanas ca vijñānapariṇāmad bahirabhāvāt*,

¹⁷ BAP, p. 503 (with regard to *anu*) *ato 'bhinnakṣyamāṇo niḥsvabhāvatayā śkāśam śūnyam eva* See pp. 504-505,

anabhisaṃskṛtā asthitā asaṃsthitā avyavasthitā anutpannā aniruddhā ākāśakalpatvād avikalpāḥ.

See BAP, p. 395, quoted above, and specially our text, IV. 93.

Or because the *dharma*s are beyond enumeration (*gaṇanā-samatikṛānta*), they are *gaganopama* ¹⁸

Or, it may be that as *jñāna* is *asanga* and is thus like the sky, so are *asanga* the *dharma*s, and as such they are like the sky. See IV. 96 That the sky is *asanga* needs no explanation

One of the grounds on which this theory is based is that the things are *nirsvabhāva*, i.e., without their own nature and condition or state of being (*svabhāva*). And that which has not its own state of being is nothing but the sky and void (*ākāśa*, *sūnya*). ¹⁹

Or again, as in fact the things have naturally neither origination nor suppression, they are like the sky. See LA. X. 172.

aniruddhāḥ anutpannāḥ prakṛtyā gaganopamāḥ |

Ś does not explain here as to how *jñāna* is *ākāśakalpa* and the *dharma*s are *gaganopama*. He would, however, explain the non-difference of *jñāna* and *jñeya* saying that *jñeya* refers to *ātman* (or strictly *Ātman*), and *jñāna* is not different from *ātman*.

¹⁸ ASP, pp. 278-279 sarvadharmāḥ api subhūte 'cintyā atulyā aprameyā samkhyeyā asamasamāḥ * sarvadharmāḥ api subhūte 'samkhyeyā gaṇanāsamatī krāntavā rūpam api subhūte : 'samasamam evam vedanā samjñā samākāśa vijñānam api subhūte samasamam evam : sarvadharmāḥ api subhūte sama-samā ākāśasamatīāt subhūte sarvadharmāḥ

BA, V 12 durjanān gaganopamān on which BAP writes satraivo hi gaganasamatvād aparyantāḥ

¹⁹ See BAP p. 503 ato bhūṃśīkṣyamāno nirsvabhāvataya ākāśam sūnyam eva, pp. 504-505 tat ko 'tra kāyah tasya pratyaveksamānasya bhavati—ākāśa samo 'yam kāyah * sarvam etad ākāśam iti paśyati *

Now the word *dharma* used here in this *kārikā* and not less than twenty-two times in this Book,¹⁰ requires some explanation. It is very widely used in such cases as the present one throughout Buddhist literature in Sanskrit and also in Pali.¹¹ Figuratively it means a thing or object, a thing of which the senses or mind takes cognition and as such, it is synonym of such Sanskrit words as *artha* or *padārtha* or *vāya* or *prameya*. Literally it has among others the sense of nature, character, peculiar condition or essential quality, in Sanskrit *svabhāva* or *śvalakṣaṇa*. It is derived from √*dhr* 'to hold, maintain, preserve, keep'. Because a thing in whatever form it may be maintains its own characteristics or essential quality (*śvalakṣaṇa* or *svabhāva*), it is called *dharma*. So we read in AKB, p. 6. *lakṣanadhāranād dharmah* (*ran.gi matshan, fid.ḥdzin paḥi.phyir chos te*). See MV, pp. 304, 457. *Buddhaghosa* (AS, §94, p. 39) explains the term in the following words: (i) *attano pana sabhāvam dhārentitī dhammā*, (ii) *dhāriyanti vā paccayehi*, (iii) *dhāriyanti vā yathāsabhāvato'tī dhammā*.¹² According to it *rasa*, *sparsa*, etc., are *dharma*s. Only these are there and not also *dharmins* 'those endowed with or having a *dharma*,' as the Buddhists hold unlike such non-Buddhist philosophers as *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas*, according to whom earth, or jars, etc., are *dharmins*, while their qualities, i.e., hardness (*kūṭhinya*), etc. are *dharma*s. In Buddhist philosophy it is only the quality of tangibility called 'hardness' (*kūṭhinya*, *sparsa*) that is regarded as existent, but

¹⁰ IV. 1, 6, 8, 10, 21, 33, 41, 46, 53, 54, 58, 59, 61, 62, 91, 92, 93, 96, 98, 99. It is used also in II 25 and III 1, but evidently in a meaning different from that in Book IV.

¹¹ For instance, ASP, p. 39 *sarvadharmā api devaputrā māyopamāḥ avapnopamāḥ*; DP, 279 (*Maggavagga*, 7) *sabbe dhammā anattā'ti*.

¹² It is thus translated in Ex., p. 50 "Dharma's may be defined as those states which bear their own intrinsic natures, or which are borne by causes-in-relation, or which are borne according to their own characteristics."

there is no entity excepting it that we call earth, or the element of earth. Āryadeva says in his CS, 309.

kaṣṭhinā drīyate bhūmih sā ca kāyena grīhyate ।
tena hi kevalam sparśo bhūmir eṣe ti kathyate ॥²³

'It is seen that the earth is hard and that is perceived with one's body. Therefore it is said that the earth is only the quality of tangibility.'

Thus, as says Stcherbatsky in his *Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 26, 'If we say "earth has odour, etc.," it is only an inadequate expression, we ought to say "earth is odour, etc.," since beside these sense-data there is absolutely nothing the name could be applied to' 24.

It is also to be borne in mind in this connexion that in the absolute truth there is nothing as *avaśyācīn* 'one having portions' as in other systems. It is owing to this fact that expressions like the following are found in Buddhist works

nāstīha sattva atmā vā dharmāstv ete sahetukāḥ |²⁵

This theory of *dharma* seems to be exactly the same as that of the *tatto* of the *Sāṅkhyas*. The word *tattva* (*tat-tva*) literally

²³ This is a reconstructed verse from Tibetan which runs

sa na brtan shes bya bar mthon ।
de yan² lus, kyis hdzin par hgyur ।
des na reg pa hbaḥ shig hdi ।
sa ho shes ni, bya bar brjed ॥

See V, 82 AK and AKV, I 35 (p. 69) 'prthivīdhātuh katamab khakkhatatvam itī vistarah, MV pp. 66-67 iha tu kāṭhunyādivyatunkā- prthivyādyasambhavaḥ sātī na yuktō vīśeṣyavīśeṣanabhāvaḥ' 'evam prthivyā dīnām yady apī kāṭhunyādivyatunkāṁ vīcāryamānām lakṣyam nāstī, lakṣyavyatī rekena ca lakṣanām nūṭīrayam tathāpi samvittir eveti' YB, 16² khakkhatatvam katamat, prthivī. This view is found also in the *Gorhōpanisad*, I tatra yat kathunam sū prthivī

²⁴ He quotes here the following from AKV, IX p. 717 *prthivī gandhavatīty ukte rūpa gandha sparśebhyo nānyad darśayitum śakyate* Cf *Soul Theory*, p. 742

²⁵ Quoted in MV, p. 355 as a saying of the *Bhagavat*

means 'thatness,' i.e., 'the state of that (referring to a thing)' and hence it signifies 'nature (*svabhāva*)' or 'true nature.' Thus, in fact, *tattva* is a *guṇa*, yet each of the twenty-five categories in the system is considered as a *tattva* (*pañcaviṃśati tattva*), and not *tattvavat* 'having *tattva*.' When the three *guṇas*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, are in equal condition (*sāmyāvasthā*), they are collectively called *prakṛti*. It is itself a *tattva*, it has no *tattva*.²⁰ It consists in the three *guṇas*, it has no *guṇa*, though sometimes even in authoritative works it is loosely said that it has three *guṇas*. Thus it is a well-known fact that teachers belonging to other systems say that in Sāṃkhya there is no difference between a *guṇa* and a *guṇin* or *dravya*²¹ (*guṇadravyayos tādātmyam*), or between a *dharma* and a *dharmin* (*dharma-dharminor abhedah*).²²

Says Aśvaghoṣa (BCK. XII 76) :

guṇino hi guṇānāṃ ca vyatireko na vidyate ।
rūpoṣṇābhyāṃ virahito na hy agnir upalabhyate ॥

²⁰ See *Tattvayāthārthyadīpani* included in the *Sāṃkhyasamgraha* (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series), pp. 72-93. *tattvānti tāntriki sūpyāḥ tadārthai cātmanātmavivēkaśratyogyanuyoginas tattatpadārthāḥ teśām bhāvāḥ tat-tatpadanimitāni puruṣatveprakṛtivyādinī pañcaviṃśadbhāṣayāḥ dharmadharma-abhedād vyaktiyo 'pi tattvānti ucyate*

²¹ Vasuvandhu gives (AK, IX 290) the following definition of *dravya* rejecting that of the Vaiśeṣikas *vidyamānam dravyam* is: *Yasmitra* adds *yat svalakṣanato vidyamānam tad dravyam*. He does not accept the position that *smṛti*, *samśāra*, *icchā*, etc., are *guṇas* as held by Vaiśeṣikas (Ibid). See AK, III 100-1. But Viṣṇuabhikṣu who is undoubtedly much influenced by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems writes the following in his commentary on SS, I, 61 *ayam ca pañcaviṃśatikō gaṇo dravyarūpa eva, dharmadharma-abhedāt tu guṇakarmasāmānyādinām straiṣṭāntarbhāvāḥ C/ 162. dharmadharma-abhedād dravyānām api tāntrīyāḥ smṛti*

²² See Viṣṇuabhikṣu on SS, II 5 where the following is quoted:

śaktiśaktinātor bhēdam paśyanti paramārthataḥ ।
abhedam cānupaśyanti yoginas tattvacintakāḥ ॥

It may be noted in this connexion that V a s u b a n d h u in his *Viññānamātrasiddhi* applies the term *dharma* to the *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhyas (O Rosenberg) ²⁹

It is not that in Brahmanical works the word *dharma* is not used in the above sense. For instance, see KU, I. I. 21, *anur esa dharmah* ³⁰ Y ā s k a (Nt, I. 20) writes *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇah*. Here the word *dharman* differs from *dharma* only in form and not also in sense, as the former, too, means *artha* or *padārtha* 'a thing'. V ā c a s p a t i explains in his *Tātparyatīkā* the word *sākṣātkṛtadharman* used by V ā t s y ā y a n a (NS, I 1.7), saying *sudrdhena pramānenāvadhāritā arthāyena sa sākṣātkṛtadharmā*. Evidently he takes here *dharman* in the sense of *artha*. V y ā s a in his commentary on YS, II 17, explains *drīya* by *buddhisattvopārūdhāḥ sarve dharmāḥ*.

In our present Book here and in other places Ś takes *dharma* to mean *ātman*. But this seems to be forced. To imply *ātman* our author uses in every case *ātman* or *jīva* ³¹. Why should he employ in this chapter *dharma* for it? Undoubtedly these two terms are well-known in their meanings. So there is no ground for giving preference to such a word as *dharma* in the sense of *ātman*. In all the twenty-two cases in the present Book *dharma* is easily construed in the sense of 'a thing,' literally 'an element of existence' as in Buddhist literature. But while in some of them Ś takes the word to mean *ātman*, in others he could not do so. In some cases he did not explain the word at all, and certainly the meaning *ātman* cannot be accepted.

²⁹ Stecherbatsky *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 27, n 2

³⁰ The commentator, Ś explains the word *dharma* here saying *ātmaḥkhye dharma*. Undoubtedly *ātman* is a *dharma* as we have seen. But certainly it is not the actual meaning of the word though it may be implied with reference to the context. See also KU, II 1 14 *evam dharmān prthak paśyaṇ*.

³¹ See for *ātman* I 12 II 12, 17, III 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, for *jīva* I 16, III 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 45, IV 63, 68, 69, 70

in them. For instance, in the text *surve dharmā mṛsā svapne* (IV. 33) the word *dharma* can in no way mean *ātman*. In two cases he explains it saying *hastyādīn bāhyadharmān* (IV. 41), and *bāhyadharmāḥ* (IV. 54). Once he writes *ātmāno 'nye ca dharmāḥ* (IV. 58). In one case (IV. 82), however, he gives the actual sense, i.e., *vastu* 'thing'³¹

It can further be shown from the words of the author himself that in meaning *dharma* and *bhāva* (= *vastu* = *padārtha*) are identical. See the following passages :

(i) *ajātasyaiva bhāvasya* (III. 20^a) and *ajātasyaiva dharmasya* (IV. 6^a).

(ii) *ajāto hy amṛto bhāvaḥ* (III. 20^a) and *ajāto hy amṛto dharmah* (IV. 6^a).

(iii) *svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvaḥ* (III. 22^{c-d}) and *svabhāvenāmṛto yasya dharmah* (IV. 7^{c-d}).

It is to be noted that while *bhāva* is used only in the second and third Books³² of the work, *dharma* in the above sense is used only in Book IV, and this is very significant indicating the Buddhist relationship of the subject dealt with in it

There is one thing more. It is said in the *kārikā* that he to whom the author pays his homage perfectly understood the *dharma*s. Here if he is meant to be *Nārāyaṇa* one would naturally ask : What is the authority for it? Where is it found that he actually did so? This question demands a reply from those who hold that *Nārāyaṇa* is referred to here. Not only what we have seen above with regard to the first *kārikā*, but also the whole chapter, as can be shown, is in favour of the Buddha.

³¹ The text is : *yasya kasya ca dharmasya*, and Ś explains : *yasya kasyacid vastunah*. This reading is in the MS. co. of Anandashrama ed., the other readings add *duṣya-* before *vastunah*.

³² *Kārikās* II. 1, 13, 16, 17, 19, 29, 33, and III. 20, 22.

2

In the second kārīkā the author salutes the teacher of the *asparśayoga*:

asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattvasukho hitah ।
avivādo 'viruddhaś ca deśitas taṃ namāmy aham ॥

'I salute him (who has) taught the *asparśayoga* which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial and free from dispute and opposition '

I construe the kārīkā taking *gena* 'by whom' as understood, thus differing a little from the commentator, Ś, who says that it is the *asparśayoga* that is saluted here

In the kārīkā *avivāda* refers to the fact that our theory is not contradicted by theories of other schools, and *aviruddha* implies that it involves no self-contradiction or is not against any other position held by us

Now what is the *asparśayoga*, by whom and where has it been taught? The word does not occur in the Upanisads, though Ś says on III 39, where it is described, that it is well-known in the Upanisads (*prasiddham upanisatsu*) See also III 37, 38 The following is found in KU, II 3 10

yadā pañcavatīsthante jñānāni manasā saha ।
buddhiś ca na viceṣate tām ahuh paramām gatim ॥

'When the five (instruments of) knowledge stand still together with the mind and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state '

Similar statements are met with in other Upanisads ' But though they in fact may point to what is called *asparśayoga* as will presently be explained it is not termed *asparśayoga*

The word *asparśayoga* literally means the yoga in which there is no contact, or the faculty of perception by touch. The author himself says (III. 37) it is a *samādhi* 'profound or abstract concentration,' it is very difficult to realize. It points to what is *asamprajñāta samādhi* (YS, I. 2, 18, 51 with the scholiast Vyāsa),² or *nirvikalpa samādhi* (PD, II. 28) of yogins. But nowhere in their systems, so far as my information goes, it is called *asparśayoga*.³ Why is it that the word *asparśa* is used here?

I am inclined to think that it refers to the ninth or the last of the nine *dhyānas* or meditations called *anupūrvavīhāra* (Pali *anupubbavīhāra*) or the successive states of *dhyāna* which the Buddha taught and are found frequently in Buddhist texts.⁴ They are as follows -

I. Four *rūpa dhyānas* or the meditations of which *rūpa* 'matter' is the object, viz -

- (i) *prathama dhyāna* or the first stage of meditation
- (ii) *dvītiya dhyāna* or the second stage of meditation.
- (iii) *tṛtiya dhyāna* or the third stage of meditation
- (iv) *caturtha dhyāna* or the fourth stage of meditation.

II. The four *arūpa dhyānas* or the meditations of which the object is not matter, viz -

(i) *ākāśānantyāyatana* (Pali *ākāśānañcāyatana*) or the place of infinity of space

² Vyāsa explains (YS, I. 2) it na tatra kīlciṣṭi *asamprajñāta* ity *asamprajñāta* 'as nothing is known there it is called *asamprajñāta*'

³ Cf. *asparśasamvīprāpti* used in explaining *svarūpalābha* in the following line of the VV, p. 42 *svarūpalābhaḥ samastakalpanottīmatvād akṛtaka-niravakāśa niruttara nīstaraṅga-niravadhī nirūketāsparśasamvīprāptir bhavati*. This is kindly pointed out to me by Dr. S. N. Sen Gupta of the Lucknow University. The following occurs in the same work (p. 4) in the course of the explanation of *mahāśāntipāraśa*, *kulākulaavikalpadotojjhito* 'vyspadeitya mahānirāvaraṇa niratyava vedyavedaka-niryukto' *varnāvarmanirvarmottīraḥ sparśasparśa prathīparivarjita upakīṣṭa paramākāśādyaśabhidhānair abhidhīyate*.

⁴ AN, Vol IV, pp. 410-413 *eva yime bhikkhave anupubbavīhāra*.
eva yime bhikkhave anupubbavīhārasamāpattiṃ deśisāmi, tam evundha.

(ii) *viññānānantyāyatana* (Pali *viññānāṇicā°*) or the place of infinity of pure consciousness.

(iii) *ākāṅkānāyatana* (Pali *ākāṅkāṇṇā°*) or the place of nothingness.

(iv) *naivasamjñā-nāsamjñāyatana* (Pali *nevasaññānāsaññā°*) or the place neither of consciousness nor of unconsciousness.

And the ninth is *samjñāveditanirodha* (Pali *saññāvedayitanirodha*) or the cessation or complete suppression of consciousness and sensation.

As in the ninth or last stage of yoga or meditation not only sensation or consciousness, but also all the mental properties or 'mentals' (*citta* or *caitasika dharmas*), headed by *sparsa* (Pali *phassa*) 'contact,'⁵ are restricted or suppressed with the *citta* or mind itself, it is called *asparśayoga*. It is to be noted that the word *sparsa* employed here implies also the other mentals of which it is the first. The cessation of *vedanā* is possible only when *sparsa* ceases, as is clearly shown in the SN, IV, p. 220 (XXXVI 15.4) *phassasamudayā vedanāsamudayo phassanirodhā vedanānirodho*. It means that *sparsa* is the cause of *vedanā*, so when there is *sparsa* there is *vedanā*, and when there is no *sparsa* there is no *vedanā*.⁶ The fact that in this state of *nirodha* (which is the same as *asamprajñāta* or *nirbija* or *nirvikalpa samādhi*) the mind and its properties (*citta* and *citta* or *caitasika*) completely cease to work is clearly described by Buddhaghosa in his VM, p. 552.⁷

It is said (III 39) that *asparśayoga* is very difficult to realize. From this very fact the word *asparśayoga* may be explained

⁵ AAS, II 2 *phasso vedanā saññā catanā° cetaṅkā sabbacittācādhāraṇā nāma*.

For its explanation see *Sthiramati* on Tk, p. 20, II 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, p. 28, I 18.

⁶ *kā nirodhasamāpatīti yā anupubbanirodhavasena cittācetaṅkīṇam dhammānam appavatti*. See also SN, Vol. IV, p. 217 (=XXXVI 11.5) *saññāvedayitanirodham samāpannasā saññā ca vedanā ca niruddhā honti*.

quite in a different way. In Buddhist Sanskrit works there is frequent use of such words as *sparsavihāra* (M^{Vt}¹, 8349, 8351; Tk, p. 28, ll. 18), *sparsavihāratā* (M^{Vt}¹, 6288), and *asparśavihāra* (AAA, p. 326; Tk, p. 28, ll. 17, 19; p. 30, ll. 15, 20). *Sthiramati* explains the last word in his commentary on Tk, p. 28, l. 18, saying: *sparsaḥ sukhaṃ tena sahito vihāraḥ sparsavihāraḥ, na sparsavihāro 'sparsavihāraḥ*. He says that *sparsa* means *sukha* 'joy, content, ease, comfort'; *sparsavihāra* is a state with it; and *asparśavihāra* is its opposite. In Tibetan *sparsavihāra* is translated by *bde gnas pa*, literally the Sanskrit equivalent to which is *sukhasthiti* (or *sukhāva-sthiti*) 'pleasant state.' In Pali *sparsavihāra* is *phāsavihāra* in the same meaning.⁸ In this light *asparśayoga* in sense is nothing but *asukhayoga* (*a-sukhayoga*) meaning thereby 'a yoga which is not one that can be attained with ease.' This explanation is fully supported by what we know of it in III. 39. It is very difficult to realize and yogins shrink from it seeing fear though in fact there is no fear.

We read in the present *kāṅkā* that this yoga conduces to happiness of all beings (*sarvasattvasukha*). This is found also in Buddhist works where it is said (SN, Vol IV, p. 228=XXXIV 19-20)* that the highest bliss is felt in the *saññāvedayitānirodha* (or *sammāvedayita*⁹ according to the Chinese version *sammā=samyg*) L

⁸ It is, however, to be noted that, strictly speaking, Pali *phāsa* is not from Sanskrit *sparsa* the Pali form of which is *phassa*. In Northern Sanskrit Buddhist works Pali *phāsa* is wrongly translated into Sanskrit by *sparsa*. See the Pali Dictionary of Childers, p. 932. Sometimes in Buddhist Sanskrit *sukhasparśavihāra* is found for *phāsavihāra*. It clearly indicates that the writers of the former did not think that mere *sparsavihāra* could imply the sense of *phāsavihāra*.

⁹ *idhānanda bhikkhu sabbaso neva saññānirodhāyatanaṃ samatikkamma saññāvedayitānirodhaṃ upasampajja viharati idam kho ānanda etamhā sukhaṃ aññaṃ sukhaṃ abhikkantataram ca paṇitaram ca*. See also the next paragraph (21) for the reply to a question raised here. Cf AN, Vol IV, pp. 414-418

We know from it that in the stage of *nīrodhasamāpatti* the *citta* or mind is completely suppressed, hence there is no experience whatsoever. But in the stage called *vyutthāna* 'rising up' one has three kinds of *sparsa* 'experience,' known as *ānījya*, *ākīñcanya*, and *ānimitta*. The word *sparsa* in such cases means 'experience' or 'that which is experienced', √ *spṛś* meaning here 'to experience.'¹²

Now, because in the yoga called *nīrodhasamāpatti* there is no *sparsa* of anything, it is rightly named *asparśayoga*.

It is said (III 39^{c-d}) of the *asparśayoga* that yogins or rather untrained ones shrink back from it, imagining fear where in reality there is no fear *yogino bibhyañi hy asmād abhaye bhayadarśinah*. But what is the cause of their fear? Ś rightly says that the so-called yogins think that it will annihilate the very self¹³ Indeed, there is hardly any difference between a yogin in this state and a dead person, their respiration being completely stopped. So when the Blessed One entered that state, i.e., *saññāvedayitanirodha* before his *parinirvāṇa*, Ānanda took him to be dead. But the venerable Anuruddha said to him that that was not the case, the Blessed one only having entered the stage of the *dhyāna* called *saññāvedayitanirodha*. After a short time, however, He passed away¹⁴. It is therefore quite natural that an untrained yogin should be afraid of it, as of death.

Yet there is a real difference between death and *asparśayoga* or *saññāvedayitanirodha*, and Buddhaghosa has explained it in his VM, p. 558, quoting a passage from the *Suttapiṭaka*. It says that all the conditions in both of them are one and the same excepting this that in the latter the heat of the body is not

¹² See KnU, IV-2: *te hy enaṇ neduṭṭham paspariṇu* [te hy enat prathamō vidācākāra—this portion is grammatically defective and not in the *Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa*, Chapter X which forms the KnU], 3 *sa hy enaṇ neduṭṭham paspariṇu*, 4 *sa hy enat prathamō vidācākāra*

¹³ *āmanāsurūpam imam yogam manyamānā bhayaṃ kurvaṇti*

¹⁴ *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, VI, 89 (=DN, Vol II, pp. 156-158)

There are two classes of teachers: one (i.e., the followers of the systems of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta¹) holding the doctrine of actual existence of an effect in its cause (*satkāryavāda*), and the other (i.e., the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas²) maintaining the theory of non-existence of an effect in its cause (*asatkāryavāda*). The author refers to these two views in the third kārīkā which runs as follows:

3

bhūtasya jātim icchanti vādinah kecid eva hi |
abhūtasyāpare dhīrā vivadantaḥ parasparam ||

'There are only certain disputants who maintain that *jāti* 'origination' is of a thing which is already existent, while there are others of firm resolve who hold that it is of a thing which is non-existent³. Thus they dispute with each other.'

¹ See SK, IX; BS, II 1 14 18 with Ś, Ś on BU, I 2 2, (p 20) kāryasya hi sato jayamānasya kārene saty utpattidastanāt. Among the Buddhists the *Vaiśeṣikas* maintain *satkāryavāda*. See CŚ, IX 15 and our text, IV, 11, note 1.

² See NK, pp 143 ff. Among the Buddhists *Sautrāntikas* and *Yogācāras* hold *asatkāryavāda*. CŚ, IX 15.

³ The interpretation of the words *bhūta* and *abhūta* by Ś in the text here is quite different from that in III 23, and it is very remarkable.

The Ācārya now proceeds to mention in the next kārīkā the doctrine of the Buddhists who subscribe to neither of these two views asserting absolute 'non-becoming' (*ajāti*) of things:

4

bhūtaṃ na jāyate kiñcid abhūtaṃ naiva jāyate |
vivadanto 'dvayā hy evam ajātim khyāpayanti te ||

o 'That which is already existent does not come into being, and that which is non-existent does not also come into being;

disputing thus the followers of the doctrine of *advaya* assert absolute non-becoming (*ajāti*)¹

Before discussing the meaning of the *kārikā* it is to be noted that the reading that can reasonably be accepted in *c* is not *vivadanto dvayā* as in many editions, but *vivadanto'dvayā* with our MS. M^c, and some editions¹ It is supported also by the commentary in those editions, as well as by the MS. *Ka* used in the Anandasram edition of 1900

The word *advaya* in the *kārikā* is, in fact, identical in meaning with *Advayavādin*, which is well-known even to an ordinary reader of Sanskrit as one of the names for the Buddha² Some of the commentators of *Amk* explain *advaya* in *advayavādin* as *advaita*³ But there is a marked difference between the two terms *advaitavāda* and *advayavāda*, while the former literally means the theory of non-difference, i.e., the non-difference between, or identity of (according to the school of Ś) Jiva and Brahman, the latter means the theory of 'non-two', i.e., neither of the two extreme views

The two (*dvaya*) or the two extreme views are as follows: The Buddha does not hold that anything exists, nor does he hold that it does not exist He rejects both of these two extreme views and propounds his view taking a middle path (*madhyamā pratipadā* or *madhyamā pratipad*) So according to

¹ Such as of Mahesacandra Pāla, Calcutta, Śaka 1806 *Durgā-carana Sāṅkhyavedāntatīrtha* Calcutta, 1331, BS and Gita Press, Gorakhpur 1993 V S

Amk, I 1 14, MV¹ 23, DA p 95 *buddhānam bhagavatām mahākāruṇikānām advayavādinām* In the *Index of words* to the last work, the word *advaitavādin* is wrongly written

³ For instance, *Bhānujīdikṣita* *advayam advaitam vadanty avaiyam, Kṣīrasvāmin* *advayam viśvāśvāntam vadaty avaiyam*

Advayavādin, the exact Tibetan equivalent of which is *gñis su med pa grun ba*, and Chinese *pu frh yu*, both literally meaning 'one who says not two' is misunderstood in the *Sanskrit Tibetan English Vocabulary* (*Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Vol IV, 1913, p 2, for the word can in no way mean 'not doubtful in his command' as it is explained there

him nothing is existent, nor is anything non-existent; nothing comes into being (*anutpāda*), nor does anything disappear (*anirōdha*); nothing is eternal (*asāsvata*), nor has anything an end (*anuccheda*); nothing is identical (*eka*), nor anything differentiated (*anekā*); nothing moves hither (*anāgama*), and nothing moves thither (*anirgama*).⁴

This *advaya-vāda* is found throughout the Buddhist sacred literature both in Sanskrit and Pali.⁵ That the reading in c of the *kārikā* must be with the word *advayāḥ* and not *dvayāḥ* will

⁴ So says Nāgārjuna, MV, p. 11

anirōdham anutpādam anucchedam asāsvataṃ |
anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam ||
yāḥ prāṇīyasamutpādam prapañcopaśamam śivam |
deśayāmāsa sambuddhaś ca tam vande vadatīm varam ||

⁵ *asīti kīṣyapa ayam eko'nto nāstīti ayam dvītyo'ntaḥ yad anayor dvayor antayor madhyam iyam ucyate kīṣyapa madhyamā pratipad dharmānām bhūtapratyavekā* KP, §60 (p. 90) See MV, p. 270.

yad bhūyastī kīṣyānyayam loko 'stīti vābhiniṣṭo nāstīti ca tena na paṇimucyate *Kātyāyanaśāstrāda* quoted in MV, p. 269

So writes Nāgārjuna

kīṣyānīvaśāste cāstī(tī) nāstīti cobhayaṃ |
pratīddham bhagavatī bhāvēbhāvēvibhāvēḥ || MK, XV 7
astītvam ye tu paśyanti nāstītvam cāpabuddhayaḥ |
bhāvēnām te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopapāśamam śivam || MK, V 8

sammādiṭṭhi sammādiṭṭhi bhante vuccatī kittāvatī ou *kho bhante sammādiṭṭhi hotīti* *dvayanissito khv ayam kaccāyana loko yebbhuyyena atthitam ceva na'thītam ca* SN, II, p. 17 (XII 13) *lokasamudayam kho kaccāyana yathābhūtam sammappaśāya passato yā loko na'thīti sā na hotī lokanirōdham kho kaccāyana yathā- bhūtam sammappaśāya passato yā loko atthīti sā na hotī* *sabbam atthīti kho kaccāyana ayam eko anto sabbam natthīti ayam dutiyo anto, etc te kaccāyana ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammam deseti*, SN, II, p. 17 (XII 13)

nītyam itī kīṣyapa ayam eko 'ntaḥ anītyam itī kīṣyapa ayam dvītyo 'ntaḥ yad etayor dvayor anītyanītyayor madhyam tad arūpyanīdarianam | *śīmetī kīṣyapa ayam eko 'ntaḥ nāstītyam itī dvītyo 'ntaḥ yad śīmanāstītyayor madhyam tad* * *samkleśa itī kīṣyapa ayam eko 'ntaḥ vyavādīnam ity ayam kīṣyapa dvītyo 'ntaḥ yo'syāntadvayasyānupagamo* (Text *anugamaḥ* but see

further be perfectly clear to anyone when one considers that in the preceding kārīkā two classes of teachers are referred to, who hold the theory of origination (*jātivāda*). According to one of them the origination is of the existent, while in accordance with the other, it is of the non-existent. These teachers are *dvaitins* 'advocates of dualism', viz., the Sāṃkhya, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. The teachers alluded to in the present kārīkā are, however, quite of a different view. They do not discuss as to whether the origination is of the existent or of the non-existent, but assert that there is no origination at all (*ajātim khyāpayanti te*). Thus the teachers alluded to in kārīkās 3 and 4 are different, though Ś takes them to be identical.

As is evident, the main subject of this chapter is the theory of non-origination (*ajativāda*). In different systems of Indian philosophy it is held that things around us have their origination, in other words, they are produced, they have their causes, they themselves being their effect. But it is the Buddhists who hold quite a different view emphatically denying the origination of anything in the world. Thus the first sentence of Nāgārjuna's MK begins with *anirōdham*

Tib version *khwa mi 'on cm'*: *nudāhāro 'pravāṣhāra iyam ucyate kasyapa madhyamā prapad dharmānām bhūtapratyavekā* KP, pp 86-88

astīti nāstīti ubhe pi antā
suddhī asuddhīti ime pi antā |
tasmād ubhe anta viva-jayitvā
madhye pi śhānam na karoti panditaḥ
astīti nāstīti vivāda esa
suddhī asuddhīti ayam vivādaḥ |
vivādaprāptyā na dukham prasmyate
avivādaprāptya ca dukham nirudhyate

SR p 30, quoted in MV pp 135, 270

bhāvābhāvadāśānadvayaprasaṅgo yāvat tāvat saṃsāra ity avetya
mumuksubhiḥ eṣaddāśānadvayanirāśena sabbhur madhyamā prapad bhāvanīyā
yathāvad itī MV, p 276 See the whole of chapter XV

*anutpāda*⁶ 'having neither origination nor suppression.' This *anutpāda* is thoroughly discussed and established in that work as in others. Let here be quoted only a few lines in translation from that book together with the commentary of Candrakīrti (MK, I. 1 with MV, p. 12):

'Now ..the Ācārya, thinking the facility in refuting *nīrodha*, after *utpāda* is refuted, begins first with the refutation of the latter. *Utpāda* of a thing may be supposed by the opponents from a cause which may be either it itself, or something other than it, or both, or again, from one which is no cause at all. But in no way it can be justified. So he (the Ācārya) says :

"Nowhere and never are such things as are produced either from themselves, or from some other things, or from both, or from what is no cause at all." ⁷.

This non-origination is asserted again and again in the same work and sometimes in identical words. ✓

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate ।

na svataḥ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutah ॥

MK, XXI 13. See XXIII 20.

'A thing does not come into being from itself, nor from other (=not-itself), nor from both, itself and other. How can it come into being?'

⁶ For the order of these two words see Candrakīrti (MV, p. 12) *atra ca nirodhasya pūrvam pratiedha utpādanirodhaḥ paurvāparya-vasthāyāḥ siddhyabhāvam dyotayitum vakṣyati* hi (MK, XI 3. MV, p. 221) *pūrvam jñeyam yadi bhāveḥ jarāmaraṇam uttaram** Our author, *Gauḍapāda*, too, has followed the same order in his widely quoted *kīrti* (III 32) *na nirodho na cotpattiḥ* *

⁷ *idānim** *utōdapratiśedhasa nirodhapratīśedhasaukaryam manyamāna ācāryaḥ prathamam evōtpādapratīśedham ārabhate utīdo hi paraḥ kālpyamānaḥ svato vā parikalpyeta parato ubhayato 'hetuto vā parikalpyeta sarvathā ca nopapadyata iti nūcityāha*

na svato nāp; parato na dvābhyām nāpy ahetutaḥ ।

utpannā jñtu vidyante bhāvaḥ kvacana kecanaḥ

MK, I. 1; MV, p. 12.

Compare this with the following line from our *kārikā*, IV. 22 which speaks for itself:

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate ¹

'Nothing is produced either from itself or from other.'

For further details one may be referred to MK, I and XXIII with MV; CS, XV. See also our *kārikā*, IV. 22.

That there is no *jāti* or *utpāda* 'origination' is thus maintained also in a short line of the BA, IX. 106:

evam ca sarvadharmānām utpattir nāvasiyate ²

'Thus the origination of all things is not known'

The first half of the present *kārikā* is undoubtedly based on such statement as the following of Nāgārjuna (MK, I. 6).

naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyotīthasya yujyate ³

asataḥ pratyayah kasya sataḥ ca pratyayena kim ⁴

For the wording in *b* of the *kārikā* (*abhūtam naiva jāyate*) see CS, 373^d (XV 23^d) *nābhūto nāma jāyate* See here also Candrakīrti on CS, 366 (XV 16) *atrāha jāto na jāyate ajāto 'pi na jāyate* ¹⁰ It may be noted here that in this book, too, the doctrine of non-origination is fully discussed

Ś explains the first half of the present *kārikā* as follows-

bhūtam vidyāmānam vastu na jāyate vidyamānatvād eva⁵.
tathā abhūtam avidyamānam avidyamānatvān naiva jāyate
śaśavisānavat.

'The thing which is already existent does not (again) come into being owing to its very existence And the thing that is

¹ BAP runs here *evam eva yathoditanyāyena sarvadharmānām sarva-bhāvānām utpattir utpādo nāvasiyate na pratiyate* See the same work, pp 355 ff
na ca svaparobhayahetunibandhanam ahetunibandhanam vā bhāvasya jñmātipaśalam upapadyate Here the subject is discussed to a great extent

² See MA, VI 58 MV, pp 82-83

¹⁰ Reconstructed from the Tibetan version *hdur smras, pa | skyes pa mi skye la ma skyes, pa, yan mi, skye ste |*

not existent does not come into being on account of its being non-existent, as, for instance, the horn of a hare.¹¹

Gauḍapāda refers to the doctrine of *ajāti* in the present kārikā, and accepts it in the next which runs as follows:

5

khyāpyamānām ajātim tair anumodāmahe vayam ।
vivadāmo na taiḥ sārḍham avivādaṃ nibodhata ॥

'We express our approval of *ajāti* which they declare; we do not dispute with them, and listen how there cannot be any dispute.'

It is to be noted here that Gauḍapāda is a Vedantist, and yet he accepts the doctrine of non-origination of the Advaya-vādins or Buddhists expressing his approval. He does not see any use disputing with them and invites apparently his Vedantist followers to listen to him as to why the view cannot be disputed.

Like the Sāṅkhyas, the Naiyāyikas, and the Vaiśeṣikas, etc., the Vedantists, are originally believers in the doctrine of origination, as is evident from the BS, I 1 2 (*janmādy asya yataḥ*, 'From whom are the origination, etc. of this') which is based on such statements of the Upaniṣads as TU, III 1. 1: *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jātāni** *tad Brahma*, 'That is Brahman from whom these beings are originated'. The reality of this origination or creation is denied later on in the school of Ś in the absolute truth. This is due to the doctrine of Gauḍapāda who invites here his followers to listen as to how

¹¹ *Buddhapālita* quoted in MV, p. 14 *na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ, tadutpāda-vaiyarhyād atiprasargadeśiḥ ca. na hi svātmanā vidyamānānām padārthānām punarutpāde prayojanam asti. aṭha saṃn api jāyeta na kadācin na jāyeta*

birth, or the immortal becomes mortal, evidently it undergoes a change. But no change of nature is possible. The *kārikā* runs :

8

svabhāvenāmṛto yasya dharmo gacchati martyatām ।
kṛtakenāmṛtas tasya katham sthāsyati niścalah 1¹

'How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal², maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial³, will remain changeless?'

The following may here be quoted from Nāgārjuna's MK, XV 1-2 in which one should note the word *kṛtaka* ⁴

na sambhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ ।
hetupratyayasambhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet ॥
svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham ।
akṛtrimah svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca ॥

¹ See III 22.

² That is, takes birth. See note 2 on IV 6.

³ The word *kṛtaka* in the *kārikā* (a) is to be explained taking it as noun, i.e., *kṛtakaiva* just as the word *anādi* in IV 14 is evidently for *anāditva*. Anandagiri lends his support writing (III 22) *kṛtakeneti kṛtakaivaiva, yat kṛtakam tad anityam iti*. Cf. Śāyana who explains *manasopeti* (TA, VII 6) as **patitva*.

⁴ It seems that our author had these *kārikās* of Nāgārjuna in his mind while writing his own and so he has unconsciously written *kṛtaka* instead of *kṛtakaiva* as is required.

In order to explain as to how nature (*prakṛti* or *svabhāva*) cannot change Gauḍapāda proceeds to define it in the next *kārikā*.

9

sāmsiddhikī svabhāvikī sahajāpy akṣatā ca yā ।

prakṛtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvaṃ na jahāti yā ।

'That is to be known nature (*prakṛti*) which is self-existent,¹ natural, innate, not artificial and one that does not give up its own being.'

As regards *svabhāva* Candrakīrti explains it following Nāgārjuna in his MV, pp. 264-265, that it is nothing but always non-origination (*sarvadānutpāda eva*). He says that by *svabhāva* we are to understand that which is independent of other (*paranirapekṣa*) and as such not artificial (*akṛtrima*), and thus having no existence before it does not come into being (not *abhūtvā bhāvah*). Therefore the *svabhāva* of fire is nothing but its non-origination (*anutpāda*), and not its heat, because it depends on its cause and conditions, and comes into being after having no existence at first².

¹ The word *sāmsiddhikī* may also mean that which comes into being simultaneously (*saha utpanna*) as illustrated by Gauḍapāda and Maṅghara (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 296) in their commentaries on SK, XLIII of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*: *tatra sāmsiddhikī yathā bhagavataḥ kapilasyātmā utpadya-
mānasya caivāro bhūtvā sahutpannā*. The explanation of Ś is as follows
*samyak siddhiḥ sāmsiddhiḥ tatra bhavā sāmsiddhikī yathā yoginām animēdya-
līlavyapīṣṭhī prakṛtiḥ* is "

² MV, p. 265; *sarvadānutpāda eva hy agnyādinām paranirapekṣatvād
akṛtrimatvāt svabhāva* ity ucyate,

Now having shown that there is no origination of anything the author proceeds to say in the next kārika that there is also neither decay nor passing away :

10

jarāmarananirmuktāḥ sarve dharmāḥ svabhāvataḥ ।
jarāmaranam icchantas cyavante tanmanisayā ॥

'All things are by nature free from 'old age' (decay) and 'death' (passing away), So the persons who believe in 'old age' and 'death' are reborn owing to their that very thought.'

That there can be neither *jarā* nor *maraṇa* is very elaborately established by N ā g ā r j u n a in his MK, XI 3 ff. from which we cull the following two couplets (3 and 4):

pūrvam jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaranam uttaram ।
nirjarāmaranā jātir bhavej jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ ॥
paścāj jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaranam āditāḥ ।
ahetukam ajātasya syāj jarāmaranam katham ॥

For further details readers are referred to the original text of N ā g ā r j u n a with MV

The author attacks the doctrine of *jāti* from different points of view and refutes it in the following way referring first to the followers of the Sāmkhya system who hold the theory of actual existence of an effect in its cause (*satkāryavāda*)¹

11

kāranam yasya vai kāryam kāranam tasya jāyate ।
jāyamānam katham ajam bhinnam nityam katham ca tat ॥

^{अतएव}
'(It is to be admitted by him) according to whom the cause itself is the effect, that it is the cause that takes birth (i.e., is

^{अतएव}

See notes on IV 3 and SK, IX

produced). And in that case how is it that the thing which takes birth and is thus different (from the effect) can be regarded as unborn (*aja*) and how it can be permanent ?¹

In the Sāṅkhya system *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* is held to be the first or original cause (*mūla kārana*). It is 'unborn' (*aja*) and permanent (*nitya*). From it other things are gradually produced. This view is criticized in this and the following *kārikās* by our author.

¹ The point is that there must be some difference between that which is produced and that which is not produced (*jāyamāna* and *aja*)

S explains the word *bhinna* in a different way saying that it means 'rent asunder', 'divided into parts' or 'opened' (*vidīna, sphuṭta*) implying thereby 'subject to some change'. And that which admits of any kind of change cannot be permanent.

The identity of cause and effect may be viewed from two different points, viz., the cause is not other than the effect (*kāryābhinnaṃ kāranaṃ*), or the effect is not other than the cause (*kārṇābhinnaṃ kāryaṃ*). But in neither case can the Sāṅkhya system be defended. The object of the first viewpoint is shown in the present *kārikā* which says. If the cause is not different from the effect then it is to be admitted that it is the cause (and not the effect) that 'takes birth' (*jāyate*) and thus, if you accept it, the cause cannot be regarded as 'unborn' (*aja*), as you hold it to be.

Now, in order to avoid this difficulty one may follow the second point of view saying that the effect being not different from the cause the former is as *aja* as the latter; and thus one cannot say that the cause is not *aja*. The author, however, says in the next *kārikā* that this argument, too, cannot be accepted:

12

kāraṇād yad¹ ananyatvam atah kāryam ajaṃ yadi ।

jāyamānād dhi vai kāryāt kāraṇam te katham dhruvam ॥

‘If you hold that the effect is also ‘unborn’ (aja), for there is no difference of it from the cause (which is aja), then, how is it, in your opinion, that the cause is permanent when the effect is produced ?’²

¹ The reading should be here *yad* and not *yadi* as discussed elsewhere

² Ś explains c saying that how it is that the cause being not different from the effect, that is, being produced, can be permanent jāyamānād dhi vai kāryāt kāraṇam ananyatvam nityam dhruvam ca ।

The author offers further grounds :

13

ajād vai jāyate yasya dīṣṭāntas tasya nāsti vai ।

jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyavasthā prasajyate ॥

‘There is no illustration (to give) for him who holds that a thing is produced from what is unborn’ (On the other hand, if it is maintained that a thing is born from what is born, then there follows no finality, it leads to an endless series of causes (anavasthā) ’

Here in the text in *d na* is to be taken with *vyavasthā* (as *na vyavasthā* = *avyavasthā* = *aravasthā*) and not with *prasajyate* Ś explains *na vyavasthā prasajyate anavasthānam syād ity arthah*

The second half of the kārikā means that if A is produced from B which you take as produced (*jāta*), by the very fact that it is produced it must have been produced

¹ That is, existing from all eternity

from one C, and C, too, in the same way must have been produced from one D, and so on. Thus it is impossible to ascertain the ultimate cause of a thing.³

³ Cf. *Candrakīrti* (MV, p. 15): *na ca vidyamāṣasya punar utpattau prāyojanam paryāmah, anavasthām ca paryāmah*; AKV (quoted in MV, p. 13) *utpannasya punar utpattau kalpyamāṣkyām anavasthāprasangah*, MA (quoted in MV, p. 13), *jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva yuktam*; ŚS, p. 262 (from ASP), *kim punar āyusman subhūte utpanno dharma utpatsyata utānūpannaḥ, subhūtir iha nāham āyusman ānūputra utpannasya dharmasyotpattim icchāmi na cānūpannasyeti*, CŚ, 260:

sambhavaḥ kṛyate yasya prāk so'atīti na yujyate |
sato yadi bhaved janma jātasya'pi bhaved bhavaḥ ||

In support of this *ajāluwāda* the author offers further arguments :

14

hetor ādiḥ phalam yeṣām ādir hetuḥ phalasya ca |
hetoḥ phalasya cānādiḥ katham tair upavarṇyate ||

'How can those who hold that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, describe that there is no beginning of the cause and the effect?'

In *c anādi* means 'absence of beginning' (*āder abhārah*). Ś explains it by *anādītva*. Cf. *kṛtaka* in IV 8c

Let us take here an example (IV 20) As regards a seed (*bija*) and its sprout (*aṅkura*) it is said that they have no beginning, for it cannot be ascertained as to whether the seed was first and then the sprout, or the sprout was first and then the seed, each of them being dependent on the other for

their existence. Yet, they say that the antecedent of the sprout is the seed and that of the seed is sprout. This cannot be justified.

The point is further dealt with in the following *kārikās* .

15

hetor ādiḥ phalam yesām ādir hetuḥ phalasya ca |
tathā janma bhavet tesām putrāj janma pitur yathā |

‘To those who maintain that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, the production of a thing would be just after the manner of the birth of a father from the son.’

The point is that if it is held that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and *vice-versa*, then it would follow from it that as a cause produces its effect, so an effect, too, produces its cause, and if one accepts it one would also accept that a son begets his father. But it is absurd.

Cf N ā g ā r j u n a in his VI V, 50

pitṛā yady utpādyah putro yadī tena caiva putrena |
utpādyah sa yadī pitā vada tatrotpādayatī kaḥ kam ||

Here in the second half *yadī*, though supported by the Tibetan text, seems to be redundant.

See NS, II | 41, IV | 39, BA, IX | 14

pitā cen na vinā putrāt kutah putrasya sambhavaḥ |
putrābhāve pitā nāsti tathāsattvam tayoḥ dvayoh ||

As regards the relationship between *hetu* ‘cause’ and *phala* ‘effect’ see MK, XX, specially XX 20

ekatve phalahetvoh syad aikyam janakajanyayoh |
pṛthaktve phalahetvoh syāt tulyo hetur ahetunā ||

MV writes here : na cānayoṛ ekatvaṃ pitāputrayoś cakṣuś-
cakṣurvijñānayoṛ bijāṅkurayoś ca aikyaprasaṅgāt.

The next *kārikā* says that there must be an order (*krama*) of a cause and its effect as to whether the cause or the effect precedes, otherwise there cannot be any relationship between them, and consequently nothing can be produced :

16

sambhave hetuphalayoṛ eṣitavyaḥ kramas tvayā |
yugapat sambhave yasmād asambandho viśānavat ||

'As regards production (*sambhava*, i.e. *jāti*) you must determine an order of the cause and the effect, for, if they are simultaneous they cannot be related (to each other), as the horns (of an animal).'

This argument is found in Buddhist works as shown below. As regards the production of an effect by its cause only three orders are possible, and not more. For, it may be said that first there is the cause and then the effect (*pūrva-krama* 'prior order'); or it may be said that first there is the effect and then the cause (*apara-krama* 'posterior order'); or, again, it may be said that the cause and the effect are simultaneous (*sahakrama* 'the order of simultaneity'). But it is clearly shown that none of them can be justified. Says Nāgārjuna, MK, XI 2:

tasmān nātropapadyante pūrvāparasahakramāḥ |¹

¹ Candrakīrti introduces it (MV) saying ata eva samāśrābhāvāḥ jarāmaraṇādīnāṃ pūrvāparasahakramā apī na sanitīyāḥ

The following may be quoted here from MK, XI 3-5

pūrvam jātir yadā bhavet jarāmaraṇam uttaram |
nirjarāmaraṇā jātir bhavet jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ ||
paścāḥ jātir yadā bhavet jarāmaraṇam āditaḥ |
āhetukam ajātasya syāḥ jarāmaraṇam katham ||
na jarāmaraṇenaiva jātiś ca sāha yujyate |
mriyeta jāyamānaś ca syāc cāhetukatobhayoh ||

Op. cit XI. 6 :

yatra na prabhavantyete pūrvāparasahakramāḥ |

For details the reader is referred to the whole of the chapters XI and XII.

In the *kārikā* under discussion *Gaudapāda* referring to the *krama* of cause and effect refutes their simultaneity saying exactly what is said by *Nāgārjuna* (MK, XX. 7) and his commentator *Candrakīrti*.

‘phalaṃ sahaiva sāmagryā yadī prādurbhavet punaḥ |
ekakālau prasajyete janako yaś ca jāyate ||

‘Should an effect come into existence just with its cause in its entirety then that which produces and that which is produced become simultaneous’

1. Here *Candrakīrti* adds *na caikakālayoh saṃyetaragovīṇayor janyajanakatvam dr̥ṣṭam vāmadakṣinakṛayor caranayor vā* But it is not seen that between two simultaneous things there is any such relation as between the producer (*janaka*) and the produced (*janya*) just like between the right and left hands or feet’²

This order of cause and effect has again been referred to later on (IV 19) by the word *kramakṛopa* ‘incompatibility of order’³

² Sometimes the female breasts are cited as example in such cases

³ See *Candrakīrti* (MV XI 78 *taṭṭa yadī purvam kāraṇaṃ pakṣi kṛyam syād akṛyakam kāraṇam nirhetukam syāt atha pūrvam kṛyam pakṣi kāraṇam evam apī kāraṇāt pūrvam kṛyam nirhetukam eva syāt atha yugapat kṛyakāraṇe syātām evam ubhayam apy a[hetu]kam syāt*

Now, according to these three orders (*krama*) of cause and effect there may be three propositions respectively, viz., (i) the cause produces its effect, (ii) the effect produces its cause; and (iii) the cause and its effect produce each other.¹ Of these three propositions the second² is taken up in the following *kārikā* :

17

phalād utpadyamānaḥ sa na te hetuḥ prasidhyati |
aprasiddhaḥ kathamā hetuḥ phalam utpādayiṣyati ||³

‘Your cause coming into being from the effect cannot come into existence ; how will, therefore, the cause that has not come into existence produce the effect ?’

The argument of our author seems to have been based on what Nāgārjuna has said (MK, X 10).

yo 'pekṣya sīdhyate bhāvas tam evāpekṣya sīdhyati |
yadi yo 'pekṣitavyaḥ sa sīdhyatām kaṁ apekṣya kaḥ ||

¹ See here Nāgārjuna with Candrakīrti, MK, XX 57, and specially the following line (MK, p. 395, ll 56) *yady evam phalaṁ yato hetor utpattau doṣa evam sati sahetupariva sāmāgi phalaṁ janātāu tad yathā pradīpaprabhāyāḥ*.

² It appears that a *kārikā* dealing with the first proposition is now lost between *kārikās* 16 and 17. For, as the second and third propositions are discussed (IV, 17, 18), one may naturally expect to have the discussion also of the first proposition, but it is not to be found. Can we think that the author himself has omitted it?

Candrakīrtti explains it thus (IV, p. 208) :

tatra yadī yo 'gnyākhyo bhāvo yam indhanākhyam bhāvam
apeksya sidhyati, indhanākhyas ca bhāvo yo 'gninātmāsiddhya-
rtham apeksitavyah, sa yadī tam evāgnyākhyam padārtham
apeksya sidhyati, kathyatām idāni sidhyatām kam apeksya ka
iti yadā cāgnyabhāve satindhanasya siddhir 'eva nāsti tadā-
kāranasyendhanasyābhāvāt kutas taddhetuko 'gny prasetsyati

It says that if the fire is effected having regard to its
fuel and the fuel is effected having regard to the fire, neither
of them can be effected. See also the next kārikā (MK, X 11).

yo 'peksya sidhyate bhāvah so 'siddho 'peksate katham |
athāpy apeksate siddhas tv apeksāsyā na yujyate ||

Mark here the use of the root √sidh with or without
the prefix pra- by Gaudapāda, Nāgārjuna and
Candrakīrtti

This point is further discussed in the following kārikā :

18

yadī hetoh phalat siddhih phalasiddhiś ca hetutaḥ |
katarat pūrvam utpannam yasya siddhir apekṣayā ||

If the coming into being of the cause is from the effect
and that of the effect is from the cause, which (of the two)
has first come into being,—the coming into being of which is
dependent?

Read here the following quoted from Nāgārjuna's
MK, X 8

yadindhanam apekṣy agnir apekṣy agnir yadindhanam |
katarat pūrvanirpannam yadapekṣy agnir indhanam ||

MV (p. 207) runs here as follows :

asyendhanasyāyam agnir dāhakah kartety evaṃ yadindhanam
apekṣyāgnir vyavasthāpyate, asyāgner idam indhanam karmety-
evaṃ agnir apekṣya yadindhanam, tat katarad anayoḥ pūrva-
niṣpannam. kim indhanam yad apekṣyāgniḥ syāt, utāgnir yam
apekṣyendhanam syāt.

Mark the wording of *c* in both the kārīkās quoted above.¹

¹ See Poussin. JRAS, 1913, p. 139

The author proceeds to show very clearly in the next kārīkā as to how the Buddhas have explained the theory of *ajāti* 'non-origination'.

19

asāktir aparijñānaṃ kramakopo 'tha vā punaḥ |
evaṃ hi sarvathā buddhair ajātiḥ paridipitā |

/ 'As there is absence of capability, or complete ignorance, or, again, incompatibility of orders, the Buddhas elucidated (the theory of) absolute non-origination (*ajāti*).²

Against the theory of *jāti* there are given three reasons in the present kārīkā, viz. (i) *asākti* 'absence of capability', (ii) *aparijñāna* 'complete ignorance', and (iii) *kramakopa* 'incompatibility of orders'. Of these three the third, i.e., *kramakopa* has already been discussed in kārīkā 16.¹ But what do the other two terms *asākti* and *aparijñāna* signify? The answer will be found in Buddhist works. In regard to *asākti* it

¹ On this as well as on *asākti* (*asāmarthyā*) one may be referred to the *kṣanabhaṅga vāda* in the Buddhist section of the SDS.

The point here is this that in the coming into being of anything there must be some *śakti* 'energy', otherwise everything is possible from everything, or nothing is possible from anything. But the existence of such a *śakti* cannot be established. For, as discussed by Candrakīrti in his MA, VI, 57, it cannot be said that the *śakti* belongs to a thing that has come into being (*jāta*), or to one that has not yet come into being (*ajāta*).³

I think this *śakti* is referred to here by Gauḍapāda in his present kārikā.

Now *aparijñāna* in the kārikā seems to me to be nothing but *pūrvāparāparijñāna* 'absolute ignorance of the first and last (points)' in kārikā IV.21. And this *pūrvāparāparijñāna* is in reality *pūrvāparaḥkoṭi-āparijñāna*, that is, absolute ignorance of the first and last points, i.e., the beginning and the end of the world as well as anything in it. To this theme a whole chapter (XI) is devoted in the MK, owing to which it is called *pūrvāparaḥkoṭi-parīkṣā* 'the Examination of the First and the Last Points'. Let here be quoted the first kārikā of it (XI. 1).

pūrvā prajñāyate koṭir nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ |
saṃsāro 'navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimaṃ ||

'The great sage said that the first point (of the world) is not known, for it is without the first and last points owing to the fact that it has neither the beginning nor the end.'

Candrakīrti comments: *koṭir bhāgo deśa iti paryāyāḥ. pūrvā koṭir pūrvo deśa ity arthah. yadi hi saṃsāro nāma kaścit*

³ skyes la nus pa smd. pa yod ma. yin |
ma skyes. no bo lahan nus yod min. ni |

The Sanskrit rendering in prose may be: *jāte śaktir na sambhavati, ajātasambhāve' pi śaktir nāsti.*

syāt nyatam tasya pūrvam api syāt paścimam api ghaṭādīnām
iva uktam ca bhagavatā anavarāgro hi bhiksavo jātijārā-
maranasamsāra iti ⁴ tasmān nasti samsārah pūrvāparakotya-
nupalambhād alātacakravād iti sthitam

It is to be noted here that *pūrvāparakoṭyaparijñāna* (or
°koṭyanupalambha) is not only of the world, but also of every-
thing So says N ā g ā r j u n a (MK XI. 8):

pūrvā na vidyate koth samsārasya na kevalam |
sarvesām api bhāvānām pūrvā koṇe na vidyate ||

‘ It is not only of the world, but also of every thing that
there is no existence of the first point.’

N ā g ā r j u n a proceeds to say (MK, XI 2) :

naivāgram nāvaram yasya tasya madhyam kuto bhavet |

‘ How is it that that which has no beginning nor the end
should have the middle? ’

And the very thing is said also by our author (II, 6, IV. 31) :

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne °pi tat tathā | ⁵

‘ That which is not in the beginning, nor in the end, is so⁶
also in the present ’

See IV, 31

⁴ See DA, p. 197, l. 5 SN, Vol II pp. 178, 193 Vol III, pp. 149, 151, MP,
II 3 2 (pp. 50-51) KV I 1 159

⁵ ādāv ante ca yan nāsti madhye °pi tat tathā

Nayopadeśa, 14

jassa n atthi purā pacchā majjham tassa kuo nivā

AS, 4 4 13.

It is not also in the middle, as says Ś (tan madhye °pi nāstīti)

It has been shown before that causation (*hetuphalabhāva*) in cases of origination is not possible. But one may meet the objection offering the example of seed and sprout (*bīja* and *aṅkura*). For it is evident that a sprout comes into being from a seed and a seed from a sprout. There is an endless series of it yet the fact cannot be denied. Thus by dint of the example 'causation is established'. The author, however, says that the example does not establish any causation, though it may appear to do so, according to you. Therefore until it is established to the satisfaction of both the parties this example cannot be cited. Thus he says :

20

bijāṅkurākhyo dṛṣṭāntaḥ sadā sādhyasāmo hi naḥ |
na ca sādhyasāmo hetuḥ siddhau sādhyasya yujyate ||

'To us the illustration of a seed and its sprout is always like a thing that is yet to be proved (*sādhyasāma*). And a reason (*hetu*) which is like one that is yet to be proved (*sādhyasāma*) cannot be used for establishing a thing in question'

Nāgārjuna has discussed (MK, X) the point thoroughly taking the example of fire and fuel (*agni-indhana*) and has arrived at the conclusion that there cannot be any causation (*hetuphalabhāva*) of anything. Let us cite here only the following few lines from this work.

yad indhanam sa ced agnir ekatvaṃ kartṛkarmaṇoh |
anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy ṛte bhavet ||

nityapradipta eva syād apradīpanahetukāḥ |
punar ārambhavarthyam evam cākṛ mākaḥ satī || X 1-2.

agnīndhanābhyāṃ vyākhyāta ātmopādānayoḥ kramah |
sarvo niravasthena sārddhaṃ ghaṭapatādibhiḥ || X. 15.

Candra-kīrtti says on CS. IX.8 : *tasmād evaṃ hetu-phalabhāvavyavasthābhāvād dvayam api (hetu and phala) svarūpena na sidhyati* ¹

sādhyaśama *hetu* is one of the fallacies of a reason (*hetvābhāsa*) . It is an assertion identical with the point to be proved, *petitio principii*. See NS, I. 2. 4, 8; V. 1. 4.

The word *hetu* has been used here in the *kārika* in the sense of *dṛṣṭānta*, as says Ś

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¹ The Sanskrit text has not yet been discovered hence it is reconstructed (see my edition) from the Tibetan version which runs *dehi phyir de ltar na rgyu dan hbras bu dnos po rnam par gnas pa med paḥi phyir gāi ga ran gi no bos grub pas yod pa ma yin no* | See also the *kārikā* and MA, p 150.

The opponent says referring to *kārika* IV 19 :

21

pūrvāparāpariñānam ajāteḥ paridīpakam |

jāyamānād dhṛvaḥ dharmāt katham pūrvam na gīhyate ||

' The absolute ignorance of the first and the last (points of a thing) is elucidator of non-origination, but how is it that the first (point) is not known (of a thing) which actually comes into being ?

The word *pūrvāparāpariñāna* has already (IV 19) been explained

To the question raised above the author gives his reply in the following *kārikā* actually in the words of Nāgārjuna and his followers

22

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate ।
sad asat sadasad vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate ॥

‘Nothing is produced either from itself or from other than itself, nor is anything produced which is existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent’¹

The author wants to say here that should there be a thing that originates (*jāyate*) one may say that it has its first point (*pūrva koṭi*), i e., the state of its becoming or being produced, but in reality there is nothing of the kind. For the first half of the *kārikā* see Nāgārjuna.

na svato jāyate bhāvah parato naiva jāyate ।
na svataḥ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutah ॥²

MK, XXI 13, see also XXIII 20.

‘A thing comes into being neither from itself, nor from another, nor from both, itself and another, and that being the case, how can it come into being at all?’

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyām nāpyahetutah ।
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvaśana keśana ॥

Op cit, I. 1.

‘There are nowhere and never such things as are produced either from themselves or from others, or from both, or from one that is no cause at all’

¹ Here the point ‘not existent-and-non-existent (*na sad asad*)’ may also be added. See IV 83.

² Quoted in RAP, p 339, and SS p 18

For the second half of the *kārikā* the reader is referred to the following line of *Nāgārjuna* (MK, I.7) :

na san nāsan na sadasan dharmo nirvartate yadā |
katham nirvartako hetur evam sati hi yuyyate ||³

‘When nothing existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent, comes into being, how is it reasonable to say that a cause brings about a thing?’

³ See

na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpyanubhayātmakam |
catuskotiviniṣmuktam tattvam mādhyamikā viduḥ |

This couplet is attributed to *Saraha* pāda in SS, p. 15 and found in a book *Jñānasarasamuccaya*, 28. The original Sanskrit of this work is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan version (Tanjur, Mdo, Tsh, Cordir III, p. 29). Here the authorship of the original book is attributed to *Āryadeva*. In Tibetan it is called *Ye tes sūn po kun las btus pa*. The present *kārikā* is quoted in BAP, p. 359, and many other books both Buddhist and non Buddhist. In this connection see IV. 83-84, and *atas tattvam sadasadubhayānubhayātmaka-catuskotiviniṣmuktam sūnyam eva* in SDS (Buddhism section) Bib. Ind., 1858, p. 14.

◊

The next *kārikā* is a reply to those who maintain the theory of origination (*jātivāda*) on the ground of the rule of cause and effect (*hetuphalavyavasthā*) saying that both of them are without a beginning and as such cannot come into existence :

23

hetur na jāyate 'nādiḥ phalam vāpi svabhāvataḥ |
ādir na vidyate yasya tasya jātir na vidyate ||¹

¹ All the MSS utilized for the Anandasram editions as well as those (not less than sixteen) collected from different provinces and examined by myself including different extant editions read *nādech* for *nādiḥ* in *a* and *hy adir* for *jātir* in *d*. With these original readings the *kārikā* hardly gives any appreciable sense. What does the second half with that reading *ādir na vidyate yasya tasya hy adir na vidyate* mean? With the reading *jātir* for *hy adir* suggested by me the sense is quite clear and it is in one way supported by the explanation given by the commentator Ś who has twisted the text with the reading *hy ādiḥ* saying

'A cause as well as an effect having no beginning does not naturally come into being, for that which has no beginning has no origination.'

Compare BC, IX. 123 :

hetor ādir na ced asti phalasyādih kuto bhavet |

'Should there be no beginning of a cause how could an effect have a beginning ?'

yasmād ādih karanam na vidyate yasya loke tasya ādih pūrvoktā jātir na vidyate
The reason for suggesting 'nādir' for 'nādeh' is this that by doing so the meaning becomes quite clear and only as such is supported by the second half of the kārīkā

24

Now, a few words are necessary to introduce the words *prajñapti* and *samkleśa* in the next kārīkā. We say 'It is a tree', and by saying so we affirm the existence of the tree. We know thereby that in reality there is a thing which is called 'tree.' But some thinkers including a class of Buddhists would utterly deny the existence of such a thing. According to them there is nothing that can be called a tree. That which is known to us as a tree is nothing but a mere understanding (*samkhyā*), a designation (*samjñā*), it is only making known to others (*prajñapti*), that is, the practical denomination, simply a common use (*vyavahāra*), it is merely a name (*nāman*) and nothing else. And it is only on account of its having the branches, the leaves etc., that it comes under the generally understood term of 'tree.' Similarly there is nothing in fact like a branch, a leaf, and so on, it being merely a current term, an enumeration, a designation, an expression or a distinctive mark of discourse.¹

¹ DS, § 1308 (see *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. 340-341): katame dhammā paññāsi. yā tesam tesam dhammānaṃ saṅkhā samāññā paññāsi ydāva nāman nāmakammam nāmadheyam nirutti vyaṅgaram abhilāpo. Compare here the theory against that of what is known as *Avogadāśā*, BA with BAP, IX. 79 seq. and ASP, p. 97. There is also a small separate treatise entitled *Avogadā-*

The true literal significance of the word *prajñapti*, 'practical denomination', is 'making known' (*bhāvasādhana*); or 'that by which a thing is made known' (*karanasādhana*), i.e., name or term. Or, again, it may mean what is made known (*karmasādhana*)². In the present case the word is used in either of the first two senses.

On the use of the word *prajñapti* in Buddhist works Kumāṛila's observation (IV, 13 12, p. 234) is interesting: śākyādi-granthesu punar yadapi kṛcīt sādhuśabdābhīprāyenāvinastabuddhyā prayuktaṃ tatrāpi prajñapti-vijñapti-paśyatātīṣṭhatādīprāyaprayogāt kṛcīd evāvīplutam labhyate. kim uta yāni prasiddhāpabhraṣṭadeśabhāṣābhyo py apabhraṣṭatarāṇ, bhikkhave ityevamādinī. See here its Tīkā *Nyāyasudhā*.

As regards *samkleśa* it has also a special sense in Buddhist works. It is well-known in Buddhist literature along with its opposite term *vyavadāna*. They mean 'impurity and purification' respectively. See BA with BAP, IX 28. By impurity the mind (*citta*) becomes impure and by purification it becomes pure. This *samkleśa* is threefold (1) *kleśa* 'passion' (i.e., *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha*) that can be avoided by right view (*darśana*) and meditation (*bhāvanā*), (2) *karman* 'act,' bad (*aḥsala*), and good-impure (*kuśalāsrava*), and (3) *janman* 'birth' (or *phala* 'fruit', recompense that projects the existence). See Vis, pp. 214 ff. Let the following be quoted here from Tk, p. 28

tatra klesakarmajanmātmakas trividhah samkleśah

nirakarana by Pandita Atoka in the *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, Bib. Ind., pp. 78 ff. The well-known Chariot Simile in the *Milindapañha*, pp. 27 ff. (ll. 1-11) may also be referred to here. The *Atayottada* is established among others in the following works of Brahmanic authority. NS II 133 ff., PB with NA on VSt. pp. 41 ff.

² ASH. 107 pañāṣṭi paṇa pañāpivattī (Skt. *prajñāpyattati* paśīṣati, paśīṣanato) (Skt. *prajñāpanatohi* vā paśīṣatīti ca duvidhī hoti). Thus the first is *karmasādhana* and the second *bhāvasādhana*.

The following occurs in MSBT, pp. 34-35 :

[kleśa eva samkleśa iti kleśa]samkleśah 'evam karma-
[samkleśo] janmasamkleśah kleśo hi pravartamānah svaparāt-
manor vyābādhakatvāt samkleśah yathoktam sūtre' rakto hi
rāgaparita atmavyābādhāyāpi cetayate paravyābādhāyāpi cetayata
ubhayavyābādhāyāpi cetayate evaṃ dveṣamoḥayor api
jñātavyam iti. karma janma ca samkleśappravartanād api
samkleśah.

¹ This is, as pointed out by S Yamaguchi, from AN, III 54

Now, the opponent having his hold on the meaning of the word *prajñapti* as well as *samkleśa* well-known among, and accepted by. Vijñānavādins, who maintain that there is, in fact, only *viññāna* and the external word has no reality at all, proceeds to refute their views, the purpose thereof being that if the existence of external things is once established one will have to accept their *jāti*, too

The *kārikā* runs thus

prajñapteh sanimittatvam anyathā dvayanāśataḥ |
samkleśasyopalabdheś ca paratantrāstitā matā ||

'The practical denomination (*prajñapti*) has its (objective) cause (nimitta),¹ for otherwise there is the disappearance of the two, (owing to this fact) as well as the experience of

¹ For *nimitta* see IV 25, 27, 75, 77, 78, LA, pp 225-226 tatra nimittam pūnāc mahāmate jñe cakravartīnāṃ vyākhyānāt āgacchati dīpāsamvākam, evaṃ śrotaghrānāṃ jñātvākāyatnanāvijñānānām śabdagandharasasprastavyadhatma-samvākam, etam nimittam iti vadāmi, p. 228 tatra mahāmate nimittam yat samsthānāskrtvīśākararūpādilakṣaṇam drīyate ten nimittam.

impurities (*samkleśa-upalabdhi*) (their) existence is regarded as dependent (*paratantra*).² ✓

It says that it must be admitted that *prajñapti* must have its *nimitta* ; i.e., the objective cause ; for otherwise there will be no notion of the (*dvaya*)³, i.e., *grāhya* and *grāhaka* 'the percipient and the perceptible,' in other words, the subject and the object,—a fact that cannot be denied. And, again, owing to *samkleśa-upalabdhi* it is also to be admitted that there must be some things (for example, as the Buddhists would say, *śkandhas*, *dhātus*, *āyatanas*) that are the causes of these *samkleśas*. Thus the things to which the *prajñapti* and the *samkleśa-upalabdhi* owe their existence are external and have their origination (*jāti*)

The argument advanced here has two parts: first, owing to the existence of *prajñapti* the existence of its cause, too, is to be admitted, and second, as there is the experience of *samkleśas* there must be also their cause. Both the parts of the argument are taken from Buddhist works. As regards the first let us quote here a few lines from the LA, p. 104

punar apāram mahāmatir āha nanu bhagavaṇṇ abhīlāpa-
sadbhāvāt santi sarvabhāvāḥ yadi punar bhagavan bhāvā
na syur abhīlāpo na pravartate pravartate ca tasmād
abhīlāpasadbhavād bhagavan santi sarvabhāvāḥ bhagavān āha
asatam api mahamate bhāvānam abhīlāpāḥ kṛyate yad uta
śaśavisanalurmāromabandhyāputrādīnāṃ loke dr̥ṣṭo 'bhīlāpāḥ te
ca mahamate na bhava nabhava abhīlāpyante ca tad yad avocaṣ
tvam mahamate abhīlāpasadbhavāt santi sarvabhāvā itī sa hi
vadah prahinaḥ

¹ For the word *paratantra* see IV. 24. 73, 74

² For *dvaya* see II. 14 III. 29, 30, IV. 24. 61, 72, 75, 79, 87

³ The printed text reads *dr̥ṣṭa* which is evidently wrong

“M a h ā m a t i says again : ‘Is it not, O Blessed One, that all beings exist, for they all have their expressions (*abhilāpa*). If, O Blessed One, there exist no beings there cannot be their expressions. Therefore, all beings exist on account of their expressions’ Says the Blessed One : ‘There are, O M a h ā m a t i, expressions also for those which are non-existent, for example, the horn of a hare, the hair of a tortoise, the son of a barren woman, and so on. These are O M a h ā m a t i, neither beings, nor non-beings, yet they are expressed Therefore, O M a h ā m a t i, the theory, as you say, that owing to expressions all beings exist, is lost ’”⁵

The following couplet from the same work (LA. p. 105) supplies the gist of the above .

ākāśaṃ śaśaṅgam ca bandhyāyāḥ putra eva ca |
asanto hy abhīlapyante tathā bhāvesu kalpanā ||

It is quoted in MV, p 528, where occurs the following .

tatrāpi bhāvakaḥ kalpanāpratiśedhamātram nābhāvakaḥ kalpanā
bhāvatvāsiddher eveti vijñeyam bandhyāputra itī śabdāmātram
evaitat. nāsyārtha upalabhyate yasyārthasya bhāvatvam abhāva-
tvam vā syād iti kuto ‘nupalabhyamānas abhāvasya bhāvā-
bhāvakaḥ kalpanā yoksyate.

The following is taken also from LA, p 319 (X 430).

asatsu sarvadharmesu prajñāptiḥ kīryate mayā |
abhilāpo vyavahāraś ca bālānām tattvavarjitah ||

It is to be noted that *abhilāpa* and *prajñāpti* are synonymous with each other See DSn, § 1308, quoted above, p 129.

⁵ See III 37 sarvābhilāpavigataḥ

Now, as regards the second part we should like to quote a few lines also from a Buddhist work *Cāndrakīrti* introduces the sixth chapter of the MK thus (MV, p. 137) :

atrāha vidyata eva skandhā[yatana]dhātavaḥ kutah
tadāśrayasamkleśopalabdheḥ iha yaṁ nāsti na tadā[śraya]sam-
kleśopalabdhir asti bandhyāduhitur iva bandhyāsūnoḥ santi ca
rāgādayaḥ kleśāḥ samkleśanibandhanam

'Here (the opponent) says: "Verily there are the *skandhas*,⁶ *āyatana*s,⁷ and *dhātus*" Why? Because there is experience of *samkleśas* arising from them, and because, on the other hand, there is no experience of *samkleśas* arising from that which has no existence, as of a barren woman's daughter from a barren woman's son "' And there are attachment and other passions, the cause of *samkleśa*

With regard to *prajñapti* the following may also be quoted in this connexion :

prajñaptir nāmamātreyaṁ⁸ lakṣmanena na vidyate |

LA, X. 23 (p. 267).

prajñaptimātram tribhavam nāsti vastu svabhāvataḥ |
prajñaptim vastubhāvena kalpayantyanti tārṅikāḥ

Op cit, X 86 (p 275).

Now the author proceeds to give his reply to the above *prima facie* case

⁶ Five rūpa, vedanā, samjñā, saṃskāra and vijñāna

⁷ Twelve six organs of sense and their objects, viz, six internal eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind and six external form, sound, odour, taste, contact and ideas

⁸ Eighteen six organs of sense their six objects, and six kinds of consciousness arising from them

⁹ Calcutta ed has *prajñaptināmamātreḍam*

25

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam iṣyate yuktidarśanāt ।
nimittasyānimittatvam iṣyate bhūtadarśanāt ॥

'Seeing the reason (advanced above) one wants (to say) that the *prajñapti* has its *nimitta*, but seeing the reality (we) want (to say) that the *nimitta* is no *nimitta* at all.'

The opponent says, as we have seen, *prajñapti* must have its objective cause, but the argument drawn from the real nature of things points to the conclusion that what is called by him a *nimitta* (cause) is in reality no *nimitta* at all. The reason hereof is advanced in the following *kārikā*.

26

cittam na samspṛṣatyartham nārthābhāsam tathaiva ca ।
abhūto hi yataś cārtho nārthābhāsas tataḥ pṛthak ।

'The mind does not touch (i.e. relate itself to) an object, nor does its appearance (*arthābhāsa*), for the object is unreal and its appearance is not different from it.'

The mind has no contact with its object owing to the absence of the object itself. For in this theory (of the *Viṣṇāvādins*) there is nothing but the mind (*citta*). Now it goes without saying that the mind having no contact with its object has in fact no contact also with its appearance (*arthābhāsa*). The second half of the *kārikā* offers the reason hereof. It means that the object is unreal and it being so its appearance which depends on it is also unreal, and thus both of them being unreal the latter is in this respect not different from the former. This being the case the mind can in no way be related either to its object or its appearance. Therefore it cannot be said,

as done in the first half of the preceding *kārikā*, that *prajñapti* has¹ its *nimitta*. One must remember here that according to the *Vijñānavādins* there is no reality of external things. Let us read here the following from the *MVBT*, p. 10:

[°athavā cittacaitasikā rūpato dravyataś ca santiti yeṣāṃ dṛstis tesāṃ pratiśedhārtham uktam] abhūtaparikalpo[¹stiti]. [tasmād] asti dravyataḥ nāsti rūpaṃ tadvyatiriktam [nāsti] dravyata iti kim kāraṇam yasmād dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate. na hy abhūtaparikalpah kasyaciḥ grāhako nāpi kenaciḥ grāhyate. kim tarhi grāhyagrāhakatva [rahitam vastumātraṃ tathā hi vijñānād bahir na rūpaḥ grāhyate svapnādīvat vijñānam hi rūpādya] bhāsam utpadyate tasmān nirabalambanam eva svapnādāv ivānyatrāpi svabijapanipākād arthābhāsam vijñānam utpadyata ity eva jñeyam, grāhyā[bhāve grāhako na bhavati grāhyābhāve grāhakābhāvo na yujyate ato rūpaṃ abhūtaparikalpān na prthagbhūtam].

The opponent may argue here. Well, according to you there are no external things. But you cannot deny that there is an appearance of things round us. It may be a false one in your opinion. Yet it must have some cause. What is it? It is nothing but the contact of the mind with an object. Thus even for a false notion or impression (*viparyāsa*) the existence of an object must be postulated.

The author rejoins that it is quite true that even false impressions are possible only when there is a contact of the mind with an object, but when that contact itself is never and in no way possible there is no possibility also of them. How to explain then the false impressions? He would reply that it is the nature of the mind itself that even in the absence of any object it transforms into various objects under the influence of *śāśana*. For it is the seed of all (*sarvabijā*) having possessed the power of producing everything. Says *Sthīramati* 1k p 36, l 7 on *kārikā* 17 *sarvabijam hi vijñānam*.

tatra sarvadharmotpādanaśaktyanugamāt sarvabijam

LA, X. 49 (p. 271) :

cittaṃ vicitraṃ bijākhyam khyāyate cittagocaram |
khyātau kalpenti utpattim bālāḥ kalpadvaye ratāḥ||

Proceeds our author :

27

nimittaṃ na sadā cittaṃ samspr̥ṣaty adhvasu triṣu |
animitto viparyāsaḥ katham tasya bhaviṣyati *

‘Never in the three divisions of time (i.e., the past, the present, and the future) the mind touches any cause (object), how is it then that a false impression would arise without any cause thereof ?’

See IV. 41, 77, 78, LA, X 123 .

viparyāsasya vastutvād yad yad evopalabhyate |
niḥsvabhāvaṃ bhavet tad dhi sarvathāpi na vidyate||

That in the above kārikās (25-27) the doctrine of the
—Vijñānavādins is supported by our author is clearly admitted by
Ś in the following words introducing the next kārikā (28) :

prajñaptēḥ sanimittatvam ityādy etadantam vijñānavādinā
baudhdhasya vacanaṃ bāhyārthavādapakṣapratishedhaparam
ācāryenānumoditam

Now the Ācārya draws his conclusion from what is said
above in this connexion .

28

tasmān na jāyate cittaṃ cittadṛṣyam na jāyate |
tasya paśyanti ye jātim khe vai paśyanti te padam *

'Hence neither the mind (*citta*), nor that which is cognizable by it (*cittadrīya*) is originated. Those who see its (i e., of the *citta* and *cittadrīya*) origination see the (foot-) mark (of birds) in the sky.'

'Hence (*tasmāt*)' refers to the reason advanced above in 26 and 27. because there is no contact of the mind with any object.

The belief in the origination of things is as absurd as the seeing of foot-marks of birds flying in the sky

For this simile compare DP, 93 (= TG, 92).

ākāse va sakuntānam padam tassa durannayam |

This simile in our *kārikā* can be better explained by what Buddhaghosa has said in his DPA on the above line

padam tassa durannayan'ti yathā ākāse gacchantānam sakuntānam imassim jhāne pādehi akkamitvā gatā idam thānam udarena pahāntvā gatā idam sisenā idam pakkhehiti na sakkā nātum evam eva^

It says with reference to an Arhat that as in the case of birds flying in the sky it cannot be ascertained that they have gone away stepping on this spot with the legs and striking this spot with the wings, just so

A similar verse is quoted by Ś in IV 91 It runs

sakunānām ivākāse gatir naivopalabhyate |

Cf DP, 92:

ākāse'va sakuntānam gati tesam durannayā |

The following is quoted by Ś in his commentary on MU,
III 2 6

śakunīnāmivākāse jale varicarasya ca |

padam yathā na dṛsyeta tathā jñānavatāṃ gatiḥ ||

On such texts is based the following observation of Ś in his commentary on the BU, IV. 4. 6 (p. 637) :

ta utsahante khe' pi śākunaṃ padam draṣṭum.

For further details see IV. 91.

As regards the main proposition here the following lines from *Āryaratnacūdapariprechā* (quoted in BAP, IX. 18, p. 392 ; MV, p. 62; ŚS, p. 235) deserve to be cited :

sa cittaṃ parigaveṣamāno nādhyātmaṃ cittaṃ samanupaśyati na bahirdhā cittaṃ samanupaśyati ° sa cittaṃ samanupaśyan cittadhārāṃ paryeṣate kutaś cittaśyotpattir itī tasyevaṃ bhavati. ālambane satī cittaṃ utpadyate tat kim anyad ālambanam anyac cittaṃ. tadā dvicittatā bhaviṣyati atha yadevālambanaṃ tad eva cittaṃ. tat katham cittena cittaṃ samanupaśyati na ca cittaṃ cittaṃ samanupaśyati tad yathāpi nāma tayaivā-sidhārayā saivāsīdhārā na śakyate chettum na tenaivāṅgulya-greṇa tad evāṅgulyagram śakyate spraṣṭum evam eva na tenaiva cittena tad eva cittaṃ śakyam draṣṭum °

And the following is from KP. 149 (§102)¹.

cittaṃ hi kāśyapa parigaveṣyamānam na labhyate. yan na labhyate tan nopalabhyate tan nātītām. nānāgatam, na pratyutpannam yan nātītām nānāgatam na pratyutpannam tat tryadhvasamatikrāntam. yat tryadhvasamatikrāntam tan naivāsti naiva nāsti. yan naivāsti na nāsti tad ajātam. yad ajātam tasya nāsti svabhāvaḥ yasya nāsti svabhāvaḥ tasya nāsty utpādaḥ yasya nāsty utpādaḥ tasya nāsti nirodhaḥ ° 2

¹ See MV, p. 45 (KP-Ratnakūṭasūtra) ŚS, p. 233, BAP, IX. 106 (p. 338)

² On citta see the work, pp. 142-150

Having shown that the *citta* does not originate the Ācārya comes to his main thesis, the theory of *ajāti* 'non-origination.' Says he :

29

ajātam jāyate yasmād ajātiḥ prakṛtiḥ tataḥ |
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathaṁcid bhaviṣyati ||

'As it is one unborn (*ajāta*) that is born (*jāta*), non-birth (*ajāti*) is its very essence (*prakṛti*). And there can be in no way any change of essence.'

For a see *jāta eva na jāyate*, BU, III. 9, 25; and *ante ajātasyaiva dharmasya jātim icchanti vādinah*, III 20, IV. 6; and note on IV. 13

If a man is born it must be said that before his birth he was unborn, and this state of being unborn before the birth is his essence. Now, if it is accepted, and it must be accepted, as his essence, there cannot be his birth which is a change for essence can in no way change, as essence and change are two contradictory terms. Similarly before a *citta* is produced it must be considered as unproduced, and that being its essence which can never change it cannot be produced at all. This law holds good wherever there is the question of *jāti*.

For the wording of the second half of the *kārikā* which is found also in III 21 see MK. XV 8

prakṛter anyathābhāvo naḥ jātūpapadyate

On this point one may be referred to also

kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate ||
tasyaiva nānyathābhāvo naḥ anyasyaiva yujyate |
yuva na jīryate yasmād yasmā jirno na jīryate '

Op cit., XIII. 4, 5.

In the next *kārikā* the author says that an advocate of the theory of *jāti* cannot account for his two propositions : first, *saṃsāra* 'continued existence' ¹ is without a beginning,² but has an end ; and the second, liberation is with a beginning, but has no end. He says :

30

anāder antavattvam ca saṃsārasya na setsyati |
anantatā cādimato mokṣasya na bhaviṣyati ||

'It would not be established that *saṃsāra* is without a beginning, but has an end, nor would it be possible that liberation which has a beginning has no end'

An advocate of the theory of origination has to admit that *saṃsāra* has its origination, and if it is so, it must have a beginning. And that being so, the tenet that *saṃsāra* has no beginning cannot be maintained. Similarly according to him liberation also has its origination, and as such it must be with a beginning, and consequently must have an end, and in that case one cannot say that it has no end.

The point discussed in the next few *kārikās* is this that it is only when there is the existence of *saṃsāra* that there arises the question as to whether it has or has not a beginning.

¹ *khandhānam patipāṭi ca dhātu śyātānāna ca |*
abbhucchinnam vattamānam saṃsāro ti pavuccati ||

² That *saṃsāra* is *anādi* is admitted on all hands. As for Buddhists see MK, XI 1 with its vṛtti.

pūrvā prajāyate koṭiḥ nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ |
saṃsāro 'navatīgro hi nāpyādiḥ nāpi paścimam |

or an end, but in fact it has no existence at all Says the Ācārya.

31

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā |
vitathaiḥ sadrśāḥ santo 'vitathā iva lakṣitāḥ ||¹

'That which is not at the beginning, nor at the end, is not also in the present, (i e., in the middle²),³ being like the unreal things still appear as not unreal'

Compare here what N ā g ā r j u n a says in his MK, XI 2 :
naivāgram nāvaram yasya madhyam tasya kuto bhavet.

'How should that which has neither the anterior point, nor the posterior one, have the middle?'

C a n d r a k i r t t i comments :

agram ity ādih pūrvam prathamam ucyate avaram ity
avasānam vyavaccheda ucyate. yasya samsārasya ādih antaś
ca pratisiddhah tasya madhyam kuto bhaviyati tataś ca
samjñāmātrakam eva viparyāsaparavaśamānasānām samsāra ādi-
madhyāvasānavirahitatvād ākāśavad alātacakravād iti bhavah.

The following may also be quoted here

yassa n'atthi purā pacchā
majjham tassa kuo siyā¹ ĀS. I. 4 4 3
ādāv ante ca yan nāsti
madhye'pi ca na tat tathā | *Nayopadesa*, 14

¹ See II 6

² yad ādāv ante ca nāsti vastu mrgatrenskādi tan madhye'pi nāstīti nīcītam
loke Ś on II 6

³ Cf adāv eva hi yan nāsti karanasambhavāt svayam |
vartamāne pi tan nāsti nāśah syāt tatra kidrīah || YV III 11 13,

na yat purastād uta yan na paścān
 madhye ca tan na vyapadeśamātram |
 bhūtam prasiddham ca pareṇa yad yat
 tad eva tat syād iti me manīṣā ||

BP, XI, 28 21.

That *sapṛa* has neither a beginning nor an end is fully discussed in MK with MV, XI.

Now, there are two kinds of things, one kind experienced in dream (*svapna*), and the other in wakefulness (*jāgrat*); and it has been thoroughly established in Book II (*Vaitathya Prakarana*) that there is no difference between the states of dream and wakefulness, and so the things experienced in the latter are as false as those in the former. The author here puts forth the same argument in the same language with a view to show that the thing which is as false as that in one's dream cannot come into being in reality, and so the *jātivāda* cannot stand. He says:

32

saprayojanatā tesām svapne'pi pratipadyate |
 tasmād ādyantavattvena mithyaiva khalu te smṛtāḥ ||

'That the things have some purpose in dream also is known; hence owing to their beginning and end, indeed, they are regarded as false.'

One may object to the falsity of the phenomena of waking experience on the ground that they really serve some purpose; as for instance, water, when it is drunk, quenches one's thirst, while the phenomena in dream are not such. To this the author replies in the above *kārikā*. His point is this that the phenomena of dream are linked with one another by some purpose no less than those of waking experience. In dream also one drinks water to quench one's thirst. So the

phenomena like those in dream having a beginning and an end have no reality at all, for that which has a beginning and an end cannot be real, as the mirage.

This *kārikā* is identical with II 7. See the note on it for a different reading

It is said that the things seen in the waking state are false, because, as regards nature, they have no difference from those seen in dreams which are evidently false. But why the latter are so the author says in the next few *kārikās* as in II. 1-10:

33

sarve dharmā mṛṣā svapne kāyasyāntar¹ nidarśanāt ।
samvṛte² 'stmin pradeśe vai bhūtānāṃ darśanam kutah ॥

'All things in dream are false as they are seen within the body, for how can objects be seen in this confined space (of the body)?'

¹ For a see II 1'

² II 1^d, 4'

34

na yuktam darśanam gatvā kālasyānīyamād¹ gatau ।
pratibuddhaś ca vai sarvas tasmīn deśe na vidyate ॥²

'(In dream) the seeing (of a thing at a distance) having gone (up to it) is not reasonable, for there is no fixed rule of time for the act of going (there), and no persons being awake exist in the place (where they dream themselves to be)

¹ Cf *adīrghatvāc ca kālasya*, II 2^a

² Identical with II 2^{c-d}

35

mitrādyaiḥ saha saṃmantrya prabuddho¹ na prapadyate ।
gṛhītaṃ cāpi yat kiñcit pratibuddho na paśyati ॥

¹ When awake, he does not find his friends and others with whom he had deliberated, nor does he see all that which he had (then in dream) grasped ²

¹ With a large number of MSS. I read this for *sambuddha* in printed editions

36

svapne cāvastukaḥ kāyaḥ pṛthag anyasya darśanāt ।
yathā kāyas tathā sarvaṃ cittadīśyam avastukam ॥

¹ In dream the (active) body is unreal, for (quite) a different body is seen (in the place where one dreams), and as the body so all the things which are cognizable by the mind are unreal.²

37

grahaṇāj jāgaritavat taddhetuḥ svapnā¹ iṣyate ।
taddhetutvāc ca tasyaiva saj jāgaritam iṣyate ॥

¹ The experience (of dream) being like (that of) wakefulness, it (wakefulness) is considered to be the cause of dream, and that being so it is (also) considered that wakefulness is real only to him (*i e.*, the dreamer) ²

It is a fact that cause and its effect must be of the same nature. Accordingly wakefulness and dream being the cause and the effect respectively must be of the same nature. So if a dream is false wakefulness is also false. And as a

dream appears to be real only to the dreamer, so wakefulness, too, is real only to an ordinary unenlightened man.¹

¹ I think the logical order of the following four *kārikās*, viz., 38-41 should be as follows 39, 41, 38 and 40. For the *kārikās* 39 and 41 with 32-37 form the same subject of discussion, i.e., the equality of the states of dream and wakefulness, while the *kārikās* 38 and 40 are meant for showing the impossibility of origination directly. The traditional order is shown in the present edition by the figures in parenthesis

38 (39)

‘asaṃ jāgarite dṛṣtvā svapne paśyati tanmayah |

asat svapne 'pi dṛṣtvā ca pratibuddho na paśyati ||¹

‘In the waking state one sees an unreal thing and being absorbed in it sees it (also) in a dream. And in a dream, too, one sees an unreal thing, but does not see it when one awakes.’

To see the unreal is common to both the states, dream and wakefulness, the only difference between them is, however as stated in the *kārikā* itself.

¹ yathaiva kāmān upanānti sevyaṃ
pratibuddhasetub(?) puruṣo na paśyati | — SR, IX, p. 29

39 (41)

viparyāsād yathā jāgrad acintyān bhūtavat sprśet |¹

tathā svapne viparyāsād dharmāms tatraiva paśyati ||

¹ For the use of ‘sprś’ in such cases see IV. 27

'As in the waking state² through mistake one may see unthinkable things³ as real, so in dream it is owing to mistake that one sees things only in that (state).'

² The word *jāgrad* is taken here in the locative sense. See III. 29 together with Ś's commentary thereon and on IV 40 (41) '*jāgraj jāgarite*, Cf. IV 65 and BU, IV 3 14 with the comm *jāgraj jāgaritadeśe*. See also IV. 61, note 3.

³ Such as *raja-sarpa* 'string serpent,' etc —Ś

Having established above that a thing which are as false as that in a dream cannot come into being the author shows his conclusion of the *ajātivāda* by some other arguments.

40 (38)

utpādasyāprasiddhatvād ajaṃ sarvaṃ udāhṛtaṃ ।

na ca bhūtād abhūtasya sambhavo 'sti kathaṅcana ॥

'As origination is not established all are said to be without origination. There is in no way origination of the non-existent from the existent.'

The origination of the non-existent, such as the horns of a hare, etc., is in no way seen —Ś

In the next *kārikā* the author says with regard to causation referred to just now that it itself is not reasonable.

41 (40)

nāsty asaddhetukaṃ asat sad asaddhetukaṃ tathā ।

sac ca saddhetukaṃ nāsti saddhetukaṃ asat kutaḥ ॥

'There is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent, again there is no existent arising from the existent and where is the non-existent arising from the existent?'

Here are four points :

- (i) An unreal thing cannot have an unreal cause,
- (ii) nor can a real thing have an unreal cause; again,
- (iii) a real thing cannot have a real cause,
- (iv) nor can an unreal thing have a real cause.

Let us read here the following from MK, XXI. 12.

- (iii) na bhāvā jāyate bhāvo
- (ii) bhāvo 'bhāvān na jāyate †
- (i) [nābhāvā jāyate 'bhāvo
- (iv) 'bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate †]

This is fully explained in MV. See the following from MK:

sadbhūtaḥ kārakah karma sadbhūtam na karoty ayam †
kārako nāpy asadbhūtaḥ karmāsadbhūtam itate † VIII. 1.

satā ca kriyate nāsan nāsatā kriyate ca sat †
kartrā sarve prasajyante doṣās tatra ta eva hi † VIII. 8

nāsadbhūto 'pi sadbhūtam sadasadbhūtam eva vā †
karoti kārakah karma pūrvoktair eva hetubhiḥ † VIII 10

† These last two lines of the *kāṅkā* missing in Sanskrit are rightly reconstructed by Poussin from the Tibetan which runs as follows

dnos med dnos med mi skye ste |
dnos med dnos las mi skyeho

This *kāṅkā* is identical with Cś, 364 (XV 14) of *Āryadeva*

Having thus refuted the *jātivāda* and established thereby the *ajativāda* of the Buddhists the author goes on to reconcile some statements made by the Buddhas themselves, which appear to be irreconcilable with the *ajativāda* doctrine.

These statements, some of which are quoted in the foot-note,¹ are in support of *jāti*. Besides, the Buddhas are found to have instructed their followers on causation, as their well-known *pratītyasamutpada* 'dependent origination' itself shows very clearly.² It must, therefore, be admitted that the Buddhas have not denied *jāti* altogether. The Ācārya takes up the point and gives his reply in the following two *kārikās*, the first of which runs thus :

42

upalambhāt samācārād astivastutvavādinām ।
jātiś tu deśitā buddhair ajātes'trasatām sadā ॥

'But *jāti* is taught by the Buddhas for those who from their perception and common practice hold that things exist (in reality) and are afraid of (the doctrine of) *ajāti*.'

These people who are intent upon the reality of things around them are of a lower order and are consequently frightened when they hear of the doctrine of *ajāti* and *nairātmya* (absence of *ātman*, i.e., *svabhāva* 'nature') as taught by the Buddhas.³ The Buddhas are, however,

¹ PSP, p. 9 buddhā bhagavanta utpannāḥ, p. 79 pañcendriyāni utpatayante, p. 91 arhantaḥ samyak sambuddhā loka utpatayante, SN, IV, p. 14 yo bhikkhave cakkhusa uppādo tīṭhi abhinibbatti pātubhāvo; MIV, p. 145 uktam hi bhagavatā tīrṇimāṇa bhikkavaḥ saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni saṃskṛtasya bhikkava utpādo'pi prajāśyate vyayo'pi sthityanyathātvam apiti na ca avidyamānasya kharaviśānasyeva jātyādilakṣaṇam asti. See also AN, I, p. 162

² SN, IV, p. 33 cakkhū ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānam

³ advitīyam śivadvāram kudrstinām bhayankaram ।
viśayaḥ sarvabuddhānām itī nairātmyam ucyate ॥
asya dharmasya nāmo'pi bhayam utpadyate 'astah
balavān nāma ko drśtaḥ parasya na bhayankarah ॥

On the word *nairātmya* Candrakīrti writes here *tatrātmā nāma yo 'parīyattasvarūpaḥ svabhāvaḥ [tadabhāvo nairātmyam]* Tibetan *de med pa ni bdag med paho*

very kind-hearted and so in order to lead them easily and gradually to the truth (*tattvāvatāra*)⁴ followed the disposition of their minds and preached to them of *jāti*, though in fact there is nothing of the kind. The author himself says elsewhere (III. 15) that the creation described differently in the Upanisads with illustrations of earth, iron, sparks of fire and such other things is meant only as a means devised for making one 'descend to', i.e., realize, truth (*upāyaḥ so'vatārāya*). This act is called *avatāranasandhi* 'intention of making one descend' of the Buddha.⁵ It has found its expression in Buddhist works from which some passages are quoted here in the foot-note.⁶ L

⁴ See MV, p. 340

⁵ MS, XII 16 17 *tattvāvatāranābhīsandhiḥ śrāvakeṣu drastavyaḥ, śāsanāvatāranārtham anuttarāsāya rūpādyaśīlavadetanāt* The word *sandhi* is here in the sense of *abhisandhi*

⁶ *lokāvatāranārtham ca bhāṣā nāstheṇa deśitāḥ |
trāso nārabhyate 'dste dste 'paiti sa sarvasaḥ |
niyamenaiṣa kiñcijjete tena trāso vidhiyate |* CS, 283

C a n d r a k ; r t t : on CS, 183

*tattvāvatāra=opānabhūtātāt pravṛtityupadeśo'pi kartavyaḥ
lokāvatāropāyātīvāt sadasādācchideśanānām*

Op cit, 196

*dharmaadhātor asambhedād yānabhedo 'sti na prabho |
yānatritayam ākhyātam tvayā sattvāvatāraib |*

NSi, 21

nānavadhārjya yathārtham śūnyatām kaścic chakṣat samsāre sangam avadhūya
nirvānasprhām utpādayitum sa ca śūnyatārtho jagatām ativottarāśakaratiśād
apṛītyāvedananipunapuruseṇa rājasaḥ prīyabhārjyāmaranākramāvedana sauma-
nasyotpādanavat kayāpi yuktyā vidusāvatāryaḥ

CS, a p. 514

*astitvanāstyadṛṣṭipatitānām te'sm uttrāsah syād it uttrāyamānā mahāmate
d ūre bhavanti mahāyānāt* LA, p. 157

*etani kalyaṇa pañca bhūksuśatāni dṛṣṭipraskandhānīmām gambhīrām dharmā-
deśanām nāvataranti nāvagāhante rādhimucyanta uttrasyanti samtrasyanti
santrāsam āpadyante* KP (—*Ratnakūṭa*) in MV, pp. 337-338

As regards the different modes of teaching of the Buddhas the following couplet may be quoted :

deśanā lokanāthānāṃ sattvāśayaavaśānugā |
bhidyate bahudhā loka upāyair bahubhiḥ kila[†]

'The teachings of the Lords of the worlds (i.e., the Buddhas) following the disposition of the people differ in the world in many ways according to the diversity of methods'[‡]

That was their 'skilfulness in method (*upāyakaūśalya*) by which all discrepancies in their teachings are explained.

tatra tathāgato mahākāruniko lokatṛāṣapadaparīhārī^{*}tham vyavahāra^{*}vatsīd
uktavān utpadyante nirudhyante ca na cātra kasyacid dharmasyotpādo na
nirōdha itī BAP, p. 589

evam ukte bhagavān āyusmantam āriputram etad avocat, alāṃ āriputra
etenārthena bhāṣitena tat kasya hetoh uttrasisyati āriputrāyaṃ sadetoko
loko 'smiṇn arthe vyākriyamāne SP, II, p. 36

āha yad etad uktam bhagavatā samskṛtā dharmā utpadyante nirudhyante
cety asya tathāgatabhāṣitasya ko 'bhīrīṣyah āha utpādanirōdhābhini^{*}vataḥ
kulaputra lokasamniveśaḥ tatra tathāgato mahākāruniko loka^{*}yottī^{*}ṣapad-
parīhārī^{*}tham vyavahāra^{*}vatsīd uktavān utpadyante nirudhyante ca na cātra
kasyacid dharmasyotpādo na nirōdha itī SS, p. 263

See also MN, I 136 137, SR, pp 70-71

[†] Bodhicittatīkāraṇa (Tib version) 97 93 It is quoted in the Buddhist
section of SSD See *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp 27ff Sometimes
there is in d of the kārika punah for kila

[‡] See

kṛtā dharmeṣv avasthānam tattvam deśemi yoginām |
tattvam pratyātmagatikam k[pyakalpena varjitam |
deśemi jñaputrānam neyam bālāna deśanāḥ |
vicitrā^{*}hi yathā māyā drīyate na ca vidyate
deśanāpi tathā citā deśyate vyabhicārini
deśanā hi yad anyasya tad anyasyāpy adeśanā |
āsture āsture vadvad bhīrag dhāvam prayacchati

LA pp 48 49

See also Op cit, X. 611 613 (pp 340 341), SP, pp 44 ff, SS, pp 14-15,
MV, pp 359 360, 369 372

Now, when there is in fact no *jāti* it is certainly no good to teach it and consequently some evil would result from such teaching. The author, however, says that in reality there would arise no evil, or if it actually does, it would be very small which can easily be overcome (by following the path of the truth)

43

ajātes trasatām tesām upalambhād viyanti ye ।
jātidosā na setsyanti doṣo'py alpo bhaviṣyati ॥

'Those who (being instructed of *ajāti*) go asunder owing to the perception (of things) and are afraid of (thinking) *ajāti*, are not affected with the evils resulting from (the perception of) *jāti*, (or if there be any evil) the evil will be a small one.'

The reality of a thing cannot be proved on the evidence of mere perception and common practice. For an elephant called up by illusion (*māyāhastin*) cannot exist in fact though we all may see it moving or carrying men. Thus the author says that it is only on account of perception and common practice that it is said of a thing that it exists, but in reality it does not.

44

upalambhāt samācāraṁ māyāhastī yathocyate ।
upalambhāt samācārād asti vastu tathocyate ॥

'As an elephant called up by illusion is said to exist owing to perception and common practice so on the same grounds it is said of a thing that it exists.'

1. For *māyāhastin* see L.A. N. 1.60

māyāhastī va' k' citraṁ patrī 1 karakā 2 va' hā
tathā d' syam nāmā bhavīti c' ite mādānavāste

TSN, 27-28 :

*mayākram mantravaṣiṭ khyāti hastyātmānā yathā |
 ākāramātram tatrasāḥ haṣṭiṁśati tu sarvathā ||
 svabhāvaḥ kalpito haṣṭi paratantras tadakṛtiḥ |
 yas tatra hastyabhāvo 'sau parinirvanṇaḥ syate |*

In the next *kārikā* the author says, as a *Vijñānavādin* can say, that there is only *vijñāna* (= *citta*) 'mind', and nothing else, yet it appears variously :

45

*jātyābhāsaṃ calābhāsaṃ vastvābhāsaṃ tathaiiva ca |
 ajācalam avastutvaṃ vijñānam śāntam advayam ||*

'There is only *vijñāna* without the two (*advaya*),¹ which is quiescent (free from all sorts of disturbances), it has no origin (*aja* 'unborn'),² it does not move (*acala*), nor is it an object (*avastutva*),³ yet it appears to have an origin (*jātyābhāsa*), it appears to admit movements (*calābhāsa*), and it also appears to be an object

It is to be noted here that *vijñāna*,⁴ *citta* and *manas* are synonyms See LA X. 459.

*cittam vikalpo vijñaptir mano vijñānam eva ca |
 ālayaś tribhavaś cetā ete cittasya paryayāḥ*

¹ The word *diṣya* refers to *grāhya* and *grāhaka* 'the perceptive and the perceptible' respectively

² But truly speaking according to the Buddhist theory it cannot be described even as *aja* See IV 74

³ Literally, one that has no quality of an object

⁴ Here in the *kārikā* under discuss on the word *vijñāna* does not refer to Ātman or Brahman of the Vedāntist. The following *kārikā* 46 using *citta* which alludes to *vijñāna* in the present *kārikā* clearly bears it out. Ś takes here *vijñāna* as *vijñapti*, but in the next *kārikā* (IV 46) he interprets it in the sense of *ātman* (*evam eva yathoktam vijñānam jñeyādītatam advayam ātmatattvaṃ vijñānantah*)

Ak. II. 34:

cittaṃ mano'tha vijñānam ekārtham.

Cf. SN, II. 94.

What follows from this discussion is shown in the next *kārikā* -

46

' evam na jāyate cittaṃ¹ evaṃ dharmā ajāh smṛtāḥ |
' evam eva vijñānanto na patanti viparyaye ||²

' Thus the mind is not originated, and thus the objects³ are declared to be without origination. Those who know it in this way do not fall into error.'

¹ Cf. YV, III 13 15 evam na jāyate kīṣcit

² See IV, 58

³ Ś takes here the word to imply *ātmans*, but in IV 54 to mean external things (*bahyadharmāḥ*), and in IV 58 he writes *ātmāno nre ca dharmāḥ*

This truth is profusely illustrated in the next *kārikās* (47-52) by the simile of a fire brand (*alāta*). The author says, that as the different appearances of a fire brand in motion, such as a circle or a straight line, do not come into existence from a thing other than itself, nor do they go out to a place other than itself when it is at rest, and at the same time they do not enter into itself, even so when the mind vibrates its appearances in the form of different objects they do not come into

being from any thing other than itself, and when it does not vibrate they do not go out anywhere, nor do they enter into it:

47

ṛjuvakraḍikābhāsam alātaṃ spanditaṃ¹ yathā ।
grahaṇagrāhakābhāsaṃ vijñānam spanditaṃ tathā² ॥

'As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight, or crooked, and so on, even so the mind when it moves appears as the perceiver (i.e., subject) and the perceptible (i.e., object).'

¹ Comparing and considering all the readings in *kārikās* 47-51 in connection with the use of *viññāna* and the derivatives of the root *spand* I think in the present *kārikā* one may incline to read *alātaṃ spanditaṃ* and not *alātaspaṇḍitaṃ*, a compound word, though the former is not supported by any MS consulted by me. In either case the import of the *kārikā* is the same.

² Cf. *cittaspaṇḍitaṃ* (with the variant *cittam spandati caḥ sarvaṃ*) in IV. 72, with *viññānam spanditaṃ* (or *viññānaspaṇḍitaṃ*) in d of the present *kārikā*.

48

aspaṇḍamānam alātaṃ anābhāsam ajaṃ yathā ।
aspaṇḍamānam vijñānam anābhāsaṃ ajaṃ tathā ॥

'As a fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance (of its being straight, crooked, etc.), and is (thus) 'unborn', even so when the mind does not move it has no appearance (of any subject or object), and is (thus) 'unborn'.

For *anābhāsa* in the text cf. *arūpaḥ*, III. 36

In the text *alāta* supported by many MSS, is, according to lexicons, another form of *alata*.

49

alāte spandamane vai nābhāsā anyatobhuvah ।
na tato 'nyatra nispandān nalātam praviśanti te ॥

'The appearances in a moving fire-brand are not produced from anything other than it, and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the fire-brand), nor do they enter into it'

50

'na nīrgata alātāt te dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ ।
vijñāne 'pi tathaiva syur ābhāsasyāvīśesataḥ ।

'They (i.e., the appearances) do not go out from the fire brand, for they have no qualities of a substance (*dravya*), and with reference to the mind, too, they must be the same, for there is no difference in appearances'

It is a substance, *dravya*, that can move from one place to another, but appearances are not substances, and hence they cannot move. The second half of the *kārikā* says that as an appearance there is no difference whatsoever in the two cases, that is, the case of a fire-brand and that of the mind

1 See IV 52^{a-b}

51

vijñāne spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhuvah ।
na tato 'nyatra vijñānān na vijñānam viśanti te ।

'When the mind vibrates the appearances are not produced from anything other than it and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the mind), nor do they enter into the mind'

52

na nirgatās te vijñānād dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ ।¹
kāryakāranatābhāvād yato 'cintyāḥ sadaiva te ॥

'They do not go out from the mind, for they have no qualities of a substance, and as there is no state of cause and effect they are always unthinkable.'

All this is Buddhistic, and so are also arguments and the words as the following quotations will show :

sa mahārāja tāvān abdhātur utpadyamāno na kuṭāścid
āgacchati° niruddhyamāno na kvacid gacchati. °°

Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra quoted in ŚS, pp 247.

evam eva kulaputra tesām tathāgatānām kāyaparinīṣpattir na
kuṭāścid dafa diti lokād āgatā nāpi kvacid dafa diti loka
gacchati.° tad yathāpi nāma kulaputra vināyāḥ śabda
utpadyamāno na kuṭāścid āgacchati niruddhyamāno 'pi na kvacid
gacchati na kvacit samkrāmati °

ASP, pp 515-516.

anyato nāpi cāyātam na tiṣṭhati na gacchati |
māyātah ko videso 'sya yan mūdhaiḥ satyataḥ kṛtam ॥
māyayā nirmitaṃ yacca hetubhir yac cā nirmitam |
āyāti tat kutah kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatām ॥

BA, IX 143.144

Cf. āgacchaty anyato nāgnir indhane 'gnir na vidyate |

MK, X. 13.

atha paṇḍitu kaś ci mārgate
kuta 'yam āgatu kutra yāti vā |
vidiśo diśa sarva mārgato
nāgatir nāsyā gatiś ca labhyati ॥

quoted in MV, p 216; BAP, p 533, ŚS, p 240

utpannasyāgātir nāstī niruddhasya gatis tathā |
 evaṃ sati katham naiva bhavo māyopamo bhavet ||²

CS, 360

² This is reconstructed by the present author from the Tibetan text which runs

skyes pa la ni hon ba dan |
 de bzir hgags la tgro ba med |
 de ltar yin na ci lta bur |
 and pa sgyu ma hdra ma yin ||

It is shown (IV 14-18, 52) that there is no causation (*hetu-phalābhāva* or *kāryakāranatābhāva*) This is further explained in the following kārika

53

dravyam dravyasya hetuḥ syād anyad anyasya caiva hi |
 dravyatvam anyabhāvo vā dharmānām nopapadyate ||

'A substance can be a cause of another substance, and a thing can be the cause of a different thing only, but it is unreasonable to hold that things can have substantiality or mutual difference'

A substance must have three qualities, (i) origination (*utpāda*), (ii) change (*vyaya*), and (iii) continuance (*sthiti*) But in fact there is no such thing called substance, as the Buddhists hold See MK with MV, VII, AN, I 152 Again it is well-known that from one thing a different thing is produced, and not the same thing from the same thing, for instance, from a seed there is the sprout Thus there is a difference between a cause and its effect But in reality this difference, too, cannot be maintained See MK, X 1 and 15

yad indhanam sa ced agnir ekatvam kartṛkarmanoh |
 anyas ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy ite bhavet |
 agnindhanābhyām vyākhyāta ātmopādanayoh kramah |
 sarvo niravaśesena sārddham ghaṭapātādibhiḥ ||

The author arrives at the conclusion :

54

evaṃ na cittajā dharmāś cittaṃ vāpi na dharmajam ।
evaṃ hetuphalājātim praviśanti manīṣiṇaḥ ॥

‘Thus the things are not produced from the mind (*citta*=*viñāṇa*), nor the mind from the things. And thus the wise enter into (the doctrine of) the non-origination of cause and effect.’

Cf. IV 46.

55

yāvad dhētuphalāveśas tāvad dhētuphalodbhavaḥ ।
kṣiṇe hetuphalāveśe nāsti hetuphalodbhavaḥ ॥

‘As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect there is the origination of cause and effect, but when the strong adherence to cause and effect is lost there is no existence of cause and effect’

Here and in the next *kārikā* (56) the word *āveśa* in the text is the same as *abhiniveśa* (IV 75, 79) ‘strong adherence.’ These are synonyms (to which *graha* and *grāha*, may be added). The latter is frequently used in Buddhist works in which it is clearly shown that not only cause and effect but everything round us owes its existence to one’s strong adherence to it. The following may be cited here

tad yathāpi nēma mahārāja puruṣaḥ suptah svapnāntare
piśācena paritāpyamāno bhītaḥ sammoham āpadyate sa śayita-
vibuddhas tam piśācam tam ca moham anusmaret. tat kim
manyase mahārāja samvidyate svapne piśācaḥ sammoho vā.

yāvad evam eva mahārāja bālo 'śrutavān pṛthagjanaś cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣtvā upekṣāsthāniyaṇy abhinivīṣate 'bhinivīṣaḥ saṇ muhyati mūḍho mohajam karmābhisamskaroti.

SS, p. 254.

bālo mañjuśrīr aśrutavan pṛthagjano 'tyantaparinirvṛtān sarva-dharmān aprajānāna ātmānam param copalabhate, upalabhy [ābhinivīṣate abhinivīṣtaḥ saṇ rajyate dusyate muhyate sa rakto dustamūḍhaḥ saṇ] trividham karmābhisamskaroti.

MV, p. 296

yas tu bhāvasvarūpam adhyāropya tadvigamāvigamata etā dṛṣṭvā utpādyābhinivīṣate : tasyām abhiniveśo nirvānapuragāminam panthānam virunaddhi, samsārikeṣu ca dukkheṣu niyojayatiti vijñeyam

Op cit, p. 537

56

yāvad dhētuphalāvēśaḥ samsāras tāvad āyataḥ |
kṣīṇe hetuphalāvēśe samsāro nopapadyate ||

'As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect the world is extended, but when that strong adherence to cause and effect is lost the world is not possible'

Thus having propounded to some extent the *vijñānavāda* our author proceeds incidentally to show also with the Buddhists that neither of the two theories, *vāstataṭāda* 'the theory that everything is eternal and *ucchedatāda* the theory that everything has annihilation'¹ can be maintained

¹ These two views are specially with regard to soul and world. See, for instance, DN, I 13, 39, MK XXVII

samvṛtya¹ jayate sarvām saśvataṁ tena naśti vai |
 svabhāvena² hy ajaṁ³ sarvām ucchedas tena naśti vai ||

In the practical truth (samvṛti) everything comes into being hence there is nothing eternal (On the other hand) everything is naturally without origination hence there is no annihilation.

It says that in the practical truth we say that a thing comes into being. In that case we cannot hold so far as the practical truth is concerned that there is any eternal thing. For that which has origination cannot be eternal as an earthen jar. Again as we have seen above nothing has naturally any origination and one that has no origination can have no annihilation also.

It is a fact that a sprout comes out only if there is a seed and not otherwise. Now the sprout is neither identical with nor different from the seed. When there is a sprout the seed is not completely destroyed nor is it absolutely in the same state as before. Hence it can be said that there is neither eternality nor annihilation.

¹ See IV 73

² All MSS and editions examined by me read *sadbhāvena* for *svabhāvena* in c yet I think the latter to be the actual reading. Everywhere in similar cases the author employs *svabhāva* (III 22 IV 8 10 23 81) and not *sadbhāva*. In the same sense he uses also the word *prakṛti* (III 21 IV 9 29 91 92 93 94). If one accepts the reading *sadbhāvena* the meaning will be according to Śāṅkara's transcendental truth (*paramārthasadbhāvena paramārthasattaya*). That the reading is *svabhāvena* is supported also by IV 29 in which we read *ajātā prakṛtiḥ*.

³ b jasya sato yathāṅkuro na ca yo biḥ sa caiva āṅkuro |

— nāna gaurāṅkuraṇāṁ sato eva āṅkuroḥ saṁskṛtadharmaḥ ||
 mudrāṁ pratimudrāṁ dṛṣṭvā mudrasaṁkrāntiḥ na copalabhyate |
 na ca tatra na ca va śīḡṛato eva saṁskṛtaḥ nūchedasāṁvṛtāḥ ||

Some of the teachers hold either of these two theories, the *śāśvata*vāda 'the theory of eternality,' and *uccheda*vāda 'the theory of annihilation.' But in the teachings of the Buddhas who maintain the Middle Path (*madhyamā pratipad*), there is no room for any one of them. So his doctrine is said to be free from both the theories (*anuccheda aśāśvata*)⁴. This view of the Buddhists is too well-known to require here any particular treatment.

The Buddhists also proclaim that there are two truths (*satya*) which they call *samvṛti satya* 'practical or empirical truth' and *paramārtha satya* 'absolute or supreme or transcendental' truth, corresponding to *vyavahāranaya* and *paramārthanaya* of the Jains, and *vyāvaharika satya* and *pāramārthika satya* of Ś respectively.⁵

śūnyatā ca na cocchedaḥ saṃsāraś ca na śāśvatam |
karmaṇo vipranāśaś ca dharmo buddhena deśitah MK, XVII 20

yasmāi pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jīyate |
yasmān nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jīyate | CS, V 25

utpādaḥhaṅgarahito lokah khapupāsanibhah |
sādaśan nopalabdho 'yam prajñāyā kīryā ca te
śāśvatochedaśvarjaś ca lokah avapnasamaḥ endā | LV, X 1-2

4 anekārtham anānārtham anucchedam aśāśvatam |
etat tal lokanāsthānām buddhānām śāśvānām MK XVIII 11

For the *uccheda*vāda and *śāśvata*vāda in Brahmanical literature see Vyāsa on YS, II 15, and MB XII 222

ucchedanūthā neḥāsti bhāvanūthā na vidyate ' 6
etam satī ka ucchedaś śāśvato vā katham bhavet 5

5 dve satve samupāsītva buddhānām dharmadeśanā |
lokasamutisatvam ca satvam ca paramārthataḥ
ye naivo na vijānanti vibhāgam satveyor dvayoh '
te tattvam na vijānanti gambhīram buddhaśāśvane
vyavahāram anāśritva paramārtho na deśyate |
paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamya te MK, XXIV 8 10
dve saccāni akkhāsi sambuddho vadatam vāro |
sammutim paramattham ca tattvam nūpalabbhosi '

quoted by Buddhaghosa in the *Atthakathā* on KV, p. 30; *Samangala-*
śīlāni (DN *Peṭṭhapādasuttā*), p. 251

It may be observed here that these two truths are not specified in the Upaniṣads and I am inclined to think that Ś has accepted them in his system from the Buddhists through G a u d a p a d a.

satya ime duvi lokavidunām d sta svayam ārunitva paresm |
samvṛti yā ca tathā paramārtho satyu na vidhyati kim ca tṛtīyu ||

Pitaputresamagama quoted in BAP pp 361 362

samvṛtuh paramārthas ca satyadvayam idam matam | BA IX 2.

On the explanation of samvṛti see BAP pp 352 ff samvṛiyata kvṛiyate yathābhūtapariyāsanam avabhavavarṇanād āvṛtaprakāśanāc cīnayeti samvṛtuh. avidyā moho viparyas tu paryāyāh MV pp 492 3 samantād varṇam samvṛtuh ajānam hi samantat sarvapadarthatattvacchādanāt samvṛtuh ity ucyate * atha vā samvṛtuh samketo lokavyavahāra ityarthah sa cabhidhānābhi dheyajānanajneyādilakṣanah loke samvṛtiḥ lokasamvṛtuh See MA, VI 28

mohah avabhāvāvaranād dhi samvṛtuh
satyam tayā khyāti yad eva kṛtrimaṃ |
jagāda tat samvṛtisatyam ity asu
munih padārtham kṛtakam ca samvṛtiṃ ||

quoted in BAP, p 353

58

dharma ya iti jayante samvṛtya te na tātvatah |¹
janma mayopamam tesam sā ca maya na vidyate ||

The things which are said as generated are so in the empirical truth and not in fact Their generation is like illusion, and that illusion too does not exist

The phrase generation is like illusion may be explained saying that generation is like illusion but itself is not illusion The true sense is however not so It says that generation is

identical with illusion, there being no difference whatsoever between them (*advayam advaidhikāram*).²

As regards the non-existence of illusion see

yāvat pratyayasāmagrī tāvan māyāpi vartate |
BC, IX, 10.

See also 27, 28.

² See ASP, pp 39-40 : kim punar ārya subhūte māyopamās te sattvā na te māyā. subhūth* avocat. mājopamās te* sattvā itī mājā ca sattvā cādvayam etad advaidhikāram itī

According to this Mādhyamika theory even the Buddha and *nirvāṇa*, and, if there is anything higher than *nirvāṇa*, that, too, are illusion. i.e. those things and illusion are one and the same thing

59

yathā māyāmayād bijā jāyate tanmayo 'ṅkurah |
nāsau nityo na cocchedi tadvad dharmesu yojanā ||

' From an illusive seed comes forth an illusive sprout, and that (sprout) is neither eternal nor is attended with destruction
The same applies to all things '

Cf yathā hi kṛtakād bijā jāyate tanmayo 'ṅkurah |
CS X. 28.'

³ This is the reconstructed text from the Tibetan which runs
ji las sa bon byas pa las
myu gu byas pa skye tguur ba

60

nājesu sarvadharmesu śasvatāśśīvatābhīdā |
yatra varṇā na vartante vivekas tatra nocyate ||

' When all things are without generation, there is no room for the appellations 'eternal' and 'non-eternal'; for where words fail discrimination cannot be expressed '

The following may be cited here :

yasmāt pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jāyate |
yasmān nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyate||

CS, XI, 25.

Now the Ācārya takes up again the *vijñānavāda* of the Buddhists showing that there is nothing but the *citta* which is the same as *vijñāna* or *manas* 'mind' that is transformed into the external world. And in doing so he shows that there is no difference whatsoever between the experiences in the waking state and those in dream, as has already been shown (II. 1-10) :

61

yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṃ cittam calati māyayā |
tathā jāgrat dvayābhāsaṃ cittam calati māyayā ||¹

' As owing to illusion the mind in dream moves with the appearance of the two (i.e., the subject and the object, or, in other words, the percipient and the perceived)², even so owing to illusion the mind in waking condition³ moves with the appearance of the two.'

¹ This as well as the next kēṅkē is the same as III 29 and 30 respectively with a few variants

² See IV. 72 grāhyagrāhakaśabd dvayam, IV 75, 6 on III 29, 30; grāhyagrāhakarūpeṇa dvayābhāsam. In Buddhist works in such cases the word *dvaya* is frequently used in the same meaning. For instance, *advayārthena paśyati*, MS, XIV. 32, *dvayagrāhavisamyuktaṃ grāhyagrāhagrāhaka-grāhavisamyogāt, advayārthenāti* *agrāhyagrāhaka-grāhena*, *Ibid*, p. 94. See II, 14, III 29, 30; IV. 62, 72, 75, 87

³ The word *jāgrat* is to be taken here in the locative case. See IV. 39, note and 62.⁴

62

advayaṃ ca dvayābhāsaṃ cittam svapne na saṃśayaḥ ।
advayaṃ ca dvayābhāsaṃ cittam jāgran na saṃśayaḥ ॥

‘ There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without the two has the appearance of the two, even so there is no doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without the two has the appearance of the two.’¹

See III 30.

¹ See IV. 61, notes.

63, 64

svapnadīk pracaran svapne dīkṣu vai daśasu sthitān ।
andañān svedañān vāpi jīvān paśyati yān sadā ॥

svapnadīkcittadrīyās te na vidyante tataḥ prthak ।
tathā taddrīyam¹ evedaṃ svapnadīkcittam iṣyate ॥²

‘ The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture, which a dreamer moving in dream sees at any time in any of the ten directions, are visible (only) to the mind of the dreamer, and do not exist apart from it (i e , mind), and this which is visible only to it (i e , the mind) is to be accepted (*lit* wished) as the mind of the dreamer

¹ See IV 77

² See IV. 65, 66.

65, 66

caraṇ jāgarite jāgrad dikṣu vai daśasu sthitān |
 aṇḍajān svedajān vāpi jīvān paśyati yān sadā ||

jāgraccittekṣaṇīyās te na vidyante tataḥ pṛthak |
 tathā taddīṣyam evedaṃ jāgrataś cittaṃ iṣyate ||¹

'The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture, which a waking one moving about in the state of wakefulness sees at any time in any of the ten directions, are visible (only) by the mind of the waking one and do not exist apart from it (i.e., the mind of the waking one); and this which is visible only to it (i.e., the mind of the waking one) is to be accepted as the mind of the waking one.'

In these four kārīkās (IV 63-66) it is said that whatever one sees in the waking state is nothing but one's *citta* 'mind', just as the things in one's dream. This view has repeatedly been expressed among others in LA, and specially in its Chapter X where the Buddha is reported to have said again and again that all the phenomena are *citta* (X. 483, 484, 692) ; *cittamātram vadāmy aham* 'I say (all this is) only *citta*'²

The word *cittadrīya* here (IV 64) and elsewhere (IV 28, 36, 77) of which the equivalent is *cittekṣaṇīya* (IV. 66) is found in frequent use in LA, pp. 56 (four times), 79, 84 (twice), 93, 94, 186 (twice), 338 (twice), etc

¹ See IV. 63, 64.

² See also X 101.

67

ubhe hy anyonyadīśye te kiṃ tad astīti cocyate ।
lakṣaṇāśūnyam ubhayaṃ tanmatenaiva gṛhyate ॥

‘You say that the cognition of both of them is dependent on each other, but you do not say what remains then Both of them have no characteristics, yet they are cognized owing to their (previous) thought.’

In the text *ubha* and *ubhaya* refer to ‘mind’ (*citta*) and *jīvās* or objects in general referred to in the preceding *kārikās*. There cognition depends on each other ; for no object is perceived without the thought of the object, nor is the thought of an object possible without the existence of the object¹. So they are interdependent in this respect. Owing to this interdependence neither of them is established as a real thing, and as such they have no characteristics and yet they are cognized owing to our previously existing thoughts of them.

The following may be quoted on this point

atītam subhūte cittam nopalabhyate anāgatam cittam
nopalabhyate pratyutpannam cittam nopalabhyate VC, 39.

uktaṃ ca lokanāthena cittam cittam na paśyati ।
na cchinatti yathātmānam asidhārā tathā manah ॥

BA, IX, J7-18.

sa cittam gavesayamāno nādhātmanam cittam samanupaśyati
na bahirdhā cittam samanupaśyati na skandheṣu cittam
samanupaśyati na dhātusu cittam samanupaśyati nāyataneṣu
cittam samanupaśyati sa cittam asamanupaśyaṃś cittadhārām
paryesate kutaś cittyotpattir itī ālambane satī cittam
utpadyate tat kiṃ anyat cittam anyad ālambanam atha yad

¹ Ś writes na hi ghatamatim pratyākhyāya ghaṭo gṛhyate nāpi ghatam
pratyākhyāya ghaṭamatih tanmatenaiva taccittatayaiva

evāmbanāṃ tad eva cittaṃ. yadi tāvad anyad āmbanāṃ anyac
cittaṃ tad dvicittatā bhaviṣyati. atha yad evāmbanāṃ tad eva
cittaṃ. tat kathaṃ cittaṃ cittaṃ paśyati. na hi cittaṃ cittaṃ
samanupaśyati. tad yathā no tayevāsiddhārayā saivasiddhārā
śakyate chettum. na tenaivāṅgulyagrena tad evāṅgulyagraṃ
spraṣṭum śakyate. evam eva tenaiva cittaṃ tad eva cittaṃ
draṣṭum iti vistaraḥ.

Āryaratnacūḍasūtra quoted in BAP, pp. 392-393 ;

MV, pp. 62-63 ; ŚS, p. 235.

For *lakṣaṇāsūnya* which is the same as *lakṣana*° in meaning
see the following :

yad dhi cittaṃ mahāmate na nityaṃ nānityaṃ na kāryaṃ na
kāraṇaṃ na saṃskṛtaṃ nāsaṃskṛtaṃ° na lakṣyaṃ na lakṣaṇaṃ°
tad vānmātraṃ° tad anutpannaṃ yad anutpannaṃ tad
aniruddhaṃ° ākāśasamam°. tatredam ucyate

pramānendriyanirmuktaṃ na kāryam nāpi kāraṇam |
buddhiboddhavyarahitaṃ lakṣyalakṣanavarjitaṃ ||

LA, pp. 189-190

tasmān na vidyate lakṣyaṃ lakṣanaṃ naiva vidyate |
lakṣyalakṣaṇanirmukto bhāvo 'pi naiva vidyate |

• MK, V 5.

upāyadeśanā mahyaṃ nāhaṃ deśemi lakṣanaṃ |
bālā gṛhṇanti bhāvena lakṣanaṃ lakṣyam eva ca ||

LA, X 21.

lakṣyalakṣanavarjitaṃ.

Op cit, X-224.

68-70

yathā svapnamayo jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca |
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ||

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yathā māyāmayo jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca |
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ||

yathā nirmītakō jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca |
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ||

'As a creature formed of dream, or made of illusion or supernatural power (*nirmītaḥ*) takes birth and dies, even so all those creatures exist and do not exist'

The word *nirmīta* or *nirmītaḥ* in the above sense is frequently used mainly in Buddhist works. Among many others the following may be quoted here :

nirmītopamāḥ pratibimbopamāḥ saivadharmāḥ jñātavyāḥ.
SR, p. 27.

acintiyān nirmīta nirmīnotyā-
deśeti dharmam bahu prānakotīnam |

Ibid, p. 23.

yathā nirmītakam śāstā nirmīmitardhīśampadā |
nirmīto nirmīmitānyam sa ca nirmītakah punah ||²
tathā nirmītakākārah kartā yat karma tat kṛtam |
tad yathā nirmītenānyo nirmīto nirmītas tathā ||

MK, XVII. 31-32.

ekasmim bhāsamānasmim sabbe bhāsanti nirmītā |
ekasmim tuñhim āsīne sabbe tuñhī bhavanti ca ||

DN, II. 212.

¹ Ś says nirmītakō : mantrasadhyādibhir abhinipāditah 'created by incantation, herb', etc'

² Cf *Sānyatāsaptaḥ* as quoted by Poussein in a note on MV, p. 330.

The following is the Sanskrit version :

ekasya bhāsamānasya sarve bhāṣanti nirmīṭāḥ |
ekasya tūṣṭimbhūtasya sarve tūṣṭīm bhavanti ca ||

Quoted as in *Āgama* in MV, p. 331; DA, p. 166;
AKV,¹ p. 27.

See *Āryaratnakūṭasūtra* quoted in MV, pp. 336 ff.;
Āryagaganagañjaśūtra quoted in ŚS, p. 270; BA, V. 57. Cf.
the *nirmāṇakāya* of a Buddha. Poussin: *The Three Bodies*
of a Buddha, JRAS, 1906, (Oct.); JA, 1913, pp. 581 ff;
ERE, Vol. 9, pp. 852-853.

The use of such words as *nirmāṇa*, *nirmāṇakāya*, and
nirmāṇacitta occurs also in the Yoga system (YS, IV. 4, 5 with
scholiasts).

The use of the word *nirmāṇa* in almost the same sense
can, however, be traced back to Upaniṣadic texts

sa yatra prasvapīty asya lokasya sarvāvato mātṛām upādāya
svayaṃ vihatya svayaṃ nirmāya^o prasvapīti. BU, IV. 3, 9.

ya eṣa supteṣu jāgartī kāmāṃ kāmāṃ puruṣo nirmīmāṇah |
KU, V. 8.

It appears, however, that it is the Buddhists who first used
the word in that definite sense.

Now having thus established his thesis the author asserts
his conclusion in the following *kārikā*, which is already found
once more (III. 48) :

71

na kaścij jāyate jivaḥ² sambhavo 'sya na vidyate |
etat tad uttamaṃ satyaṃ² yatra kiñcin na jāyate ||

¹ Cf. SR quoted in MV, p. 109 na hi kaści jāyati na ca mriyate.

² For the wording cf. etat tu paramaṃ satyaṃ, MV, p. 120.

'No Jiva of any kind takes birth, nor is there any possibility of it. It is that highest truth in which nothing originates.'

See III. 48.

Now it is affirmed in the next *kārikā* that the world consisting of the subject and the object has no reality at all, it being the creation of the movement of mind which in fact has no object at all, and as such it is held to be always free from any sort of attachment or relationship to an object (*asaṅga*) :

72

cittaspaṇḍitam evedaṃ grāhyagrāhakavad dvayaṃ |
cittam nirviṣayaṃ nityaṃ asaṅgaṃ tena kīrtitaṃ ||

'This duality which consists of the subject and the object (lit the perceiver and the perceptible) is only the vibration of the *citta* 'mind' *citta* has no object, therefore it is said to be always *asaṅga* 'having no attachment (or relation to an object)'

See IV. 79 (*nirṣaṅga*). Cf *anābhāsa* (= *nirābhāsa*), III 46; IV, 48

As regards *asaṅga* see LA, p 157 : *asaṅgalakṣaṇam jñānaṃ viśayaavacitryasaṅgalakṣaṇam vijñānaṃ*°, *asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇam jñānaṃ*°, *aprāptilakṣaṇam jñānaṃ*.

The following lines also from the LA may be cited here :

cittamātraṃ idaṃ sarvaṃ dvīdḥā cittam pravartate |
grāhyagrāhakabhāvena ātmātmīyam na vidyate ||
brahmādisthāna(²)paryantaṃ cittamātraṃ vadāmy ahaṃ |
cittamātravīnirmuktaṃ brahmaṇir nopalabhyate ||

* * cittamatram na dīśyo'sti dvidha cittam hi dīśyate |
grahyagrahakabhavena saivatocchedavarjitam ||

III 65

grahyagrahakabhavena cittam namati dehīnam |
dīśyasya lakṣaṇam naśti yatha balair vikalpyate ||

X 58 -

taranga hy udadher yadvat pavanapratyeritah |
nṛty amanah pravartante vyucchedas ca na vidyate ||

alayaughas tatha nityam vīśayapavanentah |
citrais tarangaviṣṇanair nṛtyamanah pravartate ||

II 99 100 X 56 57

* C/ (i) spandaśpandasvabhavam hi cinmatram iha vidyate |
khe vata iva tat spandat sollāsam santam anyatha ||
cittvam (?) cittam bhavitam sat spanda ity ucyate budhaiḥ |
dīśyatvabhavitam caitatā aspandanam iti śmṛitam ||
spandat sphurati citsargo nihspandad brahma śasvatam |
jivakāraṇakarmadya citspandasvabhīdha śmṛita ||

* YV III 67 68

(ii) svabhavad vyatiriktaṁ tu na cittasyaśti cetanam |
spandad īte yatha vayoṛ antah kim nama cetyate ||

* Op cit III 66 16

Having shown that the duality consisting of the subject and the object is the creation of mind the author says in the next karika that its existence is only in empirical (*samvrti*) and not in absolute (*paramārtha*) truth. For a thing which is

varaṇāt) and it is regarded as truth because it brings to light what is covered (*āvṛtaprakāśanāt*) See IV. 57, and BAP on IX. 2 (p 352). The following may be quoted here from MA, VI. 23 as cited in BAP, p 361.

samyagmṛśādarśanalabdhabhāvaṃ
rūpadvayam bibhṛatī sarvabhāvaḥ |
samyagdṛśām yo vīṣayah sa tattvam
mṛśādṛśām samvṛtisatyam uktam |.

Now as regards *paratantra* 'dependent' it has a special significance as evident from Buddhist sources. In Buddhism there are three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) or natures (*svabhāva*) of a thing, viz., (i) *parikalpita* 'imagined', (ii) *paratantra* 'dependent', and (iii) *pariniṣpanna* 'perfect'.¹ Sometimes they are briefly called (i) *kalpita*, (ii) *tantra*, and (iii) *niṣpanna* respectively.² Any object, for instance, an elephant, according to Mādhyamikas or Yogācāras is *sūnya* or merely a creation of mind, yet we know it as a particular object. This characteristic of it is an imagined one (*parikalpita*). Now the notion or imagination of the object depends for its being on its cause (or cause and conditions, *hetu-pratyaya*), and so the characteristic is called *paratantra* (= *pratītyasamutpanna*). That the object is in fact always devoid of the imagined characteristics referred to above is *pariniṣpanna*. It is so also because there

¹ MVt, LXXXVII; Tk, 39, TSN, 1

kalpitah paratantraś ca pariniṣpanna eva ca |
trayaḥ svabhāvā dhīrānām gambhīraḥśreyam یشیate .

MVST, I 6

kalpitah paratantraś ca pariniṣpanna eva ca |

² LA, X 374

buddhyā vivecyamānam hi na tantram nāpi kalpitam |
niṣpanno nāsti va bhāvaḥ katham buddhyā prakalpyate ||

is perfect invariation or because it is free from any change.³ They are called 'nature' (*svabhāva*); owing to such practice of the people though in fact they do not exist.⁴ V a s u b a n d h u gives here an example in his TSN, 27, 28: Suppose one creates an elephant by dint of one's spell. There the elephant appears, but there is only the form of the elephant, and in no way the elephant itself. Here the elephant is *pañkālpa*, the form of the elephant is *paratantra*, and the absence of the elephant is *pariniṣpanna*.⁵

Of these three *lakṣaṇas* or *svabhāvas*⁶ the first, *pañkālpa*, may roughly be compared in the system of the Advaita Vedānta of Ś

³ Tk. 40. *avikārapariniṣpattyā sa pariniṣpannaḥ* , MVBT, p. 19. ⁴ *asyā-samskrutatvān nirvikāratvena pariniṣpannatvāt*

⁵ Writes S t h i r a m a t i in MVBT, p. 19 *sa punar dravyato 'sann epi vyavahāro 'stīti svabhāva ucyate*

⁶ *māyākṛtam mantravaśāt khyāti hastyātmanā yathā |
ākāramātram tatṛstī hastyāstī tu sarvathā ||
svabhāvaḥ kalpito hastyā paratantras tadākṛtiḥ |
yas tatra hastyabhāvo 'sau pariniṣpanna nyate |*

Ā MSA, XI, 19

tadākṛtiś ce tatṛstī tadbhāvaś ce na vidyate |

⁷ For easy reference the following may be quoted here

Tk p. 39

*yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate |
pañkālpa evāsu svabhāvo na sa vidyate "* 20

(This is based on LA, p. 163 *yat punar uktam bhagavatī yena yena vikalpena ye ye bhāvē vikalpyante na hi sa teṣāṃ svabhāvo bhavati pañkālpa evāsu*)

S t h i r a m a t i *adhyātmikatābhyavikalpyavastubhōdena vikalpānām śnāntyam pradarśayann āha yena yena vikalpeneti yad yad vastu vikalpyate* * *adhyātmikam bāhyam īntasō 'ēvad buddhadharmā api pañkālpa evāsu svabhāva ity ātra kāraṇam āha na sa vidyate* in *yad vastu vikalpyasayas tad yasmāḥ satvābhāvaś ce na vidyate* *tasmiṃ tad vastu pañkālpatasvabhāvam eva na hetupratyayapratibaddha svabhāvam* * *pañkālpiśnāntaram paratantrasvabhāvo vaktavya ity āta āha paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpah pratyayodbhavaḥ |*

with *prātibhāsiḥ satya* 'the truth that exists only in appearance'; as for example, mirage, or the appearance of a snake on a piece of string; *paratantra* with *vyāvahāriḥ satya* 'the practical truth' (this is called by the Buddhists *sāmuṣṭa* 'pertaining to samuṣṭi' or *vyalahāra satya*), the phenomena in the waking state are its examples, and *pariniṣpanna* with *pāramārthiḥ satya* 'supreme or transcendental truth', e.g. Brahman of the Vedāntins⁷

Sthiramati atra *vikalpa* itī *paratantrasvabhāva*m āha *pratyodbhava* ity *anena*pi *paratantrābhidhāna*ḥ *avritinimittam* āha " *parat* he'tupratyayaḥ *tantryate utpādyate* itī *paratantra* ity *arīhah* (As the sense, requires the order of the last four words is slightly changed See MVBT, p 19 *grāhyam grāhakam ca svabhāvasūnyatvād abhūtam apy astīti parikalpyata* itī *parikalpita* ity *ucyate* sa *purā* *dravyato* 'ann *api vyavahāratō* 'stīti *svabhāva* *ucyate* *paratantra*ḥ *paravato* *hetupratyaya* *pratibaddhajanmakatvāt* p 20 *parat* *hetupratyaya*ḥ *tantryate janyate na tu* *svayam bhavati* *paratantra*ḥ) *svato* *nyahetupratyayapratibaddhā* *tmalābha* ity *uktam bhavati* *uktah paratantra*ḥ *pariniṣpannah* *katham* ity *ata* āha

niṣpannas tasya pūrvēna sadā rahitatā tu yā ' 21

(MVBT, p 19

kalpitena svabhāvena tasya yātyantaśūnyatā |
*svabhāva*ḥ *pariniṣpanno* *vikalpajāṇagocarah*

Vasubandhu says on the point, Op cit p 20 *grāhyagrāhaka* *bhāva*ḥ *pariniṣpannah* in TSN, 3 *sadā rahitatā* of Tk 21 and *atyantaśūnyatā* of MVBT referred to above are expressed by *sadā vidyamānatā* :

Sthiramati *avikārapariniṣpatti*ḥ sa *pariniṣpannah* *ta* *syetī* *paratantra*ḥ *pūrvē* *etī* *parikalpitena* *ta* *min* *vikalpe* *grāhyagrāhaka* *bhāva*ḥ *parikalpī*ḥ *tat* *ḥ* *ta* *min* *vikalpe* *grāhyagrāhaka* *tva*m *avidyamānam* *eva* *parikalpyata* itī *parikalpitam* *ucyate* *tera* *grāhyagrāhaka*ḥ *paratantra*ḥ *sadā sarvakālam* *atvanta* *rahitatā yā* *sā* *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*ḥ

According to Buddhists *nirodha* *nirzra*, and *ākāśa* are the examples of *pariniṣpanna*

⁷ For a detailed discussion and bibliography and sources, ancient and modern, see ViS, pp 514-561 TSN LA, pp 126-127, 169, 170-176, etc ; VSA VI I, XI 13, 38-41 XIX, 51-78, 79 SNS VI

It is to be noted that *saṃvṛti* consists in *parikalpita* and *paratantra* *svabhāvas* and *paramārtha* in *pariniṣpanna*. Thus it is rightly said in the *kārikā* 73 that *paratantra* can exist only in practical truth (*saṃvṛti*) and not in any way in absolute truth. This is fully explained by *Prājñākaramati* (in his BAP, pp 354-355) saying that whatever comes into existence (*jāyate*) does so being dependent on the entirety of the cause and conditions (*hetupratyayasāmāgrī*), and that which is thus dependent for its existence has no existence in reality, like a shadow on a looking glass. Let the following be quoted here :

api tu hetupratyayasāmāgrim pratītya māyāvad utpadyate. tadvaikalpyato nirudhyate ca hetupratyayasāmāgrim pratītya jātasya parāyattātmalābhasya pratibimbasyeva kutah satvabhāvatā. na ca kasyacid padarthatya paramārthato hetupratyayasāmāgritah samutpattiḥ sambhavati.

Let us quote also the following few lines

*māyayā nirmitam yac ca hetubhir yac ca nirmitam |
āyāti tat kutah kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatām
yad anyasannidhānena dṛṣṭam na tadabhāvataḥ |
pratibimbasame tasmān kṛtame satyata kutah*

BA IX 144, 145.

*yaḥ pratyayair jāyati sa hy ajāto
na tasya utpādu sabbhāvato'sti |
yaḥ pratyayādhiṇu sa śūnya ukto
yaḥ śūnyatām janati so 'pramattaḥ*

Anvavagaptahradōpasamkramanasūtra
quoted in BAP, 100 cit and MV, p 239

The subject under discussion is that nothing originates (*etat tad uttamam satyam yatra kiñcin na jāyate*, III. 48, IV 71). It has been shown in establishing it that the notion of origination is only in empirical reality and not in absolute reality in which we cannot assert the existence of even a thing that is without origination. The author now says in the next *kārikā*

that the notion of origination is due to a strong adherence (*abhīniveśa*) to the unreal (*abhūta*) referring hereby to the two (*dvaya*), i.e., the percipient and the perceptible (*grāhya* and *grahaka*).

75

abhūtābhīniveśo 'sti dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate |

dvayābhāvam sa buddhvaiva nīnimitto na jāyate ||

'There is a strong adherence to what has not been (*abhūta*¹), for the two² are not there — Just when he understands the non-existence of the two it goes beyond the range of its cause and does not come into being'.

The cause of origination is *abhūtābhīniveśa*. When one clearly understands the true nature of the two which have no existence at all that *abhīniveśa* goes away and consequently the notion of origination does not arise.

Ś explains the word *he* (*sah*) in the original (c) in the following way: *dvayābhāvam buddhvā nīnimitto nivṛttamithyēdvayābhīniveśo yah sa na jāyate*—'He who having understood the absence of the two is beyond the cause and (thus) whose strong adherence to the two which are false has turned back, is not born'.

This explanation does not appear to be proper when one reads the *kārikā* under discussion with the *kārikā* IV 79, where the same phrase *dvayābhāvan sa buddhvaiva*, 75) occurs once more with a slight variation *vastvabhāvam* for *dvayābhāvam*, there being no difference of meaning (*vastvabhāva* = *dvayābhāva*—Ś). Let the *kārikā* be quoted here:

abhūtābhīniveśād ūhi sadrśe tat pravartate |

vastvabhāvam sa buddhvaiva nīhsangam vinivartate |

¹ That is, 'unreal,' referring to the two (*dvaya*) that follows.

² The percipient and the perceptible (*grāhya* & *grāhaka*), see IV 72.

³ See IV 79.

a woman (it) pains a gambler' (RV, X. 34. 11). Similar uses are found also in the Brāhmanas. The following is from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* : *te paśava o'adhīr jagdhvā apah pitvā tata eṣa rasah sam bhavati* 'the beasts having eaten the plants and drunk water—then the vital sap arises.'

Following this the line under discussion (IV 79) would be explained by a grammarian thus *sa* (*yadā*) *vastvabhāvam buddhvaiva* (*bhavati tadā*) *tan nihsargam vinivartate*,—'just when he understands the absence of things it (mind) turns back being free from relation' Now in the *kārikā* (79) the word *sa(h)* must refer to one (understood) whose *abhūtābhīniveśa* is stated

In the same way, I think, the *kārikā* 75, too, should be explained. It is the *abhūtābhīniveśa* itself and not the person whose *abhūtābhīniveśa* is alluded to, that does not arise (*jāgale*).⁶

Naturally one has a persistent belief in the *abhūta* or unreal things, i.e., the percipient and the perceptible which have, in fact, no existence at all. So when one clearly understands their non-existence there is no room for that persistent belief to come into being.

Now, as regards *abhūtābhīniveśa* compare *abhūtaparikalpa* of the Buddhists. We read the following in the LA, pp 149-150

abhūtaparikalpa. 'bhūtaparikalpa itī bhagavaṇn ucyate. katamasyaitad bhagavaṇ dharmasyādhivacanam yad utābhūta-parikalpa itī kim vā prativikalpayann abhūtaparikalpo bhavati bhagavaṇ āha sādhu sādhu mahāmate' nām grāhyagrāhakābhīniveśābhīnivistānām ca bahyavacitārthopalambhābhīniveśāc cittacittakalāpo vikalpasamsambditaḥ pravartamānaḥ pravartata ātmātmyābhīniveśāt

⁶ Or one may take here *nirnimitta na jāgale* with reference to *yo sti kālpaḥ** (IV 73) and it may be explained saying that which is or originates in the empirical truth does not do so when one has no notion of the two (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*) there being no cause (*nirnimitta*) for origination.

The *abhūtabhūniveśa* in our work (IV, 75, 79) is, in fact, *abhūta-parīkṣa* of the *Yogācāras*. See the following line in the *Madhyāntavibhanga* (I, 2^{a-b}) of *Maitreya-nātha*:

abhūtaparīkalpo 'sti dvayam tatra na vidyate }¹

From this it is perfectly clear that the first half of our *kārikā* under discussion is in reality taken from *Maitreya-nātha*.

The word *nimitta* in *nirnimitta* 'devoid of *nimitta*' has a special sense in *Buddhist literature*. There is a very common phrase: *na nimittagrāhī bhavati*, Pali °*ggāhī hoti*, DS₂, §§ 1345-6. It means that when a *nimitta* 'specific appearance'² of a thing is grasped in the way such as a male, a female, pleasant, etc., a man is entangled in various worldly troubles, and so it is advised that he should not be a *nimittagrāhin* 'grasper of *nimittas*'. As the specific appearances are the causes of attachment, aversion, and delusion (*rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *moha*) they are called *nimittas*.³ See AS, p. 400

This special meaning seems not to have been intended in the present case. We may take the word here as well as in IV, 77 and 78 in the sense of 'objective cause' which is expressed by the word *artha* in IV, 24.

Having said as to how that persistent belief disappears, the author proceeds to discuss in the following *kārikās* how the non-origination (*anutpatti*) of mind is effected which is to be realized

¹ MVBT, pp 9 ff. On b of the *kārikā* *Śhīrāmāṭi* writes *avāmany avidyamānena grāhyagrāhakākāreṇa prakhyāte [na vyaktam bhrāntirūpatvam]*

² AKV as quoted in DS, p. 41 *nimittam vastuno 'vaasthāviśeso nīlatvādiḥ*, Tr., p. 21, l. 3 *nimittam tad-* (referring to *viśaya*) *viśeso nīlapitādyāślambana-vyavasthākaraṇam*. See AS, pp. 291, 308

³ AS, p. 400 *itthipūṣanīmīttam vā subhānīmīttādikam vā kilesavatthubhūtam nīmīttam*

76

yadā na labhate hetūn uttamādhamamadhyamān |
tadā na jāyate cittam hetvabhāve phalaṃ kutah |

'When the mind does not have any cause, superior, inferior, or middle, it does not originate, for how is there the effect in the absence of the cause?'

Here *hetu* is nothing but *nimitta* in the preceding *kārikā*
See IV. 77-78

77

animitasya cittasya yānutpattiḥ samādvayā |
ajātasyaiva sarvasya cittadrīyam hi tad yataḥ |

This *kārikā* seems to have been handed down defectively. For, evidently in the first half the sentence is not complete, as the conjunctive pronoun *yad* (in feminine *yā*) requires the pronoun *tad* in feminine (in any case-ending), but it is not to be found in either of the two halves. Nor is there the antecedent of *tad* in the second half which clearly shows to have supported something stated before. But what is it? The explanation of 'Ś appears to be far-fetched and far from satisfactory nor has he explained the word *tad* which has altogether been overlooked. It seems to me, therefore, that the above two lines are taken by mistake from two different *kārikās* of which the other two lines are lost. I leave the present *kārikā*, as it is before us, untranslated, as it does not give any complete sense so far as I can understand. The first half may, however, be explained thus

The non origination *anutpatti*, of the causeless (*animitta*)¹ mind (*citta*) is the same *sama*, i.e. unconditioned—always in the same condition) and free from the two *advaya*, i.e.,

free from the notion of the *grāhya* 'receptible', and the *grāhaka* 'recipient')

See *kārikā* IV 80. For the word *sama* or *sāmya* see III. 2, 38; IV 80, 93, 95, 100 with the author's explanation; and MuU, III. 1. 3. cf. BG, V. 19: *nirdosaṃ hi samam brahma* See MV, pp. 374-75: *mañjuśrīr āha. paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānutpāda-samatayā paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānyantā-jātīsamatayā paramārthataḥ samāḥ sarvadharmāḥ*

For *cittadṛṣya* in the second half see III 31, IV. 28, 36.

78

buddhvā 'nimittatāṃ satyaṃ hetuṃ pṛthag anāpnuvāt' 1
vitaśokaṃ tadā 'kāmaṃ abhayaṃ padam aśnute 2

'When one understands its² true state of causelessness³ it (*citta*) does not have any other cause,⁴ and as such reaches then a position⁵ which is free from sorrow, desire, and fear'

I read with MS D² *anāpnuvat* for *anāpnuvan* in editions and other MSS., construing it with *citta* referred to in the preceding *kārikā* (77). It is to be noted that it is *citta* that is referred to in *kārikās* IV 76-80. In *kārikā* 79 the pronoun *tad* refers to *citta*, as says Ś, too, expressly. One may naturally expect to have its mention or reference also in the present *kārikā*. To introduce a person who reaches the position is rather abrupt. It is also to be considered that it is *citta* and not the person that is concerned with the cause or causes (IV 76)

In this case the grammatical difficulty is to be removed as in IV. 75

¹ See the Varian's

² That is, of the *citta* 'mind'. See IV 25, 26, 27, 75, 77

³ That is, the state of being without the objective cause

⁴ See IV. 76.

⁵ *pada*=*sthiti*, IV 80

Accepting the reading *anāpnuvan* the *kārikā* may be translated thus :

‘Having understood the true state of the causelessness and having no other cause one reaches then a position free from sorrow, desire and fear.’

79

abhūtābhiniveśād dhi sadṛśe tat pravartate ।

vastvabhāvam sa buddhvaiva nihsangam vinivartate ॥

‘Owing to a persistent belief in what is non-existent it goes onwards to a similar object, but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it turns back being free from relativity’

The word *sadṛśa* means what is thought to be similar to one in which one has strong or persistent belief *nihsanga* means one beyond the reach of any connection with the object.

For c one is referred to IV 75 See III 45, IV. 72, 75, 96, 99

80

nivṛttasyāpravṛttasya niścalā hi tadā sthitiḥ ।

viśayah sa hi, buddhānāṃ tat sām्यam ajam advayam ॥

‘At that time when ‘(the *citta*) has turned back from and does not go (again) onwards to (its object), its position is firm (i.e., unwavering in the least). That is the field of activity of the Buddhas.’ and that is the same,² unborn, and free from the two ‘’

¹ Cf III 34 *pracārah sa tu vijñeyah*

² See III 2, 38 See also Vch, p 41 ‘*api tu khalu punaḥ subhūte samah sa dharmo na tatra kascid viśayah tenocyate nuttarasamyaksambodhiḥ nirāmatvena nihsattvatvena nirjivatvena nirpudgalatvena samā śānuttarā samyaksambodhiḥ*

³ The perceptible and the percipient (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*).

In *c viśaya* may be taken in the sense of the object of knowledge.

See III. 46 and IV. 77 from which it will be evident that this state is the *summum bonum* of both the Buddhists and the Vedāntists, which they call *nirodha* or *nirvāṇa* and *brahman* respectively. The Vedāntist commentator, Ś, writes here very clearly that this state of mind is *brahman*

cittasya nīcalā calanavarjitā brahmasvarūpaiva tadā sthītīr yañā brahmasvarūpā sthītīś cittasyādvayavijñānaikarasaghana-lakṣanā.

And again on IV. 77 he says

animittasya cittasyeti yā moksākhyānutpattiḥ ⁴

That this state of *citta* is the field of activity of the Buddhas is clearly said in Buddhist works.

*cittamātram nirābhāsam vihāro buddhabhūmi ca |
etaḍ dhī bhāṣitam buddhair bhāṣante bhāṣayanti ca ||*

LA, X 105.

*arthābhāse ca vijñāne jñānam tathatāgocaram |
parāvṛttam nirābhāsam āryānām gocaro hy asau ||*

Op. Cit , X 148

This state is the same as what we know from such lines as the following from Buddhist works *vijñaptimātratāyām cittam avasthitam bhavati* Tk , p 43

For the wording of *c (viśayah sa hī buddhānām)* see CŚ, p 497 *viśayah sa hī buddhānām*, Vk. p 6 *yo buddhānām viśayah*, p. 11: *buddhagocarah*, SŚP, p 120, *5a *yatpramāṇo buddhaviśayah*, MSA, XX-XXI 26 *buddhānām viśayād api*; LA, III. 80. *āryānām gocaro yathā*

⁴ See *cittam pravartate citram cittam eva vimucyate |
cittam hī jīyate nānyac cittam eva nirudhyate* ¹ Op Cit , X, 145

Accepting the reading *anāpnuvan* the *kārikā* may be translated thus :

'Having understood the true state of the causelessness and having no other cause one reaches then a position free from sorrow, desire and fear '

79

abhūtābhiniveśād dhi sadṛśe tat pravartate ।

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'Owing to a persistent belief in what is non-existent it goes onwards to a similar object, but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it turns⁺ back being free from relativity '

The word *sadṛśa* means what is thought to be similar to one in which one has strong or persistent belief *nihsaṅga* means one beyond the reach of any connection with the object

For c one is referred to IV 75 See III 45, IV 72, 75, 96, 99

80

nivṛttasyāpravṛttasya niścalā hi tadā sthītiḥ ।

viśayah sa hi, buddhānam tat sām्यam ajam advayam ।

'At that time when (the *citta*) has turned back from and does not go (again) onwards to (its object), its position is firm (i.e., unwavering in the least) That is the field of activity of the Buddhas,¹ and that is the same,² unborn, and free from the two ''

¹ Cf III 34 *pracārah sa tu vijñeyah*

² See III 2 38 See also Vch, p 41 *api tu khalu punaḥ subhūte samah sa dharmo na tatra kascid viśayah tenocyate nūttarasamyaksambodhiḥ nirātmatvena nihsattvatvena nirjīvatvena nīpudgalatvena samā sūnuttarā samyaksambodhiḥ*

³ The perceptible and the percipient (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*)

In *c viṣaya* may be taken in the sense of the object of knowledge

See III. 46 and IV. 77 from which it will be evident that this state is the *summum bonum* of both the Buddhists and the Vedāntists, which they call *nirodha* or *nirvāṇa* and *brahman* respectively. The Vedāntist commentator. Ś. writes here very clearly that this state of mind is *brahman*

*cittasya nīśalā calanavarjitā brahmasvarūpaiva tadā sthītir
yaiṣā brahmasvarūpa sthitiś cittasyādvayavijñānaikarasaghana-
lakṣaṇā.*

And again on IV. 77 he says ·

animittasya cittasyeti yā mokṣākhyānutpattiḥ *

That this state of *citta* is the field of activity of the Buddhas is clearly said in Buddhist works

*cittamātraṃ nirābhāsam vihāro buddhabhūmi ca |
etad dhi bhāsitam buddhair bhāṣante bhāṣayanti ca* †

LA, X. 105.

*arthābhāse ca vijñāne jñānaṃ tathatagocaraṃ |
parāvṛttaṃ nirābhāsam āryānāṃ gocaro hy asau*

Op. Cit. X. 148.

This state is the same as what we know from such lines as the following from Buddhist works · *viññaptimātratāyāṃ cittaṃ
avasthitaṃ bhavati* Tk. p. 43

For the wording of *c viṣayaḥ sa hi buddhānāṃ* see CS, p. 497 · *viṣayaḥ sa hi buddhānāṃ*, Tk p. 6 · *yo buddhānāṃ
viṣayaḥ*; p. 11 *buddhagocaraḥ*, SŚP p. 120, *5a. *yatpramāṇo
buddhaviṣayaḥ*; MSA, XX-XXI 26 *buddhānāṃ viṣayād
api*; LA, III 80. *āryānāṃ gocaro yathā.*

* See *cittam pravartate cittaṃ cittaṃ eva vimucyate |*

cittam hi jñate nānyac cittaṃ eva nirudhyate † Op. Cit., X. 145.

This state of mind to which the Buddhas aspire is further described in the following kārīka :

81

ajam anidram asvapnam prabhātaṃ bhavati svayam |
sakṛd vibhātī hy evaisa dharmo dhātuh svabhāvataḥ †

See III. 36

'It shines forth itself having no origination, nor sleep, nor dream. Indeed, this object (*dharma*), the fundamental element (*dhātu*), is naturally illumined once for all.'

The word *dharma* in the second half of the kārīkā may be taken in its general sense, an element of existence, an object, thing. But considering the views of the Yogācāras, and specially what Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthīramati have said in describing this state of mind¹ it is to be taken in the sense of a special kind of *dharma*, i.e., *āśrayaparāvṛtti* 'revolution or change of the recipient (i.e., *ālayavijñāna* which is the seed of all, *sarvabijaka*)'²

A few words are here required with regard to the reading *dharmo dhātuh svabhāvataḥ*. This reading is found in some of

¹ See Tk pp 43-44 yadaivam vijñaptimāitratāyām cittam avasthitam bhavati tadā katham vāpadyata ity āha

acitto nupalambho sau jñānam lokottaram ca tat

āśrayasya paravṛttir dvidhā dauṭhulyahānitā 29

sa evānāśrayo dhātur anityah kusalo dhruvah |

sukho vimuktikāyo sau dharmākhyo yam mahāmuneḥ 30

² For *parāvṛtti* in *āśrayaparāvṛtti* we have sometimes *paravṛtti* or *paricārtaṇa* (Tib gnas gyur pa or gnas yons gyur pa, or gshan du gyur pa. See Tib translation of Tk Tanjur Mdo, Śi, Fol 190a). For *āśrayaparāvṛtti* see among others Tk, loc cit MSA, XIX 54, LA, p 338 DB, App p 27, pp 190ff tasya tathā prabhāvitam tal laukikam parisuddham dhyānam āpāyikaklesapaksyam dauṭhulyam āśrayād apakarsati acireṇa tasya prahānād āśrayo 'nya bodhicattvasya parivartate pāpakasyāpāyikasya karmano tyantam akrañātāya apāyāgamanatāya ca. For its different explanation see ViS, pp 609-612

the MSS of the Anandashram edition and in some others, too, examined by me, while others read *dharmo dhātusva*^o Ś accepts the latter and Ā n a n d a g i t i supports it saying *dhātusvabhāvata ity ekam padam gṛhītvā vyācāte*. This implies that the reading *dhātuḥ sva*^o was also known to him. But neither of them seems to be very satisfactory and this leads the present writer to amend the reading as *dharmadhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ*. The reading *dharmo dhātuḥ* appears to be due to the unfamiliarity of the commentators with the significance of the word *dharmadhātu* which is quite appropriate here. Let us therefore explain the *kārikā* in this light.

In accordance with this reading the second half may be translated thus :

'Indeed the essence of reality (*dharmadhātu*)³ is naturally illuminated once for all.'

See I, 14, 16, III, 36, 37. For c see ChU, VIII 4, 1-2 which is the same. See also NUU, 9, MkU, 2-23.

We take the next three *kārikās* together. The *kārikā* 82 is incomplete and as such should be construed with 83.

³ The word *dharmadhātu* may be translated by 'the essence of reality'. It is devoid of the characteristics of subject and object (*vyukto grāhyagrahakalaksanena*) or undifferentiated into subject and object (*grāhyagrahakarahita*). It is a synonym for *paramārtha* or *paramārthatattva*, MVt, § XCIX 8; Tk, p 41, l 26. BAP, p 354 *parama uttama 'rthah, akṛtimam vastutūpam yadadhiḡgamāt sarvāritiśāsanānusandhikīleśaprahānam bhavati sarvadharmānām nihsvabhāvaḥ śūnyatā tathatā bhūtakotih dharmadhātur ityēdiparyāyāḥ*. Again, p 421 *bodhir buddhāivam ekānekasvabhāvaviviktaṁ anutpannāniruddham anucchedam atītavatam sarvopapāścavinirmuktaṁ ākāśapratīsamam dharmakāyāśāhyam paramārthatattvam ucyate etad eva ca prajñāpāramitāśūnyatā tathatā bhūtakoti dharmadhātī ēdīśabdeṇa samvṛtam upādāyābhūdhigate*.

Writes Ma i t r e y a n ā t h a MVBST, l p 41.

tathatā bhūtakotī cānumittah pa[ramārthakah]

dharmadhātus ca parvāyāḥ śūnyatāyāḥ samāsataḥ

ananyathāviparyāśatannirodhāryagocarāḥ |

het' tvāc cāryadharmānām paryāyārtho yathākramam l 15 16

As regards *dharmadhātu* V a s u b a n d h u says here (pp 41-42) *āryadharmahetutvād dharmadhātuḥ āryadharmārām tadāśambanaprabhavatīśd hetvārtho hy atra dhātvarthah* (see Tk, p 44, ll 20, 21). On the last words

82

sukham avriyate nityaṃ duḥkham vivriyate sadā ।
yasya kasya ca dharmasya graheṇa bhagavān asaṃ ॥

83

asti nāsty asti nāstīti nāsti nāstīti vā punah ।
calasthirobhayābhāvair āvṛṇoty eva bālīśah ॥

84

ḥkotiś catasra etās tu grahair yāsām sadāvṛtaḥ ।
bhagavan ābhīr aspiśto yena dīśtaḥ sa sarvadīk ॥

'It is the adherence to (an idea of) a thing—whatsoever it may be,' by which bliss is constantly covered and misery is unfolded. The glorious one (*dharmadhātu*)—

(i) is, (ii) is not, (iii) is and is not (i.e., both), or (iv) neither is nor is not (i.e., not both)—with these (notions) the childish obscure it (respectively¹ in accordance with their own ideas of its being) (i) steady,² (ii) unsteady, (iii) both,³ and (iv) the absence (of both) ✓

Sthīramati comments *avalakṣanopādāyarūpadhārāno py ayam dhātusabdo vartata ity aha hetvartho*. The word *dhātu* also means one that supports its own particularity (*śālaḥṭana*) and the secondary qualities of matter (*upādāya* or *bhautika rūpa*), including evidently, as observes *Stcherbatsky* (MVD, p. 350) also the primary qualities of matter (*mahābhūta*). *Dharmadhātu* also means the mental state considered as element (*dhātu*) owing to its ultimate reality. See *Pali Text Society's Dictionary*, s.v. *dhamma*, *Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 254-255.

¹ This adherence is mainly four-fold as shown in the next *kāṅkṣā*.

² In explaining *calasthira*⁴ in c of 83 *sthira* is to be taken first as required by the sense (*arthakrama*) even discarding the order of reading (*pāṭhakrama*).

³ That is, permanent.

⁴ That is, steady and unsteady.

⁵ That is, neither steady nor unsteady.

These are the four points by the adherence to which the glorious one is always covered, but (in fact) it is not touched by them. One who realizes it is omniscient.'

In *nāsti nāstīti vā* in c of *kārikā* 83 take the first *na* with both *asti* and *nāstī*, as *na asti* and *na nāstī*.

These four points are maintained by four classes of disputants according to their ideas of the Absolute, as it is permanent, not permanent, both, or not both. But some of the Buddhists (*Vijñānavādins* and *Mādhyamikas*) do not subscribe to any one of these views, their point is quite free from all of them, while in the *Vedānta* the first point is avowedly held; e.g., *KU*, VI. 12 and 13:

astīti bruvato 'nyatra katham tad upalabhyate |
astīty evopalabdhavyah |

TU, II. 6. 1:

asti brahmeti ced veda santam enam tato viduh |

MU, IV. 4:

asti brahmeti brahmadevyāvid abravīt

As regards the position of the Buddhists it is also very clear

na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam |
cātuskotvīnirmuktam tattvam mādhyamikā viduh ||

S a r a h a in SS, fol. 17.*

kāranaiḥ pratyayaś cāpi yesām lokah pravartate |
cātuskotkayā yuktā na te mannayakovidāḥ || LA. III. 20

punar aparam mahāmate bālaprthagjanā anādikālaprapañca-
dauphulyasvaprativikalpanā nāṣake nityantah svasiddhāntanaya-
deśanāyām akusālāḥ svacittadṛṣyabāhyabhāvalakṣaṇābhiniṣṭā

* See *Muleon*, 1903, IV, p. 389 This *kārikā* is widely quoted *JS*, 28, *SDS*, *Buddhadarśana*, *SSS*, III 7 (with the reading *na cobhābhāgām vīlakṣanam* in c), *cātuskotvīnirmuktam śūnyam tattvam* in sthūtam—*Ibid*, 9, *BAP*, p 359; *SāS*, I. 44 (*Vijñānaśālikā*), *Cf. BJS*, II. 27 (= *DN* I, 27).

upāyadeśanāpāthaṃ abhivivānte na svasiddhāntanāyam
cātuskotikanayavisuddham prativibhāvayanti. LA, p 171.

yac ca mahāmaté na kāryam na kāranam tan na san nāsad yac
ca na san nāsat tac cātuskoṭikabhāyam cātuskoṭikam ca
mahāmate lokavyavahārah Op. cit., p. 168.⁷

Cf punar aparam mahāmate catustayavinirmuktā tathā-
gatānām dharmadeśanā yad utākatvānyatvobhayanubhaya-
vivarjitā nāstyastisamāropāpavādavinirmuktā satyapraītya-
samutpādanīrodhamārgavimokṣaprativittipūrvakā mahāmate tathā-
gatānām dharmadeśanā. Op cit., p 96

It is to be noted here that according to Ś the word *bhagavat*
'the glorious one' in 82d and 84c refers to *ātman*. On the
following grounds, however, I think, it is the *dharmadhātu* in
81c, which is alluded to

The subject matter here in kārikās 60-84 is the unwavering
or the firm state of the mind which has turned back from and
does not go onwards again to its object—the state which is
dharmadhātu and to which aspire the Buddhas This is further
dealt with in the following two kārikās (85-86) There is,
therefore no room for *ātman* to which the word *bhagavat*
may refer

An objection may be raised here that the word *bhagavat*
is used with reference to a conscious or sentient being, and
as such it cannot refer to *dharmadhātu* which is nothing but
the *nirāśa sthiti* of the mind One can, however, meet it in
the following way Such common phrases as *bhagavatsmṛtiḥ*,
bhagavan vadaḥ *bhagavats bhavitauryata* etc., will show that
the word under discussion is employed also to non sentient

Sometimes instead of the four points *cātuskoṭi* referred to there are
only first three excluding the last See MN, I 7, VI 20 CS XVI 25, LA,
p 156 Sometimes only the first two are mentioned See my paper *Cātuskoṭi*,
in the *Jha Commemorat on Volam*, 1937 pp 85 ff where similar passages are
quoted from Vedic texts

beings It is found that anything irrespective of its being sentient or otherwise that is powerful or commands respect regard faith confidence or reverence may be referred to by *bhagavat*

It is also to be taken into consideration that this *dharmadhotu* is in fact Brahman of the Vedantists as shown in the clearest possible words by the author himself in III 46 which we have already discussed. Again the *dharmadhotu* is the same as what we understand by the word *prajnaparamita*. And it is very well known that *prajnaparamita* is reverently mentioned with the epithet *bhagavati*. Besides this *dharmadhotu* which is the same as *prajnaparamita* is nothing but *advaya jñāna* i.e., the *jñāna* which is free from the subject and the object and this is identified with *Tathagata* as is evident from the following couplet from the PAS of *Dinnaga* as quoted by *Haribhadra* in his AAA p 28*

prajnaparamita jñānam advayam sa tathagatah |
sadhya tadarthayayogena tēcchabdyam granthamargayoh ||

The first half of this *karika* is based on such old texts as the following

cittamatravatarena prajna tathagati mata | LA III 43

See *Ibid* pp 187 190 ending with yat sarvaprapañcatam sa tathagatah See also pp 191 ff *

* 7 See BAP p 421 etad eva ca prajñāpāramita śūnyatā tā hantī ad śābdena* abhīdhate This passage is quoted once more See IV 81 note 3 p 189

* See E. Obermiller DPP pp 7 45 55 p 14

* Let us quote here another passage which is very significant though a little lengthy from the same work i.e. LA pp 191 193

na h mahāmate abhāvas tathagatagato* k ntu mahāmate manomayadharma kīyasya tathagatasanyatad adh vacanam yatra yat? adhvait rthakarāśrāvaka pīatyekabuddhasaptabhūm pratīti śāstrīm av sayah so yo? nūtpīdas tathāgata syātan mahāmate paryaya vacanam tad yatha mahāmate ndrah śakrah purandarah hāstah karah paś s tanur deham śarīram pīth v bhūm r vasundharī khām ākāśam gaganam ity evamādyānām bhāvanām eka kīasya bhāvasya bahavah

two² and has no beginning, middle and end, what may one desire beyond it?' ~

It is to be noted that the final aim is described here to be the realization of omniscience (*sarvajñata* cf *saralakṣaṇā* or *bodhi*) which can be asserted more preferably from the Buddhist point of view than from the Vedantist

usabham pavaram v ram mahesur vij taynam |
anejam nahātakam buddham tam aham brumi brahmanam ||

Op cit, XXVI 40

It may be noted that according to Buddhists a Brahman is so called because he is *vah.lopapa* one whose sin is removed (Op cit XXVI 6) This is however far fetched The following may be quoted here ~

ye ra vāḥtapātpavād brāhmanah pāramēsthiḥ |
abhyasāmalanātraīmyas te muner eva śāśne
īhaiva śramanas tena caturdhā parik rityate |
śūnyah parapravadā hi śramanair brāhmanaiḥ tatha | TS 3589 3590

K a m a l a s i l a writes on it in his *Paṭy ka* ata eva bhagavatoktam īhaiva śramanah īhaiva brāhmanah śūnyāḥ parapravadāḥ śramanair brāhmanair iti

¹ The subject and the object

The following *karika* says that this realization of omniscience is the object of *vinaya* discipline and real *śama* quiescence¹ and *damā* 'introversion' of the senses ~

86

vipranām vinayo hy eśa śamah prakṛta ucyate |
damah prakṛtidantatvad evam vidvāḥ samam vrajat ||

This is indeed the discipline of the wise and is said to be the natural quiescence and the introversion (of the senses) owing to (their) being naturally introverted Knowing thus one should become quiescent

The reality set forth in the preceding *karikas* (IV 80-86) is further described in the next three *karikas* showing that that is the *lokottara* supra mundane knowledge through the realization of which one becomes omniscient

87, 88

savastu sopalambham ca dvayaṃ laukikam isyate ।
avastu sopalambham ca śuddhaṃ laukikam isyate ॥

avastv anupalambham ca lokottaram iti smṛtam ।
jñānam jñeyam ca vijñeyaṃ sadā buddhaiḥ prakīrtitam ॥

'That which consists of the two, the object and (its) perception, is regarded as mundane ; one without the object, but with the perception is regarded as pure mundane, while one without the object and the perception is said to be supra-mundane — This is to be understood to be the knowledge and the knowable' as is always declared by the Buddhas.'

In our ordinary experience when one perceives a jar there are both the object, the jar, and its perception. This knowledge is called *laukika*—'mundane', i.e., belonging to or occurring in ordinary life. When one, however, in a higher grade of wisdom, with the clear knowledge of unreality or the imagined or imposed form of the jar, perceives it, that knowledge is with perception, but not with the object. This is called 'pure mundane', i.e., it belongs to ordinary life and is covered (*avṛta*), it is pure,—'pure' because it is not so obscure as the mundane, its obscurity having been removed to a great extent. Finally when the reality is perfectly realized, when the mind rests on itself being completely suppressed (*niruddha*) there is neither the jar, nor the perception, and as such this knowledge is regarded as *lokottara* 'supra-mundane,' surpassing the ordinary life.

Of these three kinds of *jñāna*, viz., (i) *laukika*, (ii) *śuddha laukika*, and (iii) *lokottara*, the first is well known to all and

1 We have already (IV. 1) seen that there is no difference between *jñāna* and *jñeya*. Or it may mean that whatever we may know by the terms *jñāna* and *jñeya* is only the three things mentioned in the *kāṅkāś*.

is met with in every system, and the last two are to be found in Yogācāra texts. For instance, MVI¹, p. 19

paratantraśvabhāvo hi śuddhalaukikagocarah |

Tk, p. 40. nirvikālpalokottarajñānadīśye parniṣpanne svabhāve adīṣṭe apratīviddhe asākṣātkṛte tatprīṣṭhalabdhāśuddhalaukikajñānagamyatvāt paratantra 'nyena jñānena na grīhyate, na punar lokottarajñānaprīṣṭhalabdhēnāpi jñānena na dīśyate.

In LA, p. 156, these *jñānas* are found as (i) *laukika*, (ii) *loṇottara*, and (iii) *loṇottaratama* respectively. The difference is only in nomenclature and as such is not important. The LA, p 157, describes them very clearly in the following words which deserve here to be considered carefully.

(i) tatra laukikam jñānam sadasatpaksābhiniṣṭānām sarvatīrthakarabālapṛthagjanānām ca

(ii) tatra lokottaram jñānam sarvasāravakapratyekabuddhānāṃ svasāmānyalaksanapatitāśayābhiniṣṭānām.

(iii) tatra lokottaratamam jñānam buddhabodhisattvānām nirābhāsadharmapravicayād anirodhānutpādadarśanāt sadasatpakṣavigatam tathāgatabhūmanairātmyādhigamāt pravartate²

This reality with which we are concerned here is described by Vasubandhu in his Tk, verse 29 in the following words which may be quoted here.

acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānam lokottaram ca tat |

•Sthīramati comments

tad anena ślokadvayena darśanamārgam ārabhyottara-viśeṣagatyā phalasampattir udbhāvītā vijñaptimātrapravistayoginah tatra grāhakacittābhāvād grāhyārthānupalambhāc ca acitto

² Generally in Buddhist works things are divided into two categories, (i) *laukika*, and (ii) *loṇottara* (see MV, p 501), as for instance, all mental states are *laukika* excepting only nine, viz., four paths (*maggas*), four fruits (*magga-phalas*), and one uncompounded element (*asamkṣatadhātu*), i.e., *nirbāna*, —these are *loṇottara*, DSn, § 1093, 1094.

'nupalambho 'sau. aparicitatvāt³ loke samudācārābhāvāt
nīrvikalpatvāc ca lokād uttīram itī jñānaṃ lokottaram ca tat.

So far as goes my information, such division of *jñāna* or *jñeya* is not to be found in Upanisads

Ś explains the above three kinds of *jñāna* as the conditions of (i) waking, (ii) dream, and (iii) sleep respectively (*jāgrat*, *svapna*, *susupti*)

³ The printed text reads *anucitatvāt*, but it does not give any appropriate sense. We should, therefore, read here *aparicitatvāt* with the Tibetan version which has *hdriṣ pa ma byas pa*

89

jñāne ca trividhe jñeye krameṇa vidīte svayam ।
sarvajñatā hi sarvatra bhavatiha mahādhiyah ॥

'The threefold knowledge and knowable being gradually understood everywhere spontaneously evolves here the state of omniscience of a man of high intellect'

That the *jñāna* is *trividha* 'threefold' is just now seen in the preceding two *kārikās*. According to its function, too, it is *trividha*. We read in the LA, p. 157

tatra trividham jñānam svasāmānyaiśaśanāvadhāraṇakam cotpādayayāvadhāraṇakam cānutpādānīrodhāvadhāraṇakam ca²

The omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) referred to is Buddhahood (*buddhatva*)³

¹ The word *mahādhi* is nothing but *dhi*mat which is a name for a Bodhisattva. See MSA, XII 73 MVt, 1 627

² As regards the nature of *jñāna* the following may be cited from LA, p. 157 *asargalakṣaṇam jñānam* 'asangaśvabhāvalakṣaṇam jñānam' *apṛīptilakṣaṇam jñānam* *svapratyātmāryajñānagatigocaram apraveśānugamativād udācandrayajale*

³ See BAP, pp 447-8, ASP, pp 42-3. *Buddhatva* = *sarvajñatva* consisting in (i) *sarvākāra-jñatā*, (ii) *mārgajñatā*, and (iii) *vastujñāna*

Ś explains *sarvajñatā* as *sarvaś cāsau jñas ceti sarvajñah, tasya bhāvah sarvajñatā*.

In the next *kārikā* the author tells his followers to understand certain things.

90

heyajñeyāpyapākyaṇi vijñeyāny agrayānataḥ¹ |
teṣām anyatra vijñeyād upalambhas triṣu smṛtaḥ ||

'That which is to be abandoned, that which is to be known, that which is to be attained, and that which is to be matured are to be understood from the *Agrayāna*. It is said that among them there is perception of the three, but not of that which is to be known.'

The *Agrayāna* in the text is nothing but the *Mahāyāna* as is evident from a number of Buddhist works in which the word occurs as a synonym for *Mahāyāna*.²

Now, what are we to understand by *heya*, etc? As regards *heya* and *jñeya*, if we follow here *Asaṅga* they are *paratantra* and *parikalpita svabhāvas* (see IV, 74-75) respectively.³ *Āpya* (= *prāpya*) 'attainable' implies *dharma*

¹ All the editions and MSS examined have **yāna* instead of **yāna* as expected

² MSA, p. 53 *pīṭakatrayaṃ sūtravīṇayābhīdharmaḥ tad eva trayam hīnayānāgrayānabhedena dvayam bhavati*. See SP, III 1, V 61, MSA, p. 83; SRS (Rajendralal Mitra's *Buddhist Manuscripts from Nepal*), p. 229, LV, p. 408, VCh., pp. 30, 33. Sometimes it is also called *Sreṣṭhayaṇa*, Vch., p. 30

³ Let us quote here the following from the MSA XI 13 (p. 58) where *heya* and *jñeya* are explained.

taṁsamjyotastatam dvayena tatātām bhīṣṇatī ca samśrayah
śakyam naiva ca sarvathābhīlapitum yac cāprapañcātmakam |
jñeyam heyam atho viśodhyam amalam yac ca prakṛtyāmalam
yasyāśvāsasuvapavārisadṛśī kleśād viśuddhir matā ||

'nupalambho 'sau. aparicitatvāt³ loke samudācārābhāvāt
nirvikalpatvāc ca lokād uttimam iti jñānam lokottaram cā tat.

So far as goes my information, such division of *jñāna* or *jñeya* is not to be found in Upaniṣads.

Ś explains the above three kinds of *jñāna* as the conditions of (i) waking, (ii) dream, and (iii) sleep respectively (*jāgrat*, *svapna*, *susupti*)

³ The printed text reads *anucitāt*, but it does not give any appropriate sense. We should, therefore, read here *aparicitatvāt* with the Tibetan version which has *hdriṣ par ma byas pa*

89

jñāne ca trividhe jñeye kramena vidite svayam |
sarvajñatā hi sarvatra bhavatiha mahādhiyaḥ ||

'The threefold knowledge and knowable being gradually understood everywhere spontaneously evolves here the state of omniscience of a man of high intellect''

That the *jñāna* is *trividha* 'threefold' is just now seen in the preceding two *kārikas*. According to its function, too, it is *trividha*. We read in the LA, p. 157

tatra trividham jñānam svasōmānyaśaṅksanāvadhārakaṃ cotpāda-
vyayāvadhāranakam cānutpādānīrodhāvadhārakam ca²

The omniscience (*sarvajñata*) referred to is Buddhahood (*buddhatva*)

¹ The word *mahadhi* is nothing but *dhimat* which is a name for a Bodhisattva. See MSA XIX 73, MV I 627

² As regards the nature of *jñāna* the following may be cited from LA, p. 157 *asāṅgalakṣaṇam jñānam* "asāṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇam jñānam" *apṛāptilakṣaṇam jñānam* *avapratyākṣmāryajñānagatigocaram apraveśāṁgamatvād udakacandraḥ jale*

³ See BAP pp 447-8, ASP, pp 42-3 *Buddhatva* = *sarvajñatva* consisting in (i) *sarvaśaraṇjñatā*, (ii) *mārgajñatā*, and (iii) *caṣṭhājñāna*

Ś explains *sarvajñatā* as *sarvaś cāsau jñāś ceti sarvajñāḥ, tasya bhāvaḥ sarvajñatā*.

In the next *kārikā* the author tells his followers to understand certain things.

90

heyaññeyāpyapākyāni vijñeyāny agrayānataḥ¹ !

tesām anyatra vijñeyād upalambhas trisu smṛtaḥ ||

'That which is to be abandoned, that which is to be known, that which is to be attained, and that which is to be matured are to be understood from the *Agrayāna*. It is said that among them there is perception of the three, but not of that which is to be known.'

The *Agrayāna* in the text is nothing but the *Mahāyāna* as is evident from a number of Buddhist works in which the word occurs as a synonym for *Mahāyāna*.²

Now, what are we to understand by *heya*, etc.? As regards *heya* and *jñeya*, if we follow here *Aśaṅga*, they are *paratantra* and *parikalpita svabhāvas* (see IV. 74-75) respectively.³ *Āpya* (= *prāpya*) 'attainable' implies *dharma*

¹ All the editions and MSS examined have *yāna instead of *yōna as expected.

² MSA, p. 53. *pitakatrayam sūtravinayābhīdharmāḥ tad eva trayam hīnayānāgrayānābhedena dvayam bhavati*. See SP, III 1, V 61, MSA, p. 83; SRS (Rajendralal Mitra's *Buddhist Manuscripts from Nepal*), p. 229, LV, p. 408, VCh, pp. 30, 33. Sometimes it is also called *Śreṣṭhagāna*, Vch, p. 30.

³ Let us quote here the following from the MSA XI 13 (p. 58), where *heya* and *jñeya* are explained

*satyam yat satatam dvayena rahitam bhīntes ca samprāyāḥ
lakṣyam naiva ca sarvathābhilāpitum yac cāprapañcātmatkam |
jñeyam heyam atho viśodhyam amalam yac ca prakṛtyāmalam
yayāktāsuavamarisadeti kletāḥ viśuddhir matā ||*

dhātu or *dharmadhātu* already alluded to (IV. 81),⁴ which is *parinispanna*, and *pākyā* 'to be matured' refers to the act of maturing by discipline for the attainment of the Absolute. The last is not only for others, but also for one's own self.⁵

The second half of the *kārikā* says that among these four things only three, i.e., *heya*, *āpya*, and *pākyā*, can be perceived, but not the *jñeya* or *viñjeya*. For it is *parikalpita* 'imagined,' and a thing which is only imagined owing to its very nature cannot be perceived, just like mirage, as it

satatam dvayena rahitam tattvam parikalpitah svabhāvo grāhyagrāhaka-lakṣaṇāntyantam asattivāt bhrānteh samnirāyah paratantras tena tatparikalpanāḥ anabhilāpyam aprapaścātmakam ca parinispannah svabhāvah, tatra prathamam tattvam pariñjeyam dvitīyam praheyam tṛtīyam viśodhyam cāgantukamalād viśuddham ca prakṛtyā yasya prakṛtyā viśuddhasyākṣa-suvarnavāṇusādṛśī kleśād viśuddhīḥ na hyākāśādini prakṛtyā aśuddhāni na cāgantukamalāpagamād eśam viśuddhir nesyate

⁴ MSA XIX 56 prāpyam dharmadhātuh

⁵ MSA, XX XXI 42 sattvapariṣkācaryā dvayor eva pariṣkācāntīṣṭham pariṣkācānam hy atra vinayanam, XVII 3, 22, 36, XIX 56, DA, p 125, BBh, p 22 As regards the maturation of one's own self (*ātmapariṣkā*) the following may be quoted from MSA, VIII 1

ruciḥ prasādeḥ prasāmo nukampanā kṣamātha medhā prabalaṭvam eva ca |
aharyatāṅgaḥ samupetatā bhrīṣam jñātmaje tat pariṣkākalakṣaṇam "

ruciḥ mahāyānadesanādharme prasādas taddesike prasāmah kleśānām anukampā sattvesu medhā grahanadhāranapratibedhesu prabalaṭvam adhigame ahāryatā mātṛpravāḍibhūḥ prāhānikāṅgaḥ samavāḍgatatvam bhrīṣam ut rucyādnam adhamātrāṭvam darśayati esa samāseṇa navaprakāra ātmapariṣko veditavyaḥ

See also, VIII 11

iti navavidhāvastupācitatmā paraparipācānavogī alām upetaḥ |
śulhaṃayasatatapravardhūstmā bhavati eadā jagato grabandhubhūtaḥ "

KP, 31 tad yathā kāśyapa tejodhātuh sarvasasyāni pariṣārayati evam eva kāśyapa bodhisattvasya prajñā sarvasattvānam sarvasukladharmān pariṣārayati " See also the stanza which follows it

In BBh, a whole chapter named *Paripākapatala* VI is devoted to it giving particulars

Cf. *lokapakti* 'maturation of the world' in the SB, XI 5 7 1

has no existence, it is merely an imagination, simply a word, only a name; it is not perceived, and hence there is no perception⁶

⁶ It may be noted that sometimes five *jñeyas* are found (BAP, p. 447 - *jñeyam pañcavidham*), as says *Sthiramati* in MVT¹, p. 6, viz., (i) the worlds (*lokaḍhātā*), (ii) the living beings (*śarīra*), (iii) the elements of existence (*dharmā*), (iv) the discipline (*vinaya*), and (v) the means (*upāya*). These seem to have no connexion herewith.

In the next few *kārikās* the author gives some leading thoughts of the Agrayāna alluded to above.

91

prakṛtyākāśavaj jñeyāḥ sarve dharmā anādayaḥ ।
vidyate na hi nānātvam tesām kvacana kiñcana ॥

'All the elements of existence are without beginning, and by nature they are to be known like the sky. Verily they have nowhere any variety.'

For the first half of the *kārikā* see IV 1, where we have already seen that things are just like the sky as said in such texts as the ASP, p. 297 *yathākāśam*^o already quoted there.

For the second half where it is said that there is no variety of things see the well-known Upanisadic texts - *neha nānāsti kiñcana*, BU, IV. 4. 19, KU, IV. 11, KtU, III 8, NS, IV. 1. 34 ff (with *V ā t s y ā y a n a*). See also our own text, II. 34, IV 94, 100.

92

ādibuddhāḥ¹ prakṛtyaiva² sarve dharmāḥ suniścitāḥ ।
yasyaivam bhavati kṣāntiḥ so 'mṛtatvāya kalpate ॥

¹ See *ādau buddhāḥ*, IV. 98, cf. *ādī śānta*, IV 93, Tib. *gzod ma nas shi ba*, from this one is to take *ādī-* here for *ādītaḥ* meaning 'from the outset'.

² See IV, 93

‘By the very nature all elements of existence are well ascertained as originally knowledge. One who has such acquiescence is fit for immortality.’

The word *buddha* in *āḍibuddha* means here *bodha* ‘knowledge,’³ i.e., *advaya jñāna* which is called *Tathāgata* as we have already seen (IV 82-84). See also ŚŚP, p 124 :

tathāgatam bhadanta śāradvatiputra paryesitukēmerēṇī
paryesitavyah ātmeti bhadanta śāradvatiputra buddhasyāteḍ
adhivacanam

All phenomena are only in their imposed or imagined forms, they being *buddha*, or *bodha* or *jñāna*

Cf. here the well known phrase in later Vedāntic works⁴, *nityasuddhabuddhamukṣatasatyasvabhāva* for Brahman

As regards the meaning of the word *kṣānti*⁵ a few words are required here. Generally, *kṣānti* means ‘patience’. In Buddhism there are different *kṣāntis* of which the following three are often mentioned (i) *duḥkḥādhuḥsaṇcēkṣānti* ‘patience accepting miseries’ (ii) *dharmanidhyāna*⁶ ‘patience by meditating upon the elements of existence,’ and (iii) *parāpakāramarsana*⁶ ‘patience bearing injuries done by others’⁶

Besides, in Buddhism it has other meanings. In explaining *kṣānti* (Pali *khamati*) in AN, I 94, the commentary, *Manorathapūraṇī*, writes *khamatīti adhiṣaṇakhamati*. It says that *khamati* means *adhivāsana* ‘acquiescence,’ ‘consent,’ or ‘acceptance’. Again we read in the AN III 118

imesam āvuso tinnam puggalānam katamo te puggalo khamati
abhikkantataro ca paritataro ca

¹ Ś explains *āḍibuddhān nityabodhaṁ arūpān*

² Such as VeS, pp 38-39-281

³ Ś *bodhakartavyatānirapeksatā*

⁴ As described in BA and BAP, VI (p 172 ff), SS, IX (pp 179 ff)

The commentary explains *khamāti* saying *khamatīti ruccati*. Accordingly the passage quoted above may be translated thus

'Which of these three persons is, O friend, agreeable to you as the most excellent and exalted?'

Here evidently *kānti* is *rucc* 'pleasure', 'liking'. This is quite clear also from a passage of the SNt, 897,² where the commentator in his MNs explains *khamti* (*kānti*) in the text by *pema* (*preman*) 'fondness, predilection,' *chanda* 'desire,' and *rāga* 'lust,' which are in fact, the same as *rucc*.³

Again in Buddhist texts (CN, p 164, see Vbh, p 245) *kānti* is described as synonymous with the following words. (i) *dr̥ṣṭi* (Pali *dīṭhi*) 'view,' 'belief,' 'theory,' (ii) *rucc* 'pleasure,' 'liking,' (iii) *labdhī* (Pali *laddhi*) 'view,' 'belief,' 'theory'; (iv) *adhyāśaya* (Pali *ajjhasaya*) 'intention,' 'thought,' and (v) *abhiprāya* (Pali *adhippaya*) 'intention,' 'opinion'. It is therefore quite clear from the above that *kānti* sometimes means *dr̥ṣṭi* 'view'.⁴ And so far as I can understand in the present case it is used in this sense.

See SP, p 136, MSA, XI 52, SRS VII, DS, p 63, POUSSIN MV, pp 362ff, and AK VI, pp 165 ff, as well as the works quoted herein, St LA p 39b.

² *yā kīc imā sammutiyo puthujjā sabbā va etā na upeti vidvā*

anūpayo so upayam kim eyya dīthe sute khamti akubbamāno ||

³ See SN IV 343 *bhūtapubbam bhante cattvāro sathāro nānāditthikā nānākhamtikā nānāruccikā* MN I 437, II 43. See also the *Samangalavilasini* on DN, II 213 *khamitīti tattha katamā khamti yā khamanāti adhivāsanaṭi acandikkam anasuropo attamanatā cittasāti evam vuttā adhivāsana khamti*

⁴ It may be noted that in Sanskrit, too, *√kham* is not always used in the sense of 'to be patient' or 'to endure,' etc. Cf UC, I 14 *tan no yad uktam adivam na hi tat kṣamam te*. Here *kṣama* has nothing to do with 'patience' or 'forbearance' etc. In Pali (DhA, I 40) *√khamā* is said to mean 'to be fit,' 'to seem good' specially in such cases as *gathā te khameyya* 'as may seem good to you'.

It is well-known in *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* and the works based thereon that all elements of existence are devoid of the characteristics of their own (*nihsvabhāva*), they neither originate (*anutpanna*), nor disappear (*aniruddha*), and as such they are quiescent from the outset (*ādīśānta* = *prakṛtiśānta*), and by the very nature they are merged in *nirvāṇa* (*prakṛtinirvṛta*). This point is mainly described in the following *kārikā* :

93

ādīśāntā¹ hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ |
sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajam sāmyaṃ² viśaradam³ |

'All elements of existence are quiescent from the outset, non-originated and by the very nature perfectly merged in *nirvāṇa* ; they are all equal and not different (The absolute) is unborn, equal and fearless '

Let us quote here the following from MSA, XI 51 :

nihsvabhāvatayā siddhā uttarottaranīśrayāt |
anutpannāniruddhādīśāntaprakṛtinirvṛtāḥ⁴ |

Here follows the commentary

nihsvabhāvatayānutpādayaḥ yo hi nihsvabhāvaḥ so 'nut-
panno yo 'nutpannaḥ so 'niruddho yo 'niruddhaḥ sa ādīśānto
ya ādīśāntaḥ sa prakṛtinirvṛtāḥ

¹ Tib gzod ma nas shi ba lit *adīśāntāḥ*

² See III 2, 38, IV 77, 80, 95, 100

³ See the note on *latsaradya* in the next *kārikā* C/ *nirbhaya* in I 25, III 35 and *abhaya* in IV 78, and *Upanisads*, ChU, I 4 4, 5, IV 15, 1, etc

⁴ This is as reconstructed by Lévi according to the Chinese version. The original Sanskrit is lost. The scribe has, however, given here a corrupted *kārikā* and it is as follows

nihsvabhāvatayā siddhā uttarottaranīśrayāḥ
anutpādo niruddhaḥ cādīśāntaḥ prakṛtinirvṛtāḥ¹

See MSA, Tome II (French Translation), p 122

Owing to the absence of nature there are no origination etc. That which is devoid of nature is not originated that which is not originated is not suppressed (destroyed) that which is not suppressed is quiescent from the outset and that which is quiescent from the outset is naturally merged in perfect *nirvāṇa*.

In the text *śānti* (connected with *adīṇta*) and *nirvṛti* or *nirvāṇa* (connected with *sunirvṛta* = *parinirvṛta*) are actually nothing but *aprayṛti* meaning 'not coming forth', 'not arising', 'not originating'. Elements of existence are *adīṇta* and *au* (= *pari*) *nirvṛta* it implies that originally they do not originate and so to speak they are in *śānti* and *nirvāṇa*. For the above explanation of the two words see MIV p. 529 *ya'prayṛtis tan nirvanam iti vyavasthapyate* p. 538 *ya upaśamo prayṛtis tan nirvanam*.

POUSSIN observes (ERE Vol. 9 p. 851) 'From an absolute point of view (*paramarthatasā*) there is no difference (*nanabhava*)³ among things and the characters of things. Things are void (*śūnya*) like the daughter of a barren woman; characters are void like the beauty of this unreal daughter. Things are void because there is no real origination of things — if no origination, no destruction, an eternal non-existence. There is no difference between existence (*samsāra*) and *nirvāṇa*. Not being produced (*anutpanna*), not being destroyed, things are from the beginning quiescent (*ādīṇta*); they are really naturally (*prakṛtya*) in *nirvāṇa* (*parinirvṛta*).

For the wording and thought of the first of the *śānti* the following passages besides MSA VI 21 22-23 etc. (p. 204) may be quoted:

- (i) *ādisanta hy anutpannah prakṛtiḥ ca sarvā*
dharmaḥ te vivṛtā nātha dharmasakṛpāḥ ⁴

³ See our text *vidyate nahi nāstīti* *teṣāṃ bhavaḥ kṛtiḥ* 7 1 2 and also II 34 III 24 IV 93 94.

⁴ Quoted in MIV p. 27 and SuS. p. 79 from *Āgamaśāstra*. POUSSIN JRAS 1910 pp. 138-39 SYLVAIN LEVI JSA Tome II (French tr.) p. 122.

(ii) atah sattvāḥ prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ | BA, IX 104.

(iii) tasmāt sarvadharmā anutpannāniruddhasvabhāvatayā ādīśāntāḥ prakṛtinirvṛtāḥ. BAP, p 589.

(iv) paramārthasatyataḥ prakṛtinirvānatayā dīśāntatvāt. prakṛtinirvṛtatvāt sarvadharmānām iti. Ibid, p 385.

(v) ādīpraśāntā imi sarvadharmāḥ | SP, II. 68.

The next kārikā is in support of what is said in the preceding one

94

vaiśāradyaṃ tu vai nāsti bhede vicaratām sadā |
bhedanimnāḥ prthagvādās tasmāt te kṛpaṇāḥ smṛtāḥ |

'But verily those who always move following difference have no intrepidity. Those who maintain that a thing is diverse' (*prthak* = *nānā*) are prone to difference, and are, therefore, regarded as pitiable

The word *visarada* in IV 93 of which the noun, *vaiśāradya*, is used here requires some explanation. According to Ś they mean 'pure' (*visuddha*) and 'purity' (*visuddhi*) respectively. It is supported by Bh o j a r ā j a saying in his vṛtti on YS. I. 47 that *vaiśāradya* means 'clearness' (*naumalya*). This exposition is based on that of Vyāsa on the same YS². The idea behind it may be explained in another way³.

¹ See IV 91 and note 5 on IV 93.

² *asuddhyāvaranamulāpetaya prakāśtmano buddhisattvaya rajasamo-bhyām anabhibhūtaḥ svacchāḥ sthiti pravāho vaiśāradyaṃ*. Wood translates it thus: 'When freed from obstruction by impurity the *sattva* of thinking substance the essence of which is light, has a pellucid steady flow not overwhelmed by *rajas* and *tamas*'.

³ As in India the season *śarad* 'autumn' is particularly clear, anything in that season (*śarada* autumnal), such as the moon or water, is also clear. Thus *śarada* with the prefix *vi* which here simply emphasizes the idea might have gradually been employed in the sense of 'clear', its noun *vaiśāradya* meaning 'clearness'.

The word *viśārada* is, however, of doubtful derivation.⁴ The prefix *vi-* only intensifies the meaning of *sārada* one of the meanings of which is 'mature,' i.e., 'rich in years' (*śarad* 'a year'), 'old.'⁵ Accordingly the secondary meaning with the prefix *vi-* is *pravīṇa* 'clever.' As boldness (*pragalbhatā*) generally depends on one's maturity *viśārada* also means 'bold' (*pragalbha*).

In both Sanskrit and Pali the word *sārada* (Pali *sārada*) means *apratibha* or *apragalbha* 'timid,' 'not bold,'⁶ and *viśārada* (Pali *viśārada*) is used to mean 'scholar' (*paṇḍita*) and 'bold' (*pragalbha*).⁷

In Buddhist writings *vaiśāradya* (Pali *vesārajjā*) is explained as opposite to **śāradya* (Pali *sārāja*)⁸ which means 'timidity.' That *vaiśāradya* is 'intrepidity' (*nirbhayata*) is very clearly said in AKV², p. 646.⁹ In Buddhism *vaiśāradya* is four-fold, viz., the *vaiśāradya* regarding (i) the highest knowledge of all things (*sarvadharmābhisambodhivaiśāradya*), (ii) the knowledge of destroying all the human passions (*sarvūsravakṣayajñāna*), (iii) rightly describing the impediments (*antarāyikadharmānanyathātvaniścitaṅvākarana*), and (iv) the rightness of the way leading to salvation (*naiṛyāmikapratipattithātu*).¹⁰

⁴ It is read in the group of *drdhādī* (Pāṇini, V 1 123), and Vardhamana explains it in his GM, p. 221, taking it in the sense of *pravīṇa* 'skilful,' 'clever': *sāradasabdah pratyagravācī yathā rajjuśāradam udakam, dśacchāradāḥ saktavah sadyo hi rajjuvoddhrtam udakam pratyagram anupahatam rajjuśāradam ucyate sadyat ca drvādā pistāḥ saktavo dśacchāradāḥ śāradatva'm pratyagravism abhinavatvam tad vīgatam aśya viśāradah pravīṇah, pravīṇo lakṣaṇaj.* He himself is, however, not satisfied with it and goes on to say: *athasā vyutpattīcūnyah pravīṇavācī viśāradasabdah*

⁵ See AmK, III 3 95 *dvau tu śāradau | pratyagrāpratibhaṇ vīdvatsupragalbhaṇ viśāradau* AP, 984 *sārado saradubbhūte appagabbhe ma'o Csu.*

⁶ AP, 228, 959: *vutto viśārado tisu suppagabbhe ca paṇḍite*;

⁷ *vesārajjānūti ettha sārājjapatipakkho vesārajjem.* MP en AN, II, 8 ff

⁸ *nirbhayaṇi hi vaiśāradyam* The Tib. term for *re.śāradā* is *mi tygs pa* which means *nirbhaya* or *nirbhayaṇā*

⁹ MVI², 8 In the same work (28) there is a different kind of *vaiśāradya* which is also four fold. Again, the following four-fold *vaiśāradya* is enumerated

Until and unless the knowledge becomes completely free from any relation to its object the highest cannot be attained. Therefore the knowledge must be *asaṅga*, i.e., detached from its objects. This state of its detachment is described in the following two *kāṅkās* (96, 97), the first of which runs :

vā padam, quoted from *Āryaratnākaraśūtra* in *MV*, 90, *tad ya'hāpi nāmākāse śakunipadam*, *S&P*, p. 137; *yaithāntakse śakuneh padam budhau, vaktum na śakyam na ca darśanopagam*, quoted by *Poussin* in his French tr. of *MA*, p. 12 in *Le Muséon*, 1907, p. 261

.96

* *ajesv ajam asaṃkrāntam dharmesu jñānam isyate,¹
yato na kramate jñānam asaṅgam tena kīrtitam ||*

'It is accepted¹ that knowledge which is unborn does not go (i.e., relate itself) to the elements of existence, which are (also) unborn. As the knowledge does not go (to the elements of existence) it is declared to be free from attachment (*asaṅga*, i.e., free from any relation to its object)'

See *IV. 72, 79 (niḥsaṅga)*, 97, 99, cf. *agraha*, *III. 32*. See also *IV. 72* :

cittam nirvisayam nityam asaṅgam tena kīrtitam |

See *IV. 1*, note 5 where passages are quoted to show that *jñāna* is *asaṅga*

¹ Lit. desired (*isyate*)

97

*aṇumātre'pi vaidharmye jāyamāne 'vipaścitaḥ |
asangatā sadā nāsti kim utāvaranacyutiḥ ||*

'If there be even the least difference (of elements of existence¹ in the mind) of an unwise man, there is no state of

¹ It is to be remembered that all elements of existence are in fact non-different *sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnāḥ* (*IV. 93*), as we have already seen.

(its) being always free from attachment (*asanga*), not to speak of the disappearance of the covering.*

The state of being always *asanga* of *jñāna* or *citta* is referred to in the preceding kārikā (96)

As regards *avarana* 'covering' or 'obstruction', it is two-fold, (i) *kleśa-avarana* and (ii) *jñeya-avarana*². *kleśa* literally means that which troubles one by the strokes of various kinds of misery, as *Vācaspati Miśra* would explain it (YS, I 24). Accordingly, as sinful desires, vices, or passions are for misery they are termed *kleśa*. For the same reason it also means 'impurity', 'stain'. Sometimes the word stands for 'lust' or 'sensuality' (*rāga*), 'aversion' (*dveṣa*), and 'bewilderment' (*moha*). There are also ten *kleśas*, *lobha*, *dveṣa*, *moha*, *māna*, etc. (DSn. § 1548)³. For further details see *Pali-English Dictionary*, PTS. s.v. *kleśa*, and MV, p. 361. *Kleśa-avarana* thus means the *avarana* 'covering' or 'obstruction' in the form of *kleśas*. Until and unless they are destroyed (*kleśaprahāra*) the truth is not manifested, nor can one attain to the highest bliss⁴. *Kleśas* are regarded as the mother of all miseries. Similarly *jñeya* is also an *avarana*. The word *jñeya* means 'knowable', i.e., the *dharma*s 'elements of existence' which are not substantial and thus they have no reality. Yet one perceives them (*jñeyopalabdhī*). And as long as one continues to do so one is far from the goal. Thus *jñeya* is regarded as an *avarana*.⁵

² DS CNV MSA IX 3 12 XX-XNI, 44 BA IX 55

³ In YS II 3 59 there are five kinds of *kleśa* viz., *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhiniveśa*.

⁴ See MV p. 539. *kleśānām apravṛttivā vā prapañcāpāmah*

⁵ BAP pp. 447. *kleśa cāvṛtī jñeyam cāvṛtī āvaranam*. "jñeyam eva samāpitarīpativād avṛtī". Sometimes *jñeyāvarana* is explained as *jñeyā āvaranam*. Tk p. 15. *jñeyāvaranam aprasāraṣṭmin jñeye jñānapratibandhaḥ* 'the obstacle regarding the knowable', (i.e., the reality or the things in their true nature. See TSP, pp. 869-890). Sometimes (AN, III 436, AK IV p. 201) there are three *āvaranas*, (i) *kleśāvarana*, (ii) *karmāvarana* (5 *anantaryas* and 10 *akṛtāḥ karmapāthas*), and (iii) *upāhāvarana* (8 *akṛaras*).

and it must be removed (*jñeyanupalabdhi*) for the realization of *nirvāṇa*. *Jñeyāvarana* disappears by one's realizing the unreality of the elements of existence as separate entities (*dharma nairātmya*) while *kṛtsāvarana* goes away by the realization of the unreality of the individual ego (*pudgalanairātmya*)⁴. Or both the *avarana*s can be removed by the meditation on *śūnyatā* (BA IX 55)

* LA VII p 241 *jñeyāvaranam punar mahāmate dharmānairātmya darśanāt tad v tudhyat kṛtsā avaranam tu pudgalanairātmyāda śāśvadbhāṣa pūrvakam prah yate* See *Sthiramati* on Tk p 15

The removal of *avarana* is referred to in the preceding *karika* but in the next *karika* it is said that in fact there is no *avarana* at all

98

*alabdhavaranaḥ sarve dharmāḥ prakṛtīnirmalāḥ |
adau buddhāḥ tathā mukta budhyanta itī nayakāḥ |*

All the elements of existence have always been without any covering and unsullied in their nature. From the beginning they are knowledge as well as in *nirvāṇa* (*mukta*)—this the Buddhas understand

For *adau buddhāḥ* see IV 97 93. Because the elements of existence do not originate they are said as *mukta* i.e. in *śānti* or *nirvāṇa*. On this see IV 93 p 207

For *prakṛtīnirmalā* see IV 91. MV p 539

avaca nakṣaraḥ sarva śūnyāḥ śāntadīnirmalāḥ |

3a evam janatī dharmān kumaro buddha socyate

MV p 444 *prakṛtiprabhāsvaraḥ sarvadharmāḥ* LA X 750 753 754 *prakṛtīprabhāsvaram cittaṃ* ASP p 47 *adīśuddhatvād adīśuddhatvāt sattvasya* CVP 28

adīśuddham anutpannam niḥsvabhavam anavīlam |

*jagad bhavena sampāśyan na baddho ra ca mucyate |*¹

In the *karika* the word *nyakā* is a name for the Buddha
MIV¹ §1 20 AP 4 727 BA II 31 66 SS p 518

¹ See Pousin JRAS 1910 p 139

Let us remember here that at the very beginning of the present Chapter (IV. 1) the author has told us, that in the opinion of 'the greatest of men' (*dvīpadām vara*), i.e. the Buddha, *jñāna* and *jñeya* are identical. He has also repeatedly shown above¹ and specially in IV. 96, that *jñāna* is *asanga* as it does not relate itself to the *dharma*s or objects which have no reality. The author refers now to this fact and concludes showing the supreme truth that according to the Buddha there is in reality neither the *jñāna* nor the *jñeya* or *dharma*s as he has said neither of them

99

krāmate na hi buddhasya jñānam dharmeṣu tāyinaḥ ।
sarvadharmās tathā jñānam naitad buddhena bhāṣitam ॥

'According to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him (*tāyin*),² *jñāna* does not approach the *dharma*s (i.e., it does not relate itself to the objects)'. But all *dharma*s as well as *jñāna*—this has not been said by the Buddha.

¹ See IV 72, 73 96 Cf III 32

² The word *tāyin* is thus interpreted in BAP, p 75 *tāyīnām itī svādhigatamārgadeśakānām yad uktam tāyah śāstramārgaḥ* (PV, 2 145) See my paper, *Pramānavārtikā of Dharmakīrti*, IHQ, Vol XIII, 1937 This explanation is partly followed by Udayanācārya in his *Tātparyafikā-paribuddhi*, Bib Ind, p 8 in explaining *tāyin* in Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyafikā*, 2 (aksapādāya tāyine) *tāyī tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣanaksamasampradāyappravartakah Prajñākaramaṭi* in his RAP, p 75, offers another explanation *athava tāyah śāntānārthah āsamsāram apratisthitānirvānatayā avasthāyīnām* This word is widely used both in Buddhist (LV, p 421, BA, III 2, SP¹, pp 25, 57, 67, etc.) and Jaina (YŚ, Vol I, pp 1, 47, DV, p 115) works and is misunderstood Sometimes it is read as *trāyin* 'protector, and *tāpin* (as in the present case, see Variants The word *tāyin* as a name for Buddha is translated into Tibetan by *skyā b pa* (MV¹, § 1 15) which suggests its Sanskrit equivalent *trāyin* a protector' See JRAS, 1910, p 140, JPTS, 1891 1893, p 53, JA, 1912, p 243 *Proceedings and Transactions of the Second Oriental Conference*, Calcutta, 1922, pp 450-1

³ See IV 96

What is the significance of the second half of the *kārikā*. 'all *dharma*s as well as *jñāna*—this has not been said by the Buddha?' Let us quote here a few passages showing that the Buddha has never said a word.

(i) *Nāgārjuna* in his MK, XX, 25 :

sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivah |
na kvacit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitah ||

(ii) *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* quoted in MV on the above :

yāṃ ca rātriṃ tathāgato 'nuttarāṃ samyaksambodhiṃ
abhisambuddho yāṃ ca rātriṃ upādāya parinirvāsyati atrāntare
tathāgatena ekam apy akṣaram nodāhṛtam na vyāhṛtaṃ yāpi
pravyāharati nāpi pravyāharisyati

(iii) LA, pp. 142-3 :

yāṃ ca rātriṃ tathāgato 'bhisambuddho yāṃ ca rātriṃ
parinirvāsyati atrāntare ekam apy akṣaram tathāgatena nodāhṛtam
na pravyāharisyati avacanam buddhavadanam.

(iv) *Nāgārjuna* in his NSt. 17 .

nodāhṛtaṃ tvayā kiñcid ekam apy akṣaram vibho |
kṛtsnaś ca vaineyajano dharmavarṣeṇa tarpitah "

(v) *Bhagavat* quoted in MV, p. 264 and BAP, p. 365
(with a slight variation)

anakṣarasya dharmasya sruṭih kā deśanā ca kā |
śrūyate deśyate cāpi samāropad anakṣarah' "

(vi) LA, p. 137 .

na me yānam mahāyānam na ghoṣo na ca akṣarah' |

(vii) LA, p. 48 :

(a) *tattvaṃ hy akṣaravarjitam* . p. 194

(b) *nirakṣaratvād dharmasya*

(viii) VCh, pp. 24 .

(a) *tat kiṃ manyase subhūte asti sa kaścid dharmo yas
tathāgatena deśitah evam ukta ājyaṃśān subhūtiḥ bhagavanam
evam avocat. yathāhaṃ bhagavan bhagavato bhāṣitasārtham*

ajñāmi nāsti sa kaścīd dharmo yas tathāgatenañnuttarā samyak sambodhir ity abhisambuddhah nāsti dharmo yas tathāgatena dehitah.

(b) p 29 : tat kim manyase subhūte api nv asti sa kaścīd dharmo yas tathāgatena bhāṣitah subhūtir āha. no hidam bhagavan nāsti sa kaścīd dharmo yas tathāgatena bhāṣitah

(ix) LA, p. 144 :

yasyām ca rātryām dhigamo yasyām ca parinirvṛtāh |
etasminn antare nāsti maya kincit prakāśitam |

(x) MV, p 539

avāca 'nakarāḥ sarva śūnyāḥ ° °

Let us now make an attempt to understand the significance of such passages as cited above saying that the Buddha said nothing

This statement is on two grounds, (i) *pratyātmadharmatā*, i.e., the nature of (the highest truth) which is realized in one's own self, and (ii) *paurāṇasthitidharmatā*, i.e., the nature of the elements of existence that remains from the past. This requires some explanation. As regards the first it is held that the transcendental truth (*paramārtha*) springs up only as an inward conviction (*pratyātmavedya*), it cannot be attained through instruction from another (*aparapratyaya* = *paropadeśāgama*) for it cannot be expressed by any speech or word. So we are told that for the noble the transcendental truth is silence⁶. This is well-known also in the Vedānta⁷. Candrakīrti writes (MV, p 493)

sarva evāyam abhidhānabhidheyajñānājñeyādivyavahāro'śeṣo lokasamvṛtisatyam ity ucyate na hi paramārthata eva tat sambhavati kutas tatra paramārthe vācām pravṛtṭih kuto vā jñānasya sa hi paramārtho parapratyayah śāntah pratyātmavedya āryānām sarvaprapañcātītah sa nopadiśyate na cāpi jñāyate.

⁶ See IV 98 where the kārikā is entirely quoted

⁷ MV, p 56 paramārtho hy āryānām ūśumbhāvah

⁸ TU, II 41 yato vāco nīvarānte apīpya manasā saha, KU, II 3; BS, III 2 17, The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp 19 ff

Thus the Buddha did not say anything in fact, yet the people according to their own dispositions think that he did so. We read therefore in a text, *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, quoted in MV, p. 539, just after the passage (1) cited above :

atha ca yathābhimuktāḥ sarvasattvā nānādhātuvā'ayās tām vividhām tathāgatavācam niścarantim samjānanti. teṣāṃ evaṃ pṛthak pṛthag bhavati. ayaṃ bhagavān āsmabhyam imaṃ dharmam deśayati vayaṃ ca tathāgatasya dharmadeśanām śnumaḥ. tatra tathāgato na kalpayati na vikalpayati sarva-kalpavikalpajalavāsanaṇprapañcavigato hi tāntamate tathāgata iti vistaraḥ.*

Continues MV .

yadī tarhy evaṃ [na] kvacit kasyaci[t kaści]d dharmo buddhena deśitas tat katham ima ete vicitrāḥ pravacanavyavahārā jūāyante. ucyate nvidyānīdrānugatānām dehīnām svapnāyamānānām iva svavikalpābhyudaya eva ayaṃ bhagavān sakalatrībhuvanasurāsurasanaranātha imam āsmabhyam deśayatīti.

The following may also be quoted here from the LA, p. 194 .

na ca mahāmate tathāgata akṣarapatitaṃ dharmam deśayanti * punar mahāmate yo 'kṣarapatitaṃ dharmam deśayati sa pralapati. nirakṣaratvād dharmasya ata etasmiṇ kārāṇān mahāmateḥ uktaṃ deśanāpāṣhe mayānyatī ca buddhabodhisattvair yathāikam apy akṣaraṃ tathāgatā nodāharanti na vyāharantiṭi tat kasya hetor yad ūtānakṣaratvād dharmānām na ca nārthopasaṃhitam udāharanti. udāharanty eva vikalpam upādāyānupādāyān mahāmate sarvadharmānām sūsanalopah syāt *

And the conclusion arrived at here is that one should rest on the sense and not on letters. for one who rests on letters not only ruins oneself, but also cannot make others understand ;

arthapratisaranena* mahāmate bodhisattvena mahāsattvena[†] bhavitavyam na vyañjanapratisaranena. vyañjanānusāri mahāmate ku'aputro vā kuladuhitā vā svātmānam ca nā'ayati parārtham ca nāvabodhayati. Op. cit., pp. 194-195

* In Buddhist Sanskrit texts we have often **farera* for **aroma* in such cases

The second ground is this : The Buddha has said nothing, because what he is reported to have said was from the past. Nothing depends on the birth or absence of birth of the Tathāgatas, the true nature of elements of existence remains always the same. This is meant by the statement that the speech of the Buddha is no speech (*avacanam buddhavacanam*) Taking both the grounds together the LA, pp 143-144, says :

yad idam uktam bhagavatā yām ca rātrim tathāgato
 'bhisambuddho yām ca rātrim parinirvāsyati atrāntara ekam apy
 akṣaram tathāgatena nodāhṛtam na pravyāharīyati avacanam
 buddhavacanam iti kim idam sandhāyoktam ° bhagavān āha
 dharmadvayam mahāmate sandhāya mayaitad uktam. katamad
 dharmadvayam yaduta pratyatmadharmatām ca paurānasthiti-
 dharmatām ca ° utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā
 tathāgatānām sthitaivarāsam dharmānām dharmatā dharmasthītā
 dharmānyāmatā paurānanagaramahāpathavan mahāmate ° tad
 yathā mahāmate kaccid eva puruṣo 'tavyām parīatan paurānam
 nagaram anupāyeyd avikalapathapiaveśam sa tam nagaram
 anupraviśet tatra praviśya pratīviśya nagaram nagarakīrīsulham
 anubhavet tat kim manyase mahāmate api nu tena puruṣena
 sa panthā utpādito yena pathā tam nagaram anupraviśo nagara-
 vaicitryam ca āha no bhagavan bhagavān āha evam eva
 mahāmate yaṁ maya taṁ ca tathāgatair adhigatam sthitaivarā
 dharmatā dharmasthītā dharmānyāmatā tathatā bhūtatā satyātā.
 ata etasmāt kīranān mahāmate mayedam uktam yām ca rātrim
 tathāgato bhisambuddho yām ca rātrim parinirvāsyati atrāntara
 ekam apy akṣaram tathāgatena nodāhṛtam nodāharīyati

The following may also be quoted here from the VCh, p 243 just after the passage (iii) cited above

tat kasya hetoh yo 'sau tathāgatena dharmo bhisambuddho
 desito vā agrāhyah so 'nabhiāpyah na sa dharmo nādharmah
 tat kasya hetoh asamskritaprabhāvitā hy āryapudgalāḥ

It is thus quite reasonable that the author should declare at the end of his discussion the transcendental truth of *jñāna*

and *jñeya* or *dharma* which he begins the chapter with and discusses it throughout.

In the last *kārikā* of his work the author pays his homage to the highest truth to be realized, i.e., *nirvāṇa* of the Buddhists, and *Brahman* of the Vedāntins ;

100

durdarśam atigambhīram ajam sāmyaṃ viśāradam 1
buddhvā padam anānātvam namaskurmo yathābalam 2

• *iti gaudapādīya āgamāśāstre 'lātaśāntyākhyam* •
• *caturtham prakaranam samāptam.* •

'Having understood that state which is difficult to be seen, very deep, unborn,³ equal,⁴ fearless,⁵ and free from variety,⁶ we salute it according to our power

Here ends, in the *Āgamāśāstra* of *Gaudapāda*,

Book Four called the Cessation of the Fire-brand 7

The word *padu* 'state' in Buddhist literature is used also to mean *nirvāṇa* 8. But though it cannot be taken as a peculiarity in that literature, for the word is employed in the similar sense, i.e., *mokṣa* or *Brahman* also in Brāhmanical works,⁹ one is inclined to take it in the sense of *nirvāṇa* considering all that is discussed in this chapter. The two epithets *durdarśa* and *atigambhīra* strengthen the view. In Buddhist literature

1 See IV 93d which is the same as b of the present *kārikā*.

2 I 16, III 1, 19, 26, 33, 43, 47 IV 11, 12, 13, 38, 46, 48, 57 10, 74, 80, 93, 95, 96.

3 III 2, 38; IV. 77, 80, 93, 95

4 IV. 93 Cf *abhaya*, IV 78, *nirbhaya*, III 35

5 III 13; IV. 91, BU, IV, 4 19, KU, IV 10 11

6 AP, 819 : *padam (hāne paritāṇe nibhānamhi ca kīrtane*

7 For instance, KU, II 15, III 7-9

not for showing any unreality of Brahman but simply for indicating his splendour. On the other hand, here in our work, as well as in Buddhist works, frequently, and in every case, so far as goes my information, it is used as one of the numerous symbols of unreality.¹² The following may be quoted here from CS, 325 :

alātacakranimūṣasvapnamāyāmbucandrakaśiḥ |
dhūmikāntaḥpratiśrutkāmaricyabhraśaśamo bhavaḥ |

Poussin observes (JRAS, 1910, p. 136) that the title of the fourth Chapter, *alātaśānti*, cannot be said so far to be Buddhist, as the phrase *alātaśānti* has not been traced in Buddhist books. We cannot however, think so. For, it may equally be said that it is not traced in any Brāhmanic work older than the ĀS.¹³ Now, it may not be traced in Buddhist works, but the word *alāta* as a symbol of unreality according to the Buddhists, of which their works are full,¹⁴ is very well-known. Gauḍapāda himself has used it as such in his ĀS not less than four times (IV 47-50). He has shown taking the stand of a Buddhist, the unreality of the visible world comparing it with *alāta*, and finding out the cause of its appearance and showing thereby as to how it ceases. And if it is so, we cannot say that the title of the chapter is not Buddhist.

¹² Such as *marumariśka*, *gandhorisonagaṇa*, *khapūpa* : See NIV¹, 139-21.

¹³ A similar phrase, *mṛtasthūjālabhrentisānti* occurs in YV III 6-2.

¹⁴ See among others LA, pp. 9, 96, etc.

not for showing any unreality of Brahman but simply for indicating his splendour. On the other hand, here in our work, as well as in Buddhist works, frequently, and in every case, so far as goes my information, it is used as one of the numerous symbols of unreality.¹² The following may be quoted here from CS, 325 :

alātacakranimṛṇasvapnamāyāmbucandrakaiḥ |
dhūmikāntaḥpratiśrutkāmasicyabhraiḥ samo bhavaḥ |

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¹² Such as *māraṃaricika gandharacenegara, kṛpāṃpa* See MIV¹, 139, 21.

¹³ A similar phrase, *mṛgatruṣaḥalobhīrānti*, occurs in YV, III 6, 2.

¹⁴ See among others LA, pp 9, 96, etc

APPENDIXES

•

1

MĀNDŪKYA UPANISAD

A

TEXT

1

om ity etad akṣaram idam sarvam tasyopavyākhyānam¹
bhūtam bhavad² bhaviṣyad³ itī sarvam onkāra eva yac cānyat
trikālātītam tad apy onkāra eva

2

sarvam hy etad⁴ brahmāyam ātmā brahma so'yam ātmā
catuspād.

3

jūgaritasthāno bahisprajñah⁵ saptāṅgo ekonaviṃśatimukhah
sthūlabhūg⁶ vaiśvānarah prathamah pādah.

4

svapnasthāno 'ntahprajñah⁷ saptāṅga ekonaviṃśatimukhah
praviviktabhūk tarjaso⁸ dvitīyah pādah.

¹ ChāU, I, 1 1 om ity akṣaram² tasyopavyākhyānam, cf TU, I 8 1
om itīdam sarvam

² A¹ om itī it

³ Cf BU, III 8 3, IV 5 7 yad bhūtam ca bhavad ca bhaviṣyad ca

⁴ For hy etad A¹ tad

⁵ A² adds śuranyagarbho after it

5

*yatra supto*⁶ *na kañcana kāmam kāmayaṭe na kañcana svapnam*
*paśyati*⁷ *tat susuptam susuptasthana ekibhūta*⁸ *prajñānaghana*
*evā*⁹ *nandamayo hy ānandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prajñas tṛtiyaḥ*
pādah

6

*esa sarveśvara*¹⁰ *esa sarvajña*¹¹ *eso 'ntaryāmi*¹² *esa yonih*
*sarvasya*¹³ *prabhavapyayau*¹⁴ *hi bhūtānām*

7

nāntahprajñam na bahisprajñam nobhayatahprajñam na
prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam adṛṣtam avyavahāryam
agrahyam alakṣanam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyaya-
*sāram*¹⁵ *prapañcopaśamam śāntam śivam advaitam caturtham*
manyante sa ātmā sa vijñeyah

⁶ A¹ *susupto* for *supto*, adds *tu* before *kañcana*, and omits *eva* after **gṛhṇa*

⁷ BU, IV 3 19

⁸ Cf *ekibhāvati*, PU, IV 2 BU, IV 4 2

⁹ BU, IV 5 13 *ātmanāntaro 'bāhyah kṛtsnah prajñānaghana eva*

¹⁰ BU, IV 4 22 *sa vā esa mahān aja ātmā yo yam vijñānamayah pṛṇesu*
ya eso nāntarīdaya śrīśāś 'astmā chete^{*} *esa sarveśvara*^{*}

¹¹ MuU I 1 9 *yaḥ sarvajñah*, PU, IV 10 *sa sarvajñah*

¹² BU, III 7 3 *esa ta ātmāntaryāmi*

¹³ Cf *bhūtaṇām*, MuU, I 1 6 *yad bhūtaṇām paripaśyanti dhīrah*

¹⁴ A² *prabhāvā*^{*} D² *prabhavo*^{*} for *prabhavā*^{*} KU II 2 11

¹⁵ A¹ reads *nāntahprajñam na bahisprajñam* after *nāprajñam* and has *na*
prajñam nāprajñam na ghanam na ghanaprajñam na prajñānaghanam for *na*
prajñāna^{*} *nāprajñam* A¹ omits *na prajñānaghanam* After *alakṣanam* A¹
anigamano (?) *aṅgam* adding to it *bahisprajñam* (S reads in his commen'tary
alakṣanam vīṅgam ananumeyam ityarthah) *nāntahprajñam* and reading *cintyam*
for *acintyam* D¹ and D² add *aṅgam* before *acintyam* A¹ *ekāntam* for
ekātma-^{*}, T¹ and V¹ *ekātmyapra*^{*} for *ekātmapra*^{*}

8 .

so 'yam ātmā 'dhyakṣaram onkāro 'dhimātram pādā mātṛā
mātṛas ca pādā akāra ukāro makāra¹⁶ iti.

9

jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro 'kārah¹⁷ prathamā mātṛāpter¹⁸
ādīmattvād vāpnoti ha vai sarvān kāmān ādi¹⁹ca bhavati ya evam
veda.

10

svapnasthānaś tajasa ukāro dvitīyā mātrotkāśād ubhāyatvād
votkarṣatiha vai jñānasantatiḥ samānaś ca bhavati nāsyābrahmavit
kule bhavati ya evam veda.

11

suṣuptasthānaḥ prājño makāras tṛtīyā mātṛā miter²⁰ apiter vā
mīnoti ha vā idam sarvam apitiś ca bhavati ya evam veda

12

amātraś caturtho 'vyavahāryaḥ prapañcopaśamaś śivo 'dvaita
evam onkāra ātmaiva. samviśaty ātmanātmānam²¹ ya evam veda.

iti māndūkyopaniṣat samāptā.

¹⁶ A² A¹ IO 'raś ceti for 'ra iti.

¹⁷ A¹ omits 'kārah

¹⁸ A¹ prāpter¹ ?), IO āptor for āpter

¹⁹ VS, XXXII, 11 • ātmanātmānam abhi sam viveśa A² adds paṭyati śtes
*tmānam. K¹ Ch M² repeat ya evam veda which follows

B

TRANSLATION

1

Om, this syllable is all this. Its further explanation is: the past, the present, the future—all this is verily om. And whatever else that is beyond the three times, that, too, is verily Om.

2

Verily all this is Brahman, this self (*ātman*) is Brahman. This same self has four fourths.

3

The first fourth is the *Vaiśvānara* 'common-to-all-men,' i.e., universal, (active) in the waking state, cognitive outwardly, having seven limbs¹ and nineteen mouths² enjoying the gross

¹ According to Ś who follows here ChāU, V 18 2, these seven limbs are described thus. The very bright one (*sūryas*, i.e., the heaven) is the head. One with various forms (*utsarūpa*), i.e., the sun is the eye. That which has various paths i.e., the wind is the breath. The extended space (*bahula*) is the body. Wealth i.e., water is the bladder. And the earth is the feet. Here in the ChāU the number is more than seven.

² I.e., the means for experience of objects. According to Ś these are the following. The five organs of sense (*buddhindriya*), the five organs of action (*karmendriya*), the five vital breaths (*prāṇa*), the mind (*manas*), the intellect (*buddhi*), egoism (*ahankāra*) and thinking (*citta*). For an explanation of the last four one may be referred to the following

mano buddhir ahankāras cittaṁ karanam āntaram
samyago niscayo garvāḥ smaranam viśayā ime

These are regarded as 'mouths,' because these are the instruments with which one experiences the objects.

4

The second fourth is the *Tajasa* brilliant' (active) in the dreaming state cognitive inwardly having seven limbs and nineteen mouths enjoying the subtle

5

That is deep sleep in which one asleep desires no desire whatsoever nor does he see any dream

The third fourth is *Prājña* wise He is in the sphere of deep sleep and just unified a cognition mass consisting of bliss and enjoying bliss having the mind as mouth

6

This is the lord of all this is the knower of all this is the controller of all This is the source of all for this is the origin and end of beings

7

Not inwardly cognitive not outwardly cognitive not both wise cognitive not a cognition mass not cognitive not non cognitive not seen not to be dealt with not graspable having no distinctive marks not thinkable not to be defined the essence of the consciousness of the oneness of the self the cessation of the expression¹ quiescent blissful without a second—(such) they think is the fourth He is the self He is to be realized

8

The same self is *om* from the point of view of a syllable and from the point of view of its measure the fourths are measures and the measures are fourths and they are A U and M

¹ Or the expansion of the universe as explained generally

9

V a i ś v ā n a r a 'common-to-all-men' who is (active in) the waking state is the first measure, A, on account of its obtaining⁴ (*āpti*), or on account of its being the first. Verily, indeed, he obtains all desires and becomes first, who knows thus.

10

T a j a s a 'brilliant' who is (active in) the sleeping state is the second measure, U, on account of exaltation or intermediateness.

Verily, indeed, he exalts the continuity of knowledge, becomes equal,⁵ and none who does not know Brahman is born in the family of him who knows thus.

11

P r ā j ñ a 'wise' who is (active in) the state of deep sleep is the third measure, M, on account of measuring and immersing.

Verily, indeed, he measures all this and becomes (its) immersing—he who knows thus

12

The fourth is without any measure, with which there can be no dealing, it is cessation of expression, blissful, without the second. Thus om is the self, indeed. Enters he with his self into the self—he who knows thus

Here ends the Upanisad called M ā n ḍ ū k y a.

⁴ Or, pervading

⁵ See the note in H u m e s translation

VARIANTS

BOOK I

1 a All excepting A⁴ *bahihprajno* for *bahisprajno* d A⁴ PU¹ PU² *smrtah* N Th *matah* for *sthitah*

2 a A² *dakṣinagni°* V^o *dakṣinekṣi°* for *dakṣinakṣi°*, D² °mukho for *mukhe* b T^e °ś ca for °s tu c and d are omitted in A²

3 a and b excepting *pravivikṭabhuk* are omitted in A² d A² adds *tan* before *nibodhata*

4 b A² *ca* for *tu* which is omitted in A⁴ c A¹ A² K³ IO *anandam* for *anandaś* V^o A⁴ *tu* for *ca* IO *pramāh* for *prajnam* d A³ *trividha* for *tridha* A² *trptam* for *trptim* A¹ A² A⁴ K³ *uyanata* KN *uyanatha* for *nibodhata*

5 a A¹ *dhamastu* for *dharnasu* b K³ *yas tu* for *yas ca* c D³ V^o *vastu* for *yas tu*

6 a K³ °bhutanam for *bhavanam* b D D² °ity eva *niscayah* for °iti *viniscayah* D³ *sa niscayah* for *viniscayah* c D¹ *sarve* for *sarvam* D¹ D² *prana* A¹ *pranam°* for *prana°* A¹ °s *cetostana* D³ PU² °ś *ceto msun* for °ś *ceto msun*

7 a A⁴ D³ *vibhuti pra°* A¹ *vibhutih pra°* for *vibhutum pra°* KN *prabhavam* for *prasavam* K⁴ *pravadyante* anye for *prasavam* to anye c A¹ °sarupeti for °avarupeti d V^o *vikalpyate* IO *vikalpita* for *vikalpita*

8 b A² omits *vi* of *viniscitah* V^o *sṛstir vi°* for *sṛstau vi°* c K³ adds *bhutam* before *bhutanam* d A¹ *matyante* K¹ *mante* for *manyante*

9 At the end of the *karika* IO adds the first two *śloka*s of Ś's commentary viz *prajñānamsu°* and *yo viśvātma°*

• 10. a. A¹ *niṣṭṭiḥ*, T¹ *niṣṭṭe* for *niṣṭṭeḥ* c. A¹ °*bhūtānām* for °*bhāvānām*. IO omits the *kārikā* here, but reads it just after *kārikā* 12

11. a. A¹ A² A³ D² °*buddhau* for °*baddhau*. d. A¹ M¹ V² D² V⁴ A⁴ K³ *dvau tau*, PU² and the MSS A B C D F of NSi (pp. 194, 246) *dvau lu*, A¹ A² D¹ *dvaita*, PU¹ *dvaitam*, K³ PU² *dvau tu* for *dve tu*, while for this line K³ reads *dvau turye na tu sīdhyataḥ*

12 a. V² *parai*° for *parām*° b. V² *lān*° for *cān*°, PU¹ *cāpi nāntam* for *nāpi cāntam* d. K³ A¹ A¹ A² A³ D¹ D¹ V⁴ *turyam tat* (cf. Ś), KN *turiyam* for *turiyah*

• 13. d. K³ *tu* for *ca*

14 c. *svapnam tu* for *ca svapnam*

15 a. D² PU¹ *grahnataḥ* for *grhnataḥ* c. A¹ °*nayoh* for *tayoh*.

16 b. A¹ *sa bu*°, A² *svabu*° for *prabu*°. c. D¹ *asuptam* for *asvapnam* c. and d. A⁴ *advaitam asvapnam* for *asvapnam advaitam*

17 a. and b. A⁴ *vidyate vivartate* for *vidyeta nivarteta*, c. A⁴ *sarvam* for *dvaitam*

18 a. K³ *na nivarteta* for *vinivarteta*, K¹ omits it b. K¹ *vīkalpīto* for *kālpīto*

19 a. A¹ °*syādivi* for *syātvaiv*°

20 a. All excepting A. V⁴ V¹ *viṣṭāre* for *viṣṭāna* b. A¹ A² A⁴ *sphutah* for *sphutam* c. A² *sapratī*° for *sampratī*° d. A¹ °*vidhim* for °*vidham*

21 b. D² PU¹ *mānam sār* for *mānasa*° c. A² *sapratī*° for *sampratī*°. d. A¹ *laya sa*° D¹ *layah sa* for *layasa*°

22 a. All excepting PU¹ *ya*t for *yah* supported by Ś b. D¹ IO PU² *veti*, K³ *ecti* for *vetti* A⁴ *tadūataḥ*, K¹ *niscitam*, PU¹ *niscittah* for *niscitah* c. M¹ *sampūr* for *sa pūr*°. d. M¹ °*caiva* for °*caiva*

23 a. D² *nayati* for *nayate* d. M and KN °*gatī*h for *gatī*h

24 a. A⁴ *onkāro* for *onkāram*

25 a. *pranavo* for *pranav*°

26 a For this K¹ *pranavo brahmaparah brahma* b A¹ A² A³ D¹ D² M¹ V² V³ *parah for param IO parah smrtah for param smrtah*

27 d A² °*tarah for °taram*

28 a A⁴ omits *hi* before *isvaram* b A¹ A⁴ Ch Ch J N V² *hrdaye sthitam for hrđi samsthitam*

29 b A⁴ *smrtah for śuoah*

Colophon

A⁴ *mandukyopaniṣat samapta*

D¹ D² *mandukyopaniṣadvakhyane gaudapadabhaḡavatah kṛtau onkaraniṣayah prathamam prakaranam*

IO *iti mandukyopaniṣat samaptā*

K¹ *iti mandukyopaniṣadgaudapadavyakhyane onkarakhyā prathamam prakaranam samaptam*

K² *iti mandukyopaniṣat samaptam (sic) hare kṛṣṇa hare kṛṣṇa°*

PU¹ *prathamam prakaranam*

PU² *iti śrīgovindapūjapadaśiṣyasya paramahamsopariṣrajacaryasya śankarabhaḡavatah kṛtav agamasāstravivarane prathamam prakarane mandukyavyakhyanam samaptam*

V² *mandukyopaniṣat samapta*

V³ *iti mandukyavyakhyam prathamam prakaranam*

BOOK II

1 a A³ °*bhutanam for °bhavanam* c A A² Conc *bhcdaram for bhavanam*

2 b V² D¹ *dehan for deṣan* c V² *prabuddhaḥ for pratibuddhaḥ*

3 Before this *karika* B² reads here the *karika* 4 once more

4 b A³ A⁴ B IO K M¹ PU² *tasmāt for tathā* d All *saṃvṛtatvaṇa for saṃvṛtatvaṇ na* A³ *vidyate for bh dyate*

5 a A² omits *svapna°* A⁴ A⁴ B D¹ D IO PU² V² V³ °*ntasthāne for °nte sthāne*

7 b PU *svapno for svapne* V² ca *prat°* all others *vipraṣi° for pṛ prat°*

8. a. A² A² B² apūrvasthānidharmo, A¹ B¹ D¹ D² M¹ PU¹ PU² V¹ V¹ apūrvam sthānidharmo for apūrvāḥ sthānidharmāḥ. c V¹ matvā for gantvā. d K¹ V¹ yadaive° for yathaive.°

9. a A¹ °vrttāu ayam tv anta°, A² °vattāu artheṣv ānt°, B¹ J Jh V¹ °vrttāu apy anta°, Gh C °vrttāpy anta°, IO °vrttāu apy anta° for °vrttāu api tv anta°; K¹ °svanta° for °tv anta°. b V¹ kṣitām for kṣipitām, B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh K¹ asat, A² IO tad asat, A¹ tad idam asat for tv asat. c A¹ A² B¹ C D¹ D² IO Jh K¹ N PU² V¹ °ś cetasā for °ś ceto°, A¹ A² B¹ IO add hi and C J Jh N add ca after grhitām. d V¹ vaitathyam ubhayaḥ api omitting dṛṣṭam, A¹ K¹ sadasator vaitathyam omitting dṛṣṭam, B¹ C D¹ D² IO J Jh N sadasator vaitathyam dṛṣṭam, A² sadasator vaitathyam yukṭam

10 a A² D¹ D² anta°, V¹ hy anta° for tv anta° b. B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh K¹ V¹ asat, A¹ A² tad idam asat for tv asat. c. A¹ A² B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh K¹ PU¹ PV² V¹ °ś cetasā for °ś ceto°, A¹ A² B¹ IO add hi, the last one omitting sat, C J Jh N add ca omitting sad, A¹ A² B¹ Gh J Jh add hi after grhitām. d. A¹ A² sadasator vaitathyam dṛṣṭam, B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh V¹ sadasator vaitathyam yukṭam, K¹ satyadator vaitathyam for yukṭam va.tathyam etayoh IO and P omit the kārīkā entirely.

11 a-b A² adds tad after vaitathyam V¹ bhedānām vaitathyam for vaitathyam bhedānām c V¹ ekātān for ka etān

12 a P atmani as a different reading for ātmānam b K M¹ ātmadehah for ātma devah c V¹ bhogān for bhedān

13 b All except P vyavasthītan for vyavasthītān c A¹ A² B¹ IO °ś cittaḥ for °ś citta, B² first °ś cittaḥ then the anusvāra is struck off

14 a B¹ °laś ca for °la hi, K¹ yetas for ye'ntas b D² ya for ye

15 d A² vivesa manyahetukāḥ (evidently for vivesa nānya-hetukāḥ) for vivesas tv indriyāntare After that reading the MS reads asti tv indriyāntare

18 d A¹ A² B¹ D¹ D² PU¹ atmani for atmavī

19 a A¹ A² B¹ M¹ V¹ s ca for s tu b D² kṣipitā for

kalpitah. d. A¹ A² B¹ B² IO K¹ PU¹ *sammo°*, V^o *yan mo°* for *°yam mo°* supported by Ś.

20. a. A^o A³ B¹ D¹ K¹ IO PU¹ PU² V^o *prāṇa* for *prāṇā* b. D¹ *bhūtā iti* for *bhūtāniti* c B¹ *guna* for *guṇā* d K¹ *tadvivah* for *tadvidah*.

21. b. A¹ *visayā i bhūtāniti ca*, A² *bhūvisayāti ca* for *visayā iti*; PU¹ adds *ca* after *iti* c-d. A² *vedā iti vedavidō yajñā°* (i e . a and b of the next *kārikā*) for *loṭā iti loṭavidō*

22. a-b. A³ *loṭā iti loṭavidō devā iti ca tadvidah* for the whole line. M¹ adds *ca* after *iti* in a c A² omits *ca* d. M¹ V^o *°jya* for *°jyam* K¹ omits c and d

23. d. V^o *amūrta* for *°mūrta* omitting *ca* after *iti*

24. a. IO *kālā* for *kālu* c V¹ *pata iti vāta°* for *vādā iti vāda°* d B¹ V^o *bhuvanani ca* for *bhuvanāniti*.

25 a V^o *ca tadvidō*, Gh C Ch *mana°* for *mano°*.

27. a D¹ D² *loṭāloṭa°*, IO *loṭāl loṭa°* for *loṭā lloṭa°*. b IO adds *ca* after *iti* c. D¹ D² *°napumsakapumlingāḥ* for *°pum-napumsakam laingāḥ*; PU¹ *lingāt*, PU² *lingō* for *laingāḥ* d D¹ D² *parasparam* for *parāparam*, B¹ *atho°* for *athā°*.

28. d A^o M¹ V¹ *sarve* for *sarvaṃ*, V^o *tehe tu saṃyatāḥ* for *ceha tu sarvadā*.

29 a. K¹ *yad* for *yam*. b. *tad* for *tam*, A² *san* for *sa* c A¹ *vāvaṃ vipra bhū* for *cāvatī sa bhū°*, *vāvatī* for *cāvatī*

30. d. V^o *°yed yo vi°* for *°yet so 'vi°*.

32. Before this *kārikā* A¹ B¹ and V^o read

tamah svapnanibham dr̥itam varsabudbudasam̐ibham |
nāśapṛāyaṃ sukhāddhinam nāśottaram abhāvajam ||

(a. C *nabhasy abhra°* for *tamah svapna°*, A¹ *svabhra°* for *svapna°*. d A¹ B¹ *abhāvagam*, V^o *abhāvataḥ* for *abhāvajam*). It is quoted by Ś in his commentary on the preceding *kārikā* as from the *Vyāsa-smṛti*. P takes it as one of the verses included in the text and comments upon it.

b. V^o *baddho* and *sādhyaḥ* for *bandho* and *sādhakāḥ* respectively.

33. c. A¹ *atha dva°*, A² *artha dva°* for *upy adva°*. d. A² *yasmā°* for *tasmā°*, *śivah* for *śivā*.

34. a. A² *nātmābhāvena*, all others *nātmabhāvena* for *nānyabhāvena*, J *nābhedom* for *nānedam*. c. A² *prthaktvāt prthak kī°*, A³ *prthaktvāt prthaktvam ca*, D¹ *prthan nāprthak kī°*, D² *prthaktvāprthak kī°* for *prthan nāprthak kī°*.

36 b. B² *yoyayot* for *yoyayet*

37 a. PU¹ *nihstutir* for *nistutir*, A² *°stuto* for *°skāro*.

38 a. K¹ *mōtatva°* for *tatva°*

Colophon .

β¹ *iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādaśisyasya paramahamṣa-parivrājakācāryasya śrīśankarabhagavatpādasya kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivarane dvitīyam prakaranam vaitathyākhyam samāptam*.

K¹ *iti śrīmāndūkyopaniṣadgaudapādavyākhyāne vetadhāsa (sic) dvitīyam prakaranam samāptam*

PU² *iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādaśisyasya paramahamṣa-parivrājakācāryasya śrīśankarabhagavataḥ kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivarane dvitīyam prakaranam vaitathyākhyam samāptam*.

V¹ *°āgamaśāstre vaitathyākhyam dvitīyam prakaranam samāptam*

Vⁿ *°vaitathyākhyam dvitīyam prakaranam*

BOOK III

1 a. A¹ *upāsāśrī°* for *upāsanāśrī°* b. A¹ A² A³ Gh N J *jñāte* for *jāte*

2 b. D² *°sajāti* for *°m ajāti*, A¹ A² IO *yathā* for *gatam* c. A¹ A² *tathā* for *yathā*

In D¹ the leaf containing *kārikās* 2-7 is missing

3 c. K¹ *ghatāruvavac ca* for *ghatādivac ca* d. *°tāv evan nī°* for *°tav etan nī°*

4 b. Vⁿ *°kṣāda°* for *°kṣāda°* c and d are omitted in Vⁿ. d. Mⁿ *ñiva* for *ñivā*.

6 a. For it K¹ *nūparāgasamasmac ca* Vⁿ *°s tu* for *°s ca*

7 c. Vⁿ *naivanmanah* for *naivatmanah* d. Vⁿ *°rāvayau* for *°rāvayavau*, c and d are omitted in Vⁿ.

8. b. A¹ gagamanam for gaganam, A² malino for malinaṇi

9. c. All *sthītau* for *sthītaḥ* in V^o. c-d. V^o Jh °nīreṣu hy āḥā°, A¹ V^o °nīreṣu āḥā° (but on margin °nīreṣu āḥā°) for °nīreṣu āḥā°, d. A² °vīcakṣaṇaḥ for °vīlakṣaṇaḥ.

10. b. A¹ A² B¹ (on margin *vīsa*°) IO vīvaṇṇitāḥ for vīsaṇṇitāḥ; V^o ātma° for ātma° and °rjitāḥ for °ṇitāḥ. d. A¹ bhidyate for vidyate.

11. d. A² suayam yā, A^o B¹ B² IO PU¹ PU² V^o khaṇ yathā for sa-yathā, A¹ A² khaṇ samprakīrti°. D¹ D² V^o khaṇ prakāśi° for samprakāśi°.

12. d. IO °kāśapra° for °kāśaḥ pra°; V^o prakāśam for prakāśitāḥ.

13. a. A¹ °tmāno for °tmano°, A¹ aṇanyatvam for ananyatvam
c. A² IO bhidyate for nindyate. d. A² B¹ C D¹ D² M^o eca for etam.

14. c. Ch gauṣatvam for gaunam tan. d. A¹ A² B¹ B² D¹ D² IO JN PU¹ PU² V^o V^o hī na for na hī

15. a. A¹ A² °līngais tu for līngadyaḥ. b. A² veditā for coditā.

17. a. A² suṣi° for soṣi°, A² sumiddhāvādāvasthūstu for a.

18. b. sad for tad. c. IO ubhayatā for ubhayathā

19. c. °māno for °māne

21. b. yathā for tathā See IV 7²

22. d. A² sthāsya vinīcitam for sthāsyaṇi nīcalah

23. c. K² bhūto °bhuta° for bhūtato °bhuta°

24. a. A¹ A² cāṣṭyāt for cāmnāyād

25. c. A¹ A² kaṣ tu enam for kaṣo nu enam

26. c and d are omitted in A². The examination of K² shows that the order of the kārikās Nos. 25, 26 and 27 is actually the same as in other MSS, but owing to a mistake of the scribe in copying the commentary that order has been changed, they being copied as Nos. 25, 27 and 26 respectively.

27. a and b are omitted in A².

28. c. A¹ C D¹ D² P V^o °sulo for °putro.

31. a. A¹ A² °mukha° for °drīya°, B¹ sarvaṇ for dvaitam.

c. A² manasā for manaso; B² unmani° for amani°.

32. c. A¹ amanaskam for amanastām d. D² grāhyabhā° for grāhyābhā°.

33. b. A¹ A² jñeyam bhi° for jñeyābhi°; pracakṣyate for pracakṣate.

34. c. A¹ pravārah for pracārah.

35. a. Ch susuptau for susupte. b. V^o susuptasya ni° for susupte tan ni°, A¹ A² na ni° for tan ni°.

36. c-d. K¹ sarvajñopacārah for sarvajñam nopacārah.

37. a. A¹ A² °bhīmānavimatah, IO V^o °bhilāṣavigatah for °bhilāpavigatah. b. V^o °mujjhatah for °mutthitah. d. A¹ °bhatah for °bhayah

38. b. B² citā for cintā c-d. A¹ jñāyam ajñātīh, A² jñāyanaajñātīh for jñānam ajāti.

39. a. IO V^o °yogo nāmāyam, A¹ A² °yogī nāmāyam, PD °yogo nāmāisah for °yogo vai nāma d. A¹ bhayadarśatah, A² tattvadarśinah for bhayadarsinah.

40. a. A¹ IO nīgraho yat tad, A² nīgraho yat tam for nīgrahāyattam

43. b. A¹ A² °bhogam for bhogān

44. b. PU¹ samayet for śamayet d. B³ samam praptam, all others samaprāptam for śamaprāptam (=°t śama°) in VeS, 33 and supported by I'īdvanmanorañjanī. C vicālayet for cālayet

45. a. VeS with Subodhinī and I'īdvanmanorañjanī, loc. cit, rasam for sukham c. A¹ A² nīscitam ci°, IO nīscīlam ci°, B³ nīscararś ci° for nīscarac ci°

46. b. A¹ A² PU¹ manah for punah c. A¹ aningita°, A² anangita°, B¹ D² alingana° for aningana° d. K M' tathā for tadā

47. d. A¹ A² sa sarvajñah parikṣite for sarvajñam parīcakṣate.

48. b. B¹ sambhāvo for sadbhāvo

Colophon

B¹ PU³ iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādasīsy asya paramahamsa-parivrājakācāryasya śaṅkarabhagavatah kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivarane advaitākhyam tṛtīyam prakaraṇam samāptam

PU¹ iti śrīgaṇḍapādācāryavīracitam advaitākhyam tīrtiyam prakaraṇam.

V^o āgamaśāstre advaitākhyam tīrtiyam prakaraṇam samāptam.

V^a gaṇḍapādiye advaitamāyayo nāma tīrtiyam prakaraṇam.

BOOK IV

1. c. A¹ samvuddha^o, A² sambhinna^o for sambuddha^o. d. PU² ntaram for varam.

2. d. V^o darīta^o for deśita^o

3. a. V^o jāta^o for jāti^o b. B¹ first sarva then corrected to kecid as in the text.

4. a. All excepting D^o GP M^o dvayā for 'dvayah. d. A¹A² na jātim, V^o ajātam for ajātam

6. d. A² martya nu for martyatām, A¹A² syati for esyati.

7. a. D¹ martye for martyam b. D¹D² mṛtyu^o for martya^o; A¹A² Jh V^o yathā for tathā. See III, 21⁶.

9. a. A¹ nisvābhāvīkī for svabhāvīkī b. IO kṛta, B¹ B² K¹ GP Me V^o akṛtā, A¹ A² amṛtā, Jh kṛtakā, C^o py akṛtā for py akṛtā; Jh yathā for ca yā. c. A¹ 'ś ceti, A² sveti, A³ 's seti for seti. K¹ reads only d omitting other lines altogether.

10. b. A¹A² sarva^o for sarve d. A¹A² tanmayā apt for tanmanīṣayā.

It is to be noted that in D¹ kīrikās from 10 to 53 are wanting.

11. d. B¹ nityam bhinnam for bhinnam nityam, A¹ A² yat for tai

12. a. A¹A²A³ B¹B²M^o D¹ V^a yady ananyatvam, A² yayam ananyatvam, V^o yad anyatvam for yad ananyatvam As the word yadi occurs in b here in a one should read yad as actually found in V^o though it reads in b tai a for yadi

13 c-d. A¹ *mānas tasya vṛgavathā for *mānasya na vṛgavathā. d. V^o prajāyate, PU¹ PU² prasajjate for prasajyate.

14. a. A² *dī samam for *dih phalam. IO omits the kīrikā

15. b. V^o ādihetuh for ādir hetuh, A¹A² IO phalam ca yat for phalasya ca. d. A¹ putra^o for putraj^o.

· 16 b. V° °eṣitaḥ, B¹ K¹ °ṣitavyaḥ for °eṣitavyaḥ. d. A² vṣayāvat for vṣāṇavat.

17 a. B² phalātanupa° for phalaḍ utpa°. b. A¹ A² to for te.

18. b. A¹ hetuḥ, A² hetusu for hetutaḥ, C Jh phalāsiddhiḥ for phalaśiddhiḥ. c. A¹ A² param tat for katarat.

B² gives the number of the kārīkā as 16 instead of 18 and henceforth the scribe counts the following kārīkās accordingly, i.e., 17, 18, etc.

19 a. A² atrokṭi° for aśakṭi°, A¹ A° °paviṣṇānam for °pari-ṣṇānam d. A¹ A² °jāti for °jatiḥ; A¹ °vāpītā for °dīpītā.

20 b. A¹ A² °tamo for °samo, A° A¹ A² A³ B¹ B² D¹ IO PU¹ PU² V¹ V² saḥ for naḥ in C D². c. A° A³ B¹ B² IO PU¹ PU² V² V³ hṛ for ca in A¹ A² supported by Ś

21 a. Gh °parapari° for °parōpari° b. V° °dīpikam for dīpakam

22 a. IO omits va after svato

23 b. A° A¹ A² A³ B¹ B² D¹ IO M° PU¹ PU² cāpi for cāpi. d. PL¹ on the margin jatiḥ for hy ādir

24 d. A¹ A² paratam nasti nama tū (the former °taḥ for °tā) for the line. V° matām for matu

25 a. A¹ A² prajāpte for prajāpteh b. A¹ bhukṭi° for yukṭi°, V² °anyatha dīyanasataḥ for b. K¹ bhūta° for yukṭi° c and d are omitted in K¹

26 a. V° arthan for artham b. A° nabhasam V° arthābhāsa ta° for nartābhāsam ta° d. V IO °bhasam for bhasas, A¹ tata, C tatha for talaḥ

27 a. V saha for sadu b. pañcasu for °ty adhvāsu c. A¹ vīpariyatsaḥ for vīpariyasah

28 b. citam for citu° c. V nati V² yanti for jatiḥ d. V° te for kṛc and kṛc for t

29 a. V tasmad for yasmad b. A A² D° tatha for talaḥ c. A² nyatha for . anyatha

30 c. A anantabhaḍadimato A anantata vādimato, C D¹ anantata adimato for anantata vādimato

31. c-d. A² *santyeu*^c, A³ D² *santo vi*^o (in the latter between *santo* and *vi*^o there is an *avagraha* mark above the line and it seems to have been struck off) for *santo 'vi*^o, A² D² *lakṣitā* for *lakṣitāh*.

32. b. All excepting D² *vīpratīpadya*te for 'pī *pratīpadya*te See II. 7.

33. a. All *serve dha*^o for *sarvadha*^o in A¹, PU² *mṣāh* for *mṣā*. b. A² V² *kāryasyā*^o for *kōyasyā*^o. c. B¹ B² M¹ V² *samvīte* for *samvīte*

34. a. A² *jātvā* for *gatvā* b. A² *kālalaśyā*^o for *kālaśyā*^o. d. IO *darṣe* for *deṣe*.

35. b. A^c A² B¹ B² K¹ M¹ *sambuddho* for *prabuddho* c. A² D² *vāpi* for *cōpi*. **

36. b. D² 's *adarśanāt* for 'sya *darśanāt*

37. c. A^c B¹ B² PU¹ V² 'tvāt *tu* for 'tvāc *ca* d. A¹ A² D² *sajāga*^o for *saj jāga*^o

38(39). b. A¹ *tanmayā* for *tanmayāh* c. A¹ A² *dr̥tāc ca* for *dr̥tā ca*.

39(41). b. A² 'cintyāt for 'cintyān c. Gh *yathā* for *tathā*; A¹ A² *vīparyāsam* for *vīparyāsāt* d. A¹ A² *tatra ca* for *tatraiva*.

41(40). c. B² *sa* for *sac*.

42. a. A² *upālambhāt* for *upalambhāt* d. A¹ A² 's *ca satām* B¹ 's *trasyatām* for 's *trasatām*

43 a. A¹ 's *tu asatyam*, A² 's *tu satām*, D² *susatam*, B¹ 's *trasyatām* for 's *trasatām* b. A¹ D² *te* for *ye*, V² first *te* then corrected to *ye*.

45. a. A¹ A² *vastvabhāsam* for *vastvābhāsam* d. A¹ *jāntim*, B² *sāntam* for *jāntam*; D² *avyayam*, V² *sadvayam* for *advayam*

46. a.b. B¹ *cittacintam* for *cittam eram*. c. V² 'm *añānto*, PU² *jānanto*, C *viñāṇto na* for *viñānanto*, d. A¹ *tapati*, A² A² *tapanti* for *potanti*.

47. d. All excepting B¹ C Jh PU¹ *viñānaspā*^o for *viñāṇam spā*^o

48. a. A^c A² D¹ IO M¹ PU¹ PU¹ *akṣtam* for *akṣtam*. In A¹ a and b are omitted, c. A¹ 'māna *vi*^o for 'mānam *vi*^o.

A² reads c-d as a-b, and a-b as c-d with the following variants. c. °māna vi° for °mānam vi°, and °prajam for °m ajam. V° is damaged here

49 b D¹ B² nābhāsa for nābhāsa; A¹ A² A³ Kh Gh J N °ś cānyato for anyato. c-d A¹ nispandām nā°, A³ nispandā na, Gh nispandan nā° for nispandūn nā°

50 a-b B² °nirgatālata dra° for nirgatā alātāt te dra°. c-d. A¹ °vāsya nābhāsasthāvi° for °va syur ābhāsasyāvi°.

51 c A¹ A² A³ nispandam na for nispandūn na.

52 a K Jh rgatā vijñā° for °rgatās te vijñā°, K Jh M¹ V° °tā vijñānāt te, B¹ °tā vijñānas te, B² °lā vijñānā te, PU¹ °t te vijñānāt for °tas te vijñānād b A¹ A² A³ dravyatvam bhā° for dravyatvabhā° c-d A¹ °yogādanovittah, A² yogād ato cittāh for °bhāvōd yato °cintyāh, A¹ cintyā for °cintyāh, A¹ A² hi for te.

53 c A² °m anyathābhā° for °m anyabhā°

54 b A² B² D¹ V² capī for vapī, A¹ dharmajāh for dharmajam c A² °jālīh for °jāt m

55 a Vⁿ yad dhetu°, PU¹ yāva hetu° for yavad dhetu°. c D¹ D² °hetuh for hetu°

56 d A¹ A² B¹ B² D¹ D² M¹ PU¹ V° Vⁿ samsāram na prapadyate, A² samsāran nopapadyate for samsāro nopapadyate in A¹ and JO

57 a A¹ A² svapnam for sarvam b A¹ B¹ B² M¹ PU¹ PU² nāsti tena vai for tena nāsti vai, c All sadbhāvena for svabhāvena d A² nāsmī for nāsti.

58 b All excepting Vⁿ jāyante for samvṛtyā supported by Ś

59 a A² °yā jātā° for °yād bijā°, c A¹ A² na sa for nāsau; A¹ bocche° for cocche°

60 a A¹ nādyesu, A² nājyesu for nājesu, b A¹ śāśvatā nasti dhiyate, A² śāśvatāśāśvato'bhīdhā for this line c Vⁿ °nyamūdyante vartante for na vartante.

62 a. V° tu for ca b A¹ A² B¹ D¹ D² manah for cittam c V° tu for ca d A¹ jāgram na, A² jagrena for jāgran na.

63 a A¹ A² *pracalan* C *kvacaran* for *pracaran* b A¹ *disam utthitan*, A² *disamurcchitan* for *dasasu sithitan* c A¹ *anjanan* for *andajan*, B¹ *svapne* for *sopt*

64 a D¹ *svapne* for *svapna°*, A¹ A² °*kim na* A¹ D¹ °*kitta°* for °*citta°* b A¹ A² *bhidyante* for *vidyante* c A² *na drīya°* for *taddrīya°* A¹ °*m etedam* for °*m evedam* d A¹ *k m ta°* A² *kam ta°* A² D¹ *kitta°* for *citta°* K¹ *jagratā* cī° for *svapnadīk cī°*

65 a A¹ A² *varam* for *caran* a b V² *tasma dikṣu* corrected to *tac ca tyakṣu* for *jagrad dikṣu* -b A² *dasmulthitan* for *da asu sithitan* c D¹ *cepi* for *vapi*

66 a D¹ °*kṣmīyās°*, V² °*kṣanīyam°* for °*k anīyas°* b, A¹ *bhidyante* A² *bhidyantī* for *vidyate* c A¹ *drīyam idam evedam* for *tad drīyam evedam* d B¹ *jagrac* for *jagratā*

67 a C °*drīyeta* for °*drīye te* b A¹ A² A² B¹ B² C Ch D¹ D² G IO K M¹ PU¹ PU² V² *ca* for *na* After this *karika* D² adds .

pramapāṣunyam ubhayaṃ cittam caittam dvayaṃ yataḥ |
tanmatenaiva tac cittam tayaiva ca tad ghyāte ||

There are different readings for which see Ś's commentary (A²) from which it is taken. Here *d* is defective of metre.

68 d Kh Gh N Jh na *bhacanti* for *bhavanti na*

69 A¹ A² omit it. In A¹ it is not in the body but on the margin by a second hand b K¹ *mīyate nyate* for *nyate mīyate* d Kh Gh N J na *bhacanti* for *bhavanti na*

70 A² V² omit the *karika* a A K V *nirmitako* B B *nirmitako* for *nirmitako* b A² D D¹ M¹ *vā* for *ca*

71 c A² *ya etad u°* for *etat tad u°* A² V² *sarlam* K¹ *patram* for *satyam*.

72 a For this A¹ A¹ *cittam spandati me sarlam* b D¹ D² *grāhyam gra°* for *grāhyagra°*

73 c All *paratantrabhi°* for *paratanthro 'bhi°* d For this V² *paramarthena nasy asau*. Then again it has *c* and *d*

- 87 a A¹ *avastu* A² *svastu* for *savastu* c and d are omitted in K¹

88 a Vⁿ **palam* for **palambham*

89 a B¹ *dividhe* for *trividhe* b D¹ *vindate* D² *vidate* for *vidite*

90 a A¹ A² **jneyasga lakyaṇi* IO **jneyopatāḥyaṇi* for **jneyāpyapakyaṇi* d D¹ **lambho°* for **lambha°*

91 a A¹ A² A³ **ujneyāḥ* for **¹aj jneyāḥ* a b Ch reads *sarve* before *jneyāḥ* b All *sarve dharma* excepting A¹ V¹ which read *sarvadharma* c V² *ca* for *hi*

92 b All *sarve dharmāḥ* excepting V² which reads *sarva dharmāḥ*

93 b A² *prakṛtau* *ia* for *prakṛtyaia* A²] *sun mitch* V² *suniscitah* for *sunirvritah* c A² V² *sarvadha°* for *sarvā'dha°* d A¹ A² *tyamam* for *sumyam* A² **radam* for **radam* For d B² *prakṛtyava sunirvritah* repeating c and d as in the text

94 c A¹ *vedabhinnah* A² *vedabhinnah* Vⁿ *bhedanīṣṭhā* for *bhedanīmnah*

95 a A¹ A² *ajam* for *aje* A¹ *sumyam* for *āmye* b A¹ A² *vpaścitam* IO *vīniscitah* for *suniscitah*

96 a A² *ajetyojam* M *aje py ajam* for *ajesu ajam* D² *ajam kṛntam* for *asamkṛntam* D and D² add here *sarvabhūtatma bhūtasya sarvabhūtatmitasya ca* which is found in Śs commentary on the preceding *karika*

97 a IO *vaidharṇe* for *ia dharmye* d A² *udharane* for *utavarana°* D **¹aranā°* for *arana*

98 c A¹ *budhus* A² *buddhas* for *buddhas* A *yutā* A² *yukta* for *mukta* d A² *budhyaṇti* IO *budhyante* for *budhyanta*

99 a A¹ *budhasya* for *buddhasya* b A *no monah* A² first *bodhinah* then corrected to *vyapīnah* D D² K¹ M¹ PU¹ *tap nah* A² *tap(yi)nah* for *īṣṭmah* c All excepting A¹ A² *sarve dha°* for *sarvadha°* d A¹ *budhena* for *buddhena*

100 a Vⁿ *durdātām* for *durdarām* b A **yamam* for *sumyam* A² **radam* for **radam* d A¹ *manah kurmo* A² *manaskurmo* A³ D² Vⁿ *namah kurmo* for *namaskurmo*

Colophon :

A¹ A² ity upadeśagranthe 'lātaśāntyākhyam prakaranam samāptam.

A³ adds to the above only *caturtham* after *prakaraṇam*.

B¹ B² iti śrī govindabhagavatpūjyapādaśiṣyaśāṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛtav āgamaśāstravivarāṇe alātaśāntākhyam caturtham prakaranam samāptam (B² sampūrṇam).

D¹ D² iti śrīgaudapādabhagavataḥ kṛtau āgamagranthe upadeśagranthe vedāntamūle gaudapādiyam caturtham prakaraṇam.

IO ity alātākhyam caturtham prakaranam upanīsat samāptam (sic) śiva śiva (17 times).

K¹ iti māṇḍūkyopanīsadgaudapādavyākhyāne.

PU¹ iti śrīmadgaudapādācāryakṛtau māṇḍūkyavārttikē alātaśāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraṇam samāptam. prakaraṇa-caturthayātmakam śāstram sampūrṇam

PU² iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādaśiṣyasya śāṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivarāṇe - alātaśāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraṇam samāptam.

V^c iti śrīgaudapāda āgamaśāstre alātaśāntyākhyam caturthaprakaranam samāptam

Vⁿ iti śrīgaudapādiye upadeśagranthe alātaśāntyākhyacaturthaprakararam.

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36, identity with dravya, of, 91

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grahaṇagrāhakābhāsa, with
the appearance of the perci-
pient and the perceptible,
155

grāhaka percipient, 24.

grāhya perceptible, 24

caturkoṭi, four points, 191, 192.

calācalaniketa, with an un-
fixed home, 46

citta, mind, cxxx, cxxxii,

cxxxv, cxlii, it does not relate
itself to an object, 135, 137,
138, it is the seed of all, 137,
it has no origination, 137, 154,
it is not found, 139, 168;
duality is only it, 172; all
this is it, 167, 172; without the
objective cause it is mokṣa,
187, when without an objec-
tive cause it has no origina-
tion, 184, this non-origination
is unconditioned and always
the same and free from the

two, 185 ; nothing to be seen by it, 137, 138 ; no Brahman (creator), etc., excepting it, 172 ; nothing visible excepting it, 173 ; it is in the form of the subject and the object, 173 ; it is with and without movement (spandita), 173 ; the creation is owing to its movements, 173 ; cessation of its movements is Brahman, 79 ; asanga, without relation, 172 , ākāśasama, like the sky, 169, nirvisaya, without the object, 172 ,— abhiniveśa, adherence to, 167, —īksaniya,—dṛśya, (cf mano dṛśya, 67) to be seen by, cxxiv, 145, 166, 184 ;—dhārā, continuity of, 139, —nāśa, disappearance of, cxxxi, —mātra, pure, 186-187, 167, —spanda (or cit^o) is expressed by such terms as jīva, etc., 173

cinmātra, pure thought, cxxxvii.

chāyātman, ātman in the form of a shadow, lxlxxxvii, lxlxxxviii.

chāyāpuruṣa, a person in the form of a shadow, lxlxxxvii, lxlxxxviii.

janmasamkleśa, impurity through the birth, 131.

janya-janaka, to be produced and the producer, 118

jagarita, wakefulness, 145-147.

jāgrat, wakefulness, 165, 167.

jāti, birth, origination, 50, 108 ; dispute on, of the existent, and of the non-existent, 101 ; neither of the existent nor of the non-existent, 101, of different things, 149 ; teaching of and its significance, 149 —vāda, theory of, 104 128, 146, refutation of, 105ff

jīva, cxxx 50, neither a transformation nor a part of Ātman, 7, nirmīṭaka, i.e., made by supernatural power, 170 ; māyāmaya, i.e., made of illusion, 170, svapnamaya, i.e., made of dream, 169.

jñāna, knowledge, civ, cvi, cxxxv, cxxxviii, 68, 83-85, 88, akalpaka, 68, 83 ; āja, 68 209, anutpannapradhvamsi, 85, anutpādarūpa, 85, (cf anutpādalakṣaṇā prajñāpāramitā, 85 ;) aprāptilakṣaṇa, 85, 198 ; asanga, 68, 85, 209 ; asangalakṣaṇa, 68, 85, 172, asangaśvabhāvalakṣaṇa, 85, 172, 198 ; ākāśakalpa, 83, ātmasanistha, 72 74, ālambanam nopalabhate, 73, ālambya m arthaṁ nopalabhate, 73 ; jñeyābhinna, 68, 83 ; trividha, viz., svasāmānyalakṣaṇa-

- nirvāna, apravṛtti, not coming forth, not arising, cxxviii, cxlu, 50, 81, 205.
- nirvisaya, objectless, cxxxi.
- nirvikalpa, indeterminate, cxxi, cxxxvi.
- nīspanna, = parinīspanna, cxxxv.
- nairātmya, the state of being without ātman, i e, svabhāva, nature, 149. A.
- Nyāya, 91
- pañcaviṃśaka, a collection of twenty-five, 35.
- pañjikā, commentary, 43
- paññatti (P.), S prajñapti, q v
- pada, state, 194.
- paratantra, dependent, 132, 174-177, 179.—lakṣana,—svabhāva, characteristic of, nature of, 176, 177, 199, 200
- paranirapekṣa, independent of others, 111.
- paramārtha, absolute truth, 49, 87, 108, 205, 214 —naya, view,—satya, truth, 162, 163, 173, 189; as upeya, to be approached, 175.
- parikalpita, imagined.—lakṣana, characteristic,—svabhāva, nature, 176-179, 199, 200.
- parinirvāna, 99.
- parināma, transformation, cxxxxi.—nityatā, eternity as, cxlxxx, —vāda, theory of c.
- parinirvṛta, perfectly merged in nirvāna, 204, 205. See sunirvṛta.
- parinīspanna, perfect.—lakṣaṇa, characteristic, —svabhāva, nature, 176-179, 197, 200
- paripāka, maturation, 200; ātma°, of one's own self, 200, sattva°, of the people, 200.
- paripācana, maturation, 200.
- para°, of others, 200. . .
- paśu, a person in bondage, 35.
- pakya, to be made matured, 199, 200
- Paśupata, a philosophical system, 35.
- pāṭhakrama, the order of reading, 190.
- pāda, quarter, 9, 31.
- pudgalanairātmya, unreality of the individual ego, 211.
- purānasthitidharmatā, the nature of the elements of existence, that remains from the past, 214.
- puruṣa, person, 35
- purvāparakoṭiparikṣā, examination of the first and the last points of the world, 123.
- purvāparakoṭyaparīkṣāna, absolute ignorance of the first and last points of the world and things, 123.
- prithak, different, 41.

- vidyā, one of the tattvas in the Pāsupata system, 35.
 viparyāsa, false notion, 136, 137.
 vipranāśa, disappearance, 162.
 vibhu; all-pervading, 1, 4
 vibhūti, expansion, 3; manifestation, 35
 vivacana, synonym, cxxxx. ✓
 Vivartavāda, the doctrine maintaining that the appearance of the universe is imposed on Brahman, cx.
 viśāda, scholar, bold, 207
 Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda, cx, cx
 viśva, the embodied self in the waking state, lxxxiv-lxxxviii, cii, cxiv, 1, 2, 4-6, 9, 11, 12, 31. ✓
 vijaya, field of activities, 69, 187; object of senses, 31
 vihāra, field of activity, 69, 187.
 vītyakāya, loss of the action of the mind, 82
 viddhasammatai, approval of the old teachers, lxix.
 veda-pāra-ga, 44.
 vedapāra-ga, 44
 vevacana (P.), S. vivacana, q.v.
 Vedānta, xlvī, lxxiv, 44, 101, 175, 214.
 vesāraja (P.), S. vaiśāradya, q.v.
 vaitathya, unreality, ciii, 15, 16, 47.
 vaiśāradya, P. vesāraja, 1
 intrepidity, derivation and meaning of; four-fold, 206-208
 Vaiśvānara, belonging to all-men, lxxxv, lxxxvi, c, ci.
 vyaya, change, 158.
 vyavadana, purification, 103, 129
 vyavahāra, common use, 129
 —naya, practical point of view, 162, —satya, empirical truth, 162, as upāya, means, 175
 vyāvahārika satya, empirical truth, 175, 178
 śakti, one of the tattvas in the Pāsupata system, 35; energy, 91, 121-123; cannot be established in the coming into being of anything 123.—mat, one with, 91 No difference between śakti and śaktimat, 91
 saṃkleśa, impurity, 129, 130.
 sama equanimity, 77.—prāpta, one that has reached, 77.
 śānti, peace, 75
 śarad, autumn, 207.
 śāda, timid, not bold, 207
 śāradya P. śāraja, timidity, 207, 308.
 Śīra ātman, incorporated soul, lxxxix, lxxxviii.

śāstra, Chinese lun, Tib. bstan bcos, lxii.

śāśvata, eternal, always existing, cxxv, cxi, 160 — aśāśvatābhidhā, appellation of eternal and non-eternal, 164 — vāda the theory of eternity, cxliv, 162.

śiva, one of the tattvas in Pāśupata system, 35, calin, 50 sadā°, one of the tattvas in Pāśupata system

Śuddhādvaitavāda, the theory of the Pure Monism, cx.

śuddhi-asuddhi, purity and impurity, 104

✓ śūnya, 47 — tā, 47, 189, 211 — praveśa, mahā-, 95

sramana brāhmaṇa 194

śrutiprasthāna, the Course of Revelation, ciii

✓ Śreṣṭhayaṇa same as Mahāyana 199

śadvimśa consisting of twenty-six the philosophical system of Patañjali, 35

samvitti, consciousness 86

✓ samviti covering, i.e., empirical truth 161, 163, 173 175 — satya empirical truth 162 See kalpitasamviti, satya

samsara 141, 143 160, 162 205

✓ sakaśāya, with passions, 77

sakkāyadīthi (P.), S. satkāyadr̥ṣṭi, the theory of individuality, 26-27.

samkleśa, impurity, 129, 130, 131. — upalabdhi, experience of, 131, 132.

saṃkhyā, understanding, 129.

sa-ce (P), in the sense of tacet See sa-yathā, sa-yadi 55

samjñā, consciousness, ✓ 96; designation, 129. — vedānīrodha, a samādhi in Buddhism, 96, 99, 100 See saññāvedayita° S samjñā°, q.v., 96, 99, 100 According to Chinese P. sammā°, S. samyak° for saññā°.

satī (P), S. smṛti, meditation, 45

sat, existent, not arising from the existent or the existent, cxxi, 147-148

satkāyadr̥ṣṭi, P sakkāyadīthi, q.v.

✓ satkāryavāda, the theory that the effect exists in its cause 101, 102; Buddhist views on, 101.

satva, one of the constituents of Prakṛti in the Sāṃkhya system, 31, people — avatāra, causing the descent of, or leading the, 150 — paripāka, the act of maturing the, 200

- satya, truth, 162; vyavahāra°, practical; paramārtha° or pāramārthika°, transcendental, 162, 175, 178; prātibhāsika°, existing in appearance, 178, vyāvahārika°, 162, 175, 178; samvṛti°, empirical, 162.
- sadbhāva, 161.
- sanimitta, with (objective) cause, 131
- sanirvāna, extinct, cxxxvi, 81
- santati, continuance, cxli — nityatā, eternity as continuance, cxliv.
- sandhi, = abhisandhi, intention, 150.
- sama, always in the same condition, 73, 184, 185.—tā, 49, 72, 73, 194.—prāpta, 78. See samaprāpta
- samādhi, intense abstract meditation, 70-72, 74 vajropama°, thunderbolt like, 307.
- sambuddha, perfectly understood, 83.
- sambhava, origination, 63, 115, is not of the non-existent from the existent, 147; possibility, 171.
- sambhūti, birth, 63; various explanation of, 64
- sammuti (P.). S. sammati, general consent, 162.—satya, truth by, 175.
- sa-yathā, in the sense of. tad yathā. See sa-ce, sa-yadi, 55.
- sa-yadi, See sa-ce, sa-yathā 55.
- sarva, all.—jñā, knower of, omniscient, 70;—tā, tva, 194, 195, 198, 199, sarvajñatva—vāda, cxxxv. sarvabija, seed of all, 136.—ka, 188
- sahaja, innate, 111.
- sāmvrta, pertaining to samvṛti, q v. 178
- sāmsiddhika, self-existent, 111
- Sāṅkhya, 101, 102.
- sādhyasama, that which is yet to be proved, 125.
- sāmānyadharma, common quality, 9.
- sāmya, = sama. q v. 208, 217
- sukhasthiti or sukhāvasthiti, pleasant state, 97
- sunirvṛta, perfectly merged in nirvāna, 204, 205
- suṣupta, referring to Prājña, lxxxvi, deep sleep, 34.—stha, one in the state of deep sleep, lxxxviii.
- suṣupti, deep sleep, 34.
- sūtraprasthāna, the Course of Sūtras, civ.
- ṛpti, creation, 37.
- stabdhībhāva, stiffness, 78.

yatpādābjarajoleśasamparkāt sahasā sakṛt |
 sarvaśaṃsārahino 'haṃ tān nato 'smi gurūn sadā || 2
 tāpanīyarahasyārthavivṛti[r] leśato mayā |
 kriyate 'lpadhiyām tasmāt kṣantavyam kṣatam
 uttamaiḥ || 3

iha pūrvasmin granthe nṛsiṃhākārabrahmavisayā
 nirupādhikabrahmavidyāphalādhigatā. tathā hy uktam
 v ā r t t i k a k r d b h i h

,nṛsiṃhabrahmavidyaiṣa vyākṛtā jñānasiddhaye |

And it ends thus .

tāpanīyarahasyarthadīpikā tīmirāpahā |
 gurvanugrahalabdhasā satam astu sukhāptaye ||
 saccidānandapūrn[āya] pratyagekaraśātmane |
 tejase mahate bhuyān namaḥ pumsimharūpiṇe ||
 yasya samsmṛtimātreṇa taranti bhavāsāgaram |
 tam nato 'smi gurum bhaktyā dhiyā vācā ca
 karmanā ||

iti śrīmatparamahamsaparivṛajakācāryaśrīmacchuka-
 munindraśiṣya-śrīmadgaudapādāmunivīracite uṭṭaratāpa-
 nīyavivarane navanīlāḥ khandah śubham astu. śrī-
 lakṣmīnṛsimho rakṣatu mām nṛsiṃhārpaṇam astu.

tārane vatsare masī śrāvaṇe 'śitapakṣage |
 pañcamirevatīyukte tithau kumbheśāpattane ||
 nṛsimhatāpanīyākhyatikām gaudābhīdhām satim |
 vyāseśvaro 'likhat svast[y]a
 nṛsimhas tena nūtha(tuṣya?)tām ||

It is interesting to note that the following passage
 from this Vivaraṇa (pp. 25-26) is identical with that in

Śaṅkara's commentary on the MāU, 11, excepting a few unimportant variations as noted in the foot-notes :

mīyate iva hi viśvataiṣasau prājñena pralayotpattyoh
praveśanirgamābhyām prastheneva yavāh. tathonkāra-
samāptau punaḥ punaḥ¹ prayoge ca praviśya nirgatāv²
ivākārokaṛau makāre 'ntyē 'ksare ekibhūtāv ivākārokaṛau.
tathā susupte prājñe viśvataiṣasau³ minoti jāgradādi-
yāthātmyam jānātīty arthah.⁴ apitiś ca jagatkāraṇātmā ca⁵
bhavati.

P. cxxxv. Regarding the identity of *citta* and Brahman, see YV, III 64. 31 ; 65. 3 ; 66. 14 ; 96. 56, 66, 73 ; IV. 35. 20-23, 54. 20. From these verses we can gather that *jīva*, *cit*, *ātman*, *brahman*, *śūnya*, *nairātmya*, etc., are the different expressions of *citta*. From the same authority (III. 122. 35) we also know that such names are made by the authors of *śāstras* in order to supply some terms required by them.

śāstrasamvyavahārārtham tasyāsyā vitatākṛteḥ |
cidbrahmātmēti nāmāni kalpitāni kṛtātmaibhiḥ || .

P. cxxxvi, note 8. For *manahkṣaya* there is *manah-parikṣaya* in YV, III. 116. 13 It has also *manonāśa* (III. 95. 35-36) and *manahpraśamana* (III. 122. 27).

¹ Ś omits it

² Ś nirgacchata.

³ For susupte "taṁsasu" Ś has viśvataiṣasau susuptakāle prājñe

⁴ Ś minoti ha vā idam sarvaṁ jagad

⁵ Ś omits it

BOOK I

5. It is quoted in ŚV, p. 27.

6. On the creation from Prāṇa see KtU, III. 3 and BS, I. 1. 23, 28. Here in the kārīkā we have an Idealistic view (Vijñānavāda).

9. For *āptakāma* see BU, IV. 4. 6. For *bhogārtham sṛṣṭiḥ* see Śrīdharaśvāmin on BP, III. 7. 4: *avidyopādher jīvasya bhogārtham īśvaraḥ sṛstyādi karoti.*

10. See BU, IV. 2. 4; 4 22; 5. 15.

12. The word *sarvadvīś* in sense is the same as *sarvājña* 'omniscient' (III. 36). His omniscience is, according to Śaṅkara (BS, I. 1. 4), on account of his capacity for all knowledge (*sarvajñānaśaktimattvenaiva sarvajñatvam abhyupagantavyam*), or owing to the fact that he is never dissociated from his intelligence, i.e., all-embracing knowledge (*Op cit.*, I. 3. 42: *sarvajñatvalakṣanayā prajñayā nīyatam aviyogāt*).

On this kārīkā as well as on I. 15 see *Upadeśasāhasrī*, XVIII. 26.

13. In this and the following kārīkāś *nīdrā* in sense is, in fact, *suṣupta*. Here *nīdrā* is said to be *bija* 'seed', i.e., origin, because *nīdrā* being non-realization of truth is the cause of both dream and waking. See *Upadeśasāhasrī*, XVIII. 26 as quoted in NS, IV. 43: *suṣuptakhyam tamo 'jñanam bijam svapnaprabodhayoh | atmabodhagnidagdhām syād bijam dagdhām yathābhavam ||*

This explanation of *bija* slightly differs from the one given before on p. 6.

14. See I. 16 III. 35 36, IV. 81. In the fourth state, *Turya*, there is no *nīdrā* nor *svapna*. In such cases

while *nidrā* means the *laya* or *mūḍha* 'infatuated' state of the mind, *svapna* indicates the state called *vikṣepa* 'distraction'. This state of Turya is the state of Brahman.

15. For *b* of the *kārikā* cf. YS, I. 10: *abhāva-pratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā*. This *kārikā* is quoted in NSi, IV. 42.

16. This *kārikā* is quoted in MnU, I. 13, with the reading *ajanmanidram* for *ajam anidram* in *c*.

17. The following is quoted as from Ga u ḍ a - p ā d ā in Ś a ṅ k a r a ' s *Viṣṇusahasranāma-bhāṣya*, Mysore ed., p. 18:

yad yad dvaitam prapañcasya tan nivartyam hi cetasā |
manovṛttimayam dvaitam advaitam paramārthatah ||

19. The Praṇava-upāsana referred to here is well-known in Upaniṣads, older and later alike (ChU, I. 1. 1, 4. 1; PU, V. 1-2; TU, I. 8. 1; MuU, II. 2. 6; MU, IV. 4. 37). Here a few words are necessary for the real significance of *upāsana* (sometimes *upāsana*), which is enjoined (yuñjita praṇave cetah, I. 25) and described to some extent here by our author. The word *upāsana* is derived, as well-known to all, from *upa-√ās* literally 'to seat near at hand (in order to honour or wait upon)', and figuratively 'to do homage, worship, be devoted to', etc. But in such Upanisadic texts as *mano brahman upāṣita* (ChU, III. 18. 1), or, *sa yo nāma brahman upāste* (Op. cit., VII. 1. 5), it has some special meaning. The first sentence quoted above does not mean 'One should worship the mind as Brahman,' nor do we understand from the second sentence 'He who worships the name as Brahman.' In both of the cases *manas* or *na-*

or *upāsana* gives the sense of meditation (*dhyāna*). It is in the words of Ś a ṅ k a r a a continuous flow of one and the same idea having an *ālambana* 'support' recommended by the scripture, unmixed with other ideas. (BS, IV. 1. 7 : *upāsanaṃ nāma samānapratyayapравāha-karanam*. See ChU, I. 1. 1 and our text, p. 48). The best *ālambana* for the *upāsana* of Brahman, as in the present case, is Om. We read in the KU, I. 2. 17 :

etad ālambanam śreṣṭham etad ālambanam param |
etad ālambanam jñātvā brahmaloke mahīyate||

The meditation of Om as Brahman, just as the meditation of an image (*pratimā*) as Visnu 'the all-pervading one', is the means for the realization of Brahman. It is to be noted, according to Ś a ṅ k a r a's school, that while *Brahmajñāna* leads one immediately and directly to *mokṣa*, *Brahma-upāsana* does not do so, it helps one in gradually attaining to it and to prosperity. Ś a ṅ k a r a says, it effects the purity of the mind and making the truth clear thereby helps us in acquiring the knowledge of Brahman. Besides, there being an *ālambana* 'support' it is easy to make an *upāṣana*.

It is to be further noted that there are two kinds of *upāsana*, that involving the contemplation of the Self (*ahamgrahopāsana*), and that which is symbolical or concerned with external symbols (*pratīkopāsana*). In the former, the Self, the Paramātmān, is contemplated in his conditioned form (*saguna*) with the idea that 'I am he'. For instance, we read in the TA, VII. 6 :

sa ya eso 'ntarhrdaya akāśah, tasmin ayam puruṣo
manomayo mṛto hiraṇmayah.

'It is that space within the heart. Here is 'the Person, formed of thought, undying and golden'.

Here the person (*i.e.*, Paramātman) within the space of the heart with those qualities is to be meditated with the thought that 'I am the Person'.

But where a worldly or external thing which is other than Brahman is contemplated being regarded as a higher god or Brahman himself that contemplation or *upāsana* is symbolical (*pratīkōpāsana*). For instance, in the case of the text, *mano brahmety upāsita* (quoted above), the mind is to be contemplated as Brahman. So here is another instance of *pratīkōpāsana*. For details see BS, III. 3 and IV. 1.

Now with regard to our own case, Om is to be meditated as the Self, and so we have also here an instance of *pratīkōpāsana*. The three measures (*mātrās*) of Om are to be meditated as *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* respectively. And that Om which has no measure (*amātra*), *i.e.*, the measures of which are not considered separately, and which is thus immeasurable (*amātra*); or which, in other words, is with unlimited measure (*anantamātra*) is to be meditated as *Turya*.

It is said that in an *upāsana* one thing is to be viewed as another thing; for instance, here the first measure of Om, *a*, is to be regarded as *Viśva*. It amounts to saying that these two things are identical. But how can this identity be possible? The answer is this that such identity is by no means actual, but owing to some common quality (*sāmānyadharma*) of the two the identity of which is intended. This is a well-known

practice among us. We say of a brave lad that he is a lion (*siṃho māṇavaḥ*), though in fact he is not so. It is only on account of the common quality, bravery, of the lad and a lion that we identify them employing the phrase. Simply following this method of expression our teacher has shown some common qualities of the Puruṣa and Om (I. 19 ff.) owing to which their identity has been made possible. Let us remember here the following line of Yāska in his Nt, VII. 24 : *bahubhaktivādini brāhmanāni bhavanti*. It means that the Brāhmaṇas have a great deal of *bhaktivāda*. But what is *bhaktivāda*? D u ṭ ṭ g ā c ā r y a says in explaining the above line of Yāska : *bhaktir nāma gunakālpana. tena kenacidguṇena brāhmanam sarvam sarvathā varṇayati tatra tattvam anvesyam*. It says that *bhakti* means assumption or consideration of a quality by which a Brāhmaṇa describes all things in all kinds of way. But the truth must be investigated there

1 20. Evidently the meaning 'subsequence' of the word *utkarsa* as given in the translation (p. 10) is far-fetched. The explanation as offered in the *Vivarana* attributed to G a u d a p ā d a on the NUTU, 2 (see pp. 291 ff) seems to be better. Besides 'excellence', the word *utkarsa* means 'attracting' or 'pulling upwards'. Taking this last sense the *Vivarana* says that among the three components, *a*, *u* and *m* of Praṇava *a* is guttural and *u* is labial. So while *a* is pronounced from the lower part (throat) of the mouth, *u* is done from the upper one (lips). Such being the case, in pronunciation *u* is, as it were, pulled upwards.

Or it may be that *u* is higher than *a*, because the former is manifested on the lips filling completely or stepping beyond the throat, and because it is manifested with an effort more than that required for the latter. Let the passage be quoted here as it is in the transcription (p. 25) :

akārād utkarṣa ūrdhvam ākṛṣṭa iva hy ukāra[h]
 praṇave drīyate. taijasaś ca viśvata[h]. svapnādiṣu
 akārata• utkrīṣṭaḥ. uttamo vā ukāraḥ vyāptyatiśayād
 balātiśayāc ca. akārasthānaṃ kaṇṭhaṃ vyāpya •ati-
 kram[y?]a oṣṭhasthāne hi tasyābhivyaaktiḥ. tenākārādhi-
 kavyāptimattvenokta ukāraḥ virāja iva hiraṇyagarbhaḥ.
 balātiśayatvam - ca kharaprayatnavyaṅgyatvāt praṇa-
 vasthokārasya mandaprayatnavyaṅgyam akāram apekṣya.

The *utkarṣa* 'excellence' of Taijasa in this respect in relation to Viśva is this that the former is nearer by one step than the latter to Turiya

26. See MU, VI. 5; PU, V. 2 : etad vai satyakāma
 paraṃ cāparam ca brahma yad omkāraḥ.

28. Note 1. Add ŚU, III. 13 ; IV. 17
 Note 2. Read 21 for 22.

BOOK II

1. The phrase, āhur manīṣiṇaḥ, is often used not only in our text (II 5, IV. 54), but also in an Upaniṣad (KU, III.4) itself and the BG (XVIII.3).

4. It may be noted that *samṛtātva* is referred to by Ś in his commentary on BS. III. 2. 3.

5. Cf. MnU, I. 8-11 :

antar asminn ime lokā antar viśvam idaṃ jagat |
 bahirvan māyayā bhāti darpaṇe pratibimbītam ||
 svapne svāntargatam viśvam yathā pṛthag avekṣyate |
 tathaiva jāgratkāle 'pi prapañco 'yaṃ vivicyatām ||
 svapne svasattaivārthānām sattā nānyeti niścītā |
 ko jāgrati viśeṣo'sti jadānām āśunāśinām ||
 svapne prakāśo bhāvēnām svaprakāśān na hitarah |
 jāgraty api tathāveti niścinvanti vipaścītaḥ ||

For *prasiddha* see Ś on BS, 1.1.22.

7. P 20, l 1. Read 'That for 'that.

9-10 Cf. MnU, I 7-8

21 P 31, l 17 For 6 3, 8.3 read 6—8.

24 P 34, l 16 Read *gyoti* or *yoti*^c.

32 P 41, l 1 Read *kanṭha* for *kankā*

34 [or *anyabhava* see IV 53.

A piece of crystal which is naturally white becomes red in contact with a red flower, yet, it cannot be said that it is red either in its own nature (*svabhava*) or in the nature of other (*anyabhava*). It is true that under the circumstances it looks red, yet it is actually not so, it only appears to be so, for its innate whiteness does in no way change. See Śaṅkara on BS, III 2 11 *na hi svacchah san sphatiko laktakadyu-
 padhivogad asvaccho bhavati, bhramamātratvad abhi-
 niveśasya, upādhiṇaṃ cavidyāpratyupasthāpitatvāt.*

35 P 43 l 5 Read *NPTU*, *NUTU* and *RUTU* for *NPU*, *MU* and *RUU* respectively, and *pa-paṇi* for *pa-paṇi* in l 10

For the *Prapañçavilayavāda* showing the relationship between the *ṛkarma-* and *jñāna-kāṇḍas* in connexion with *niyoga* one may be referred to *Hiriyanna : Journal of Oriental Research*, 1927, pp. 109 ff, and the original authorities cited therein

36. The *smṛti* quoted here is *Vasiṣṭhasmṛti* or *Vasiṣṭha-dharmaśāstra*. Ś quotes here also the following couplet which is not traced :

yam na santam na cāsantam nāśrutam na bahuśrutam |
na suvṛttam na durvṛttam veda kaścit sa brāhmaṇaḥ ||

38. For the stanza, *sūnyam ādhyātmikam*° see AK, IX. 250. For *paśya* the reading is also *paśyan*.

BOOK III

1. The *upāsana* mentioned here may refer also to *Praṇava-upāsana* in I. 19 ff. See III. 16. For the true significance of *upāsana* or *upāsana* see pp. 295 ff., and modify the Annotation here in accordance with it.

3. See MnU, III. 9 :

ghaṭākāśo mahākāśo ghaṭopādhikṛto yathā |
dehopādhikṛto bhedo jivātmaparamātmānoḥ ||

and III. 25-26 :

dehendriyamanobuddhiprāṇāhamkārasamhatam |
ātmasaṅkalanād ajñair ātmatvam pratipadyate |
vahnidhiḥ kṣāthaloḥādau vahnīsamkalanād iva ||

According to *Brahmadatta*, one of the *Samuccayavādin* Vedantist, Brahman has both origination (*utpatti*) and disappearance (*laya*). See *Procēd-*

ings and Transactions of the Fourth Oriental Congress, pp. 188-89 ; Śribhāṣya, I.4.2 ; Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad, I.4 ; ViP, VI.40.39.

4. Cf. BP, XII, 5.5 :

ghaṭe bhinne ghaṭākāśa ākāśaḥ syād yathā purā |
evam dehe mṛte jivo brahma sampadyate punaḥ ||

6. P 52, l. 26. Read *II* for *12*.

11. This kārīkā supports Ś a ṇ k a r a ' s second interpretation (idam tv iha vaktavyam^o) refuting that of the V r t t i k ā r a in the Ānandamayādhikāraṇa of the BS, I 1. 12-19. On this see MnU, III. 27-31 also :

deham annamayam kośam āviśyātmā prakāśate |
sthūlo bālah kṛṣaḥ kṛṣṇo varṇāśramavikalpavān ||
prānakośe 'pi jivāmi ksudhito 'smi pipāsitah |
saṁśīto nīśīto manya itī kośe manomaye ||
vijñānamayakośastho vijñānāmiti tisthati |
ānandamayakośākhye tv ahankāre purākṛtāḥ ||
puṇyair upāsanābhīś ca sukhito 'smi modate |
evam kañcukitah kośaḥ kañcukair iva pañcabhiḥ ||
paricchinna ivābhātī vyāpto 'pi paramēśvaraḥ |

12. Cf. ChU, I. 9 1, VIII. 14. 1 ; BS, I. 1. 22, 3. 41

14 See RV, I 164. 20 ; ŚU, IV. 6-7 ; MuU, III. 1. 1-3.

15. P. 58, l 18. Omit *IV.2.14*.

16. P. 59, l. 14. Omit *etc*

17. See IV. 5.

23. G a u d a p ā d a says here that between the

two statements in the scripture that which is with a reason is acceptable. * Cf. Ś on BS, II. 1. 4 :

yathā ca śrutinām parasparavirodhe saty ekavaśeneta-
rā niyante evam pramānavirodhe 'pi tadvaśenaiva śrutir
niyeta. dṛṣṭasāmyena cādṛṣṭam arthaṃ samarthayanti
yuktir anubhavasya saṃnikṣyate, viprakṣyate tu śrutir
aitihamātreṇa svārthābhidhānāt.

On reasoning (*tarka*) see Ś on BS, II. 1. 11. With regard to *yukti* we may remember here what is said in YV, II. 18. 2-4 about the two *śāstras*, *ārṣa* 'derived from ṛṣis' and *pauruṣa* 'derived from men'. The author says that a *śāstra*, though it is a *pauruṣa*, deserves to be accepted, if it is reasonable. One must follow reason. A speech, if reasonable, must be accepted even from a child, but that which is not reasonable should be rejected like a piece of straw though it might be uttered even by Brahman, the creator. That man is certainly not wise who rejecting the beautiful water of the Ganges flowing before him drinks from a well thinking only that it belongs to his father :

api pauruṣam ādeyaṃ śāstram ced yuktibodhakam |
anyat tv ārsam api tyājyaṃ bhāvyam nyāyaikasevinā ||
yuktivyuktam upādeyaṃ vacanam bālakād api |
anyat tṛṇam iva tyājyam apy uktam padmayoninā |
yo 'smattātasya kūpo 'yam iti kaupam pibaty apaḥ |
tyaktvā gāṅgam purastham taṃ ko na śāsty atigarhitam ||

27^b. Read *yujyate* for *jujyate*.

29. P. 66. l. 19. Add *the* after *with*.

30. Here is the Tibetan version :

gñis. min. yid. ni. rmi. lañ. na |
 gñis. su. snañ ste. the. tshom med |
 de. bshin. gñid kyis. ma. log. tshe |
 gñis. min. gñis. snañ. the tshom. med ||

P. 67, l. 5. Read *the two* for *a second*.

31. For *manodrīyam* see *cittadrīyam*, IV. 28, 36, 77.

P. 67, l. 13. Read *perceptible* for *perceived*.

2. P. 68, l. 2 Read *ViS* for *Vis.* and add 38 after III.

35 Note 1. Add 44, 46 after 42.

36. Note 3 Add *cf. sarvadrīś*, l. 12 ; IV. 84.

P. 70, l. 6 Read *TAk* for *TA*.

39 Read *vat nāma* for *nāmaisa*.

46 P. 80, l. 24. Read *buddha*^o for *baddha*^o.

P. 81, l. 13 Ś shows here the Buddhist views. On the next line read 549 for 587

BOOK IV

1 P. 86, last line Read *TA'* for *TA*¹.

P. 89, l. 6 Add *a* after *is*, and *sva* before *lakṣaṇa*^o on l. 14.

P. 91, ll. 29, 32. Read *SaS* for *SS*.

P. 92, note 30 On the word *dharma* quoted from KU see Glasenapp *Buddhism in Kathopanisad* in the *New Indian Antiquary*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 138 ff., and Stcherbatsky, *Ūp cit*, p. 68 ff, SMV, pp. 136-7, See also MV p. 355 - *nāstīha sattva ātmā vā dharmās tv etc sahetukah*

2. The word *asparśayoga* is found at least once in a Buddhist work. See *Bauddha Gāna O Dohā*, *Sāhityapariṣad Granthāvalī* 55, 1323 B.S., p. 19. Here the Sanskrit *ṭkā* which is not edited critically and full of mistakes reads referring to a yoga *asprśayogotvāt* for which the Tibetan version (Tanjur, Narthang, Rgyud, Tsi, 175^a. 4) has *mi. reg. pahī. sbyor baḥi. phyir. te* clearly suggesting its Sanskrit equivalent *asparśayogāt*. The only notable difference between the two versions, Sanskrit and Tibetan, is this that while the former has *asprśā* the suggested reading in the latter is *asparśā*. But considering the uncritical way in which the edition of the Sanskrit text is prepared and the well-known occurrence of the word *sparśā* it naturally occurs to one's mind that the reading *asprśā* for *asparśā* is a misprint or a mistake of the scribe of the MS used for that edition. Another difference is the use of *-tva* in the Sanskrit text, which is not to be found in the Tibetan one. According to the former the latter should have been written *sbyor. baḥi nīd kyi* for *sbyor. baḥi*. But it is often found in Tibetan versions of Sanskrit texts that *nīd* for *-tva-* (or *eva*) is not used even when it is necessary; on the contrary, it is employed when it is not required at all.

4. P. 102, l. 6. For our MS *Me* and some read *Me* and some other.

11. P. 113, l. 5. Read *kārana* for *kaṛaṇa*.

12. Note 1. Here 'elsewhere' refers to *Variants*, p. 237.

20. P. 125, last line. Read *cākramakṣaḥ*.

23. Note 1. PU actually has *jātir* in the margin for *hyādir* in *d*. Read here *edition* for *editions*.

P. 130, l. 31. Read *AS* for *ASh*.

24. P. 132, note 3. Add 62 after 61 and omit 79.

28. P. 138, l. 26. Read *MuU* for *MU*.

30. Note 1. The couplet is from VM, Simon Hewavitarane Bequest ed. p. 407 with the variant *khandhānam ca patipāti* in *a* as in *Bhāratīya Vidyā Series* ed., Part I, p. 282.

31. The first half of the *kārikā* is identical with that of YV, IV. 45. 45.

33. In such cases (*viz.*, IV' 10, 91-93) one may be inclined to read with some of the MSS (*i.e.*, A¹, A², V^o) *sarvadharmah* for *sarve dharmāh* agreeing with Buddhist works

38 Note 1 In *b* read *pratibuddhavantah* as in *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol II, p. 100.

42 P. 150, note 5 Read *MSA* for *MS*.

51 Read *nispandāt* for *viññānāt*

58 For the first half see IV, 57 For *d* see LA, pp. 28-49 *vicitra hi yatha maya drīyate na ca vidyate*. See our text, p. 151, note 8 Read *BA* for *BC* on p. 164, l. 5, and *ktako* for *tanmauo* on l. 19.

60 See IV' 99

71 Note 2 It is a speech of *Bhagavat*.

72 See LA II 151-152 *viññānabhjam spandate*.

74 P. 177, l. 16 Read *nasti* for *nāsti*.

81 Read *vibhato* for *vibhati*

P. 188, Note 2 For the meaning of the word *parāṛtti* see P. C. Bagchi *Studies in the Tantras*, Calcutta University, 1939, pp. 87 ff

83^a. Read °*asti-nāstīti nāstī-nāstīti*° for °*asti nāstīti nāstīti nāstīti*°.

84^a. For *sarvadṛś* cf. *sarvajña* (I. 12, III. 36) and *sarvajñatā* (IV. 85. 89).

On this see E. O b e r m i l l e r (*The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā*, etc., p. 44): "When the Bodhisattva^o has attained the highest of the Unimpeded Paths in the Path of Concentrated Contemplation, he is considered to have terminated his course of training in the path. This last moment of Concentrated trance called the 'thunderbolt-like' (*vajropama samādhi*) is characterized by the removal of the most subtle forms of defilement and of ignorance. It is simultaneous with the final 'momentary Illumination (*ekakṣaṇa-abhisambodha*), and the culmination of the Bodhisattva's intuition of the absolute. All the factors for the attainment of the Omniscience of the Buddha are now brought to accomplishment. Owing to this, the representation of the Absolute appears in its full light: the differentiation to subject and object ceases to exist, the accidental obscurations which had hitherto separated the Germ of the Absolute in the living being now completely vanish, and the Germ now coalesces with the Unique Ultimate Essence which is personified as the Cosmical body (*dharmakāya*) of the Buddha".¹

1 "At the second moment we have the last Path of Deliverance (*cimukt-mārga*). At that time the double representation (i.e. of subject and object) disappears, and the object of Concentration (in its true aspect) becomes one with the knowledge cognizing it like one particle of water uniting with another (*chu-la chu tsag-pa-las=ye paṇiḥīṣeparati*). In the aspect of this intuition all the things cognizable in their varieties become directly perceived like a myrobalan (*īmaloḥa*) fruit on the palm of the hand (*īkaraḥāmaloḥakaraḥ*)."

“ The special Omniscience which is peculiar only to the Buddha (*sarva-ākāra-jñata*) is the knowledge of all the aspects of existence as being devoid of an independent separate reality and as not being liable to origination from the standpoint of the Absolute”. *Op cit.*, p. 64.

See Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyayaḥnikā* (Reprint from the *Pandit*), pp. 110, 147, 205.

90 See MSA, XIX, 56 pañcavidham hi . vastu bodhisattvānām aprameyam paripācyam vastu sat-tvadhatuḥ aviśeṣena viśodhyam lokadhatuḥ bhajaṇa-lokasamgrhitāḥ prapyam dharmadhātuh. paripācana-yogyam vineyadhatuh samyagdeśanavastu vineyopayadhatuh.

94 P 206, note 2 Read *Woods* for *Wood*.

P 207, 1 13 The word *śaradya* actually occurs in Sanskrit as in *parisaṁchāradya* It means *sankoca* 'shrinking' In Tibetan for it we have *bskumps. pa* from *skum pa* 'to contract' See MV, p 46; ŚS, p 296

99 P 212, note 2, 1 31 Read *kyob. pa* for *skyb pa*

100 For *durdarśa* see KU, I 2 12

For *alata* see MV, p 219 purvaparakotyānupalambhaḥ [alata]cakravat (mgal. meḥ hkhor lo bshin no); p 221 adimadhyāvasānavirahitatvād alatacakravat